1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sivaraman Nair, J. - The petitioner, who is at present working as a Higher Grade Postman, seeks to avoid his exclusion from P-4 list of excess qualified departmental candidates for promotion to the posts of T/S Clerks/Sorters in the Posts and Telegraphs Department.

2. The petitioner seems to be an enterprising member of the Scheduled Caste, who was originally appointed as an Extra Departmental Delivery Agent on 10th August, 1959, was selected and promoted as Postman on 3rd October, 1967, in which post he acquired quasi permanency with effect from 3rd October, 1970, was confirmed on 1st March, 1973 and was thereafter promoted as Higher Grade Postman with effect from 1st June, 1974. He appeared for the departmental examination for promotion from lower grade to the cadre of T/S Clerks/RMS Sorters conducted on 28th October, 1979 and secured 109 marks. This examination was conducted division wise, and in Idukki Division, he was included in the list of excess qualified departmental candidates as No. 4 as is evident from Ext. P-4.

3. The appointment to the post of T/S Clerks and RMS Sorters is governed by Ext. R-3 rules framed under Art.309 of the Constitution of India, according to which, 50 per cent of the vacancies is to be filled up by direct recruitment and the remaining 50 per cent by promotion through a test. The rules also provide that permanent or quasi permanent officials below the time-scale clerical and sorters grade in accordance with the orders issued by the Posts and Telegraphs Board from time to time constitute the grades from which promotion has to be made. Admittedly, the petitioner belongs to a category from which promotions are to be made according to Ext. R-3 rules. Ext. R-4 departmental communication provides, that if there are candidates who qualify in the prescribed test for promotion to the clerical and allied cadres in excess of the vacancies available in the unit, such excess qualified officials who are not approved for their own unit on the basis of the competitive examination may be offered promotion in the neighbouring units of the same branch of service for which they are treated as departmental candidates, provided that qualified departmental candidates in those units are not enough to fill up the vacancies during the particular year of recruitment. Along with other conditions limiting the eligibility for diversion of qualified surplus candidates of one unit for appointment in another unit, Ext. R-4 also provides that "before these surplus qualified candidates are diverted to other units, written declaration will be obtained from them embodying the above mentioned terms". Whereas promotions to T/S Clerks/RMS Sorters have to be made from an approved list prepared on the basis of a competitive examination to the existing vacancies in a particular unit during a particular year of recruitment, the claim of surplus qualified candidate in any one unit for promotion in another unit are governed by the provisions contained in an executive order and is subject to restrictions contained in Ext. R-4. According to these conditions, it appears as if such a surplus candidate has no tangible right until after a written declaration in terms of Ext. R-4 is sought by the department and furnished by the candidate.

4. The petitioner, as stated above, was working in Idukki Division. For the recruitment year 1980, there were three vacancies in the category of T/S Clerks/RMS Sorters in that division, two of which had to be filled up on the basis of general merit, and one was reserved to be filled up by a candidate belonging to Scheduled Caste. The two general vacancies were filled up by Shri P. D. Souriar and Shri P. Sadanandan Nair, who had secured 153 and 146 marks respectively. Shri S. Jayaram, a Scheduled Caste candidate, who had secured 144 marks, was selected and appointed against the vacancy reserved for a Scheduled Caste candidate. The petitioner who had secured 109 marks only could not therefore be included in the approved list of candidates for promotion pursuant to the results of the competitive departmental test. He was, however, included provisionally in the list of surplus qualified departmental candidates for appointment against vacancies in other divisions. It is common case that there were 13 vacancies in the Kerala Circle, which could be filled up by candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes and which remained unfilled due to want of qualified hands in other divisions. These vacancies could therefore be filled up by surplus qualified candidates from other divisions as provided in Ext. R-4. It is stated that the panel of surplus qualified departmental candidates for the recruitment year 1980 was prepared provisionally and the petitioner was included as the last person against the 13 vacancies available for Scheduled Caste candidates in the circle. It is not in controversy that the respondents had not sought to obtain any written declaration as provided in Ext. R-4 from the petitioner on his inclusion in the list of surplus qualified candidates.

5. At this stage, the respondents became aware of the reclassification of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes brought about by the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Amendment) Act 108 of 1976, which necessitated a fresh verification of the Caste or Tribe to which the candidates awaiting promotion as T/S Clerks/RMS Sorters belonged. Pulaya community in Malabar, which was till then a Scheduled Tribe, had been reclassified as Scheduled Caste under Act 108 of 1976, and consequently the cases of 3 Pulaya candidates from Malabar had to be considered against the vacancies reserved for Scheduled Castes. One of the three, Shri P. V. Sivan of Calicut Division had secured 144.5 marks in the competitive examination. Since he was treated as a candidate belonging to a Scheduled Tribe and there was no vacancy reserved for Scheduled Tribe candidates, Shri Sivan had been excluded from the approved list. Smt. M. Padmavathy, a person belonging to the Scheduled Caste, who had secured 131.5 marks had been selected against the vacancy reserved for Scheduled Caste in Calicut Division. On reclassification pursuant to Act 108 of 1976, Shri Sivan, belonging to an erstwhile Scheduled Tribe was reclassified, and since he had secured more marks than Smt. Padmavathy had to be provided against the vacancy reserved for Scheduled Caste, rendering Smt. Padmavathy a surplus qualified Scheduled Caste departmental candidate. This, by itself, would have resulted in the exclusion of the petitioner from the 13th place which he was precariously occupying. But there were two more persons belonging to the Pulaya community of Malabar, who had secured more marks than the petitioner and who were not included either in the approved list or in the list of surplus departmental candidates for the reason that they were considered as Scheduled Tribe candidates. These persons were Shri N. T. Balan from Malappuram Division who had obtained 122 Marks, and Shri K. Krishnan of Palghat Division who had obtained 111.5 marks. Since other Scheduled Caste candidates from these respective divisions had secured more marks than these two persons, they could not, however, be included in the approved list of qualified departmental candidates. When, however, Smt. Padmavathy, Shri Balan and Shri Krishnan, who had admittedly secured higher marks than the petitioner and who, according to the reclassification, belong to the Scheduled Castes were to be accommodated against three of the 13 vacancies available in the circle for Scheduled Caste candidates, the petitioner who was the 13th and the last in the list of surplus departmental candidates had necessarily to go out of the purview of selection. It is stated in the counter affidavit that this exclusion was effected in the final list of surplus qualified departmental candidates, and that list was published in Ext. R-2. Naturally therefore, the name of the petitioner could not find a place in that list. This resulted in Ext. P-5 communication, in which it was stated that the name of the petitioner had to be excluded.

6. The petitioner made Exts. P-6 and P-7 representations. It also appears that these representations were preceded by another representation submitted by him on 29th April, 1980. In Ext. P-8, these representations were turned down, stating that by reason of the reclassification according to the latest orders, the petitioner, who was selected earlier, became below the range of selection. This Original Petition was then filed seeking the issue of a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash Exts. P-5 and P-8 communications, or the issue of a writ of mandamus or other appropriate writ, direction or order directing respondents 1 and 2 to include the petitioners name in the select list as in Ext. P-4 and to give him promotion to the cadre of T/S Clerks/Sorters against the unfilled vacancy shown in Ext. P-4.

7. The petitioner contends that Exts. P-5 and P-8 are liable to be set aside. It is submitted that the reclassification of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes effected by Act 108 of 1976, as a consequence of which his name was excluded from the list of surplus qualified departmental candidates, did not really apply to or affect the classification as contained in the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 and the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 as promulgated by the President of India in exercise of his powers under Art.341(1) and 342(1) of the Constitution of India; and, hence, the reclassification was wrongly adopted by the respondents to the prejudice of the petitioner. It is then submitted that the respondents went wrong in adopting the reclassification on their own without any directive or instructions from the department. It is submitted further that in any case, the exclusion of the name of the petitioner from Ext. P-4 list by Ext. P-5 list was without notice to him and this violation of the principles of natural justice rendered Exts. P-5 and P-8 void.

8. It is necessary to refer briefly to the provisions of Act 108 of 1976 and the constitutional provisions relating to safeguards provided for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes as also to the provisions of the orders issued by the President and the Parliamentary enactments in this regard.

9. Act 108 of 1976 seeks to amend the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes orders, which, as per definition contained in S.2(e) and (f) are respectively, the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 and Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950. Sections 3 and 4 carry out the amendment to these orders. S.5 provides for ascertainment or estimation of population of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in each State by the central authority and provides for variations consequent on the amendment of the schedules by sections 3 and 4 of the. Such population figures as ascertained or determined are required to be notified in the Gazette of India, and on such publication, such figures shall supercede all previous publications in that regard. Finality attaches to such figures which cannot be called in question in any court (sub-s.3 and 4). S.6 to 10 of the deal with provisions consequential upon redetermination of population of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and amendments to the Delimitation of Parliamentary and Assembly Constituencies Order, 1976 etc.

10. The interests of the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are safeguarded and sought to be promoted by various provisions of the Constitution, some of which are positive mandates and the others enabling provisions. Art.15(4) and Art.16(4) in Part III of the Constitution relating to fundamental rights enable the State to make special provisions for advancement of any socially or educationally backward classes of citizens or for Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes as also for reservation of appointments to posts in favour of any backward class of citizens, which in the opinion of the State is not adequately represented in the services under the State. Art.46 in Part IV of the Constitution dealing with "Directive Principles of State Policy" enjoins upon the State to "promote with special care, the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and" to "protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation". This is a positive constitutional mandate, which should inform all State action. Art.335 in Part XVI of the Constitution dealing with "special provisions relating to certain classes" contain another positive constitutional directive to the effect, that -

"The claims of the members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes shall be taken into consideration, consistent by with the maintenance of efficiency of administration, in the making of appointments to services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State."

11. The guarantee of minimum electoral representation for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the Central and State Legislatures is ensured by Art.330 and 332 of the Constitution. Art.338 provides for a special officer for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes to be appointed by the President; and makes it the duty of such special officer to investigate all matters relating to safeguards provided for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes under the Constitution as also to report to the President upon the working of such safeguards at such intervals as the President may direct.

12. Art.340 deals with the appointment of a Commission to investigate the conditions of backward classes which is required to submit its report setting out the facts found and making such recommendations as they think proper. The report of the commission has to be placed before each Houses of the Parliament and enables the President, by virtue of the provisions of Art.338(3), to specify such other classes of people as backward classes based on the report.

13. Art.366(24) and (25) define the "Scheduled Castes" and "Scheduled Tribes" respectively and are in the following terms:

"366(24) Scheduled Castes means such castes, races or tribes or parts of or groups within such castes, races or tribes as are deemed under Art.341 to be Scheduled Castes for the purposes of this Constitution;

(25) Scheduled Tribes means such tribes or tribal communities or parts of or groups within such tribes or tribal communities as are deemed under Art.342 to be Scheduled Tribes for the purposes of this Constitution."

14. The location and identification of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes as defined, and, which, according to the enabling and obligatory provisions referred to above are entitled to special treatment, is taken care of by Art.341 and 342 of the Constitution. They are in the following terms.

15. Art.341(1) provides, that the President shall specify the castes, races or tribes or parts of or groups within castes, races or tribes which shall, for the purposes of this Constitution, be deemed to be Scheduled Castes in relation to that State or Union Territory, as the case may be. Art.342(1) confers on the President a similar power to specify Scheduled Tribes. Sub-Art.(2) of these two Articles provide that Parliament may by law include in or exclude from that list of Scheduled Castes/Tribes specified in the notification issued under clause (1) any caste, race or part of or group within any caste, race or tribe or tribal community. It is however provided that save as aforesaid, a notification issued under the clause (1) shall not be varied by any subsequent notification. The Presidential specification in Art.341(1) and 342(1) is final subject only to the power of the Parliament by law to include in or exclude from the list of Scheduled Castes/ Scheduled Tribes specified in the notification.

16. It is evident on a reading of the various constitutional provisions referred to above viz., Art.15(4), 16(4), 46, 330, 332, 335, 338, 340, 341, 342 and 366(24) and (25), that these Articles constitute a composite scheme relating to safeguards available to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The power entrusted with the President to locate, identify and specify Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, who are entitled for constitutional safeguards and protections, should be exercised by him only once and the power available to the Parliament is only to effect inclusions in or exclusions from the list of such Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes specified in the Presidential notification. Obviously, the President can issue only one notification each in respect of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. He cannot issue separate notifications specifying different Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for different constitutional purposes, one for Art.15(4), another for Art.16(4) and a third for Art.330. All purposes of the Constitution relating to the Scheduled Castes/Tribes should therefore be served by the only notification each which the President is empowered to issue under Art.341(1) and 342(1) of the Constitution. The Scheduled Castes/Tribes for all constitutional purposes are, by definition contained in Art.366(24) and (25), those specified as such under Art.341 and 342. It is elementary that justification for differential treatment of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes under Art.15(4) in the matter of reservation for educational purpose, under Art.16(4) in the matter of reservation for purposes of public employment and under Art.330 and 332 for electoral representation in the Central and State Legislatures must necessarily be interrelated. The basic justification for all these special provisions in favour of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes is the dismal social, educational and economic backwardness of these sections of the free Indians. Emphasis which permeates these constitutional provisions is on a protection of these people from social injustice and all sorts of exploitation and to help them advance with other sections of the people socially, educationally and economically. Art.338 and 340 provide for an effective presidential oversight through a special officer and a commission in respect of all matters relating to safeguards provided for the Scheduled Castes/ Tribes and for improvement of the condition of the backward classes. A periodic review of the position is enabled by virtue of the provisions contained in Art.338 and 340 of the Constitution. As far as electoral representation is concerned, it is specifically provided in Art.330(2) and 332(3) that there shall be a reasonable co-relation of percentage of the population and the percentage of reservation made in favour of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Special provisions made in favour of socially and educationally backward classes or Scheduled Castes/Tribes under Art.15(4) in matters of education and under Art.16(4) for reservation in favour of such classes of people for public employment have been tested more often then once by the Supreme Court with reference to the same yardstick. In short, the same standards apply in justification of all constitutional provisions containing special provisions for Scheduled Castes/Tribes. It is therefore only natural that the inclusions in or exclusions from the Scheduled Castes/ Tribes as defined in Art.366(24) and (25) are meant to be applicable to all purposes of the Constitution for which the notifications were originally issued.

17. The argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that the reclassification made by Parliament by law (in this case by Act 108 of 1976) would relate only to one of the various purposes of the Constitution, for which the notifications specifying Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes had been issued by the President under Art.341(1) and Art.342(1) of the Constitution of India, and in the present case, the preamble to Act 108 of 1976 makes it clear, that the reclassification attempted thereby confines itself only to the question of electoral representation provided by Art.330 and Art.332 of the Constitution; and that it has nothing to do with reservation in public employment provided for in Art.16(4) of the Constitution. In other words, the submission is that a classification of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for purposes of Art.16(4) must be taken to be as it was prior to the enactment of Act 108 of 1976, and therefore, the Pulayas in Malabar, who were Scheduled Tribes, could not be treated as Scheduled Castes for purposes of reservation in public employment, and, the petitioner could not have been removed from the list of surplus qualified departmental candidates for Scheduled Caste vacancy as was done by Ext. P-5.

18. The petitioner contends that the notification of Scheduled Castes/Tribes may be issued by the President for all or any one of the constitutional purposes, just as it may be issued in respect of the whole or a group or part of a caste, race, tribe or community, or in respect of the whole or a part of a State or Union Territory. He further contends that if this be permissible, the inclusion in or exclusion from the notification of any caste, race, tribe or community by a parliamentary enactment also can be for all or any of the purposes of the Constitution.

19. In support of this submission, the petitioner referred us to the decision of the Supreme Court in Bhaiya Lal v. Harikishan Singh (AIR 1965 SC 1557 [LQ/SC/1965/25] ). The question which was considered there was as to whether it was competent for the President to make a classification of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in respect of a portion of the territory of a State. It was held that it would be open "to make the said specification by reference to different areas of the State". Counsel for the petitioner submits that if this be the position, a notification or its amendment can as well be for one of the many purposes of the Constitution for which notifications under Art.341(1) and Art.342(1) are authorised. We are unable to accept this submission. Art.341(1) and 342(1) in express terms have conferred power to specify castes, races or tribes or parts of or groups within castes, races or tribes as Scheduled Castes and parts or groups within tribes or tribal communities as Scheduled Tribes in relation to the State or Union Territory as the case may be. Parts of or groups within a class, race or tribe whose social, educational and economic conditions are found to be so dismal as to justify special treatment, may be confined to part of an area within the State and such confinement may make the condition such as to justify the notification of that caste, race or tribe or part of group within the caste, race, tribe or tribal community as a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, as the case may be. There is, therefore, enough constitutional authorisation for declaring a caste or a tribe within a part of the State as a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, and this is the basis of the reasoning for the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1965 SC 1557 [LQ/SC/1965/25] . It is not possible to accept the argument of the counsel for the petitioner that there is a similar power on the Parliament to include in or exclude from the notification issued by the President under Art.341(1) or 342(1) for any one of the purposes for which such notifications were made. It does not seem to be possible in the context of the definition of Scheduled Castes/Tribes contained in Art.366(24) and (25) and the other constitutional provisions containing safeguards for the Scheduled Castes/Tribes that there can be different specifications of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for different constitutional purposes. The basic justification for the special treatment of these classes of citizens for all constitutional purposes is one and the same, and this is perhaps best highlighted by Art.46 "to protect them from social injustice and all kinds of exploitation". Periodic review of such safeguards are constitutionally provided for and such measures as are called for on a review of the reports of the Special Officer and commission by the Parliament is made obligatory. All these provisions apply to the special treatment and safeguards provided for Scheduled Castes and Tribes, The advancement of these classes socially, educationally and economically to a sufficient degree as is fervently anticipated by Art.337 above can result in the termination of the special treatment. As long as the social stigmas persist the dismal economic conditions continue and voice of these people is a voice apart emanating from abysmal depth of object penury, the educational, vocational and electoral representations may have to continue. The need for one cannot be divorced from the other. These constitutional safeguards have the ring of "Do or Die". They cannot be partly energised and partly paralysed. We are, therefore, of the opinion that just as the notification by the President of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes under Art.341(1) and 342(1) of the Constitution has to be for all purposes of the Constitution, the inclusions in or the exclusions from the notification by the Parliament as authorised by Art.341(2) and 342(2) also should be for all such purposes.

20. Even as a matter of fact, the petitioners submission does not appear to be sustainable. What has been done by Act 108 of 1976 is to substitute the schedules to the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 and the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950. With this substitution, the pre-existing schedules have ceased to exist. The date of commencement of Act 108 of 1976 as notified is 27th July, 1977; and with effect from that date, the only schedules to the two orders issued by the President under Art.341(1) and Art.342(1) are those which are substituted by Act 108 of 1976, and the pre-existing schedules have ceased to be operative. It is impossible to accept the contention that the schedules which have been substituted shall be deemed to be in force for the purpose of Art.15(4) and Art.16(4) and the substituted schedule shall be effective only for the purpose of Art.230 and Art.332 of the Constitution.

21. Considerable emphasis was laid by the counsel for the petitioner on the preamble to Act 108 of 1976, which reads as follows:

"An Act to provide for the inclusion in and the exclusion from the lists of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, of certain castes and tribes, for the re-adjustment of representation of parliamentary and assembly constituencies in so far as such re-adjustment is necessitated by such inclusion or exclusion and for matters connected therewith."

It is submitted that this preamble is a key for understanding the import and intent of the enactment, and if so understood, the entire enactment can be referred only to the intention to include in and exclude from the notification relating to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes certain classes and tribes for purposes of electoral representation provided for by Art.330 and 332. It is next submitted that a reading of the provisions contained in S.6 to 10 of the also lends considerable support to this submission. Reference was made to Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes and two decisions of the Supreme Court reported in Kochuni v. States of Madras and Kerala (AIR 1960 SC 1080 [LQ/SC/1960/152] ) and M/s Surrakur Coal Co. v. Union of India (AIR 1961 SC 954 [LQ/SC/1961/58] ). It was laid down in AIR 1960 SC 1080 [LQ/SC/1960/152] that -

"The preamble of a statute is a key to the understanding of it and it is well established that it may legitimately be consulated to solve any ambiguity, or to fix the meaning of words which may have more than one, or to keep the effect of the within its real scope, whenever the enacting part is in any of these respects open to doubt."

After laying down this test, the Supreme Court proceeded to state -

"we do not find any ambiguity in the enacting part of the. Assuming that there is some doubt, the preamble confirms our view of the construction of the."

In M/s Surrakur Coal Co. v. Union of India (AIR 1961 SC 954 [LQ/SC/1961/58] ) it was held, after referring to the advisory opinion of Das, C.J., in re Kerala Education Bill (AIR 1958 SC 956 [LQ/SC/1958/83] ), as follows:

"While holding that it is permissible to look at the preamble for understanding the import of the various clauses contained in the Bill, this court has not said that full effect should not be given to the express provisions of the Bill even though they appear to go beyond the terms of the preamble. It is one of the cardinal principles of construction that where the language of an Act is clear, the preamble must be disregarded though, were the object or meaning of an enactment is not clear, the preamble may be resorted to explain it. Again where very general language is used in an enactment which, it is clear must be intented to have a limited application, the preamble may be used to indicate to what particular instance the enactment is intended to apply. We cannot, therefore, start with the preamble for construing the provisions of an Act, though we would be justified in resorting to it, nay, we will be required to do so, if we find that the language used by Parliament is ambiguous or is too general though in point of fact Parliament intended that it should have a limited application."

We have no hesitation in agreeing with the principle that in a case where the provisions of the statue are vague or ambiguous, resort to the preamble for the purpose of understanding the import or intent of the provisions is justified. We also agree that in cases where there is doubt relating to the intention of the Legislature, assistance can be had from the preamble. But we cannot subscribe to the proposition that when a Constitutional provision which is the fountain head of authority for a particular enactment is clear and unambiguous, as in the present case, recitals in the preamble should be resorted to for the purpose of understanding the import of the Legislation, or that when the provisions of the statute are clear and unambiguous, such clear provisions shall be avoided on the basis of recitals in the preamble. Even otherwise, it may be seen that the preamble does not confine itself to matters connected with electoral representation only. "And matters connected therewith" at the end of the phrase is significant. We feel that this comprehends matters connected with the inclusion in and exclusion from the lists of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The preamble itself therefore indicates, according to us, that the amendment is meant to serve all purposes for which the original notifications were issued. Counsel for the petitioner also referred us to the following passage from "Legislation and Interpretation" by Jagadish Swarup:

"The preamble is a good means to find out the meaning of the statute and, as it were, a key to open the minds of the makers of the and the mischiefs which they intended to redress".

It is also stated on the basis of weighty authority by the same author, that: -

"though a preamble may afford useful light as to what a statute intends to reach, it is a settled rule that the preamble cannot, for any purpose, control, restrict, extend qualify, alter, detract from, or add to the enactments themselves where they are expressed in clear and unambiguous terms".

We feel that in the context of the composite scheme contained in the constitution for safeguarding the interests of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, the power given under Art.341(1) and 342(1) to the President and under Art.341(2) and 342(2) to the Parliament to locate, identify and specify the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes is for all purposes of the constitution. If the petitioners contention be correct, it would be as if there are different Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for the purpose of educational reservation under Art.15(4), for reservation in public employment under Art.16(4) and a third such category of castes and tribes for purposes of electoral representation under Art.330 and 332 of the Constitution. By reason of the provisions contained in Art.330(2) and 332(3), there has to be a ratio between electoral reservation available to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and if the petitioners submissions are to be accepted, the reservations and preferences under Art.15(4) or Art.16(4) of the Constitution can be completely divorced from any such standards. This will be a very undesirable, anomolous and unreasonable state of affairs; and we are not in a position to subscribe to this view. There are further difficulties in accepting the petitioners submission. It is true that S.6 to 10 of Act 108 of 1976 deal with matters relating to electoral representation; but, S.3 to 5 admittedly are of general import. The effect of the petitioners submission is that we shall forget the effect of these three sections and read only the preamble and S.6 to 10. Any interpretation which fails to give effect to enacted portions of a statute cannot command its acceptance by us. Secondly, if the petitioners submission, that the substitution of the schedules to the 1950 Orders promulgated by the President under Art.341(1) and 342(1) are confined only to electoral representation under Art.330 and 332 is to be accepted, we will land ourselves in a very unenviable position, which will be self defeating as far as the petitioner is concerned, because, there will be no Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes for purposes of Art.15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution of India. We are not persuaded to accept the interpretation which will result in an anomaly like this. We feel that matters of interpretation, particularly of the Constitution, shall be guided by "the Sober second thoughts of the community". We, therefore reject the submissions based entirely on a reading of a part of the preamble to Act 108 of 1976.

22. The next submission of the counsel which has to be considered is as to whether the respondents acted illegally in giving effect to the reclassification made by Act 108 of 1976 and thereby excluding the petitioner from the list of surplus qualified departmental candidates to give place to the three Malabar Pulaya Community candidates, who had to accommodated against Scheduled Caste vacancies. The submission is that unless the Government of India or some other superior authority issues positive mandate or direction for implementation of Act 108 of 1976, Ext. P-4 list which was published on 26th February, 1980 long after Act 108 of 1976 came into force should not have been revised. The substance of this submission appears to be that unless there is a directive from official superiors, the respondents should not implement the enactment which had escaped their attention while preparing Ext. P-4. We feel that any enactment is to be implemented by any instrumentality of the State even without being prodded by any specific departmental orders. Citizens are expected to take note of the statutes and correct themselves to be in compliance therewith. Governmental agencies like the respondents cannot be an exception to this rule. Their conduct should rather be object lessons for due and diligent compliance with statutes and their changes. We cannot therefore find fault with the respondents for having given effect to the reclassification made by Act 108 of 1976 at least at a late stage by issuing Ext. P-5 order.

23. The last submission of the petitioner is that Ext. P-5 having been issued without notice and without affording an opportunity to the petitioner of being heard was illegal and unsustainable. Counsel submits that had he been given an opportunity, he would have been in a position to inform the respondents that the three persons allegedly belonging to Pulaya Community of Malabar did not really deserve to be included against the Scheduled Castes vacancies, and the petitioner should have been retained in the list of surplus qualified departmental candidates. In this case, the counter affidavit containing details relating to the three candidates with their marks was filed as early as on 29th September, 1980 and an additional counter affidavit containing further details was filed in November, 1980 in reply to the contentions raised by the petitioner in the reply affidavit. But till date, the petitioner has not attempted to make out that he is not liable to be excluded for the purpose of including the three candidates scoring higher marks than he and belonging to Malabar Pulaya community. It is also to be noted that the petitioner was included as a surplus qualified departmental candidate in the list only on a provisional basis. Such inclusion was only on the basis of a departmental instruction Ext. R-4, and did not give any right to be appointed against existing vacancies in the unit as in the case of a person included in an approved list consequent on the result of an examination. It is also to be noticed that the provision for diverting surplus candidates of a particular division to other divisions where there are not enough qualified candidates is not a matter of right, but is only a concession extended by the department to such surplus qualified candidates. Withdrawal of such concession does not affect any of the rights of the petitioner. This is particularly so since the petitioner has not even been asked to furnish his written declaration in terms of Ext. R-4 agreeing to be diverted to other divisions for purposes of promotion. A provisional inclusion on the basis of a concession does not give the petitioner any right for being promoted against vacancies in other units. The petitioner had made representations, Exts. P-6 and P-7, and his complaint has been dealt with in Ext. P-8 order.

24. Counsel for the petitioner referred us to two decisions of the Supreme Court - AIR 1981 SC 136 [LQ/SC/1980/396] and AIR 1981 SC 818 [LQ/SC/1981/26] - in support of the submission that Ext. P-5 order excluding his name from the list should not have been passed without notice to him. We are not persuaded to hold in favour of the petitioner on the basis of these decisions, because we are of the opinion that no right or interest of the petitioner was affected by Ext. P-5 order, since his name was only provisionally included on the basis of a concession by the department in the list of surplus qualified departmental candidates for appointment to other units in which there was a short-fall of qualified candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes. The appointment in other units cannot be claimed as a matter of right. A person gets an enforceable interest for such appointment only if the list was finally published and a written declaration is sought for by the department and furnished by the candidate in terms of Ext. R-4. It is not the petitioners case that Ext. P-4 was a final list; or that at any time before Ext. P-5, a written declaration in terms of Ext. R-4 was sought for or furnished by him. No right or interest of the petitioner having in any manner been affected, the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above cannot be applied to the facts of this case. Even otherwise, it is repeatedly stated by the Supreme Court that the principles of natural justice are not embodied rules which shall be applied uniformly in all cases and that the application of the principles will vary on the basis of various factors like the statute to be administered, the nature of the rights affected, the constitution of the Tribunal, etc. (1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] ">(1968 SC 850, 1970 [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] [LQ/SC/1967/323 ;] SC 150, 1977 SC 965, [LQ/SC/1977/67] etc.) We are satisfied that no violation of the principles of natural justice is involved in this case and the post decisional opportunity which the petitioner availed of satisfies the requirements of fairness in the facts of the case.

25. It was then submitted that in the absence of rules enabling exclusion of a person included in the select list, a selected candidate cannot be excluded at all. Support for this proposition was sought from the decision of this court reported in 1978 KLT 628. The principle laid down therein is that once a person is included in a select list prepared by the Departmental Promotion Committee, the same was published provisionally and after approval by the Government the same was finally published as provided for under R.28 of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, that list cannot be reviewed by the D.P.C. except under provisions of R.28(1) of the K.S.S.R. or by the Government in exercise of its power under R.29 of the K.S.S.R. It is not in dispute that Ext. R-3 is the relevant service rules in this case. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner was not in the list of approved candidates prepared thereunder. Therefore, no question of review or revision of the list of candidates prepared under a statutory authority for exclusion of his name arises in this case. Inclusion of his name in the list of surplus qualified candidates and elimination of his name are both referable to Ext. R-4 executive instructions. Inclusion of his name was only provisional. The conditions under Ext. R-4 to complete the finalisation of even that list had not been taken. In the meantime, the list was corrected to be in compliance with Act 108 of 1976. To this situation, the observations in the decision in 1978 KLT 628 cannot obviously be applied.

26. The petitioner is of course an enterprising member of a Scheduled Caste. The fact that there are more enterprising and deserving members of the Scheduled Castes who deserved better consideration should not dishearten him. His plea that he should retain the preference wrongly given him deserves little sympathy. The Original Petition therefore fails and is dismissed; but without costs.