A.K. Menon, J.:— Heard learned counsel for parties. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Respondent waives service. By consent taken up for final hearing and disposal at the stage of admission.

2. These three Writ Petitions challenge final Awards dated 2nd March, 2017 passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Maharashtra, Mumbai in Reference (IT) Nos. 81 of 2003, 82 of 2003 and 15 of 2006 which came to be filed by the respondents-Engineering Workers' Association and Ors.

3. In Writ Petition No. 3150 of 2017 the impugned reference is dated 24th September, 2003 and the final Award in Reference (IT) No. 82 of 2003 dated 2nd March, 2017 by which the Tribunal held that the contract between the petitioner and the respondent no. 3 contractor M/s. Mazda Services is sham and bogus.

4. In Writ Petition No. 3188 the petitioner challenges the order of reference dated 18th January, 2006 passed by the Additional Labour Commissioner and the impugned Award dated 2nd March, 2017 passed in Reference (IT) No. 15 of 2006 by which the Tribunal held that the contract between the petitioner and the respondent no. 3 contractor M/.s. Mazda Services is sham and bogus.

5. In Writ Petition No. 3189 of 2017 the challenge is to the order of reference dated 24th September, 2003 and the impugned award dated 2nd March, 2017 in Reference (IT) No. 81 of 2003 by which the Tribunal held that the contract between the petitioner and the respondent no. 3 contractor M/.s. Devraj Enterprises (now known as Mechclean) is sham and bogus.

6. In all these petitions the impugned orders are based on a similar set of facts. For the sake of convenience reference is made to the facts in the Writ Petition no. 3188 of 2017. The petitioner carries on business as an engineering company engaged in the business of manufacturing of compressors, locks, material handling equipment, office and home furniture, office equipment, precision equipment, refrigerators, security equipment, tooling, washing machines etc. It has its registered office and factories located in Vikhroli, Mumbai. Respondent no. 1 the contesting respondent is a trade union which represents workmen engaged by the respondent no. 3 contractor with whom the petitioner has entered into a contract for execution of various jobs. The respondent no. 2 is a union said to represent workmen believed to be engaged by Respondent no. 3.

7. It is the petitioner's case that on 29th December, 1999 it entered into a contract with respondent no. 3 (“Contractor”) assigning to it a job rate contract for carrying out tasks of casual nature which were intermittent and sporadic. The contract was valid for 12 months and the petitioners renewed the contract from time to time depending on requirements. The nature of work in the case of this contractor was mechanized floor cleaning of Shop Floor area, sweeping, swabbing, dusting and mopping of the office area. Many of the jobs were stated to be not of a regular nature and their frequency varied. Some were daily others were weekly and fortnightly. The contractor was required to employ his own labour and exercise direct supervision and control over his workmen and inter alia be responsible for compliance of labour laws including Employees' State Insurance Act (ESI), Provident Fund Act (PF), Workmen's Compensation and Minimum Wages Act. The Contractor is believed to have obtained a license under the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 (CLRA Act). The petitioner had also registered under the said Act.

8. The petitioner has contended there is no privity of contract between the petitioner and the workmen engaged by the contractor. That the contractor enjoyed full control over the workmen including the power of adopting disciplinary action, granting leave, etc. to the respondents workmen.

9. The Respondent-workmen filed a complaint under the MRTP & PULP Act being Complaint (ULP) 520 of 1995 claiming to be absorbed as part of the petitioner's work force. The complaint was dismissed by the Industrial Court as not maintainable. The workmen thereafter raised an Industrial dispute before the Office of the Commissioner of Labour claiming permanent posts with the petitioner, payment of difference in wages and other benefits which the employees of the petitioner company enjoyed. The demands made by the workmen were referred to the Tribunal in the instant Reference.

10. In similar disputes another group of 171 workmen engaged by the same contractor Mazda Services had filed Reference No. 82 of 2003. These two References along with the third Reference which forms subject matter of Writ Petition No. 3189 of 2017 was filed by M/s. Mechclean came to be heard together.

11. In the statement of claim the workers contended that they were entitled to be made permanent, and paid the same wages, allowances and benefits as the permanent employees of the petitioner. The workmen contended that they were doing work of permanent and perennial nature and yet were discriminated against, retaining them through the device of the Contractor for many years and at low wages without benefits available to permanent workmen.

12. Petition No. 3188 of 2012 was filed pursuant to Reference No. 15 of 2006 involved 99 such workmen claiming permanency. They contended that the union had taken up the issue with the petitioner as well as the contractor but all efforts have been in vain and hence the complaint came to be filed. According to the respondent the contract between the petitioner and M/s. Mazda Services was sham and bogus. The main thrust of the respondent's case was that they were engaged in the very same work as permanent employees of the petitioner, yet they were deprived of their dues. A written statement came to be filed by the petitioner which contended that the reference was misconceived and untenable. That there was a recognised union functioning in the establishment which enjoyed membership of a majority of the employees and there were long term settlements entered into with such employees. It is contended that the disputes relating to absorption would have to be pursued only through recognised union. Furthermore, the claim of the respondent was actually in the nature of a collective scheme of a class nature which could only be espoused by a recognised union and not by individual workmen. The petitioner contended that all these workmen were employed by the contractor under a genuine and valid contract for execution of job work and once it is found that the contract is genuine and valid there was no occasion to consider the present claim since disputes regarding abolition of contract labour could be raised under the provisions of CLRA Act. The petitioner therefore questioned the jurisdiction of the Court to interfere in the present Reference. It was contended that the preliminary objection be dealt with at the trial/preliminary stage.

13. A reply came to be filed by the contractor wherein the contractor stated he had not received any demand from the workman employed by him to the effect that the workmen should be absorbed in the services of the petitioner company and they be granted the same benefits and condition of services. It was contended that the attempt of the workmen amounts to questioning the respondent no. 3-contractor's right to carry on business. It was contended that law does not prohibit employment of contract labour and therefore it was not permissible for the union to seek abolition of the contract labour. It was contended that the workers employed by the contractor were not members of the union and hence maintainability of the reference may be decided as a preliminary issue.

14. It was further contended that the Reference would curtail the right of the contractor to carry on work and that the Respondent no. 1 union had in a surreptitious manner made a demand without appropriate notice to the contractor. On the merits of the claim the contractor submitted that a number of supervisors were appointed for supervisory work carried out by its employees and the contractors. It is denied that the work carried on by employees of the contractor are supervised and controlled by Officers and Managers of the petitioner. It is therefore denied that the contract between the parties were sham and bogus and that the workmen were working through a device of a sham and bogus contractor. It was inter alia contended by the contractor that the workmen were covered under ESIC and PF Act by the said contractor. The workers are given annual leave, sick leave and casual leave. They are provided with uniforms and safety shoes by the contractor and in case of workers required to perform overtime work they are paid wages at double the rate. According to the contractor the scope of work carried out by his workers is different from those of permanent employees of the petitioner. It was further contended that the contractor's workman claimed wages of those paid by the company to its employees. They have denied that the 99 workman were working through the device of a sham and bogus contract. Before the Industrial Court evidence was led by the unions and also by the petitioner company as also respondent no. 3 - contractor whose sole proprietor deposed.

15. On or about 23rd July, 2014 the Industrial Tribunal passed orders allowing the complaints which came to be challenged in the three Writ Petitions (WP/819/2015, WP/820/2015 and WP/821/2015) filed in this court on behalf of the petitioner herein. The petitions were heard and disposed, setting aside the order dated 23rd July, 2014 passed by the Industrial Court and remanding the matter to the Industrial Tribunal with a direction to decide the same afresh within a period of six months. Liberty was granted to lead additional evidence. It is pursuant to remand that the impugned Awards dated 2nd March, 2017 came to be passed. By the impugned order, the Tribunal framed four issues which are reproduced below:

No.	Issues
1.	Does the 2nd party union proves that, the reference raised by it, is maintainable even when recognized union is functioning in the undertaking of 1st party
2.	Whether the contract between the first party no. 1 Principal Employer and first party no. 2 Contractor is sham and bogus
3.	Does the 2nd party prove & justify the demands in reference
4.	What order

16. After hearing parties the Industrial Court has by the impugned judgment held that the reference was maintainable and that the contract between the petitioner and contractor was sham and bogus. The petitioner was directed to treat the workers named in the schedule to the Reference as permanent workers w.e.f. 18th January, 2006 and employ them till superannuation and provide all consequential benefits from the date of the Award. In respect of arrears of differences in wages and benefits the petitioner was directed to pay lump sum amount of Rs. 5,00,000/- to each of the concerned workers.

17. The petitioner is aggrieved by the said award and has challenged the same on the basis that the Tribunal has failed to take into consideration that the order of reference did not require the Tribunal to adjudicate upon whether the contract was sham and bogus and the Tribunal had not taken into consideration copies of the contracts dated 5th February, 1987 onwards. That numerous contracts were placed before the Tribunal the terms and conditions of which were not taken into consideration. Express terms and conditions required the contractor alone to decide upon the workmen to carry out jobs. The contractor was also required to indemnify and keep the petitioner indemnified against the claims and demands, difference in wages, etc. that may be filed including costs and expenses thereof. That the documents filed by the petitioner included wage slips maintained by the contractor, advances made by the contractor to these workman and payment relating to provident fund and ESIC contribution made by the contractor as well as document regarding the leave application, muster rolls maintained by the contractor in respect of the workmen.

18. Mr. Cama the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner contended that the contractor was engaged by the petitioner company many years ago but as such they would need licences under Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970. He submitted that the Model Standing Order 4C and consequences of completing 240 days of service do not apply under the Industrial Disputes Act and this was the basis on which the respondent no. 1 had initially approached the Court. He submitted that the Tribunal had misdirected itself in having directed payment of Rs. 5,00,000/- as compensation without any evidence at all. He submitted that least that should have been done was evidence should have been led on this aspect before awarding a lump sum amount.

19. On behalf of the respondent Ms. Buch submitted that the CLRA Act had no application in the instant case. That the complaint filed was basically for absorption under the Industrial Disputes Act. She submitted that the respondent union had locus to file the complaint under the Industrial Disputes Act. In view of the fact that the respondent's case is that the contract is sham and bogus, the Industrial Disputes Act will apply and not the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 Act. The evidence on record according to Ms. Buch establishes that the contract is sham and bogus and the contractor has merely lent his name. She invited my attention to the schedule to the enclosure to the Order dated 18th January, 2006 passed by the Additional Labour Commissioner and submitted that it is clear that the company must absorb 99 workmen working under Mazda Services and pay them difference of wages. She submitted that in the statement of claim, the workmen had set out that they had been working through the device of M/s. Mazda Services for many years and performing the same jobs as permanent workman. The jobs were perennial in nature and the petitioner was discriminating against them by paying them wages at much lower rates as compared to those in permanent employment of the petitioner. None of the benefits or other facilities enjoyed by the permanent workmen were being offered to the respondent. In view of their plight, they had no option but to file a complaint under the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971 before the Industrial Court but the said complaint was held to be not maintainable and as a result they were forced to approach the Industrial Tribunal by way of the reference seeking absorption.

20. Ms. Buch submitted that the workmen have been rendering services from 1995 and having failed in their attempt under the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971 they had sought intervention of the Labour Commissioner and had attempted an amicable settlement which failed. As a result of the failure report submitted, the Reference has been made. It was canvassed on behalf of the petitioner that workmen in the instant case are engaged in cleaning and maintenance work in the factory premises. In addition they would transfer material from one plant to another to facilitate assembling and packaging, the erection of heavy duty racks within the factory premises. It is her case that the contractor does not supervise or allot work to these persons and allotment and supervision is by the petitioner company. Besides the workmen were deputed to work outside the petitioner's premises and at third party installations. Leave is sanctioned, transfers are actioned and placements are made by the petitioners' supervisors and there being no dispute that these workmen have rendered services for more than 240 days continuously they could not be deprived of the status of permanent workmen. She therefore submitted that the demands for permanency were rightly allowed by the Industrial Court in these cases.

21. Ms. Buch submitted that in the course of hearing the reference, one Mr. Kersi Randeria, partner of the respondent no. 3 was examined. He deposed that his concern Mazda Services was a contractor for the petitioner company engaged for carrying out work in the premises of the company and for the purpose of carrying out the work assigned to his firm, he had engaged a large number of employees including supervisory, administrative staff and other workman. He deposed that day-to-day activities of controlling allotment of work and the attendance of these workers been maintained by his firm. The workers were issued attendance cards in which supervisors make entries based on attendance of workers. Ms. Buch submitted that the cross examination of the said witness reveals that the contract is sham and bogus. She submitted that the said witness was in fact a former employee of the petitioner company and he had resigned from the services of the company and started his business in 1986 and in the same year he was awarded a contract by the petitioner. According to Ms. Buch, the provident fund contribution of these workmen were paid by the petitioner and not by the respondent no. 3. Mr. Randeria had contradicted himself in his cross examination firstly by contending that prior to 2003 ESIC and provident fund contribution were being paid for by the petitioner and not by him. Inspite of deposing that his firm was allotting work, supervising workmen and maintaining attendance records he had not filed any document in support of his contention. She invited my attention to the notes of cross examination to demonstrate that there was no substance in the case of respondent no. 3. Ms. Buch submitted that there was nothing on record to establish that the aforesaid witness had resigned in the year 1986.

22. Ms. Buch submitted that Mr. Kamlesh Mishra, one of the workmen had deposed in favour of the respondents to the effect that the work carried on by the workmen were regular and perennial, linked with main processes of the company and permanent workers of the company who were doing the same and similar work. That there are about 2000 permanent workmen and an equal number of workmen engaged through the device of various contractors. He admitted that the concerned workmen were carrying out factory maintenance jobs. Mr. Cama on the other hand submitted that the workmen were engaged mainly in house keeping work. Ms. Buch submitted that apart from the averment contained in the statement of claim the respondent's witness had also deposed to the effect that allotment of workmen and supervision of work was always carried out by supervisors of the company.

23. Specific reference was made to paragraph 21 of the deposition of the Respondent's by way of examination in chief and the documents produced by the witness. Ms. Buch submitted that the witness concerned had produced his ESIC card which showed his date of appointment as 2nd August, 1991 and the stamp of the petitioner company. She also referred to certain delivery challans and copies of attendance records and other documents brought on record during the further examination in chief. The witness was subjected to cross examination but he stood by his version. Ms. Buch submitted that the workmen concerned has denied that he was employed by respondent no. 3 contractor and contended that he was claiming permanency with the petitioner company.

24. Ms. Buch tendered a compilation of documents consisting of ESIC cards issued to one Dinkar Harishchandra Shivnekar and Shri. Tukaram Jagtap which indicated the name of the employer as that of the company. She invited my attention to (a) four challans prepared by Godrej Appliances Limited bearing signature reportedly being of some of the workmen, (b) Log Report of the Composite Effluent Treatment Plant showing names of operators viz. some of the workmen, (c) an inter office memo certifying that one Mr. Suresh Gaikwad working under contractor had worked for 26 half days during the month of August 1997 for cleaning heavy vehicles. Reference was also made to certain other documents such as communication from the petitioner to their construction department to record attendance of two “contract workmen”. In all 16 documents were filed which included evidence of passes issued to some of the workmen by the petitioners. Provident fund payments were made in respect of payment of ex-employee Mr. Sawant Vasudeo towards provident fund and Form 2 under the Employee Provident Funds Scheme 1952 in the name of one Vilas Laxman Shinde who is said to have joined on 2nd November, 1992. Reference was also made to several other entry passes issued by Maruti Udyog Limited, RPL, Reliance Industries Limited which were reportedly issued by these companies to workmen engaged by the petitioner. The petitioners were engaged as contractors at locations of these clients and the employees were allowed entry to the project sites under these entry permits. The name “Godrej” appeared predominantly on these passes which according to Ms. Buch indicated that members of the first respondent Union were being deputed to various sites under the guise of being contractor's employees. She relied upon the following judgments in support of her case;

(1) The Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. v. Lal Bavta Hotel Aur Bakery Mazdoor Union, [2016 (5) ABR 443].

(2) Bharat Forge Limited, Pune v. Maharashtra General Kamgar, [(2010) 2 CLR 619]

(3) Secretary, Haryana State Electricity Board v. Suresh, [(1999) 1 CLR 959]

(4) Hindustan Coca Cola Bottling S/w. Pvt. Ltd. v. Bharatiya Kamgar Sena, [(2001) 3 CLR 1025]

(5) Ashok Jadhav v. The Bombay Dock Labour Board, [(1997) 1 CLR 919 ]

25. Ms. Buch submitted that the workmen were engaged since the year 1986, but the muster roll produced by the petitioner was only for the year June, 2006 and onwards and not for the earlier periods. In the case of Mazda Services Muster Rolls for the year 2008 and 2009 only were produced. ESIC cards issued to some workmen were available and were introduced in evidence but there was no rebuttal evidence on that aspect. She submitted that the Award categorically records that the document filed with Exhibit C-6 were leave applications, privilege leave records and muster-cum-wage register from 2004. The impugned order records that all the documents specially the PF and ESIC, return cum challan were not expected to be in the custody of the employer. Yet they were produced from the custody of the principal employer. This was taken as indication of the fact that the principal employer was looking after all statutory compliances of the contractor as well and was engaging workers in the name of the contractor.

26. The award records that oral evidence of Mr. Kersi Randeria of Mazda Services contained incorrect statements viz. he denied that there were no documents to show that he was paying PF and ESIC premium to the concerned workmen from 1986 and that prior to 2003 these amounts were being paid by the petitioner. Furthermore, he denied that PF and ESIC contributions were paid under the code of the petitioner and that the petitioner was paying these PF contributions of the workmen prior to 2003. In fact the petitioner was paying these contributions till the year 2003 and the contractor registered under the Acts in question in the year 2003. In the light of these facts and when the witness Mr. Randeria had not filed any documents to support his contention that he was paying the PF contribution and ESIC premium, his deposition was obviously not beyond doubt. In fact this witness deposed that if he finds all the relevant document and if there is a direction from the Court he would produce the documents.

27. Ms. Buch further submitted that only copies of some documents were furnished as can be seen from paragraph 43 and 44 which indicated that the petitioner was in custody of these documents. Ms. Buch invited my attention to the fact that the award had taken into consideration the fact that the concerned workmen were engaged in the process of manufacture or activities carried out in the establishment of the Principal Employer and its vendors or clients. That the work carried out was incidental and perennial in nature and that some of the work was prohibited under the CLRA Act. Ms. Buch submitted that the petitioner or the contractor failed to satisfy the Tribunal that the contract was genuine and legal and/or that the nature of work was not of perennial nature. Specific reference was made to the fact that the workmen were engaged in the premises of the petitioner and also performed duties at the premises of clients of the petitioner such as Reliance Industries, Maruti Udyog, NHAVA etc. On that basis it was concluded that the workmen could not be employees of the contractor and that in reality the petitioner had controlled and supervised, the concerned workmen and complied with the statutory provisions of law. Details of attendance-cum-wage register, monthly bills and payments made by the principal employer to the contractor were not produced. Records of registration were not forthcoming and for those reasons the Court held that the contract was sham and bogus. The impugned order also records that the contractor had no registration under the ESI and Provident fund enactments till the year 2003 or licence for running the business till the year 2005. Apropos the challenge to the quantum of compensation awarded, Ms. Buch invited my attention to paragraph 72 of the award that the Industrial Court had approached the matter of compensation on a rough and ready basis and specified a lump sum amount which would not cause irreparable loss to the petitioners and the workers also would receive a tidy sum. She supported the impugned order on that aspect as well.

28. In rejoinder Mr. Cama submitted that the Industrial Court accepted the fact that the contract was valid inasmuch as in paragraph 35 of the order the Court recorded that there were two different employers one being Principal Employer and second being the Contractor and workers of both were shown separately. In this respect specific reference was made to the fact in the deposition of one Mr. Kamlesh Mishra examined by the Respondent no. 1 Union, he had stated that he was not aware whether the recognised union had signed a settlement on behalf of Mazda Services. Mr. Cama submitted that the contentions of the respondent no. 1 union is not sustainable in the light of the observation of the Industrial Court in paragraph 32 and 35 of the Award which admits of two different employer. He further submitted that there has been virtually no cross examination on the documents produced before the witness. The petitioner's witness has not been confronted and no inconsistencies or contradictions have been brought out in the evidence. On the other hand, in paragraph 50 what was clearly established is that the petitioner was paying contributions till the year 2003. Mr. Cama submitted that mere reference to long service cannot be justification for accepting the respondents contention.

29. Apropos the documents referred to by Ms. Buch during her submissions, Mr. Cama submitted that the first document in the compilation would indicate that the petitioner was paying ESIC contribution in support of Mr. Shivnekar. As regards document at pages 5 to 8 that is delivery challan prepared by Store Keeper there was no way of identifying the name of the person said to have signed and hence document could not be relied upon. He denied that the workmen concerned were engaged in manufacturing. Document at item no. 4 of the list is not evidence of workmen working in the manufacturing plant since the attendance at the effluent treatment plant does not amount to manufacturing. Mr. Cama admitted that the inter office memo at item no. 5 and 6 were in fact issued by the petitioners, but these are of no avail to the respondents. Whereas documents at item no. 7 only showed that the wages were being paid on the basis of number of days. Mr. Cama pointed out that the workmen were clearly referred to as “contract workmen” and that these were memos issued by the office of the petitioners to the construction departments. He submitted that these by itself did not constitute evidence of workmen being employees of the petitioner. He invited my attention to the cross examination of the respondent witness Mr. Kamlesh Mishra and in particular paragraph 27 thereof, wherein the witness admitted that he was not aware whether the contractor was maintaining any records nor did he have any evidence to show that he had applied for leave to the company. Mr. Mishra had no proof to show that the company was maintaining privilege leave and muster roll cum wage register and it was not true that he was not employee of the contractor. He denied that he was not employed by Mazda Services and claimed permanency with the petitioner. He volunteered that he was an employee of the petitioner and hence he was claiming permanency.

30. In further cross examination by the Advocate for Mazda Services he admitted that he had not produced documentary evidence to show that he had applied to the petitioner for job in construction department. He had no proof to show that the salary was paid by the company. He had not produced salary slips or other evidence that the company was paying salary. Though his work was controlled and supervised he has denied that Mazda Services was making payment of salary and had issued salary slips. He volunteered that the petitioner company was to pay salary and give salary slips. At the same time he admitted that he had no documentary evidence to show that the company was paying salary and issuing slips. Mr. Cama submitted that the deposition did not reveal that the burden of proof had been discharged by either party. He submitted that an adverse inference must be drawn against the respondents who had gone to Court. He submitted that the workers did not say that the petitioner was involved in supervision, it is the contractor who says it.

31. Mr. Cama assailed the grant of lump sum compensation which he said cannot be uniformly paid to all across the board. In the course of his submissions Mr. Cama relied upon the following judgments:

(i) Pottery Mazdoor Panchayat v. Perfect Pottery Co. Ltd. [(1979) 3 SCC 762].

(ii) Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited. v. State of Jharkhand [(2014) 1 SCC 536].

(iii) National Engineering Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan [(2000) 1 SCC 371 ]

(iv) Bharatiya Kamgar Sena v. Udhe India Ltd., [(2008) 1 LLJ 371 (Bom)]

(v) Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. National Union Water Front Workers, [(2011) 3 CLR 349]

(vi) Workmen of Niligiri Co-op Mkt. Society Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu [(2004) 3 SCC 514]

(vii) Balwantrai Saluja v. Air India Limited [(2014) 9 SCC 407]

(viii) R. M. Yellati v. Asstt. Executive Engineer [(2006) 1 SCC 106]

(ix) Gangadhar Pillai v. Siemens Ltd. [(2007) 1 SCC 533 ]

32. I have heard the learned counsel at length and perused the relevant record with their assistance. Although this Court in its writ jurisdiction is not required to enter upon the merits of the controversy by re-appreciating evidence counsel on both sides have canvassed merits of the case.

33. Ms. Buch had made reference to the pleadings before the Industrial Tribunal. In its written statement, the company contended that the contractor was employed for cleaning, painting booths, chimney, lifting and segregating scrap, cleaning of paint tanks and the like. The contractor was also responsible for executing the contract by employing his own labour and exercising direct supervision over his workmen. He is responsible for compliance with all labour laws including E.S.I, Provident Fund Act, House Rent Allowance Act, Workmen's Compensation Act, Minimum Wages Act etc. and that the contractor had obtained the requisite license under the provisions of Contract (Labour, Regulation and abolition) Act. It was contended there was no privity of contract between the petitioners and the workmen employed by the contractor. The contractor was stated to exercise full control. However, the evidence inter alia discloses that some of the members of the respondent union were having E.S.I. identity cards issued at the instance of the petitioner. Ms. Buch pointed out that the code numbers appearing on the identity card of one Tukaram Jagtap was that of the petitioner company, not only was he described as an employee of the petitioner under the column for “local office” but the name, address and code number of the employee is also shown as that of the petitioner and his date of appointment is shown as 1st July, 1986. As far as the challans issued by one Godrej Appliances Ltd. is concerned, I do not find it relevant in order to conclude that persons who signature appears on the challans are the members of the respondent. Some of the evidence relied upon indicates that the company had certified that employee Mr. Suresh Gaikwad had worked under “M/s. Kersi Contractor” for 26 half days. Similar letters are seen to be issued in the subsequent months as well. A memo from the petitioner to its construction department records attendance of two contractors labour with the instruction that construction departments make payment to these workmen. This was used to demonstrate that payment were also been made by the petitioner company. Several similar letters are issued in respect of other workmen between 1st March 2001 and 1st January, 2002. In yet another letter issued by the accounts department of the petitioner on 14th October, 2002 addressed to Shramik Sahakari Bank Limited reference was made to a sum of Rs. 80,844/- being paid to the ex-employees towards settlement of Provident Fund. This was payment made to a nominee of the deceased employer.

34. In yet another instance of one Mr. Manoj Kumar who was designated as helper in Reliance Industries Ltd, Hazira (Surat) his identity card was issued by the petitioner so also in other case of one Mr. Kamlesh D. Mishra his permanent address is shown as that of the petitioner. Persons sent on deputation to Maruti Udyog Ltd. namely one Prem Dubey has also entry permit which shows the name Godrej thereby suggesting that the company had deputed these persons. A salary slip of one of the employee who is made permanent is also been relied upon. In the circumstances the question to be considered is whether the Industrial Court had on the key question rightly concluded that the contract was sham and bogus. One has to ascertain whether in the facts of the present case the employees of the respondent were directly under the control of the petitioner company.

35. One of the submissions assailed by Mr. Cama was that the reference is improperly and presumptuously worded to the extent that it indicated of the course to be adopted by the Industrial Court. The reference reads as follows:

ORDER

1. Reference (IT) No. 15/2006 answered in affirmative.

2. It is held and declared that the Second Party No. 1 (Workers Union) is having locus standi to represent concerned workers.

3. It is also held and declared that the contract between Godrej & Boyce Mfg.Co. Ltd. and Mazda Services is sham and bogus.

4. Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. shall treat these workers whose names are appearing with schedule of reference excluding whose names are deleted) as its permanent workers w.e.f. 18/01/2006 and shall employed them till they attend the age of superannuation. Further shall provide all consequential benefits similar to permanent workers with effect from the date of starting compliance of this award.

5. Against all the arrears (difference in wages and benefits) claimed as per schedule of reference Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. shall pay lump sum amount of Rupees Five Lac only to each concerned worker whose names are not deleted from present reference.

6. Out of concerned 99 workers who were working in the premises of Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. till the end of year 2016 and whose names are not deleted from present reference also shall be entitled for the benefits of lump sum amount of Rs. Five Lac only.

7. For necessary preparation and compliance of this order 2 months time is granted to Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. from the date of receipt of this award.

8. Award be send to the appropriate government for its publication in accordance with the provision of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

36. I therefore considered the language of the reference and to my mind there is no substance in the contention that the language does not depict the true nature of the reference. The language could have been more lucid, but as presently worded it does not lead to any confusion. I have no doubt in my mind the reference as worded does not fall foul of the law and which has also found expression in the decision of the Supreme Court in TISCO (supra). In any event the language of the reference is now inconsequential given the fact that the issues framed by the Industrial Court are correctly focused I am unable therefore to agree with Mr. Cama that the Awards are bad since the reference was improperly worded.

37. Having come to that conclusion it is necessary to examine the manner in which the impugned order has dealt with the merits. The workmen in question were undoubtedly engaged at the premises of the petitioner for number of years and as indicated prior to even the contractor being engaged. The evidence led by the parties does not reveal the circumstances in which the contractor had been engaged. The written statement filed by the contractor proceeds on the basis that he had not received any demand from the workmen employed “by the Company” that the workmen employed by the contractor should be employed in services of the company. The contractor contended that the union had not served any notice upon the contractor demanding equal status as permanent workmen engaged by the company. It was contended by the contractor that he employs a number of supervisors and workmen employed by the contractor are given annual leave with wages and also granted sick leave and casual leave. They are also provided uniforms and safety shoes by the contractor as also other basic requirements. Identity cards are also stated to be provided by the contractor. Gratuity has been paid to the workmen who had retired or retrenched from employment of the contractor and that the contract between the respondent no. 3 and the company is a genuine one. It is also contended that completion of 240 days in the employment of the contractor would not permit the union or workers to claim permanency in employment to the company in the absence of employer-employee relationship between the company and the workmen engaged by the contractor. It is in this background that the parties went to trial wherein the petitioner contended that the workmen concerned were only carrying out jobs of maintenance of the factory, delivery of material, assembly and packing of material.

38. However the case canvassed before me at the hearing is also to the effect that the workmen concerned were being engaged in premises of other companies who are clients of the petitioner such as Reliance Industries, Maruti Udyog, NHAVA etc. ESIC cards were issued to some of these employees which shows his date of appointment as of 2nd August, 1994 and so on and so forth.

39. On the other hand the proprietor Mr. Kersi Hormusji Elavia was examined as witness by the petitioner and he has deposed that he had provided assistance for compliance of statutory requirement of P.F. and E.S.I. and in respect of contract labour engaged by the company. That the petitioner company had been entering into numerous contracts for execution of various jobs including one with Devraj Enterprises. In cross examination he admitted that some of the workers of the contractor are working continuously from 1986 and that he was unaware whether the contractor had given appointment letters to these workers.

40. The evidence of Mr. Kersi Randeria partner of respondent no. 3 proceeds on the basis of his written statement. He has deposed that he has employed a number of persons comprising of supervisors, administrative staff and workers and has overall control of the employees employed by him. The attendance of workers employed by him is maintained by his concern and at the end of the month attendance cards are scrutinized to ascertain number of days for which workers are required to be paid. Payment to the workers is made in the presence of representative of the company as required under the Contract Labour (Abolition and Regulation) Act, 1970. In the cross examination, however, he admitted that he was also working for the petitioner company and had resigned from services and started his own business in 1986. He contended that he was paying provident fund and E.S.I from 1986 but did not produce any records. He denied that prior to 1986 ESIC and Provident Fund contribution were being made by the company and not by him. His deposition to that effect that he would produce the record, if available and if so however directed by the Court does not augur well for the veracity of his evidence.

41. Both sides have relied upon case law which is briefly dealt with hereafter.

(i) In Pottery Mazdoor Panchayat (Supra) the Supreme Court found that the very terms of reference showed that the points of dispute between parties was not the fact of closure of the business but the propriety and justification of the respondent decision to close business. In the case of Pottery Mazdoor Panchayat (supra) the reference being limited to the narrow question as to whether the closure was proper and justified, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to inquire into whether the business was in fact closed down. Mr. Cama had relied upon this judgment to submit that in the instant case the reference itself was invalidated because the Court had traveled beyond the scope of the reference. The Reference read as if it was a forgone conclusion that the workmen were to be absorbed in employment of the company. I am unable to agree with Mr. Cama that the refrrence in the instant case suffers the same vice as in the case of Pottery Mazdoor Panchayat for reason set out above.

(ii) In TISCO (supra) Mr. Cama invited my attention to the fact that no amicable settlement had taken place in conciliation proceedings a failure report had been submitted. It was contended by the appellant in that case the manner in which reference are worded does not depict true nature of the dispute between parties. It was submitted that the workmen concerned were no longer in the employment of the appellant and therefore could not have raised the grievance and no Industrial dispute existed. The Court observed that the terms of reference in that case were not properly worded as the term does not reflect real dispute between the parties. It depicted the version of the respondent. In fact it mandated the Court to decide only whether the appellant therein was required to take them back. In that case, the company had a cement division and it decided to transfer this cement division to one Lafarge and communicated the decision to the employees. The employees working in the cement division were also taken over by Lafarge and fresh letters of appointment were issued. The workers not being satisfied felt that they were entitled to be taken back in the parent company. In the circumstances a reference came to be made. The Supreme Court observed in paragraph 16 thus:

“16. The Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act is a creature of that statute. It acquires jurisdiction on the basis of reference made to it. The Tribunal has to confine itself within the scope of the subject matter of reference and cannot travel beyond the same. This is the view taken by this Court in a number of cases including in National Engg. Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan. It is for this reason that it becomes the bounden duty of the appropriate Government to make the reference appropriately which is reflective of the real/exact nature of “dispute” between the parties”.

(iii) In National Engineering (supra) the Supreme Court highlighted the fact that the High Court could entertain a petition impugning a reference on the ground of non-existence of an actual or apprehended industrial dispute. Mr. Cama had stressed upon the fact that the reference at hand is invalid and as observed by the Supreme Court there can be many splinter groups each wanting to form a separate trade union under Section 4 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926. Under Section 2(oooo) of the Industrial Disputes Act as applicable in Rajasthan a “representative union” meant a union for the time being registered as a representative union under that Act. Under section 9D of the Act any union which has for the whole of the period of at least for three months during the six months immediately preceding the calendar month in which it so applies, must have a membership of at least 15% of the total number of workmen employed in the industry. The Supreme Court observed that the Industrial Tribunal being a creature of the statute, its jurisdiction is based on the reference and it cannot go into the validity of the reference. The question before the High Court was one of jurisdiction which the High Court had failed to consider. In the present case Mr. Cama had submitted that the recognised union is Godrej & Boyce Shramik Sangh. The State Government in the present case had failed to make proper reference and it did not consider the relevant considerations by making the reference, similar to the situation in the case of National Engineering (supra). I do not find these decisions to be of any assistance to the Petitioners for reasons set out in paragraph 34.

(iv) In Bharatiya Kamgar Sena (supra) a single Judge of this Court has held that the documents brought on record before the Industrial Court revealed that the company did not have any supervisory control over the workmen and the work was supervised only by the contractor. The evidence of the contractor revealed that he had brought on record voluminous records indicating that he had complete control over the workmen. The contractor had processed leave applications and decided their loan applications as well. Action was taken against the workmen for misconduct. The workmen agreed in that case that salary slips were never issued by the company and that although till 1992 the company paid the Provident Fund contribution, the contractor had started paying the said contribution from the year 1992. The registration of the firm with the Provident Fund authorities was belated and till then the petitioner company had to pay the dues. In that case the Court found that merely because employees were doing some work, other than house keeping also would not by itself change the nature of relationship between the company and the workmen. Perusal of the contract brought on record reveals that the company had raised specific demands and asked for services of particular workman. Other documents brought on record revealed that the company did not have supervisory control.

(v) In Steel Authority of India Ltd. (supra) the issue pertaining to the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 was considered wherein the Supreme Court held that the beneficial legislation needs to be construed liberally in favour of the class for whose benefit it is intended, do not extend to reading in the provisions of the Act that which is not specifically provided whether expressly or provided by necessary implication. The Court held that if some of the elements enumerated under Section 10(2) of that Act were present that itself was no ground for absorption of contract labour on issuing notification under Section 10(1) of the Act. It was held that the parliament did not intend that absorption of contract labour would result from the issuance of abolition notification under section 10(1) of that Act. The issue in that case was whether on a true and correct import of the expression ‘appropriate Government’ as defined under section 2(1)(A) of the CLRA Act and whether the notification issued by the Central Government in 1976 was valid and applies to all Central Government companies and automatic absorption of persons working in the establishment of the principal employer as regular employees, follows on issuance of a valid notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act, prohibiting the contract labour in the concerned establishment. It was then sought to be submitted that in the present case there was no question of automatic absorption and the petitioner was not under an obligation to absorb these workmen.

(vi) Reliance was placed on Workmen of Niligiri Co-op Market Society (supra) which held that the relevant factors to determine an employer employee relationship were not only the control test and organisation tests but the Court was required to consider several aspects such as (a) who the appointing authority and pay master were (b) who could dismiss (c) extent of supervision and control (d) nature of the job whether skilled or professional, (e) Nature of the establishment and (f) the right to reject. It was necessary to examine whether the workmen concerned were fully integrated into the employers concern viz. independent of the concern but attached to it to some extent. Apart from these relevant tests it is also held that the person who asserts existence of an employer/employee relationship bears the burden on establishing proof of relationship. In Workmen of Niligiri Co-op Market Society (supra) the Supreme Court made reference to observation in in Swapan Das Gupta v. First Labour Court of W.B., [1976 Lab IC 202 (Cal)] that it was not for the company to prove that the workmen was not an employee of the company but of some other person. The question of relationship between the parties whether employer or employee is a pure question of fact that normally a High Court in exercise of judicial review would not interfere with unless the finding is manifestly or obviously erroneous or perverse. The question that arises in the facts of the present case is as to whether the employees in question were employed by the company or by the contractor.

(vii) In yet another case of Balwant Rai Saluja (supra) this aspect came to be considered while determining the test of administrative control and supervision of the employees of a canteen run by a contractor on the premises of the principal employer and in that case the Supreme Court held that where the workers of contractor could be termed as employees of the factory or the company on whose premises they run the statutory canteen must be tested. Applying the tests of complete administrative control had necessarily shown that there existed an employer employee relationship which would include relevant factors as to who appointed the workmen, who paid salaries, who has authority to dismiss and take disciplinary action and also whether there was any continuity of services and extent of control and supervision and whether there existed complete control and supervision. The Supreme Court considered in that case whether Air India Limited had complete control over the contractor and that such complete control would be required to be established. The Court found in that case that the contractor was Hotel Corporation of India (HCI) which was a wholly owned subsidiary of Air India Limited. Yet the Court found that the mere fact that Air India had a controlling interest did not mean that those employed in the canteen were employees of Air India. The Supreme Court considered the fact that HCI was separate legal entity and the association with HCI did not give control to Air India over running the canteen.

(viii) In the case of R.M. Yellati (supra) it was held that the onus of proving 240 days continuous service was on the workmen who should adduce cogent evidence both oral and documentary. Merely affidavits or self-serving statements may not suffice. It was held that mere non production of the muster roll without any plea of suppression by the claimant workman will not be a ground for the Tribunal to draw an adverse inference against the employer. In the instant case, I do not see how this judgment is relevant since the fact that the workmen had completed 240 days was not seriously in dispute.

(ix) In Gangadhar Pillai (supra) the Supreme Court observed that it is not the law that on completion of 240 days of continuous service in a year, the employee concerned becomes entitled to regularisation of services and or a permanent status. The concept of 240 days was introduced so as to fasten statutory liability on an employee to pay compensation specified in Section 25-F before retrenchment and not for grant of permanent status. It was therefore contended that the mere completion of 240 days will not be of any consequence in the present case. Mr. Cama laid stress on the fact that in Union of India v. Ramchander [(2005) 9 SCC 365] reference was made by the Supreme Court to Gangadhar Pillai. The Court did not lay down any law having universal application and did not direct regularisation of the workmen but merely directed the appellants to re-employ respondent as daily wagers.

42. The decisions cited by Ms. Buch can now be dealt with;

(i) In Bharat Forge Limited, Pune (supra) the division Bench of this Court has held that on plain reading of section 10(1) of the Industrial Dispute Act read with section 36(1) only a recognised union is entitled to represent the workmen except in a proceeding where the legality or propriety of an order of dismissal, discharge, etc. of any employee is under consideration and that although there is a proviso to that effect in Section 36(1) there is no such qualification laid down in Section 10(1) and consequently there is no constraint upon the appropriate Government forming its opinion as to whether an industrial dispute exists. It held that Section 10(1) does not lay down that an appropriate Government is required to consider whether the dispute is raised by a recognised union or not and therefore it cannot be said that at the very threshold of raising dispute before appropriate Government, the workmen of an unrecognised union can be shown the door. The Court found that it would not be appropriate to read the proviso to section 36(1) to hold that even at the stage of reference the unrecognised union has no locus.

(ii) In Haryana State Electricity Board (supra) the Supreme Court considered section 10 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 in which case the board had awarded a contract for cleaning, sweeping and removal of garbage from the main plant building for a period of one year with a stipulation to engage 42 Safai Karmachari. On completion of 240 days the Safai Karmachari sought permanent jobs. The Labour Court held in their favor and also awarded them back wages. The High Court confirmed the award without back wages. The Supreme Court found that the contract system was a mere camouflage and a smoke screen.

(iii) In Hindustan Coca Cola Bottling (supra) a division Bench of this Court was considering maintainability of the complaint in the Industrial Court. The contract employees and their union filed complaints under the MRTP and PULP Act claiming that they were in employment for several years and the contractors were operating from their residence. They were falsely labeled as contract labour. In that case since the employer employee relationship was disputed it was found that the Industrial Court had no jurisdiction. While allowing the appeals, the complaint filed by the union and the employees were held not maintainable.

(iv) In yet another decision of this Court in Ashok Jadhav (supra) services of certain workers working in the Dock Labour Board were terminated. The Board contended that the petitioners were not their workmen and that it was clearly an issue incidental to the main issue referred to the Tribunal. The Tribunal ordered that it could not travel beyond the terms of the reference for it may also go into and adjudicate into incidental questions arising out of the Reference. The Tribunal was of the view that the question whether the workmen were all employees of the board or not is not an incidental question but a foundational one. The Board found that the issue whether the petitioners therein were employees of the board or not was a issue clearly incidental to the reference namely whether the termination of their services was legal.

43. This Court in the case of SCI (supra) had occasion to consider various factors before coming to the conclusion that the workmen employed in the canteen of the Corporation were to be treated as direct employees of the SCI. On the factual side the Court observed that the Union had filed a petition. In that case, the Court observed that the workmen's contention were that they were always employed by the Corporation and had inducted a contractor merely with a view to create a camouflage. The following facts were taken into consideration in SCI (supra). Supervision and control were done by officers of the Corporation and that the contractor was merely a name lender, where instructions relating to the canteen, menu and prices and raw materials to be brought were decided by SCI, other facts that were alleged by the union was that heavy subsidy was given by the SCI, water and electricity was provided by the SCI, so were cooking instruments and utensils. The test was whether the canteen was overwhelmingly under the supervision and control of the SCI. The evidence before the CGIT revealed that workers were working in the canteen prior to their present contractor who had come in place of an earlier one. Different contractors were employed since 1983-84. New contractors came in 1987, 1991-92 and then in 1995 at the time of the dispute. The canteen workers were required to be absorbed by successive contractors. SCI had addressed a letter to the contractor requiring him to absorb 78 candidates which included the petitioners. There were further communications whereby the SCI confirmed that canteen contractors may change from time to time but services of the canteen workers would be continued up to the age of superannuation. Salaries were disbursed to them from the accounts department of SCI after releasing the same to the contractor. Medical reimbursements were made directly by the SCI and wage revision communications were also issued by the SCI.

44. Another important factor which came to be considered is that the during partial closure of the canteen in the year 2002, canteen workers were redeployed by the SCI through administrative machinery. The work for which canteen workers were freely redeployed by the Petitioner their work included providing of drinking water to the officers on the floor, moving files within the same building, taking out photocopies for various departments, filing of papers based on ability of the concerned workmen. The canteen workers reported to the Assistant General Manager every day at the beginning of the office hours. Admittedly, the workers were not doing the normal tasks assigned to them. The canteen contractor had nothing to do with redeployment. Evidence that furthermore in the minutes of meeting the SCI and then recognised staff union, the contractor (personal and administration) stated that upon closure of the canteen all existing canteen boys would be absorbed in the payroll of the SCI. Facilities like house/building loans and cloth allowance were also extended at less cost to the canteen workers proposed to be absorbed. Based on the aforesaid evidence the CGIT had concluded that the canteen workers have been working for 30 years without changing and the then current contractor was required to absorb them. This fact was also communicated to the union by SCI. In addition canteen workmen were assigned various other jobs as described above after reporting to the Assistant General Manager of SCI. The SCI had agreed to absorb canteen workers and wages of workers had been reimbursed by the SCI.

45. This being the factual basis, the Court came to the conclusion that the contractor was merely an agent and the canteen workers were in fact employed by SCI. This Court found that the conclusions drawn by the CGIT warranted by facts and the CGIT had considered all relevant material placed before it and no irrelevant material had been considered for arriving at the conclusion. The CGIT had applied what is described as the “control and organisation” tests in principle.

46. In SCI while sustaining the order of the CGIT this Court had also considered submission on the basis of principles laid down ratio of the Supreme Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi [(2006) 4 SCC 1]. The decision of this Court in Maharashtra State Transport Corporation v. Maharashtra Castribe Rajya Parivahan Sanghatana [(2009) 8 SCC 556] while observing that the Supreme Court had found in Hari Nandan Prasad v. Management of Food Corporation of India, [(2009) 3 CLR 262] the fine balancing was required while adjudicating Industrial dispute and where there is an unfair labour practice when workmen had been continued for years as daily wagers or ad hoc or temporary workers in the face of availability of posts, with a view to exploit the workmen, the industrial adjudicator may grant relief by regularisation. Relying on MSRTC (supra) it was observed in Hari Nandan Prasad (supra) proceeding that balancing of the rival contentions would have to be taken up in each case.

47. In the case at hand, however, we are not concerned with the aspects of public service but there are different aspects considered by the Industrial Tribunal firstly on the aspect of payment of provident fund dues of the employees who are stated to be employees of the contractor, secondly the long tenure of many of these employees. In some cases the employees had been deputed to other plants. In the first round of litigation this Court remanded the matter for fresh hearing with liberty to lead additional evidence and the clear finding is to the effect that the contract between petitioner and the contractor was sham and bogus. Two aspects have to be considered. First whether the employees were carrying out work alloted by the company in the house keeping department as canvassed by Mr. Cama and whether the said employees were in fact employees of the contractor to allege that they rendered services at the premises of the company. On this aspect of the matter it would be appropriate for us to consider the case of the contractor.

48. Based on all the above what is to be considered is whether workmen concerned were believed to be engaged by the respondent contractor were integrated into the petitioners concern. Secondly whether as observed by the Supreme Court in Swapan Das Gupta (supra) whether finding of the Industrial court is manifestly or obviously erroneous or whether it is also necessary to consider whether the workmen concerned were overwhelmingly under the control of the petitioner company. In this regard it is necessary to note that although this Court had vide order dated 11th August 2015 remanded the three matters setting aside the order dated 23rd July, 2015 with a direction to decide the issue afresh. Liberty was given to parties to lead additional evidence before the Tribunal, if they so desired. Admittedly, neither party led any additional evidence. It was open to the company and the contractor to lead additional evidence to buttress their case that the employees concerned were engaged by the contractor but no evidence was led. The impugned order therefore proceeded to decide the issue based on the evidence at hand and it considered all aspects and come to the finding that the work carried out by the workmen were perennial in nature and that the contract was sham and bogus.

49. In my view the petitioner having come to Court in an earlier occasion and the matter having been remanded with a direction that the parties were at liberty to lead evidence. Considering the fact that the order impugned in this writ petition were against the petitioners and in the light of the petitioner not having conclusively established before the Industrial Court in the first round that the contract was an arms length and valid contract it was incumbent upon the petitioner/respondent no. 3 to lead additional evidence in support of their case. However, this is not been done. An opportunity was granted once again to establish cogent evidence that the contract entered into was valid. Furthermore evidence on record has also revealed that point apart from the case in the petition that the workmen were largely engaged in cleaning, maintaining of the factory and other odd jobs all within the factory premises. There was no explanation as to how the workers with identity cards bearing the name Godrej were deputed in other organisation, probably in view of the relation between the petitioner and the other organisation.

50. In the circumstances the Court came to the conclusion that the workers are in the control of the petitioner rather than the contractor. No further evidence was led on these aspects by the contractors to establish all the workmen concerned were their own. In fact the burden cast upon the petitioner and respondent no. 3 contractor was loaded against the petitioners and the contractors. There could not have been better opportunity to establish their case than upon remand. Although substantially reliance was placed by the respondent on the decision in SCI (supra) the facts of that case were established in no uncertain terms. That the contractor had virtually no control over the canteen workers. Although in the case at hand it would not be appropriate to equate the facts to those in the case of SCI (supra). However, if it appears that the Industrial Court was convinced that the workmen being fully integrated into the petitioners concern, I find there is nothing manifestly or obviously erroneous in the Court having come to such a conclusion. The impugned order therefore cannot be faulted for having concluded that the contract is sham and bogus.

51. That having been said, in my view there is no justification in the impugned order awarded a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- as compensation. The tribunal adopted a rough and ready assessment without any basis whatsoever. The order for payment of compensation imposed therefore cannot stand and is required to be set aside. In the circumstances the petitions succeed in part and I therefore pass the following order:

(i) The impugned orders dated 2nd March, 2017 passed in Reference (IT) Nos. 81 of 2003, 82 of 2003 and 15 of 2006 to the extent it directs the petitioner to pay a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- to each concerned worker against arrears being difference in wages and benefits as claimed in the schedule reference is hereby set aside. Save and except for the above, no case is made out for interference with the impugned order.

(ii) Writ Petitions are disposed of in the above terms.

(iii) No order as to costs.

52. At this stage Mr. Gopalan seeks stay of the order for a period of eight weeks. The request is declined.