(Appeal under section 96 of C.P.C. against the Judgment and decree dated 6.3.2003 in O.S.No.14 of 2000 on the file of the Court the VII Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad).

The appellant is the sole defendant in O.S.No.14 of 2000 on the file of the VII Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad.

2. The respondent filed the suit for eviction of the appellant from the suit schedule premises, a residential house, and for recovery of arrears of rents. Through its judgment dated 06-03-2003, the trial Court decreed the suit. Hence, this appeal.

3. Smt. Ms. B. Vijetha, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the respondent failed to prove his ownership over the suit schedule property, much less, did he establish the existence of relationship of tenant and landlord, between himself and the appellant. She contends that Ex.P-5, lease agreement, dated 18-8-1999, was not signed by the respondent; was not properly stamped, and in that view of the matter, it was inadmissible in evidence. She contends that Rajeswar Goud, the father of the plaintiff, and L. Ramesh Babu, was the G.P.A. of the landlord, of one Sri Gugu Murthy, and since the original owner and his G.P.A. are no more, the respondent herein could not have secured any rights, much less his G.P.A., L. Srinivas Goud. She submits that the trial Court did not take into account, the fact that the appellant had paid huge amounts to clear the arrears of electricity bills, not only for the partition in his occupation, but also the neighbouring premises, because of the fact that the power was supplied through a common meter.

4. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that the denial of ownership of the respondent, over the suit schedule property, is not bona fide and without any basis. He contends that the respondent got issued notice, dated 01-10-1999, Ex.A-2, requiring the appellant to pay the arrears and to vacate the premises, and in the reply, marked as Ex.A-3, the appellant did not raise any dispute, as to the ownership of the respondent. He further submits that Ex.A-5, is not a lease deed, but an agreement of lease, and in that view of the matter, it was not required to be registered. He contends that even otherwise, the document is admissible for collateral purposes.

5. In his plaint, the respondent claimed that he is the absolute owner of the property, bearing No.293/82/A/185, Ground Floor, at Plot No.185, Road No.15, Jubilee Hills, Hyderabad, and that the appellant is his tenant, on a monthly rent of Rs.3,000/-. He pleaded that the tenancy is from 18th of a month to 17th of a succeeding month, and that the appellant committed default in payment of rent from July 1998, till the date of filing of the suit. He claimed that a sum of Rs.54,000/- had accrued as arrears, by the date of filing of the suit. He got issued notice, dated 01-10-1999, requiring the appellant to pay the rents, and other charges, as well as to vacate the premises by 18-11-1999. Reference was made to the reply, got issued on behalf of the appellant and the cause of action for filing of the suit; was stated in the plaint.

6. The appellant filed a written statement, pleading inter alia that the suit was not presented by the proper party. According to him, the G.P.A. in favour of L. Srinivasa Goud, who filed the suit in that capacity, did not subsist, as on the date of filing of the suit. The ownership of the plaintiff, over the suit schedule property, was denied. The very existence of relationship of tenant and landlord, was denied and the plea as to arrears, was disputed. He pleaded that, one Guru Murthy, was the owner of the property, and since the said Guru Murthy is no more, it is his legal representative, that have succeeded to the property, and not the respondent. The lease agreement, dated 18-08-1999, on which the respondent placed reliance, was disputed. He has also denied the obligation to pay any water or electricity charges, or the liability to pay the future mesne profits. The notice got issued on behalf of the respondent is said to be not in accordance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act (for short the).

7. On the basis of these pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues:

1. Is the plaintiff not the owner of the suit property as contended by the defendant

2. Whether the defendant committed default in payment of rent and electricity and water charges If so, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for Rs.69,715/-

3. Is the notice given by the plaintiff is a proper one under S.106 of T.P. Act and thereby the tenancy was terminated

4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for vacant possession

5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to mesne profits at Rs.150/- per day from 19-11-1999 to 30-11-1999 and future mesne profits at the same rate

6. The result of suit

8. On behalf of the respondent, PWs1 and 2 were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-13 were marked. The appellant has neither chosen to cross-examine the witnesses, examined by the respondent, nor did he lead any oral or documentary evidence.

9. In view of the contentions raised by the parties, the following points arise, for consideration:

a) Whether the respondent herein is the owner of the suit schedule property

b) Whether the appellant is the tenant of the respondent

c) Whether the tenancy, in favour of the appellant, was property terminated

10. Strictly speaking, the plea put forward by the respondent herein, in his suit remained uncontroverted, and the trial Court was left with no alternative, except to decree the suit. Learned counsel for the appellant had stated several reasons, on account of which, the appellant was said to have been disabled from cross-examining the plaintiff witnesses, and leading any evidence, on his behalf. An appeal being the continuation of a suit, it is permissible for this Court to examine such reasons. A perusal of the order passed by the trial Court in I.A.No.135 of 2003, filed by the appellant, for reopening of the matter and for permitting him to lead evidence, disclose that it is the appellant, who was squarely to blame himself, for such a situation. The reasons stated for not cross-examining the plaintiff witnesses and for not leading any evidence, were not at all satisfactory. An attempt was made to throw the blame on an Advocate, who represented the respondent in the trial Court. It is not as if the appellant was not aware of the proceedings or progress in the suit, or that he was residing in a remote village, suffering any disability, to contact his counsel, from time to time.

11. PW-1, was examined, in chief, on 24-10-2002, and the matter was adjourned to 31.10.2002, for his cross-examination. The appellant and his counsel did not attend the Court. The right to cross-examine was forfeited. The suit was adjourned to 13-11-2002. There was no representation on that day also. It was again posted to 21-11-2002, subject to payment of costs. Neither the condition was complied with, nor there was any representation on that day. The evidence of the appellant was closed, and the matter was listed on 03-12-2002 for arguments, and thereafter, it was posted to 04-12-2002. On a representation made by the appellant, the matter was adjourned to 13-12-2002.

12. I.A.No.1249 of 2002 was filed for re-opening the evidence. The I.A. was allowed and PW-1 was recalled for further examination on 03-01-2003. Even this opportunity was not availed of, and ultimately, the Court proceeded to hear the matter. Therefore, it cannot be said that the trial Court denied the opportunity to the appellant, to lead his evidence, and to cross-examine the witnesses, examined by the respondent herein.

13. The trial Court did not base its conclusions only on the absence of defence, on the part of the appellant herein. It proceeded to examine the matter, to satisfy itself, as to whether the respondent made out his case.

14. As to the plea of the appellant, that the respondent therein did not possess the title to the property, it needs to be noticed that, before filing the suit, the respondent got issued a notice dated 01-10-1999, marked as Ex.A-2. In this notice, he asserted that he is the owner of the property; it was given on lease to the appellant under an agreement of lease, on a rent of Rs.3,000/-, and that the appellant committed default in payment of rent from July 1998 onwards. He called upon the appellant to pay the arrears and to hand over the vacant possession of the property. On receipt of Ex.A.2, the appellant got issued a reply, marked as Ex.A.3. In this, the appellant did not dispute the ownership of the respondent over the suit schedule property. He admitted that he is the tenant of the suit premises, and he did not plead that a person, other than the respondent, is the owner of the property. The appellant, in fact, stated in Ex.A-3, that he paid rents to the respondent, but the latter did not issue the receipts, from time to time, in spite of requests. A further contention was raised to the effect that, all the rents, due till September, 1999, were paid, and that the rent for the month of October, is due to be paid in November, 1999. Therefore, there is acquiescence and admission, on the part of the appellant, in the title of the respondent over the suit schedule property, at least, in the limited context of tenancy. In that view of the matter, the finding of the trial Court on Issue No.1, does not call for any interference.

15. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contends that the lease agreement, marked as Ex.A-5, ought not to have been received by the trial Court, in evidence, at all. She places reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Mulla Alamsabgari Dastigiri v. B. Pullamma (2004 (2) ALT 271 [LQ/TelHC/2004/113] ) and Section 17 of the Registration Act. The objection, as to admissibility of the document, Ex.A-5, on the ground that it was not registered, could certainly have been examined, if only the document was a lease deed. A lease deed, in respect of an immovable property, for a period, exceeding one year, or reserving a nearer rent, becomes admissible in evidence, if any it is registered, as required under Section 107 of the. Ex.A-5 is termed as lease agreement. Even assuming that the nomenclature of Ex.A-5, is not a decisive factor, and that its contents disclose that it was a lease deed, the objection cannot be sustained, for more reasons than one. Firstly, the appellant admitted the lease through his reply in Ex.A-3. Secondly, even if Ex.A-5 is to be treated as lease deed, it becomes admissible for collateral purposes, under the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act. The possession of a party to the suit, in relation to a property, is always treated as collateral, to the principal issues involved in a suit. Since the appellant did not dispute the ownership of the respondent over the suit schedule property in Ex.A-3, and since he admitted the payment of rent, to the respondent, point Nos.1 and 2, reserved to be answered against the appellant.

16. As regards the validity of the notice of termination, being Ex.A-2, except pleading that it is not in accordance with Section 106 of the Act, the appellant did not demonstrate as to how it is not legal. The effect of failure to cross-examine the witnesses, examined by the respondent, and absence of any evidence on his behalf, would have its impact, in fact, on the objection as to the validity of Ex.A-2 also. In Parwati Bai v. Radhika (AIR 2003 SC 3995 [LQ/SC/2003/577] ), the Supreme Court held that an objection to a quit notice under Section 106 of the Act, must be specific, but not general and vague. Hence, the third point is answered in favour of the respondent.

17. Therefore, this Court does not find any basis to interfere with the judgment of the trial Court. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. The appellant is granted two months time to vacate the premises. There shall be no order as to costs.