AVADH BEHARI, J.

( 1 ) THIS is a tenants appeal against the order of the rent control tribunal dated

January 13, 1972.

( 2 ) THE appellant Gjan Singh is a tenant of house No. 40-4j/4921 Mtliulcd in

Raigarpura, Karol Bagh. New Delhi on a monthly rent of Rs. 20. 00. In this house he

has one room. kitchen, varandah and common bath, latrine and a court yard in his

occupation. The respondent Tarlok Singh is the landlord. He purchased this property

on March 30. 196s. The appellant is a tenant since the days of the previous over.

On March 30, 1968, he attorned to the res- pondent.

( 3 ) ON May 23, 1969, the landlord filed a petition for the tenantejectment.

Ejectment was sought on clause (h) of the proviso lo S. 14 (U of the Delhi Rent

Control Act, 1958 ("the Act" ). That Clause reads:" (H) that the tenant has. whether

before or after tile commencement of this Act, built, acquired vacant possession of,

or been allotted, a residence. "

( 4 ) THE landlords case was that on February 6. 1966, the tciiani was allotted a

residence by the Central Public Works Department ("c. P. W. D. "), that is, quarter

No. 489 Sector V, R. K. Puram. New Delhi and he promised to vacate the premises

in dispute but did not shift to his Government allotted accommodation. It was said

dial the tenant "took possession of the said accommodation but further let it out to

somebody in order to get enhanced rent and has retained the suit premises without

any basis".

( 5 ) THE tenant contested the case. He raised three principal defences. Firstly, he

said that the notice to quit was not valid. Secondly. he denied that the premises laid

been let to him only for residential purpose. Thirdly, he denied that he was in

possession of any allotted accommodation.

( 6 ) THE rein controller by order dated January 27, 1971, passed an order of

eviction. He found that the notice to quit was valid. that the letting purpose was

residential and that the C. P. W. D. did allot a quarter to the tenant on February 5.

1966 possession whereof was handed over to him on February 7, 1966 by the

department. He further found that the tenant surrendered possession of the quarter

in April 1968 to the department.

( 7 ) IN his evidence before the controller the landlord produced a clerk of C. P. W.

D. He proved that the quarter was allotted to the tenant on February 5, 1966 which

remained with him till April 10. 1968. In his evidence the tenant admitted this tact

of allotment. But he, however, said that he himself never shifted to that quarter.

The quarter was used by his son for studies and that is why he got the allotment.

Later he found that the quarter was situated at a very inconvenient distance and,

therefore, he voluntarily surrendered it as he had no use for it. He also said that he

had attained the age of Superannuation and was getting yearly extension in service

and. therefore, was not entitled to retain the Government allotted accommodation.

He said he was entitled to retain his private rented house as lie was on the verge of

retirement. The rent controller found the purpose of allotment for studies not

proved. The tenant also did not prove that he had attained the age of

superannuation. But one fact was clearly established. It was this: that the quarter

was allotted to the tenant in February 1966 which remained in his possession till

April 10, 1968. In the view of the controller clause (h) applied. He, therefore, passed

an order of eviction, as I have said.

( 8 ) THE tenant appealed lu llie rcm control trihuiial. The tribunal affirmed the

findings of the controller and held that the notice was valid and the letting purpose

was residential. Following a division bench rolling this Court in lluilu Mill v.

Ruinesimar Nalt. 1970 R. C. R. 532 () the tribunal held in agreement with the

controller that the tenant was liable to ejectment as he had once been allotted a

quarter and it did nut matter that he surrendered possesion thereof in April 1968.

The tenants appeal was dismissed.

( 9 ) THE tenant appeals to this Court. The issue to be decided in the appeal is: Is

the tenant liable to be evicted on the ground stated in clause (h) notwithstanding

the fact that the quarter was allotted and the allotment was cancelled long before

the petition was brought r; will he remembered that the respondent purchased the

house on March 30. 196s. The quarter was allotted in February 1966 and that it was

surrendered in early April, 1968. The petition was Filed on. May 23. 1969. that is.

after more than a year of the caneellation of the allotment of the quarter.

( 10 ) THIS appeal raises a question of interpretation of clause (h ). seems to me

that the crucial word in the clause is has. That wore gives us a key to its

interpretation. The underlying object in enacting clause (h) of the proviso to S. 14

(1) of the Act is that the cannot should not have more than one premises for his

residence in these days of housing shortage. In case the tenant has taken on rent a

particular premises for his residence and thereafter acoures vacant possession of

another premises for his residence, he. the lenant in such an eventuality would have

to quit the earlier tenanted A premises. See Shyam Sunder v. Khan Chand, 1966 (2)

O. L. T. 223 (^ ). The controller and the tribunal both thought that all that. this

clause rcquired the landlord to prove is that the tenant was once allotted a

residence and that he was given vacant possession thereof. They thought that it did

not make any difference that the allotment was cancelled before the ejectment

petition was filed as in their view on allotment a cause of action arose to the

landlord which the tenant could not destroy by his own act of surrender of the

house. This view was avowedly based on the division bench ruling in Hutoo Mals

case (supra ). Though there was a later decision of P. S. Safeer J in Ved Parkush v.

Sh. Chum Lul, 1971 D. L. T. 59 taking a contrary view the tribunal declined to follow

that ruling as he felt himself bound by the division bench. The tribunal expressly

said that the single bench ruling in the case. Ved Parkash (supra) favoured the

tenant but unfortunately he did not. follow it. He preferred to rest his decision on

the authority of the division bench.

( 11 ) IN Barren v. Foidree (1932) A. C. . 676 (P. 682) Lord Warrington of Clyflc

said: the safer and more correct course of dealing with a question of construction is

to take the words themselves and arrive if possible at their meaning without, in the

first instance, reference to cases. " Clause (h), in my view, should be construed

according to the ordinary meaning of the English language. The words used there

have. no idiomatic meaning. An elementary rule of construction is that the phrases

and sentences are to be construed according to the rules of grammar. "the length

and detail of modern legislation" wrote Lord Evershed M. R. . "has undoubtedly

reinforced the claim of literal construction as the only safe rule. " If there is nothing

lo modify, alter or qualify the language which the statute contains. it must be

construed in the ordinary and natural meaning of the words and sentences. (See

Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes. Twelfth Edition page 28 ).

( 12 ) CLAUSE (h) uses the word lias. It is a key word in the setting of the clause.

The word "has or have, the dictionaries tell us, means to hold in possession us

property; own; to hold. keep or retain, esp. in ones use. service, or at ones disposal

as for example (You cannot have your cake and citing too ). (The Chairman has all

the tickets needed ).

( 13 ) PLAINLY the words in the clause mean that on the date of the application the

tenant must be having a residence either because he has (1) built: or (2) acquired

vacant possession; or (3) been attested a residence. One of these situations must

exist on the date of the application in order to furnish a cause of action to the

landlord. If one of the situations exist he can go to court and say: "the tenant

should be asked to vacate my house as he has an alternative residence in his

possession by reason of building or acquisition or allotment. " If on the date of the

application for eviction the tenant, las not got any such residence in his possession

lhen it cannot be said that the landlord has a cause of action to move the controller

for passing an order of eviction against him. If the tenantless no present right to the

vacant residence on the date of the application then his ejectment cannot be

ordered under this clause. When we say that the tenant has been acquired vacant

possession of a residence" or that the tenant "has been allotted a residence". we

mean that he lias a present right to move into the premises. for. the vacant

residence, whether built, allotted or acquired, is at his disposal. It is not possible to

ignore in the construction of the clause the possessive character which the word

"has" denotes. In interpreting the clause in this way i am not alone. I am in good

company of P. S. Saleer. He has also taken this view in the case of Ved Parkash

(supra ).

( 14 ) INDISPUTABLY in this case it has been established that a quarter was allotted

to the tenant in February 1966 and it remained in his possession till the beginning of

April, 1968. It is also not in dispute that the present landlord purchased the

premises on March 30. 1968. For all practical purposes, therefore, both the

allotment and the surrender took place in the time of the previous landlord. The

present landlord thought of suing the tenant only in May, 1969. On that date again

it is not disputed that the tenant was no longer in possession of an allotted quarter

and that he had surrendered the same in April. 1968. As the tenant on the date of

the application was not in possession of a Government allotted accommodation the

landlord, in my opinion, was not entitled to invoke clause (h) and seek the tenants

ejectment. This interpretation, it appear to me, fits with the facts of life. "the

canons of construction are not so rigid as to prevent a realistic solution. " (Per Lord

Reid in Cramas Properties, Ltd. v. Connaught Fur Trimmings, Ltd. , (1965 I W. L. R.

892, at p. 899) (5 ).

( 15 ) 1. he counsel for the landlord has argued that on the allotment of the quarter

to the tenant in February 1966 a complete cause of action accrued to the landlord to

sue the tenant in ejectment as all the conditions of clause (h) were satisfied and the

present landlord after purchase of the house was entitled to sue and that it did not

matter that on the date of the application the allotment had been surrendered, i

cannot read the words of the clause as counsel would have. them read.

( 16 ) THE word "has" received a judicial interpretation at the hands of the Supreme

COUrt in Goppulal v. Thakurji Shriji Shirii Dwarkadheeshji, 1969 R. C. R. 300. In that

case the Court had to interpret clause 13 (1) (c) of Rajasthan Preinises (Conirol of

Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. The relevant words were has sub-let". Speaking for

the Court Bachawat J said: "the present pcriecl tense conternpla. tes a complelej

event connected in some way with the present time. The words take within their

sweep any subletting which was made in the past and has continued upto the

present. lime. "

( 17 ) THE counsel lor the landlord placed great reliance on Mangilal v. Sugnchand

Rathi, 1964 (5) S. C. R. 239. In that case the Court was called upon to interpret S. 4

(a) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act. 1955.

( 18 ) THE tenant was in arrears of rent. He was given one months notice to pay

the arrears. He Failed to make payment to the kindlord of the arrears within one

month of the written notice of demand. The. landlord sued the tenant for ejectment.

The High Court ordered ejectment. Appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed.

THE Supreme Court said : this provision dearly speaks of a tenant having failed to

make payment to the landlord of the arrears of rent due from him within The time

prescribed in that clause, It does not mean that the ground on which evolution)".

esaimed must subsist till the date of suit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . the grounds

set out in cl. (a) of s. 4 need not be shown by the landlord to exist at the date of

institution of the suit. All that is necessary for him to establish is that the tenant was

in fact in arrears, that he was given one months notice to pay up the arrears and.

that in spite of this he failed to pay those arrears within one month of service of

notice on him. "

( 19 ) THE counsel for the respondent submits that as in that case. so in this it is not

necessary for the landlord to show that the ground on which eviction is claimed

subsists till the date of the suit. I do not agree. Mangi Lals case (supra) was a

decision of a different hue. in that case the landlords claim was based upon "the

right which had accrued to them tinders. 4 (a) of the Act in consequence of the

default made by the defendant in paying arrears of rent", as the Supreme Court

said. This was emphasised again when it was said that the claim was on the basic of

the statutory right under s. 4 of the Accommodation Act accruing by reason of the

default made in the payment of rental arrears. "

( 20 ) THE provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955

were different from the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. Now the protection to the

tenent by the Delhi Rent Control Act. 1958 is more extensive and a tenant in arrears

of rent is given time to pay the arrears after the institution of the suit for eviction :

See S. 14 (2) of the Rent Act, This was not so under the Madhya Pradesh Act and,

therefore, a right accrued to the landlord on the failure of the tenant to pay the rent

within the period of one month and no subsequent event, it was held, could lake

away that right. (See page 247 of the report ). The decision of the Supreme Court in

that case, therefore, is to be confined to an interpretation of clause (a) of S. 4 of the

Madhya Pradesh Act. The observations made in that case are of no help to us in the

interpretation of clause (h) of the proviso to S. 14 (1) of our Act. ft is most

dangerous to interpret one. section of an Act: on the analogy of interpretation

placed upon another section of a different Act.

( 21 ) LASTLY I must examine the division bench ruling of this Court in the case of

Batoo Mal (supra ). The tribunal thought that it was bound by that decision. So am

1. But in my opinion, that case has not been correctly understood by the tribunal.

( 22 ) BATOO Mals ejectment was sought by his landlord v. the ground mentioned

in clause (h) oi the proviso to S. 14 (1) of the Act. Batoo Mal. owned oilier premises

also which he had let out on i-cni:. One of them fell vacant in 195^ and another in

1962. In 1962 the petition for ejectment was filed against him. The tenant said that

the house which became vacant in 1962 was not sufficient for his residence. The

learned judges of the division bench rejected the. argument. They said.-- in the

present case the tenant owns other premises which he has let out on rent. One of

them fell vacant in "1958 and another in 1962. He must, therefore, be said to have

acquired vacant possession of a residence in 1958 and 1962 within the meaning of

proviso (h) to section 14 (1 ). On 12-1-196 L the tenant Batoo Mal had made a

statement before the Magistrate First Class Delhi, that he would vacate the premises

in favour of the landlord as and when his own house would become vacant (vide

exhibit R/l ). The tenants house has actually become vacant in 1962. The eviction

petition was filed in 1962. Learned counsel for the tenant said that the house which

had become vacant in 1962 was not sufficient for the purpose of residence of the

tenant. But the tenant cannot be heard to despite its sufficient in view of his own

admission that he would vacate the premises when his own house would become

vacant. Apparently he had thought that his house would be sufficient for his

residence nor did the landlord delay too much in Filing the eviction petition on this

cause of action. It may he that in an exceptional case if the landlord files the

eviction petition too long after the tenant obtains vacant possession of a residence

for himself then the tenant may defend the eviction petition on the ground that he

had in the mean while let out his own residence to some oilier person as he was not

bound to keep it vacant wailing for the landlord to file an eviction petition. Tile

present is not such a case. " The above passage contains the quintessence of their

decision.

( 23 ) BATTO Mals case was a decision on the particular facts of that case. Tenants

house actually fell vacant in 1962. The landlord did not delay the filing of the

eviction petition. He brought the petition in 1962 itself. The tenant could not say

that the accommodation was insufficient. His eviction was ordered.

( 24 ) THE division bench itself recognizes that there may be cases where delay will

defeat landlords claim for tenants ejectment under clause (h ). The present. I think,

is such a case. Circumstances in this case are substantially different from Bafii Mals

case (supra ).

( 25 ) BATTO Mals case is an authority for what it decides and not for what it says.

Lord Halsbmy in Quinn v. Leathern (1901) A. C. When the judges of this court (the

Court or Appeal) give a decision on the interpretation of an act of Parliament that

decision itself is binding on them and their successors. But the words which the

judges used in giving a decision are not binding. This is often a very fine distinction,

because the decision can only be expressed in words. Nevertheless it is a real

distinction which will best be appreciated by remembering that, when interpreting a

statute, the sole function of the court is to apply the words of the statute to ,a given

situation. Once a decision has been reached on that situation the doctrine of

precedent requires us to apply the statute in the same way in any similar situation :

but not in a different situation. Whenever a new situation emerages, not covered by

previous decisions, the court must be governed by the statute and not by the words

of the judges. "

( 26 ) IN Wright v. Walford (1955) I Q. B. 363 (CA) Evershed M. R. pointed out that,

after a matter has come before the courts on the meaning of a phrase in an Act of

Parliament, there is a danger that the courts will thereafter construe not the Act and

the words in it but expositions of the Act expressed in judgments of the courts,

which expositions were in a sense necessarily limited to the parti- cular facts of the

particular case. IT is true that after an ejectment petition is filed a tenant cannot

destroy the cause of action by giving up the newly acquired residence. If that were

so every tenant would defeat the right of a landlord easily. In the case of Shyain

Sunder (supra) this is what happened. During the pendency of the ejectment

proceedings the tenant vacated the premises H. R. Khanna J said:"mr. Misra then

contends that the appellant has, during the pendency of the ejectment proceedings,

vacated the premises in Kishen Gan. This fact, in my opinion would not make

material difference because the appellant became liable to ejectment when he

shifted to his new place of residence after having acquired vacant possession to the

same. Once that liability to ejectment has been incurred the same cannot be undone

by the appellant surrendering possession of the premises he took on rent in Kishen

Gan. "

( 27 ) IN view of the fact that in the present case the quarter was surrendered by

the tenant in April, 1968, and the petition for ejectment was brought in May, 1969,

when admittedly the tenant was not in possession of the acquired residence the

tenants ejectment cannot be ordered for something which he did in the past during

the time of the previous landlord. In my opinion, a landlord cannot store causes of

action. If the tenant acquires new residence ejectment proceedings have to be

launched immediately. A tenant can not be evicted for what he may have done in

hoary past. If in the days of yore a tenant was allotted an accommodation and he

surrendered it much before he is sued it is neither right nor just to ask him to vacate

the premises in his occupation. Such an interpretation not only is unwarranted but

also not in keeping with the purposes and plain words of the social legislation such

as is the Rent Act.

( 28 ) IN the result the appeal is allowed. Ejectment order is set aside. The parties

are, however, left to bear their own costs in the circumstances of the case.