Dawson Miller, C.J.The question for decision in this appeal is whether an order passed by the Munsif of Raghunathpur granting a review of a judgment and a decree reversing the decision previously arrived at can stand.

2. The appellants who are the plaintiffs in the suit are the purchasers from the recorded tenants of a 12 annas share in the latters non-transferable occupancy holding the rent of which they allege was Rs. 14. The landlord sued the tenants who had retained the other 4 annas in the holding for arrears of rent of the whole holding alleging the same to be at the rate of Rs. 31 and obtained a decree and in execution had the holding advertised for sale. The plaintiffs were not parties to that Suit. Before the sale took place, the plaintiffs instituted a suit before the Munsif claiming a declaration that the decree obtained by the landlords against the recorded tenants was collusive and fraudulent and should be set aside alleging that the rent was not Rs. 31 as decreed but Rs. 14 only. Pending the hearing of the suit thev obtained an injunction staying the sale. The landlords and the recorded tenants from whom the plaintiffs had purchased their 12 annas share in the holding were impleaded as defendants in that suit.

3. The Additional Munsif to whose file the suit was transferred for trial decided that the decree was obtained by collusion between the landlords and the tenants but that the plaintiffs had no cause of action as they had not been dispossessed and had suffered no damage and were not entitled to apply for a declaration that a decree passed in a suit to which they were not parties was fraudulent and collusive and should be set aside until they had suffered some actual damage by dispossession, and as they had not been actually dispossessed of their property by sale in execution of the decree he considered that the suit was premature and not maintainable at that stage. For this proposition he relied upon the authority of Gananath Satpathy v. Harihar Pandhi (1918) 5 P.L.W. 232. The facts of that case were somewhat similar. The transferees of a portion of a non-transferable occupancy holding also sued the landlords for a declaration that a rent decree obtained by them against the tenants, the transferors of the plaintiffs, was fraudulent It was not shown that the plaintiffs had suffered any damage by reason of the decree but it was said that shay might be dispossessed if the decree were executed by sale of the holding. It was not suggested that the plaintiffs in that case had at the time of suit suffered any actual damage by the decree beyond the apprehension of being dispossessed and it was held that as the landlords had not up to that time dispossessed the plaintiffs and it was not known whether they would do so, the right to a declaration under action 42 of the Specific Belief Act did not arise. In the course of the judgment it was stated: "Here the landlords have not yet dispossessed the plaintiffs and it is not known whether they will do so. When that time comes it will be open to the plaintiffs to adopt such remedies as the law gives them but before that time comes the plaintiffs are not entitled to a declaration that a tenant alleged by the landlords to be their tenant is not in fact their tenant and that a decree obtained by the landlords against their alleged tenant is fraudulent. Having no legal title or interest which the landlords are concerned to deny, the plaintiffs cannot invoke the operation of Section 42 of the Specific Belief Act in this suit". In a later case Asarfo Singh v. Ram Khelawan Sinha (1919) 4 P.L.J. 115 decided by a Full Bench consisting of three Judges of this Court in 1918 it was decided that such a suit was maintainable before the plaintiff had been dispossessed if in fact he had suffered damage by the decree, and it was held that in so far as Gananath Satpathy v. Harihar Pandhi purported to decide (1) that even if the transferee has made a deposit or (2) even if the transferee has suffered actual damage by an infraction of his legal rights, irrespective of whether pecuniary damage has been sustained or not, such transferee cannot maintain an action to attack the fraudulent decree, the decision was incorrect. I agree that, if the transferee has suffered actual damage or if he has been obliged to deposit the decretal amount in a fraudulent rent suit to preserve his property, which comes to much the same thing, he would be entitled to maintain an action to attack the decree as fraudulent, but I do not consider that the judgment in the earlier ease, in which I as a member of the Bench concurred, intended to lay down the proposition attributed to it by the Full Bench decision. However that may be the Full Bench decision was not drawn to the attention of the learned Munsiff and he dismissed the suit upon the ground that the plaintiff had at the date of its institution suffered no damage as he had not been dispossessed and had no cause of action. The present suit was tried on the 11th June 1919. The Full Bench case was decided in December 1918 and was reported in the authorised reports on the 28fch February following. There was no reason therefore why with ordinary care the decision should not have been drawn to the attention of the Court by the defendants pleader.

4. There was no appeal from the additional Munsifs decision but the appellants applied on the 20fch June in the Court of the additional Munsif for review of judgment stating that the Court had dismissed the suit as not being maintainable on the basis of a decision, which had been subsequently overruled by a Full Bench decision of the same Court. The application for review then proceeded as follows: "It will appear from the facts above stated that the present suit is maintainable. At the time of the trial of the suit petitioners could not place the aforesaid Full Bench ruling before the Court as they were not aware of it. It is therefore prayed that the aforesaid Full Bench ruling may be referred to and that the suit may be decreed after setting aside the order of dismissal." The office of additional Munsif having been abolished the application was heard by the permanent Munsif in August 1919.

5. The learned Munsif allowed the application for review on the ground that his predecessor had committed an error of law. He considered that Order 47, Rule 1 of the CPC was wide enough to include such a case. Having arrived at this conclusion he considered the effect of the Full Bench decision in Asarfo Singh v. Ram Khelawan Sinha (1919) 4 P.L.J. 115 and found that as the landlords by collusion with the tenants had obtained a decree for a rate of rent higher than the actual rate this afforded sufficient ground in itself to give the plaintiffs a cause of action and passed a decree in their favour declaring that the decree obtained in the rent suit was fraudulent and collusive and should be set aside.

6. The defendants appealed to the Subordinate Judge who held first, that no appeal lay from the decision of the Munsif and secondly that the Munsif was right in holding that the suit was maintainable.

7. A second appeal was preferred to this Court which was heard by Adami, J., who held that an appeal lay against the order granting the application for review and secondly that the production of an authority which was not brought to the notice of the Judge at the hearing and which lays down a view of the law contrary to that taken by the Judge was not a sufficient ground for granting a review. He considered that the decision of the Privy Council in Chaju Ram v. Neki 1922 P.C. 112 concluded the matter and allowed the appeal. Prom that decision the present appeal has been preferred to this Bench by the plaintiffs.

8. It was contended in the first place that Order 47, Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Code, which limits the grounds upon which an order granting an application for review may be objected to in appeal precluded the respondents from questioning the propriety of the order in this case and secondly, that the decisions of the Munsif and of the Subordinate Judge on appeal accurately interpreted the law as laid down in Asarfo Singh v. Ram Khelawan Singh (1919) 4 P.L.J. 115 and applied it to the facts of this case. Under Order 47, Rule 7, apart from any question of limitation, the only grounds upon which it is permissible to object to such an order are that the application is in contravention either of the provisions of Rule 2 or of the provisions of Rule 4 of the Order. Rule 2 does not apply. By Rule 4 proviso (6) it is provided that no such application shall be granted on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence which the applicant alleges was not within his knowledge or could not be adduced by him when the decree or order was passed or made without strict proof of such allegation. Before considering the effect of this Rule it is necessary to bear in mind that Rule 1 of the Order lays down the grounds upon which a review of judgment may be applied for by a person aggrieved by the decree or order. These are (a) the discovery of now and important matter or evidence which after the exercise of doe diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or (b) on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or (c) for any other sufficient reason. It was contended that role 4 did not apply as the ground of the application in this case was a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record and not the discovery of new and important matter or evidence. It is necessary to consider therefore whether where the judgment sought to be reviewed is based upon a wrong application of the law this constitutes a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. There are undoubtedly decisions of the Courts in India which support the view that a wrong application of the law constitutes an error on the face of the judgment. See Sharup Chand Mala v. Pat Dassee (1887) 14 Cal. 627. There are also oases which lay down that the production of a binding authority which was not placed before the trial Court amounts to the discovery of new and important matter of evidence but those decisions are by no means uniform. It is not necessary to consider them in detail as the whole question has, in my opinion, been finally settled by the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 1922 in the case of Chhajju Ram v. Neki 1922. P.C. 112 In that case their Lordships examined the case-law on the subject in India which they found to be conflicting and they held that the first two grounds upon which a review is permissible under Order 47, Rule 1, namely, the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which could not after due diligence have been produced at the trial or some mistake or error apparent -on the face of the record did not apply to a case where the ground of review is that the judgment has proceeded upon an incorrect exposition of the law. They further held that the third ground namely, any other sufficient reason must be a reason sufficient on grounds analogous to those previously specified. In the present cases the review was granted upon the ground that the case law relied upon by the Munssif had been modified by a subsequent decision which, in my opinion, amounts to the same thing as a wrong exposition of the law. In view of the recent decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council it is no longer open to the appellants to argue that the ground of review was an error on the face of the record. In fact the ground upon which the application for review was based was that the petitioners were not aware of the Full Bench ruling of this Court and could not place it before the Munsif at the first trial. Evan assuming that this were a legitimate ground of review which the Privy Council has decided is not so, it could only be justified on the ground of the discovery of new matter or evidence and an order granting review on such grounds is clearly appealable under Order 47, Rule 7 coupled with Rule 4 of the same order. That Rule provides that the application shall not be granted on such grounds without strict proof either that the new matter is not within the knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced by him when the decree or order was passed or made. In the present case no such proof was given. Indeed it would be impossible to prove that a Full Bench decision of the High Court to which the trial court was subordinate, published in the authorised law renorts some four months before the trial, could not have beet adduced at the trial. If in fact the decision was not within the knowledge of the petitioner or his pleader, ignorance of this nature ought not, in my opinion in view of Rule 1 of Order 47 to be allowed to be pleaded in support of an application such as the present. It follows therefore that the order granting the review upon the ground assigned was altogether irregular and ought never to have been made and in appeal it can be set aside.

9. Moreover, although it is not perhaps necessary in view of the above finding to decide the point, I am of opinion that in the present case, even on the assumption that the decree was obtained by collusion between the landlords and the tenants the plaintiffs having at present suffered no loss the action was not maintainable and the facts of this case are not governed by the decision of the Full Bench in Asarfo Singh v. Ram Khelawan Singh (1919) 4 P.L.J. 115 a decision which was based upon the finding that the plaintiff in that suit had suffered loss by the wrongful and collusive act of the defendants.

10. In my view the judgment of the learned Judge of this Court was right and should be affirmed. 1 would dismiss this appeal with costs.

11. I would add, however, that our present decision must not be taken as in any prejudicing the plaintiffs right to take such steps as may be open to them to challenge the validity of the decree in the rent suit, if and when their rights should be infringed or their possession assailed. At present it is not known whether the landlord defendants will or will not attempt to deprive the plaintiffs of possession.

Mullick, J.

12. Defendants 2 and 3 are the recorded tenants of an occupancy holding of which the defendant No. 1 is the landlord. Defendants 4, 5, 6 and 7 are said to be unrecorded tenants who have an interest in the holding jointly with defendants 2 and 3. The plaintiffs have purchased a twelve annas share in the holding from defendants 2 and 3 and allege that the rental of the holding is Rs. 14 per annum but that the defendant No. 1 in collusion with defendants Nos. 2 and 3 obtained a decree at the rate of Rs. 31 per annum in execution of which he caused the holding to be attached and proclaimed for sale. The plaintiffs thereupon brought a suit in the Court of the permanent Munsif of Raghunathpur for a declaration that they had purchased the Jamal right to the extent of twelve annas in the holding and praying that the sale should be declared collusive and fraudulent and that an injunction should be issued restraining the defendant No. 1 from executing the decree. The suit was transferred to the Additional Munsif of Raghunathpur who dismissed it on the 11th June 1919 on the ground that the plaintiffs had shown no cause of action. An application for review was then filed before the Additional Munsif but upon his Court being abolished the application was heard by the permanent Munsif who on the 22nd of August 1919 set aside the decree of the Additional Munsif. The ground for the reversal of the decree was that the Full Bench decision of this Court in Asarfo Singh v. Ram Khelawan Singh (1919) 4 P.L.J. 115 had overruled Gananath Satpathy v. Harihar Pande (1918) 5 P.L.W. 232 upon which the Additional Munsif had acted and that the mere passing of a collusive decree was a sufficient cause of action. On appeal the Subordinate Judge of, Manbhum affirmed this decree and the defendant No. 1 thereupon appealed to the High Court and on the 3rd of July, 1922, Mr. Justice Adami decreed the appeal on the ground that the permanent Munsif had acted without jurisdiction and upon insufficient grounds in reviewing the judgment of the Additional Munsif. He accordingly restored the decree of the additional Munsif and the present Letters Patent Appeal is filed by the plaintiff against the judgment of the learned Judge.

13. Now the first question is whether it was open to the learned Judge of this Court to examine the sufficiency of the grounds upon which the permanent Munsif of Raghunathpur granted the review. It is contended that when a Court grants a review his order can be objected to only for the reasons enumerated in Rule 7 of Order 47 of the CPC either by an appeal against the order or by any appeal against the final" decree. Here it is contended that as the review was not granted on any of the grounds (a), (b) and (c) enumerated in the first clause of Rule 7 but because there had been an error apparent on the face of the record or for some other sufficient reason the order was final and could not be attacked in appeal.

14. It is clear that as the application for review was presented So the additional Munsif in the first instance and was heard by the permanent Munsif after the court of the additional Munsif was merged in the court of the permanent Muuaif there cannot have been any breach of Rule 2 of Order 47.

15. If the review was granted on the ground of discovery of new and important matter and if strict proof was not given of the fact that the matter was not within the knowledge of the applicant when the order was passed, then there was a breach of Rule 4 and it was open to the Court which heard the appeal from the final decree to determine whether or not strict proof had been given. The learned Judge of this Court has held that the discovery of the decision in Asarfo Singhs case was not new matter within the meaning of Rule 1 and in this view I agree. The decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Chhajju Ram v. Neki 1922 P.C. 112 seems to ma to conclude the point.

16. It is next necessary to examine the contention that if the decision in question was not new matter then the Munsif must have granted the review on the ground that there was an error apparent on the face of the record or for other sufficient reason.

17. Now Ghhajju Barns case makes it clear that the sufficient reason must be a reason sufficient on grounds analogous to those previously specified in Rule 1 and therefore the appellant is compelled to argue that an order granting a review on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record cannot be attacked in the appeal against the final decree. If he succeeds on this point we are precluded at the outset from examining the propriety of the order.

18. Now in Section 376 of the CPC of 1859 (Act VIII of 1859) it was enacted that an order refusing or granting a review shall be final. That however did not preclude the party affected from objecting to the review in his appeal against the decree Joogul Kishore Singh v. Oogur Narain Singh 8 W.R. 483, Next the CPC of 1882 while enacting that an objection against an order granting a review on the ground of a contravention of Section 624 which now corresponds to Rule 2 of Order 47 or of Section 626 which corresponds to Rule 4 taken either bv an appeal against the order or in an appeal against the final decree did not take away that the appellant to object to the order on the ground that the court had acted without jurisdiction, nor has the present CPC made any alteration in the law in this respect.

19. If therefore the Munsif granted the review on the ground that there was an error apparent on the face of the record it was open to the Court which heard the appeal against; the final decree to oonsidar the correctness of his decision in this matter.

20. It was open therefore to Mr. Justice Adami to consider the propriety of the order.

21. In my opinion it cannot be said that the additional Munsif committed an error apparent on the face of the record by following the decision of a Division Bench in Gananath Satpathys case. Even if it were assumed that the Full Bench decision in Asarfos case directly overruled the decision of the Division Bench still that would not be a sufficient ground for review, and the proper remedy of the aggrieved party was to appeal against the decree. The decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Chajju Barns case concludes this point. As a matter of fact the Full Bench did not overrule the Division Bench in any way. I agree therefore with Mr. Justice Adami that the order granting the review was improperly made.

22. On the merits also the decision is correct, for in my opinion the plaintiffs have no cause of action.

23. The position of a transferee of a portion of a non-tranferable occupancy holding is a peculiar one. He has a right to possession as against the whole world but the landlord is not bound to receive rent from him nor to recognize his existence in any litigation between himself and his recorded tenant. He is not a necessary party in a suit for arrears of rent or for enhancement of rent and he cannot since the latest Full Bench decision upon this joint in this Court deposit the arrears u/s 170 of the Bengal Tenancy Ace so as to save the holding from sale, He may according to the Full Bench ruling in Dayamoyee v. Ananda Mohan (1915) 41 Cal. 172 apply under Order 21, Rule 90, C.P.C., to have the sale set aside on the ground of irregularity but he cannot sue the landlord for a declaration that a decree obtained by him against the recorded tenant is void except upon showing that he has actually suffered damage by the landlords act. I can find nothing in the Full Bench decision in Asarfo Singh v. Ram Khelawan Sinha (1919) 4 P.L.J. 115 which justifies the view that a suit would lie against the landlord if his decree against the tenant had failed to cause damage to the transferee.

24. It is contended that even if he cannot prove damage the transferees suit will lie u/s 42 of the Specific Relief Act. Now it is undoubtedly true that the transferee has a legal right in Immovable property, that is to say, a right to remain in possession. It may be also admitted that he has a right to such possession upon payment of a certain rent to the recorded tenant, but what has the landlord done which can be construed as a challenge to the transferees right. It is said that by obtaining decree for Rs. 31 instead of Rs. 14 the landlord has proclaimed to the world that the true rental is Rs. 31 and that he has thereby cast a cloud upon the title of the transferee. The answer is that the landlord has no concern with the transferee and that the fact that he has obtained a collusive decree against the recorded tenant at Rs. 31 per annum is no declaration that the transferee is liable to pay to the recorded tenant an enhanced sum. It cannot be said that the landlord has denied the right or is interested in denying the right of a person of whose existence he is not even aware, and no case has been shown to us in which a declaration has been given to a transferee simply on the ground that the landlord has obtained a collusive decree against a recorded tenant. In my opinion the suit of the plaintiffs is premature for the recorded tenant may satisfy the decree before sale. Reliance has been placed by the respondent upon a decision of this Court in Lala Brahmdeo Lal v. Sheo Prasad Lal (1917) 2 P.L.J. 561. In that case the transferee had been allowed to deposit the decretal amount u/s 170 of the Bengal Tenancy A at and under the provisions of Section 171 he had acquired a mortgage lien upon the holding and had taken possession of the same. The landlord was bound to receive rant from the transferee till his mortgage lien was discharged and he was brought into direct relationship with him. The landlord thereafter brought a collusive suit at an enhanced rental against the original tenant and it was held that the transferee was competent to bring a suit for a declaration that the decree was collusive and not binding upon him.

25. In that case the transferees right to keep possession of the holding upon payment of the existing rent was directly challenged by the landlords collusive decree and the case fell strictly within the provisions of Section 42 of the Specific Belief Act. In the present case the transferee had no such mortgage lien and I cannot see that the landlord has in any way denied his right or that he is interested in denying it.

26. I think therefore that the decree of the Munsif issuing a permanent injunction upon the landlord prohibiting him from executing his rent decree is wrong and the decree of the additional Munsif in the first instance was right.

27. The result therefore is that the judgment of Mr. Justice Adami must be affirmed and the appeal dismissed with costs. The contesting defendant will get his costs throughout.