This is an appeal from the decree of the Subordinate Judge of Chicacole dated 19th November, 1936 reversing on appeal the decree of the District Munsif of Vizagapatam dated the 10th November, 1932 in O.S. No. 175 of 1932. The reversal was based on a single ground namely, that the plaintiff had failed to show that she or her vendors had possession of the suit property at any time within 12 years prior to the suit and that therefore the suit was barred by limitation. The other points which arose in the case and which had been decided in favour of the plaintiff were not considered by the lower appellate Court and indeed the main complaint by the appellant has been that the judgment of the lower appellate Court does not satisfy the legal requirements of a judgment.

This is a case in which by a curious irony, the Subordinate Judge who decided the case was an officer junior in rank to the District Munsif who decided the case as the trial Judge. This is accounted for by the fact that nearly four years elapsed between the decision by the trial Judge and the decision in appeal.

The question of possession was dealt with by the trial Court in a careful judgment covering a lot of ground and no attempt was made by the lower appellate Court to come to close quarters with the evidence in the case or to meet the reasoning of the trial Court in support of its conclusion. In other words, this is a case to which the observations of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Rani Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Maharaja Jagadindra Nath Roy Bahadur (16 M.L.J. 272 at 274) would apply, namely, that the judgment in appeal does not come to close quarters with the judgment which it reviews and indeed never discusses or alludes to the reasoning of the trial Judge.

In such a case their Lordships observed that this characteristic of the appellate Courts judgment seriously invalidates its authority. The entire evidence is dealt with very unsatisfactorily by the lower appellate Court in a few sentences and no reference is made to the documentary evidence on the side of the plaintiff and no reason is given for rejecting the conclusion of the trial Judge as regards the credibility of the witnesses examined on the side of the plaintiff. On the other hand, the documentary evidence on the side of the defendants was accepted without question by the lower appellate Court in spite of several reasons given by the trial Judge for rejecting the documentary evidence. On the whole, I have no doubt that this is a case in which the judgment of the lower appellate Court does not satisfy the requirements of the law and must therefore be deemed to be a judgment vitiated by an error in procedure.

Even otherwise there has been a failure to give sufficiently good reasons for upsetting the findings of the trial Judge as regards the credibility of the oral evidence in the case. As a matter of law, the lower appellate Court was bound not to go against the opinion of the trial Judge who had an opportunity of having the witnesses before him in deciding upon the credibility of the oral evidence in the case. Unless good reasons are given, any interference with the conclusion of the trial Judge on matters of this kind must be deemed erroneous in law. These considerations are sufficient to meet the contention on the side of the respondents that the second appeal is not competent as it does not fall within any of the grounds mentioned in S. 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. This is a case in which the second appeal does come within one of the grounds mentioned in that section and the objection as to the competence of the appeal is not well-founded.

In the circumstances, the only course to be adopted is to reverse the finding on the question of possession and the decree of the lower appellate Court and to remand the appeal for fresh disposal according to law after considering all the evidence in the case. The costs of this second appeal will abide and follow the result and should be provided for in the revised decree of the lower Court. The Court-fee paid on the memorandum of appeal will be re-funded to the appellants.

Leave to appeal is asked for but I see no sufficient reason to grant leave.