Fazl Ali, J.This is an appeal by the decree-holder from the order of the Subordinate Judge of Purnea dated 19th November 1941. The decree which the decree-holder is seeking to execute was passed on 27th September 1928. After the decree several applications were made by the decree-holder for executing it, but these applications proved abortive. The last application was made by him on 27th September 1940 and in this application he asked the Court to proceed against seven lots of properties. The sixth property was described as follows:

Tauzi No.--861; Area--263.7; revenue payable to the Collector Rs. 77-13-3; Village Fulbari; Thana 168; Pargana Sultanpur; Police station Araria.

2. On 20th March 1941 the decree-holder filed an application stating that the sixth property had been wrongly described in the execution petition and he prayed for the amendment of the petition by inserting a new description. The new description was as follows:

3. The amendment was allowed ex parte, but on 6th May 1941 the judgment-debtor appeared in Court and presented an application asking the Subordinate Judge to recall his ex parte order directing the amendment of the execution petition by including in it the property already referred to. The learned Subordinate Judge granted the prayer of the judgment-debtor and hence the present appeal. The learned Subordinate Judge has stated in his order that the amendment was allowed by him ex parte as it was not brought to his notice that at the time when the application for the amendment was made by the decree-holder his decree had already become time-barred u/s 48, Civil P.C. The view taken by him was that the order allowing the amendment was ultra vires and therefore it was fit to be cancelled. The learned Subordinate Judge also expressed the opinion that the execution cannot proceed against property No. 6.

4. Now, the first point raised on behalf of the decree-holder is that the learned Subordinate Judge had no power to recall his own order after it had been made and that the only remedy that was open to the judgment-debtor was to proceed to a higher Court. In my opinion, this contention is not sound. On a reference to the order-sheet it appears that the amendment was made long after the application for execution had been admitted and after the notice of the original application had been served on the judgment-debtor. The description of the property which was inserted as a result of the amendment was wholly different from the description of the property in the original application and what the judgment-debtor in effect contended was that the Court had no jurisdiction to proceed to sell a property which was essentially different from the property described in the original execution petition without notice to him. It is well settled that a Court has inherent jurisdiction to recall and cancel its invalid orders, specially when such orders are based upon a mistake and the party in whose favour the order is made is responsible for the mistake. In the present case the learned Subordinate Judge has stated in his order that it was not brought to his notice at the time the application for amendment was made by the decree-holder that the decree had become barred by limitation. In fact the application made by the decree-holder shows that what he stated was not that his decree had already become barred by limitation but that it was going to be barred by limitation. This was undoubtedly a mis-representation and in my opinion the learned Subordinate Judge had complete jurisdiction to cancel his order, if he was satisfied, that he was induced by such mis-representation to make it and that it was to the prejudice of the party against whom it was made in his absence and without notice to him.

5. The next question which was pressed for our consideration was that even assuming that the Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction to recall his order, he was not justified in doing so in the present case. It is contended that the amendment was a very proper one and that it was an amendment contemplated by Order 21, Rule 17. It was further contended that in any event the application made by the decree-holder on 20th March 1941 could not be regarded in law as a fresh application and should have been treated as a continuation of his original application for execution which had been filed within time. Order 21, Rule 17, Sub-rule (1), Civil P.C., provides as follows:

On receiving an application for the execution of a decree as provided by Rule 11, Sub-rule (2) the Court shall ascertain whether such of the requirements of Rules 11 to 14 as may be applicable to the case have been complied with; and, if they have not been complied with, the Court may reject the application, or may allow the defect to be remedied then and there or within a time to be fixed by it.

6. Sub-rule (2) of the same Order provides: Where an application is amended under the provisions of Sub-rule (1) it shall be deemed to have been an application in accordance with law and presented on the date when it was first presented.

7. It is contended that the amendment in the present case fell within Rule 17, because the requirements of Rule. 13 had not been complied with. This rule requires that where an application is made for the attachment of any immovable property belonging to a judgment-debtor it shall contain a description of such property sufficient to identify the same and also a specification of the judgment-debtors share or interest in such property. The learned advocate for the appellant contends that as the description of the sixth property belonging to the judgment-debtor was not correctly stated in the original execution application, the requirements of Rule 13 had not been complied with and therefore an amendment could have been applied for under Rule 17. On the other hand, the contention put forward by the learned Counsel for the judgment-debtor is that this was not a case of mere mis-description of a property but the description given in the application for amendment being totally different from the description given in the original application, what the decree-holder had in effect done was to substitute a new property for the property mentioned in the application for execution.

8. In my opinion, the contention of the learned Counsel for the judgment-debtor is fully borne out by reference to the application made by the judgment-debtor on 6th May 1941 in which the description of the two properties is given side by side in Schedules A and B. These schedules show that whereas the property referred to in the original application for execution was a revenue paying zamindari, the property mentioned in the application for amendment was an istimrari tenure. The schedules further show that the property mentioned in the execution petition is situated in a totally different village and that the two villages in which the two respective properties are situated lie within different thanas and paraganas. As regards the first property a sum of Rs. 77-13-0 is payable to the Collector, while in regard to the second property Rs. 494 is payable as rent to the common manager of the Balua estate. The only point of similarity which can be urged between the two properties is in their names which are also not exactly identical, because the first property is named Fulbari and the second property is called Fulbari Nankar. The learned Counsel for the respondent has further shown that there is no reliable evidence before us to enable us to hold that the first property, the existence of which is not denied, did not in fact belong to the judgment-debtor.

9. The view which has been generally taken as to the meaning of Order 21, Rule 17 is that it is intended to deal with only formal amendments but for which the application for execution or attachment will not be regarded as complete. For example, under Rule 11 the judgment-debtor is required to state such details as the number of the suit, names of the parties, the date of the decree, etc., in his application and if upon scrutiny of his application it appears that any of these details is missing in the application, the Court may give an opportunity to the decree-holder to remedy the defect. Similarly, what Order 21, Rule 13 contemplates is that the property which is sought to be attached should be described in such a way in the application for attachment as to show that the property is identifiable. If, therefore, there are found wanting in the description such details as are necessary for the proper identification of the property, the Court has full power to allow the decree-holder to remove the defect by supplying such details. Rule 17, however, was never intended in my opinion to enable the decree-holder to ask the Court to delete from his application a property which is fully described and to substitute in place thereof another property with a totally different description. In my opinion therefore the present case cannot be said to be covered by Order 21, Rule 17.

10. The next question to be considered is whether the application made by the decree-holder on 20th March 1941 for the amendment of his original application can be regarded as a continuation of that application. On this point numerous cases were cited by both parties, but as far as I can see the preponderance of legal opinion is in favour of the view that where the decree-holder wishes by means of a subsequent application merely to correct any mis-description of the property mentioned in his application for execution, his application may be regarded as a continuation of that application, but where he tries to substitute a new property which is quite different from the property against which he wished to proceed in the first instance, his application must be regarded as a, fresh application for execution.

11. This has been held in numerous cases, but, for the purpose of the present appeal, it is necessary to refer only to two decisions of this Court. In Jagannath Das v. Chamu Raghunath AIR 1929 Pat. 407 it was held that an application for the amendment of a pending application for execution made after the decree sought to be executed had become barred by limitation cannot be entertained. In this case in his last application for execution the decree-holder made a prayer to proceed by attachment and sale of certain moveable properties belonging to the judgment-debtor, but when no moveable properties were found, he made an application to the Court to amend his original application by inserting therein certain immovable properties. It was held, however, by this Court that he could not be allowed to proceed against a new property after the decree had become barred by limitation and that the difficulty in the way of the decree-holder could not be overcome merely by his asserting that all that he wanted was to amend his original application for execution. Similarly, in Ram Ran Bijay Prasad Singh v. Kesho Prasad Singh AIR 1941 Pat. 635 it was held that the decree-holder should not be allowed after the expiry of the date of limitation to execute the decree against a property which was not specified in the application as originally presented.

12. The learned advocate for the decree-holder has relied among others upon (1) Gnanendra Kumar v. Rishendra Kumar AIR 1918 Cal. 73; (2) Sheogobind Ram v. Mt. Kishunbasi Kuer AIR 1932 Pat. 222 ; (3) Subramania Desika Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadbi v. Rangaswami Chettiar AIR 1935 Mad. 161 and (4) B. Shiva Shankar Das and Others Vs. Mufti Syed Yusuf Hasan . The first case was referred to by Kulwant Sahay J. in his judgment in Jagannath Das v. Chamu Raghunath AIR 1929 Pat. 407 and the learned Judge observed in the course of his judgment that if that case was meant to be an authority that an application for amendment of a pending application filed after the period of limitation can be entertained such a view was directly opposed to the decision of the Full Bench in Asgar Ali v. Triloikya Nath Ghose (90) 17 Cal. 631 to which no reference was made by the learned Judges who decided it. The third case was a decision by a Single Judge who purported to follow among others the decision of this Court in Sheogobind Ram v. Mt. Kishunbasi Kuer AIR 1932 Pat. 222 which, in my opinion, can be easily distinguished on the ground that in that case it was held that the amendment in question had been made under Order 21, Rule 17, Civil P.C. That was a case in which an application for execution was filed against a deceased judgment-debtor in the first instance and subsequently leave was granted by the Court to substitute on the record her heir. The learned Judges who decided that ease pointed out that as soon as the defect was brought to the notice of the Court it fixed the time to correct the mistake and therefore the case was in substance a case covered by Order 21, Rule 17.

13. The present case, however, as I have already shown cannot be said to fall under Order 21, Rule 17.

14. The last case which was relied upon by the learned advocate for the appellant is undoubtedly a case in which a decree-holder was allowed to include some new properties in a subsequent application which was filed after the expiry of the period of limitation and the view taken was that the subsequent application was a continuation of the original application. The facts of the case, however, were very peculiar. In that case a decree for sale upon a mortgage was passed on 2lst August 1915. The decree-holders made an application in execution on 13th March 1919 in which they asked the Court for the sale of certain properties out of the entire mortgaged properties and they also prayed that the decree be transferred to the Collector, because the properties sought to be sold were ancestral properties. It was further stated in the application that if the sale proceeds of the properties proved insufficient, then the decree-holder would give a list of other mortgaged properties. The decree-holder afterwards made an application on 16th March 1931 for the sale of "the remaining properties" of which a list was given. The question that arose was whether the application was barred by limitation u/s 48, Civil P.C.

15. The case came. up before a Bench of three Judges, two of whom held that the latter application wan not a fresh application within the meaning of Section 48 but was merely supplementary or ancillary to and in continuation of the previous application and was not barred by limitation. Sulaiman C.J., however, who was also a member of the Bench, was of a different opinion. The point which has been rightly emphasised by the learned Counsel for the respondent, so far as this case is concerned, is that in that case the decree-holder had stated in his original application that it the sale proceeds of the properties mentioned therein would prove insufficient, then they would give a further list of the other mortgaged properties and that this prayer not having been finally disposed of by the Court, the view taken by the majority of the Judges might well be justified on that ground alone. It seems to me that if in that case the Court had then and there passed an order to the effect that the decree-holder would not be allowed to supplement the list of properties in the original application as prayed, the decree-holders might have then and there supplemented the list. In any event that case has no resemblance to the present case and in my opinion it is difficult to hold on the facts before us that the property against which the decree-holders wish to proceed now is identical with the property originally mentioned in their application.

16. In my opinion the view taken by the learned Subordinate Judge was correct and I would dismiss this appeal with costs.

Chatterji, J.

I agree.