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G. Prabhaker And Ors v. Dandu Buchaiah

G. Prabhaker And Ors v. Dandu Buchaiah

(High Court Of Telangana)

CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO.4108 OF 2014 | 18-10-2022

1. This Civil Revision Petition (for short 'CRP') is filed under Section 115 of Civil Procedure Code (for short 'CPC') by the petitioners/defendants assailing the orders dated 30.08.2013 passed in I.A. No. 1078 of 2013 in O.S. No. 207 of 2009, on the file of the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Sangareddy.

2. I.A. No. 1078 of 2013 was filed by the defendants under Section 5 of Limitation Act to condone the delay of 1282 days in filing an application to set aside the ex-parte decree dated 18.12.2009 in O.S. No. 207 of 2009. The trial Court has dismissed the said application holding that the petitioners have simply thrown the entire blame on their counsel on record and they are not diligent in prosecuting the litigation and that the delay is not properly explained.

3. Feeling aggrieved by the order impugned dated 30.08.2013 this CRP is filed alleging that the trial Court has grossly erred in dismissing the petition seeking condonation of delay of 1282 days on the premise that the petitioners failed to give proper explanation for such delay. The Court below ought to have considered the fact the delay occurred only due to the failure of the counsel for the petitioners in informing them about ex-parte proceedings. The Court below has also failed to consider that the petitioners are ignorant of legal procedure, they belong to rural background and failed to comply the principles of natural justice.

4. Heard learned counsel on both sides. The submissions made on either side have received due consideration of this Court.

5. For the sake of convenience, the parties hereinafter referred to as plaintiff and defendants, as arrayed in the original suit.

6. The plaintiff has filed original suit in O.S. No. 207 of 2009 on the file of the Principal Junior Civil Judge at Sangareddy for declaration and mandatory injunction in respect of land in Sy. No. 328/a to an extent of Ac.0-04 guntas, situated at Kothlapur Village and Mandal, Sangareddy, Medak District. In this case the defendants have caused their appearance through their counsel but after filing Vakalat, their counsel did not inform them about the steps to be taken in the suit and that ultimately they were set ex-parte and that on 18.12.2009 an ex-parte decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff.

7. It is alleged by the petitioners that they did not know about the ex-parte decree passed and that their counsel did not inform them and that only on 07.07.2013, when the plaintiff along with his supporters came to the suit schedule property, the defendants have come to know about the ex-parte decree and thus, they have approached their counsel and filed this application under Section 5 of Limitation Act to condone the delay of 1282 days in filing an application to set aside the ex-parte decree dated 18.12.2009.

8. In support of the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the 1st defendant has filed an affidavit wherein it is alleged that he was not aware of ex-parte decree and his counsel has not informed him and that only on 07.07.2013 when the plaintiff tried to occupy the suit schedule property, the defendants came to know about the ex-parte decree and accordingly, the application to condone the said delay of 1282 days was filed.

9. Learned counsel for the petitioners/defendants strenuously contends that the petitioners belong to rural background, they are illiterate persons, their counsel failed to inform them about the status of the suit after filing Vakalat and it is sheer negligence on the part of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners before the trial Court and the parties cannot be made to suffer for the negligence of their counsel. He relied on the principles laid in the following decisions:

(1) N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy (1198) 7 Supreme Court Cases 123.

(2) Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another Vs. M/s. Katiji and others (1987) 2 Supreme Court Cases 107 [LQ/SC/1987/214] .

(3) O.P. Kathpalia Vs. Lakhmir Singh (died) and others (1984) 4 Supreme Court Cases 66 [LQ/SC/1984/177] .

(4) Ram Sumiran and others Vs. D.D.C. and others (1985) 1 Supreme Court Cases 431 [LQ/SC/1984/347] .

(5) Kavali Narayana and others Vs. Kavali Chennamma 2005 (1) ALT 805 (S.B.)

10. In the decision Nos. 1 to 4 cited supra the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with interpretation the word 'sufficient cause' held that the word 'sufficient cause' should be construed liberally for advancing cause of substantial justice particularly, in decision No. 5 cited supra, while dealing with the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, considering the rural background of the appellants and prevailing illiteracy and ignorance in the country delay of six years was condoned.

11. In this context, I may refer to the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Mg.Commit. of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others 2013 (12) SCC 649 [LQ/SC/2013/1033] wherein the Apex Court while interpreting the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act regarding condonation of delay, summarised the principles as follows:-

(i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

(ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.

(iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.

(iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

(v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

(vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.

(vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.

(viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

(ix) The conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.

(x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

(xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.

(xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.

(xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.

12. The law consistently laid down by the Apex Court says that the word 'sufficient cause' must be construed liberally to meet the ends of justice without adopting pedantic approach. But, exception to this test to be applied is whether the petitioner made out a sufficient cause or not Thus, the Court has to examine the circumstances and if the Court satisfied that the cause shown by the petitioner is beyond his control, such cause is to be accepted as sufficient cause, which prevented the petitioner from appearing before the Court on specified date. If the Court finds that the petitioner is negligent and deliberately protracting the proceedings for one reason or the other, such person is disentitled to claim the benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

13. Revering back to the facts of the case on hand, on an over-all consideration of material available on record, it is noticed that the defendants have filed Vakalat in original suit, failed to pursue the matter for more than four years and it is only on 07.07.2013 when the plaintiff has approached to the suit schedule property, they came to know about the ex-parte decree. Thus, the petitioners/defendants were not prudent and lack of bona fides imputable to them, the defendants having filed Vakalat, the written statement, failed to proceed with and in such circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that the defendants are not entitled for condonation of such inordinate delay of 1282 days in filing an application under Order 9, Rule 13 of CPC, When the facts of the present case are tested on the touch stone of the principles laid by the Apex court in Esha Bhattacharjee case (6th supra) the answer is in the negative. The petitioners/defendants have failed to place any cogent material either before this Court or before the trial Court giving satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay. Be it stated that the concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. The petitioners failed to explain that the circumstances are beyond their control over a period of 1282 days after passing of ex-parte decree. Accordingly, I do not find any jurisdictional error or infirmity in the order impugned and it does not warrant any interference by this Court in exercise of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

14. In the result, this CRP is dismissed confirming the orders impugned dated 30.08.2013 passed in I.A. No. 1078 of 2013 in O.S. No. 207 of 2009, on the file of the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Sangareddy. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to the costs. Miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall stands closed.

Advocate List
  • P VENKAT REDDY

  • CHILUMALA PRATAP REDDY

Bench
  • HON'BLE MR JUSTICE A.VENKATESHWARA REDDY
Eq Citations
  • LQ
  • LQ/TelHC/2022/992
Head Note

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 9 R. 13 and S. 53-A — Setting aside ex-parte decree — Condonation of delay in filing application — Liberal approach — When not warranted — Delay in filing application for setting aside ex-parte decree — Defendants filing Vakalat in original suit, failing to pursue the matter for more than four years and it is only on 07.07.2013 when plaintiff approached to the suit schedule property, they came to know about the ex-parte decree — Held, defendants were not prudent and lack of bona fides imputable to them, defendants having filed Vakalat, the written statement, failed to proceed with and in such circumstances, defendants are not entitled for condonation of such inordinate delay of 1282 days in filing an application under Or. 9 R. 13 — Limitation Act, 1963, S. 5