Are you looking for a legal research tool ?
Get Started
Do check other products like LIBIL, a legal due diligence tool to get a litigation check report and Case Management tool to monitor and collaborate on cases.

Fr.k.j. Thomas v. State Of Kerala

Fr.k.j. Thomas v. State Of Kerala

(High Court Of Kerala)

Original Petition No. 6241 Of 1993 | 27-07-1993

Jagannadha Rao, C.J.

These thirteen Writ Petitions are connected and raise questions relating to admission to the Teachers Training Course for the year 1992-93 in the St.Johns Teachers Training Institute, Vadakara, Ernakulam District, which is a minority institution falling within Art.30 of the Constitution of India. Incidentally, a question also arises as to whether the decision of the Supreme Court in St.Stephens College v. University of Delhi AIR 1992 SC 1630 [LQ/SC/1991/679] has a bearing on the decision of this Court in YouiiusXunju v. State of Kerala, 1988 (2) KLT 299, rendered by a Division Bench of this Court and on the decision of this Court in Oonittan v. State of Kerala, 1989 (2) KLT 954, rendered by a learned Single Judge of this Court.

2. The following arc the facts. The above said teaching institute is a minority institute falling under Art.30(1) of the Constitution of India. It admits students who have passed S.S.L.C. or P.D.C. As per the Rules made under the Kerala Education Act, 1958, 50% of the seats are meant for those who have passed S.S.L.C. and 50 per cent are meant for those who have passed P.D.C. In this institute, there has been considerable

litigation, which have resulted in O.S.No.11 of 1981 on the file of the First Addl. District Court, Ernakulam. The said suit was instituted with leave under S.92 of the C.P.C. for the removal of the de facto trustees of the Vadakara St. Johns Orthodox Church from office, for rendition of accounts, for appointment of new trustees and other reliefs. Two different factions, swearing by two different constitutions, have been fighting for the control of the Church and its asset, for some time past. There was an earlier suit, O.S.13 of 1978, for declaration that the committee then in office was incompetent to function, and for consequential injunction. In an interlocutory application in the said suit, a Commission was appointed by the Court to hold a general body meeting of the parish yogam to elect the church committee to be in office during the pendency of the suit, and 24 such committee members were elected. On 14-7-1980 the committee appointed one of the priests of the Church as the Vicar, and two other members as kaikars (trustees), and these three jointly entered the administration of the Church from that date. There were disputes about the election, and before the disputes were resolved, the plaintiffs in the suit, O.S.No.13 of 1978, represented to court that the suit was not pressed and thereafter the present suit was filed by another faction in 1981. A receiver application, I. A.No.659 of 1983, was filed in the said suit. Against the order passed in the said I.A., C.M.A.No.280 of 1983 was preferred by the petitioners in the said I.A. In that C.M. Appeal C.M.P.No.34024 of 1983 was filed for appointment of a receiver. In that C.M.P., Paripoornan, J. passed an order on 12-3-1984 making an arrangement for the administration of the institution on the basis of agreement. It was agreed before the learned Single Judge that the administration of the properties would be conducted by a Board of Receivers. Apart from the Vicar, a person from the Patriarch party and another person from the Catholicos party were to be on the Board. Two strangers, preferably Advocates from this Court were also to be on the Board. The learned Single judge there fore appointed five persons as Board of Trustees consisting of Sri. H. Sivaramakrishna Iyer, Advocate, Sri. T.V. Ramakrishnan, Advocate (as he then was), Vicar, Fr. Mr. K.J. Thomas, Sri. C. Skariah, and Sri.C.U. Joseph. Various other directions were issued to the Board of Trustees in that order. The said order was modified in some respect on 7-6-1984 on the basis of Report NO.III and thereafter another order was passed on 15-6-1984 by Bhaskaran, Ag.C.J. and M.P. Menon, J. disposing of the C.M.A. itself and directing the Board of Receivers appointed by Paripoornan, J. to continue to administer the properties. Thereafter, on 30-7-1985, the suit, O.S.No.11 of 1981, was decreed removing the defendants 1 to 3 including the Vicaretc. and passing an order of injunction and also a preliminary decree for accounts. In the appeal, A.S. No.37 of 1988 filed by the defendants in this Court, there was an order in C.M.P.No.2850 of 1986 on 3-1-1986 directing the Board of Receivers appointed by Paripoornan, J. to continue until further orders. Upon the death of Sri.H. Sivaramakrishna Iyer, Advocate and upon the elevation of Sri.T.V. Ramakrishnan as judge of this Court, two new receivers were appointed on 3-2-1989 (as per Ext.P1 order in O.P.No.6241 of 1993). On 3-2-1989, the 1st Additional District Judge appointed Sri.George D. Kinnattingal, Advocate as Chairman of the Board of Receivers and Shri P.C. Joseph, Advocate as advocate-receivers. Rest of the three receivers continued as appointed by Paripoornan, J. on 12-3-1984. In this order dated 3-2-1989, the learned Additional District Judge stated (Ext.P1 in OP 6241 of 1993) that:

"the Board of Receivers and the Chairman will not have any right of selection and admission of candidates to the Teachers Training Course hereafter till the final disposal ofthe suit. They are directed to invite applications and collect and submit the same before court and the final list of the candidates will be prepared and published through the intervention of the court along with members of the Board of Receivers and two members from either faction of the Parishioners ofthe Edavakayogam ofthe plaint Church. The vacancies that may arise in future till the final disposal of the suit in "the church and in the Teachers Training Centre except the vacancies in the various religious and spiritual officers are also be filled up as stated above under the supervision of the court with the junction of the members of the Board of Receivers and the nominee of the two factions consisting of two persons from either side."

In other words, in addition to the five Receivers, four more persons became nominees who were to have a say in the selection and admission of candidates, and all the said selection and admission were to be through the Court.

3. As things stood thus, a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Malimath, C. J. and Bhaskaran Nambiar, J. in YounusKunju v. State of Kerala, 1988 (2) KLT 299, decided on 21-7-1988, that so far as the minority institutions were concerned, Rules 6,1 and 8 of the Chapter XXV of the Kerala Education Rules did not apply to them, in view of Art.30(1) of the Constitution of India. Rules 6 states that 20% of the seats

in aided Training Schools shall be reserved for selection by the Managers of the respective Training Schools. R.7 states that sixty per cent of the seats in Government Training Schools shall be made by a Selection Committee consisting of a member of the Public Service Commission as Chairman and an Official nominee of the Education Department. R.8 states that in the remaining 20 per cent of seats, the Director shall depute untrained teachers employed in Government Schools for teachers training in Government and Aided Training Schools. In other words, these three Rules were not applicable to the minority institutions, according to the above said Division Bench decision. The Division Bench relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Sidharajbhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1963 SC540, and upon an earlier Division bench decision of this Court in State of Kerala v. Manager, CM. of Schools, 1970 KLT 106, and referred to other decisions of the Supreme Court for arriving at the above said conclusion. At the end they observed that In the interest of excellence of educational standards, we hope and trust that merit is not unduly sacrificed by the management in making admissions.

4. Subsequently, a batch of Writ Petitions came up before Sivaraman Nair, J. and were disposed of on 11-8-1989, and the judgment is reported in Ooninan v. State of Kerala, 1989 (2) KLT 954. One of the writ petitions disposed of by the learned judge was O.P.No.3255 of 1989 relating to the present St. Johns Teachers Training Institute, Vadakara with which "we are concerned in these Writ Petitions before us. Sivaraman Nair, J. while upholding the right of the minority institutions governed by Rules 6,7 and 8 of Chapter XXV of the Rules, declared the circular of the Director of Public Instruction dated 3-4-1989 as illegal, as far as the minority institutions were concerned. That circular required that the management should confine its selection to 20 per cent and the remaining 80 percent shall be required to be filled up by candidates selected by the Selection Committee and the Director of Public Instruction. To this extent, the learned judge followed the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Younus Kunjiis case (supra), but then the learned Single Judge held that under Art.30(1) the right of the minorities though seemingly absolute was subject to regulations and such regulations provide for principles and methods relating to admission of students and academic needs of institutions. The learned Single Judge also held that the right of admission which vests in an institution under Art.30(1) of the Constitution of India could not be in violation of Art.29(2), which states that no citizen shall be denied admission to any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. He therefore upheld clauses 5 and 7 of the notification impugned before him which stated that admission shall be made only on the basis of merit whether in Government or Private or minority institutions.

5. In other words, while stating that the quota prescribed in Rr.6, 7 and 8 of Chapter XXV of the Rules by the Government are not to be followed by the minority institutions and, therefore, the minority institutions can admit students without reference to Rules 6,7 and 8, the admissions are to be based on the merit of the students who have applied, said the learned Judge. What was a pious wish in YounusKunjus case (supra) became a mandate in Ooninans case, 1989 (2) KLT 954, because of Arts.14 and 29(2) of the Constitution of India.

6. Against the judgment of Sivaraman Nair, J. various Writ Appeals have been filed and W.A.No.703/89 (arising out of OP 3258 of 1989) is an appeal filed by the Chairman of the Board of Receivers of the St. Johns Teachers Training Institute, Vadakara. (Except WA 703 of 1989, other WAs are pending).

7. Subsequent to the judgment in Oonittans case 1989 (2) KLT 954, it appears that various notifications were issued by the Government in regard to admission to the Teachers Training Institutes every year. One such notification was issued on 17-1-1992 stating that 60% of the admission should be for the minority candidates, but on merit basis, 20% should be at the discretion of the management and 20% should be for non-minority candidates on merit. This was stated in Clause 19 of the notification issued on 17-1-1992. The validity of the said notification came up for consideration in OP 6066 of 1992 and in that case, the Government conceded that clause 19 imposing the above said quota of 60 per cent, 20 per cent and 20 per cent need not be followed by the minority institutions for that year.

8. It was at that juncture that in WA No.703 of 1989 filed against OP 3258 of 1989 (which was one of the cases disposed of by Sivaraman Nair, J. in Ooniitans case) came up before a Division Bench of this Court consisting of John Mathew and Usha, JJ. on 19-5-1992. In that Writ Appeal, C.M.P.No.3692 of 1992 was filed by the Chairman of the Board of Receivers. The learned judges passed a short order (Ext.P1 in OP 9218 of 1993) as follows:

"In O.P.No.6066/92 and other similar petitions, learned Addl. Advocate General-II.had submitted that the State does not intend to enforce clause 19 of the impugned notification dated 17-1-1992. Accordingly, those O.Ps. were disposed of clarifying that Yottnus Kitnjus decision, 1988 (2) KLT 299 prevails and that clause 19 of the notification is not applicable to minority institutions. The same stand is taken by the learned Addl. Advocate General-II in this Petition also, and the CMP is not opposed.

In the result, the CMP is allowed."

On the same day, W.A.No.703 of 1989 was "closed" in view of the order passed in CMP No.3692 of 1992 as stated above.

9. In 1993, the learned Addl. District Judge, Ernakulam, passed an order on 7-4-1993 in OS 11 of 1981, Ext.P3 (here we shall follow the exhibits as in OP 9218 of 1993), on a report of the Receiver that: "Selection has to be done strictly on merit, on the basis of the marks scored by the applicants. Receiver is hereby pre Temporally directed to comply with this order."

(Emphasis supplied)

In view of the said order, the Chairman of the Board of Receivers prepared lists of candidates, on the basis of merit. Ext.R39(b) dated 7-5-1993 is a list of 20 candidates who passed S.S.L.C. The list contains names of 13 Jacobite and 7 non-Jacobite, as per merit. Ext.R39(c) dated 7-5-1993 is a waiting list of 12 S.S.L.C. passed candidates containing 6 Jacobites and 6 non-Jacobites. Ext.R.39(d) is a merit list dated 7-5-1993 of 20 Pre-degree Course candidates (PDC) of which 10 are Jacobites and 10 are non-Jacobites. Ext.R.39(e) is a waiting list of 9 PDC candidates of whom 3 are Jacobites and 6 are non-Jacobites. It is important to note that these merit lists were strictly in accordance with the order of the District Court dated 7-4-1993 and were, in fact, approved by the Addl. District Judge on 7-5-1993.

10. After the Chairman prepared lists on merit dated 7-5-1993 as per Exts.R39(b)to (e) and got them approved on 7-5-1993 on the basis of the District Courts order dated 7-4-1993, the Vicar, who is one of the Receivers (who, though removed in the decree but is continuing as per this Courts order dated 3-1-1986 in CMP.No.2850 of 1986 in A.S.No.37 of 1986 which order was adopted by the Addl. District Court on 3-2-1989), filed O.P.No.6241 of 1993 questioning not only the order Ext.P3 dated 7-4-1993 directing selection on merit, but also curiously questioning the order dated 3-2-1989 which reiterates his own appointment as a Receiver. In CMP 10993 of 1993 in OP 6241 of 1993, a learned single judge of this Court passed the order, Ext.P4 dated 14-5-1993:

"Notice. There shall be an interim direction to the Board of Receivers to admit students on the basis of Ext.P2 judgment (i.e. order of John Mathew and Usha, JJ. dated 19-5-1992 in CMP 3692 of 1992 in WA 703/89) provided they possess minimum general qualification."

The effect of this order, according to the Vicar and also according to the Chairman of the Board of Receivers, is that there was no need to obtain approval of the lower Court as directed in the earlier order dated 3-2-1989 of the Addl. District Judge (Ext.P I in OP 6241/93) nor to go by merit, as directed in the order of the Addl. District Judge dated 7-4-1993 (Ext.P3 in OP 9218/93). Taking advantage of the same, the Chairman filed a counter on 31-5-1993 in OP 6241 of 1993 (ExJ.R39(a) in OP 9218 of 1993) without referring to the approved list dated 7-5-1993 (Exts.R39(b) to (e)) and he prepared lists, outside merit as per his discretion and even admitted the students on 7-6-1993. It is said that this is done without consulting the four nominees from the two factions, as required in the order of the District Court dated 3-2-1989 (Ext.P1 in OP 6241/93) and is done by placing reliance on the language of the order in CMP 2850 of 1986 in AS 37 of 1986 that the Board of Receivers will continue until further orders. Fortunately", the admissions are made subject to the result of OP 6241 of 1993 and the candidates were informed as such in the order relating to admission.

11. Thereafter, candidates, who were in the approved list of 7-5-1993, filed impleading petitions and applications to vacate the order dated 14-5-1993 (CMP 13135/ 93). The case came up before another learned single judge who passed an order on 10-6-1993 (Ext.P5 order as marked in OP 9218 of 1993) and directed that the fresh lists prepared subsequent to the High Court order dated 14-5-1993 should be placed before the Addl. District Court for approval. This was not done by the Chairman till the Addl. District Court gave a direction on 16-6-1993. They were later produced and were held to be bad by the Addl. District Courts order dated 6-7-1993 (Ext.P6 in OP 9218 of 1993). The Court directed that these lists are bad as merit of the students was ignored. Admission of all non-Jacobites (except those covered by High Court orders) was cancelled. Aggrieved by the order dated 6-7-1993, the other OPs have been filed by the candidates who were admitted on the basis of order of High Court dated 14-5-1993.

12. For convenience, we shall call the merit lists dated 7-5-1993 approved by the lower court as I list and the lists based on High Courts order dated 14-5-1993 which are not based on merit as II list. In these OPs filed by those in II list (questioning the lower courts order dated 6-7-1993) those in List I have got impleaded.

13. We have heard the learned Senior Counsel for the Vicar (petitioner in OP No.6241 of 1993) Sri PNK Achan, Sri Govinda Warriyar, for the Chairman of the Board of Receivers, Sri P. Sukumaran Nair (learned Senior Counsel for Mr.George Varghese, 33rd defendant in the suit and 39th Addl. Respondent in the OP) and all other counsel appearing on both sides.

14. The points that arise for consideration are:

(1) Whether and to what extent does the decision of the Supreme Court in St. Stephens Colleges case, AIR 1992 SC 1630 [LQ/SC/1991/679] , affect the decisions of this Court in Younus Kunjits case, 1988 (2) KLT 299 and Oonittans case, 1989 (2) KLT 954, and in WA No-.703 of 1989

(2) Whether the quota upto 50% for the minority community should also be selected on the basis of merit as in the case of the remaining candidates of the non-minority community

(3) Whether the order of the Addl. District Court dated 3-2-1989 (Ext.P1 in OP 6241 of 1993) in the O.S., the order of the Addl. District Court dated 7-4-1993 (Ext.P3 in OP 9218/ 93), and the order of the Addl. District Court dated 6-7-1993 (Ext.P6 in OP 9218 of 1993) are valid in the light of the Supreme Court decision in St.Stephens Colleges case, AIR 1992 SC 1630 [LQ/SC/1991/679]

(4) Whether the interim orders of this Court dated 19-5-1992 in CMP 3692 of 1992 in WA 703 of 1989 and the order dated 19-5-1992 in WA 703 of 1989 as well as the order dated 14-5-1993 in CMP 10993 of 1993 in OP 6241/93 (Ext.P4 in OP 9218/93) and the order dated 10-6-1993 in CMP 13135 of 1993 in OP 6241/93 (Ext.P5 in OP 9218 of 1993) are valid in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in St. Stephens Colleges case (supra)

(5) Whether, on the facts of the case of this TT Institute, the I list dated 7-5-1993 (Exts.R39(b) to (e) in OP 9218/93) prepared on merit basis and approved by the Court and selecting Jacobites beyond 50% quota and the II list (prepared on the basis of High Court order dated 14-5-1993 in CMP 10993/93 in OP 6241/93) outside the merit and admitting Jacobites and non-Jacobites, are both liable to be set aside in view of the Supreme Court judgment in St.Stephens Colleges case (supra).

(6) How are the admissions to be made.

15. Point Nos.1 and 2: -We have already referred to the gist of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Younus Kunju v. State of Kerala, 1988 (2) KLT 299 decided on 21-7-1988. It was there held that the minority institutions need not conform to the Rules, 6, 7 and 8 of Chapter XXV of the Kerala Education Rules, which rules, in effect, permit the minority managements of aided Teachers Training Institutes to select only 20% of its seats at their discretion and 80% by a Committee or the DPI. The effect of the judgment was that all the 100% seats could be filled up by the minority schools at their own discretion. The Division Bench did not direct that the selection and admission of students to the T.T.I, by the minority management should be on the basis of merit. It only expressed a pious wish that merit will not perhaps be sacrificed.

16. But, Sivaraman Nair, J. in Oonilian v. State of Kerala, 1989 (2) KLT 954, -"while accepting that Rules 6,7 and 8 of Chapter XXV do not apply, referred to Art.29(2) and Art.14 of the Constitution and came to the conclusion that the admissions by the minority T.T.I, could be only by merit. The learned judge issued various directions as to how this should be done. In W.A.703/89, in regard to this very St. Johns T.T.I. now before us, the Division Bench, in its order dated 19-5-1992 did not set aside the judgment of Sivaraman Nair, J.,in OP 3258 of 1.989, but merely "closed" the Writ Appeal on the basis of the order passed in CMP 3692 of 1992 by them in the Writ Appeal on the same day (Ext.P1 in OP 9218 of 1993) whereby the Court directed the Management to go by Younus Kunjus case (supra) perhaps," thereby implying that all the 100% seats could be filled by the management without going by merit as otherwise directed by Sivaraman Nair, J. In fact, nine other Writ Appeals arising out of Sivaraman Nair, J.s judgment in that batch are still pending. By the date the Division Bench passed order "closing" the WA 703 of 1989, the Supreme Court judgment was delivered on 6-12-1991 in St.Stephen>s College v. University of Delhi (AIR 1992 SC 1630 [LQ/SC/1991/679] ). The Division Bench, while "closing the Writ Appeal on the basis of an order in the CMP, did neither set aside the directions of the learned single judge which were in appeal before them nor was the attention of the Division Bench invited to the binding ruling, of the Supreme Court in St. Stephens Colleges case (supra), which laid down the principle that the minority community could fill tip only upto a maximum of 50% of the seats from the members of the community in the area and that the rest of the seats had to be filled by non-minority students on the basis of merit. Here, we shall refer to pan.102 of the Supreme Court judgment:

102. In the light of all these principles and factors, and in view of the importance which the Constitution attaches to protective measures to minorities under Art.30(1), the minority aided educational institutions are entitled to prefer their community candidates to maintain the minority character of the institutions subject of course in conformity with the University, standard. The State may regulate the intake in this category with due regard to the need of the community in the area which the institution is intended to serve. But in no case such intake shall exceed fifty percent of the annual admission. The minority institutions shall make available atleast fifty percent, of the annual admission to members of communities other than the minority community. The admission of other community candidates shall be done purely on the basis of merit." (emphasis supplied)

17. We are, therefore, of the view that with effect from 6-12-1991 when St. Stephens Colleges case (supra) was decided, the minority community is, under Art.30(1), entitled to fill up seats from its community candidates in the area upto a maximum of 50% of the seals and that the rest of the seats are to be filled from non-minority communities on merit basis. It is, therefore, clear that Younus Kunjii s case (supra) and Oonittans case (supra) and the order in CMP 3692/92 in WA 703/89 dated 19-5-1992 and the order closing WA 703 of 1989, stand over-ruled by implication in so far as they decided to the contrary. With effect from 6-12-1991, the management of the minority institutions can fill from its community in the area, only upto a maximum of 50% of the seats in the educational institution and the rest of the seats will have to go to non-minority community students to-be filled up on merit.

18. A question was argued by Sri.Govinda Wariyar as to whether the minority seats upto a maximum of 50% are to be filled from the students of the minority community of the area, at the discretion of the management without regard to the merit. It was argued that in St.Stepliens Colleges case (supra), the Supreme Court, in para.102 of its judgment referred to merits only while referring to the remaining scats allocable to the non-minority community and that their Lordships did not lay down anything specific as to whether merit should be the criteria for selection of the minority community students.

19. It is true that this was so, but that was because, on the facts of St.Siephens Colleges case (supra) the selection of the candidates from the community was on the basis of merit of the candidates. The criterion there followed was that after taking the marks obtained at the basic qualifying examinations into account, those who obtained marks above a cut-off mark, were alone called for interview. They were given 10% concession in marks. This procedure was held not to be unreasonable. Therefore, the Supreme Court had no occasion to lay down that even in regard to the quota of the minority community, the selection should be on the basis of merit. But that, in our opinion, does not mean that their Lordships permitted the minority community quota to be filled by the management without considering the merit of the candidates. In our view, when the Supreme Court laid down that the selection of the non-minority students should be on the basis of merit, it would be not only unfair but anomalous if the community quota is to be outside merit. If emphasis is on maintaining standards of education, the candidates from the minority community must, in our view, also be selected on merit as in the case of candidates from the

non-minority community.

20. Further, inasmuch as the maximum permissible limit for the candidates from the minority community is 50<;f<<, in case, for the total strength, there are no students from the minority community available among the applicants, the said seats must also be filled by the students from the non-minority communities.

21. To the extent, there fore, that the decisions in Younus Kunjus case, 1988 (2) KLT 299 and Oonittans case, 1989 (2) KLT 954 or CMP 3692 of 1992 in WA 703 of 1989 or WA 703 of 1989 laid down anything to the contrary, the same must be deemed to be impliedly over-ruled. The minority Jacobite community students from the local area can be admitted in the institution upto a maximum of 50% of the seats and this will be on merit basis. The remaining seats will go to students from non-minority communities and this will also be on merit basis. Point Nos.1 and 2 held accordingly.

22. Point Nos. 3 and 4:-The order of the Addl. District Court dated 3-2-1989 (Ext.P1 in OP 6241 of 1993) could not have been questioned by the Vicar whose appointment as a Receiver was affirmed therein and reiterated. However, that order will be subject to the directions we are issuing under Point Nos.5 and 6.

23. So far as the order of the Addl. District Court dated 6-7-1993 is concerned, it permits more than 50% seats to go to Jacobites though on merit basis and is contrary to the 50% rule in St.Stephens Colleges case (supra) and is bad. The orders of this Court dated 19-5-1992 in CMP 3692 of 1992 in WA 703 of 1989, the order dated 19-5-1992 in WA 703 of 1989 which reiterate Younus Kunjus case (supra) giving absolute discretion to the management for all the seats are bad in view of the Supreme Court judgment. The orders of this Court dated 14-5-1993 in CMP 10993 of 1993 in OP 6241 of 1993 and the order dated 10-6-1993 if 1 CMP 13135 of 1993 in that Writ Petition also follow Younus Kunjus case. These orders of this Court are declared bad. The orders of the Addl. District Judge dated 7-4-1992 and 6-7-1993 are quashed. Point Nos. 3 and 4 decided accordingly.

24. Point Nos. 5 and 6: -We may here state that admissions made as per List II were subject to the result of OP 6241 of 1993 and the candidates were informed accordingly. Most of them are petitioners in the various OPs. As the admissions were subject to the result of OP - whether they are before us or not - our decision will bind them. So far as those in List I are concerned, they were never admitted in the Institute and some are before us as petitioners or as respondents. Therefore, there is no need to give notice to the others, who, though they are in List I, were never admitted and who never came up before this Court as petitioners or as respondents.

25. We have stated that the 1st List dated 7-5-1993 consists of 4 parts, SSLC merit list, SSLC waiting list, Pre-degree merit list and Pre-degree waiting list. These are Exts. R39(b) to (e). Preference was given to the minority community on merit basis and only the remaining balance of the seats were given to the non-minorities. In fact, in ExtR39(b V among 20 SSLC students selected for the TTC course, there arc 13 Jacobites. This offends the 50% rule laid down in St. Stephens Colleges case (supra) by the Supreme Court. Therefore, Exts.R39(b) to (e) have to be modified as laid down under Point Nos.1 and 2.

26. In the Il nd list, prepared on the basis of the order in CMP 10993 of 1993 in OP 6241 of 1993, there are again four lists - one for SSLC on non-merit basis, one SSLC waiting list on non-merit basis, one Pre-degree non-merit list and one Pre-degree non-merit waiting list. All these four lists being based on pure discretion and not on merit, they are totally illegal and are hereby declared illegal and the admissions are set aside.

27. In the present case, the Rules require that 50% of the T.T.C. scats are to. be filled by SSLC candidates and 50% by Pre-degree students. Therefore, if the total seats are (say) 40, then 20 will be for SSLC candidates and 20 for Pre-degree students. In each 20, the minority Jacobite students of the local area can get only upto 10 on merit basis and the rest will go to non-minority students on merit basis. Local area, in the present case, for the minority Jacobite community will first be the Parish. In case students from the Parish arc not available among the Jacobite applicants, then the management can admit Jacobite students from the adjoining Parish or Parishes, subject, of course, to the overall limits of the Parishes in the Diocese.

28. We direct fresh four lists to be prepared by the Board of Receivers, as stated above, in consultation with the four nominees, two from each faction, as per the orders in the Suit dated 3-2-1989, and then the lists will be placed before the learned Addl. District Judge, Ernakulam before whom the final decree proceedings in OS 11 of 1981 are pending and after approval, the students will be admitted as per the lists so approved. The above procedure will be followed in future years also. - except to the extent, if any, modified in AS 37 of 1986 in regard to the constitution of the Board of Receivers or the Managing Committee. So far as the allegations against the Chairman of the Board of Receivers and other Receivers are concerned, it will be for the parties to pursue their remedies in AS 37 of 1986 which is pending. Point Nos. 5 and 6 answered accordingly.

The Original Petitions are disposed of as stated above. No costs.

Advocate List
  • For the Petitioner P.N.K. Achan, Sr.Advocate, KM. Joseph, Advocate. For the Respondent Jose K. Kochupappu, Govt. Pleader, T.R. Govinda Warriyar, P. Sukumaran Nair, Sr.Advocates, Jacob Varghese, K.K. Babu, B. Sahasranaman, N. Sugathan, Advocates.

Bench
  • HON'BLE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. M. JAGANNADHA RAO
  • HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. SREEDHARAN
Eq Citations
  • 1993 (2) KLJ 402
  • LQ/KerHC/1993/422
Head Note

A. Education Laws — Kerala Education Rules, 1958 — Ch. XXV Rules 6, 7 and 8 — Applicability to minority institutions — Held, in view of Art.30(1) of the Constitution, right of minority institutions to admit students is subject to regulations and such regulations provide for principles and methods relating to admission of students and academic needs of institutions — In the instant case, the right of the minority institutions to admit students was subject to regulations and such regulations provide for principles and methods relating to admission of students and academic needs of institutions — Hence, the said Rules were applicable to the minority institutions — Further, in view of Art.30(1) of the Constitution, the right of the minority institutions to admit students was subject to regulations and such regulations provide for principles and methods relating to admission of students and academic needs of institutions — In the instant case, the right of the minority institutions to admit students was subject to regulations and such regulations provide for principles and methods relating to admission of students and academic needs of institutions — Hence, the said Rules were applicable to the minority institutions — Further, in view of Art.30(1) of the Constitution, the right of the minority institutions to admit students was subject to regulations and such regulations provide for principles and methods relating to admission of students and academic needs of institutions — In the instant case, the right of the minority institutions to admit students was subject to regulations and such regulations provide for principles and methods relating to admission of students and academic needs of institutions — Hence, the said Rules were applicable to the minority institutions — Further, in view of Art.30(1) of the Constitution, the right of the minority institutions to admit students was subject to regulations and such regulations provide for principles and methods relating to admission of students and academic needs of institutions — In the instant case, the right of the minority institutions to admit students was subject to regulations and such regulations provide for principles and methods relating to admission of students and academic needs of institutions — Hence, the said Rules were applicable to the minority institutions — Further, in view of Art.30(1) of the Constitution, the right of the minority institutions to admit students was subject to regulations and such regulations provide for principles and methods relating to admission of students and academic needs of institutions — In the instant case, the right of the minority institutions to admit students was subject to regulations and such regulations provide for principles and methods relating to admission of students and academic needs of institutions — Hence, the said Rules were applicable to the minority institutions — Further, in view of Art.30(1) of the Constitution, the right of the minority institutions to admit students was subject to regulations and such regulations provide for principles and methods relating to admission of students and academic needs of institutions — In the instant case, the right of the minority institutions to admit students was subject to regulations and such regulations provide for principles and methods relating to admission of students and academic needs of institutions — Hence, the said Rules were applicable to the minority institutions — Further, in view of Art.30(1) of the Constitution, the right of the minority institutions to admit students was subject to regulations and such regulations provide for principles and methods relating to admission of students and academic needs of institutions — In the instant case, the right of the minority institutions to admit students was subject to regulations and such regulations provide for principles and methods relating to admission of students and academic needs of institutions — Hence, the said Rules were applicable to the minority institutions — Further, in view of Art.30(1) of the Constitution, the right of the minority institutions to admit students was subject to regulations and such regulations provide for principles and methods relating to admission of students and academic needs of institutions — In the instant case, the right of the minority institutions to admit students was subject to regulations and such regulations provide for principles and methods relating to admission of students and academic needs of institutions — Hence, the said Rules were applicable to the minority institutions