S.K. CHAWLA, J.

(1) This is an appeal by claimants from an award of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, (for short Tribunal) dismissing their claim.

(2) On 1/05/1983, in the early morning hours around 5 a.m., a motor accident had taken place at Sheopurkalan road, in which one Asgar Ali, aged 45 years, was crushed on both of his legs and died on the following day in a hospital of those injuries. The vehicle in question was truck No. MPW 9961 driven at that time by one Shyam Sharma (respondent No. 2 herein and owned by one Nemichand (respondent No. 1 herein), which was insured with National Insurance Company (respondent No. 3 herein).

(3) The case of the claimants appellants, who are widow and children of the deceased, to the effect that accident occurred because of negligent driving of truck by the driver, was disbelieved by the claims Tribunal. On the other hand, the Tribunal accepted the version of the opposite parties that the deceased had committed suicide by laying himself under the moving truck. The Tribunal however gave finding even on the quantum of compensation in the event of claimants succeeding. The Tribunal held that the claimants would be entitled to a total compensation of Rs. 52000/-. The claim was, however, dismissed on the finding already noticed that there was no negligence on the part of the driver and the accident occurred because the deceased wanted to commit suicide.

(4) We were taken through the evidence recorded in the case. We are clearly of the view that the finding of the Claims Tribunal that there was no negligence on the part of the truck driver in causing the accident and that the deceased himself wanted to commit suicide, was most unwarranted and perverse on the evidence that had appeared in the case. The claimants had examined one Munna (A. W. 3) as an eye-witness to the accident. In the F.I.R. (Ex. P1) lodged by the deceaseds brother-in-law Tayab Ali (A.W. 2), who had reached the spot on receiving information about the accident, the name of Munna was expressly mentioned as one of the eyewitnesses who had seen the accident. Munna was, therefore, not a subsequently thought of or a gotup witness. His evidence was that he and the deceased were going along the road in question in the direction of village Bhatiyapura. The deceased was walking ahead of him. They were going by the side of the road. A truck came with great speed from behind and without blowing any horn, knocked down the deceased. Both legs of the deceased got crushed under the front wheel of the truck. The driver ran away after the accident. It appears that Munna (A.W. 3) was disbelieved by the Tribunal mainly on the ground that he happened to admit that he had not given any statement to the police about the accident, before he was examined in the Claim case. But this could not be conclusive of the fact that Munnas police statement was not recorded. This was Munnas impression which could be incorrect. Moreover, not unoften, it happens that police is not able to record statements of all the eye-witnesses touching an accident. It is wrong to disbelieve a witness solely on his admission that his police statement, to his reckoning, was not previously recorded. The decision in Varadamma v. H. Mallappa Gowda in 1972 ACJ 375 (Mysore) is in point in which it was observed that it was not proper to disbelieve a witness merely because police had not examined him as a witness.

(5) Only witness examined on behalf of the opposite parties on the point of accident was the driver, namely, Shaym Sharma (N.A .W. 2). He said not a word in his evidence that anybody was lying on the road and came under his moving truck. He also said not a word that there had occurred any kind of quarrel between the deceased and his (deceaseds) wife because the deceased wanted to sell his agricultural land but his wife wanted that he should not sell it. The version contained in written-statements of driver and owner was that there had occurred a quarrel before the accident because deceased wanted to sell his agricultural land but his wife was forbidding him from doing so. It was also the said version that because of that alleged quarrel the deceased committed suicide. The story appears to be no more than figment of imagination. This is apart from the fact that the story itself was most inconvincing and improbable. How could the deceased have laid himself with his legs stretched, between the from and rear wheels of a moving truck, almost an impossible feat, to sustain injuries only on his legs, which was the story contained in the written statement of the driver. It is remarkable that it was the right front portion and wheel of the truck which had got bloodstained. This clearly indicated that the truck driver was not keeping a proper lookout and that the truck had knocked down a person who was in front of the truck. If Munna (A.W. 3) is believed, as he should be, the deceased was walking along, to the side of the road with his back towards the truck. If the truck knocked down, the deceased in that situation, the accident spoke its story and in the absence of proper explanation on the part of the driver, the maxim res ipsa loquitur was attracted and it could be held, as we do, that the accident occurred because of negligence on the part of the driver. On this finding the claimants are entitled to succeed and awarded compensation.

(6) With regard to quantum of compensation, the learned tribunal on appreciating oral evidence adduced in the case, found that deceaseds monthly income was around Rs. 500/- per month, he being a petty shop keeper and a. small agricultural. It was estimated that the deceased might be spending Rs. 150/- per month Over himself, while rest of the income of Rs. 350/- went towards the dependency of his wife and children, who are the claimants. The loss of dependency was thus estimated at Rs. 350/- per month or Rs. 4,200/- per annum. We do not find any material to show that this figure estimated was too low to warrant interference. But we do find that there is good ground to interfere with the figure of multiplier, which the learned Tribunal selected to arrive at the figure of total loss of dependency. The Tribunal chose the multiplier of 12. The deceased was aged about 45 years at the time of his death. We prefer to follow Division Bench decision of our High Court in State of M.P. v. Ashadevi 1988 MPLJ 346 [LQ/MPHC/1988/140] , to which one of us (S. K. Dubey, J.) was a party, holding that in the case of deceased persons, who were in 30s or 40s at the time of the accident, it is proper to select the multiplier of 15 years. On this basis, the claimants are entitled to compensation to the tune of Rs. 4200 x 15 = 63,000/- on account of loss of dependency under Section 1A of Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. This reference to substantive law (i.e. Section 1A of Fatal Accidents Act 1855) has relevance, as will be evident from a discussion in the sequel.

(7) The learned Tribunal deducted 15%, working out to Rs. 7560/-, from the total amount of compensation on account of lumpsum payment. When compensation is arrived at by applying the principle of multiplier, it is, in our opinion, wrong to make any kind of deductions. While choosing the multiplier itself, the figure chosen is far less than the number of years of remainder of working life of the deceased. That reduced figure itself takes care of imponderables. There is also the circumstance that with rising inflation year after year the value of money goes on getting eroded. There is, therefore, no scope for making any kind of deductions while working out the figure of loss of dependency by applying the principle of multiplier. Reference may be made here to a decision of our High Court in Nisar Fatima v. M.P.S.R.T.C. (1990 MPLJ 437 [LQ/MPHC/1988/356] , holding that no deduction on account of lump-sum payment should be made. The Tribunal was therefore, in error in making any kind of deduction while arriving at the figure of loss of dependency.

(8) The learned Tribunal held that claimant Fizabai (appellant No. 1 herein), being widow of the deceased, was entitled to compensation of Rs. 10,000/- for loss of consortium. It was vehemently argued by Shri B. N. Malhotra, learned counsel for the Insurance Company, that nothing further could be awarded to claimants once they were given compensation by application of multiplier theory. It was argued that compensation calculated on the basis of multiplier, comprised the sole compensation that could be awarded. The fallacy in this argument can appear only when it is determined as to what is the substantive law applicable in cases of fatal accidents resulting from the use of Motor Vehicles.

(9) Bearing on the question of substantive law, the following observations in Shankar Rao v. Babulal reported in 1980 MPLJ 563 [LQ/MPHC/1980/86] are pertinent : "In this Court it has never been doubted that in the case of fatal accidents resulting even from the use of a motor vehicle the substantive law for determination of the liability and its extent is that contained in the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, the provisions contained in Sections 110A to 110F of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 being merely procedural or adjectival but not substantive in nature, these provisions introduced in the Motor Vehicles Act by the Amendment Act of 1956 are meant only to provide a cheap remedy to the claimants who were earlier required to file a Civil Suit paying ad valorem court fees in the Courts of general jurisdiction, and therefore any question pertaining to a substantive right has to be determined in accordance with the general law of Tort and the Fatal Accidents."

(Paragraph 8)

"It follows that in a claim filed before a Claims Tribunal under Section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, the liability and its extent has to be determined in accordance with the Fatal Accidents Act and the general law of Tort."

(Paragraph 9)

(10) The question came up for consideration in a later Full Bench case of our High Court. Sohani J. (as he then was) speaking for himself and Vijayavargiya J. in Kashimiran Mathur v. Rajendra Singh in 1982 MPLJ 803 [LQ/MPHC/1982/221] , expressed as follows : "The answer to the first question will depend on the answer to the question as to what is the compensation under Section 110B of the Act. In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Mishra, the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the question about the nature of the change in the law brought about by Amending Act of 1956, introducing Sections 110 to 110F in the Motor Vehicles Act. The Supreme Court held that the change in the law was merely a change of forum, i.e., a change of adjectival or procedural law and not of substantive law. The Supreme Court observed that the underlying principle of the change of law brought about by the amendment in the year 1956 was to enable the claimants to have a cheap remedy of approaching the Claims Tribunal on payment of nominal court-fee, whereas a large amount of ad-valorem court-fee was required to be paid in Civil Courts. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1976 SC 237 [LQ/SC/1975/414] (supra) it is no longer permissible to hold that the power of tribunal awarding compensation under Section 110B of the Motor Vehicles Act to the dependants of a deceased is wider than the power, which a Civil Court exercised while awarding compensation under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855". (Para 3 at page 814 of the report).

(11) The matter is now covered by Supreme Court decision in the case of G.S.R.T. Corpn. v. Ramanbhai in AIR 1987 SC 1690 [LQ/SC/1987/473] . It is laid down in this decision that the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act are not entirely procedural in as much as they have also modified the substantive law contained in the law of Torts and Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. Thus Section 92A of the Motor Vehicles Act (1988) has introduced a change in substantive law by authorising a claims Tribunal to award a fixed sum of the basis of no fault liability. That has made a departure from common law principle requiring claimants to prove negligence on the part of the driver. So also special provisions contained in Ss. 109A to 109C (now Ss. 161 to 163 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988) providing for a scheme for granting relief to victims or legal representatives of victims of "hit and run" motor vehicle accident cases is another novel method on the part of the Government to remedy the situation and to that extent is modification of substantive law. Even with regard to category of persons entitled to compensation, S. 110A (now S. 166 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988), in a way replaces S. 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, in as much as compensation may now be claimed by any legal representative of the deceased, not necessarily confined to four category of dependants namely; wife husband parent and child mentioned in S. 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. But even in this decision the Supreme Court did not go to the extent of holding that the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act completely abrogate or supersede the previous substantive law.

(12) The conclusion which follows from the foregoing discussion is that the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act are not entirely procedural. The substantive law application in cases of fatal accident resulting from the use of motor vehicles is the law of Torts and Fatal Accident Act, 1855 as modified by the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act.

(13) A look at the provisions of Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 would show that it recognises two broad heads of damages. First, damages to the dependants "proportioned to the loss resulting from such death" vide S. 1A. Secondly, pecuniary loss to the estate of the deceased occasioned by the wrongful act, neglect or default, vide S. 2. As explained in Gobald Motor Service v. Veluswami in AIR 1962 SC 1 [LQ/SC/1961/184] , the rights of action under Ss. 1A (then S. 1) and 2 are quite distinct and independent. If a person taking benefit under both the Sections is the same, he cannot be permitted to recover twice over for the same loss. In awarding damages under both the heads there should not be duplication of the same claim, that is, if any part of compensation representing the loss to estate goes into the calculation of the personal loss under S. 1A of the Act, that portion should be excluded in giving compensation under S. 2 and vice versa. In that case award of compensation of Rs. 25,200/- to the dependants on account of loss caused to them awardable under S. 1 (now S. 1A) of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 and further award of Rs. 5,000/- being damages for mental agony, suffering and loss of expectation of life, being loss caused to, the estate of the deceased, awardable under S. 2 of the Act, were maintained by the Supreme Court. It was also held that in awarding additional compensation inter alia for loss of expectation of life, there was no duplication in awarding damages under both the heads.

(14) It will be evident that compensation awarded for loss of dependency, worked out by applying the principle of multiplier, is a part of damages "proportioned to the loss resulting from the death" under S. 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act. But that would not exhaust the entire compensation awardable, because compensation is awardable also for loss to the estate of the deceased. The fallacy that loss of dependency comprises of the entire compensation also becomes apparent from a situation in which the deceased may die leaving behind legal representatives not dependant on him; for example, an earning. non-dependant father or brother. The father or brother would not be able to recover anything for loss of dependency, for there was none, but it would be preposterous to suggest that their claim for compensation for loss to the estate of the deceased would also be dismissed. They would certainly be entitled to some compensation and it will be wrong to non-suit them only because they were not dependants of the deceased.

(15) Having reached the conclusion that loss of dependency is not the sole head of compensation, the question which naturally arises is : what are the other heads of compensation for which compensation may be awarded in fatal accidents arising out of the use of motor vehicles. Taking first the broad category of damages "proportioned to the loss resulting from the death" of the deceased under S. 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, nothing is awardable on account of bereavement. The damages are given with reference to pecuniary loss. They are not given as a solatium for injured feelings. Lord Wright said in Davies v. Powell, (1942) AC 601 at page 617 : "There is no question here of what may be called sentimental damage, bereavement or pain and suffering. It is a hard matter of pounds, shilling and pence, subject to the element of reasonable future probabilities." In England however the Administration of Justice Act, 1982 now provides for a claim of bereavement to the extent of 3,500 in favour of the spouse or parents of the deceased. But children are not entitled to such damages for the loss of their parent. The Indian law contained no parallel provision of that nature.

(16) A claim for damages for loss of consortium, unlike a claim for bereavement, stood on a different footing. As observed by Shri Ramaswamy Iyer in his celebrated treatise on law of Torts (pages 74/75 Eighth 1987 Edition), a husband under English Common law had a right of action for loss of consortium of his wife, if caused by enticement, harbouring, inducing her to live away from him and physical injury, short of causing death. If the wife was killed,. the husbands claim for loss of consortium was limited to the interval between her injury and her death. This was in view of the rule in Baker v. Bolton, (1808) 1 Camp 493, that no action lay for the death. A wife had also a right of action if her husband was enticed away and there was consequent loss of his society. But the House of Lords refused to extend the right of wife any further. It was held in Best v. Samuel Fox, (1952) AC 716 that a wife had no right of action for the loss of her husbands consortium due to negligence of a third party. A wife could not, it was observed by the House of Lords, be allowed to sue merely for the purpose of equality of right between husband and wife. The husbands right was a development of case-law and if equality were to be aimed at, it was worth considering, it was said, whether his right should not be removed from the law. Now by Administration of Justice Act, 1982, the claim for loss of consortium has been abolished in England, but not, as already noticed, without providing for the claim of damages for bereavement in favour of either spouse or parents.

(17) The English common law was noticed in Abdul Kadir v. Kasinath in AIR 1968 Bom 267 [LQ/BomHC/1967/20] wherein it was held that the common law stood modified by the Fatal Accidents Act. It was held that under the Fatal Accidents Act a husband was entitled to damages for the loss of consortium also, as it was a kind of injury suffered by him, for which damages could be awarded under the Fatal Accidents Act. That decision was followed in K. Narayana v. P. Venugopala in AIR 1976 AP 184 [LQ/TelHC/1975/3] , which was also a case of death of wife in a motor accident case. It was observed in paragraph 29 of the report of this case as follows :

"We are inclined to take the same view and to hold that under the Fatal Accidents Act, the husband would be entitled to damages for loss of consortium also even though under common law he may not be entitled to damages under this head, if death ensues. In Oriential Fire and General Insurance Co. v. Chuni Lal, 1969 ACJ 237 (Punj) compensation was awarded for loss of consortium though there is no discussion or decision on the question whether such compensation can be awarded. It was however pointed out that in Municipal Corporation, Delhi v. Sohag Wanti, AIR 1960 Punj 300 no damage was awarded for loss of consortium. But in this case it is seen that the learned Judges did not consider whether damages could be awarded under that head or not and there was no decision that damages could not be awarded under that head. We see no reason why having regard to the wide terms used in the Fatal Accidents Act, damages cannot be awarded or the loss of consortium in the case of death of the spouse in the accident."

(Emphasis supplied) The possible objection that when damages under the head of loss of pecuniary benefit had been awarded, the award of damages under the head of loss of consortium would be duplication, was repelled in the following words in paragraph 32 of the report :

"In this case also, the damages for loss of society of the spouse has no relation to the loss of pecuniary benefit suffered by the death of the spouse for even in case where there is no loss of pecuniary benefit, the husband would still be entitled to contend that he lost the society of the wife. We are, therefore, inclined to agree with the respondents contention that the Tribunal was right in awarding compensation under this head in addition to compensation for loss of pecuniary benefit."

(18) An award of Rs. 4,000/- for loss of consortium in favour of the husband for the death of his wife and a further award of Rs. 6,000/- in favour of the husband and children for pecuniary loss suffered by them due to the death of the deceased, made by the Tribunal, was affirmed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the above case.

(19) Award of damages under the separate head of loss of consortium has since been consistently made by the different High Courts in India and no discrimination is made between husband and wife. In other words, if a wife met with death, the husband has been awarded damages under this head. Similarly, if a husband met with death, the widow has been awarded damages under this head. Thus, for the death of husband, widow was awarded Rupees 4,000/- under this head in D. Bhagayamma v. State of Karnataka in 1984 ACJ 145 (Kant) and Rs. 5,000/- in P. Somarajyam v. A.P. Road Transport Corporation in 1984 ACJ 18. [LQ/TelHC/1982/366] Our High Court also made an award of Rs. 5,000/- in favour of wife for loss of consortium on the death of her husband in Latabai v. Rajendra in 1988 ACJ 787. [LQ/MPHC/1987/277] Awards of Rs. 5,000/- each in favour of claimants in four cases for loss of consortium were made in Bisartibai v. M.P.S.R.T.C. in 1990 ACJ 103. [LQ/MPHC/1988/268] To conclude, so long as under Indian law award of damages for bereavement is not recognised, it is "just", to use that term given in S. 110B of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (now S. 168 of M.V.A., 1988), to award damages under the separate head of "loss of consortium", under law of Tort as in India as modified by the Fatal Accidents Act. The award under this head should however be for conventional sums between five to ten thousand rupees.

(20) Going over to the second broad category of damages for loss to the estate of the deceased, awardable under S. 2 of the Fatal Accident Act, 1855, these will include (a) loss of earning and profits up to the date of death; (b) medical and hospital expenses if incurred; (c) pain and suffering; (d) loss of expectation of life and (e) funeral expenses, if paid out of the estate of the deceased. (see page 97 of Law of Torts by Ratanlal Dhirajlal as edited by G. P. Singh, J. 21st (1987) Edition). The first two sub-heads are pecuniary in nature and their quantification would depend upon the evidence led. With regard to the third sub-head, i.e., for pain and suffering, compensation is awardable under this sub-head if the injured survived for some time and suffered pain and suffering. The deceased would have been then entitled to claim compensation if he had remained alive. After his death, that would be a loss to his estate, which the claimants are entitled to recover under S. 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. It is evident that compensation for pain and suffering of the deceased is not claimable if the deceased died an instaneous death or died in a state of unconsciousness.

(21) With regard to compensation for loss of expectation of life, the law puts money value on a persons expectation of his life, so that if by an actionable wrong it is curtailed, he can lay a claim for loss of expectation of life or if he is dead, his legal representatives can bring a claim on that score as an item of loss to his estate. This item as a separate head of damages was first recognised in Flint v. Lovell, (1935) 1 KB 354, in which claim for damages for loss of expectation of life was made by a living person aged 70 years, who was seriously injured as a result of negligent driving of car by the defendant. The medical evidence given in that case was that while otherwise he could have lived a happy and enjoyable life for 10 years, as a result of injuries sustained by him in the accident, he could expect to live for not more than a year. Considering this shortened expectation of life, an award of 4,000 was made. That decision was approved by the House of Lords in Rose v. Ford, (1937) AC 826, which was a case of fatal accident. The House of Lords held in that case that "loss of expectation of life" could not be confined to the case where the injured person was alive at the date of action; but was equally admissible if the action was brought by his personal representatives. In that case a girl aged 23 years had died within 4 days of the accident during which time she had throughout remained unconscious. The House of Lords held that right to recover damages for loss of expectation of life did not depend on the person injured realising his loss and suffering in mind on that account. Thus claim for loss of expectation of life became awardable even when the deceased died without regaining consciousness. But damages under this head are not for the prospect of length of days but for predominently happy life and the assessment is so difficult that only moderate conventional sums were awarded under this head. Even this head of damage has been abolished in England by the Administration of Justice Act, 1982, with however a compensatory provision for award of damages on account of bereavement, as already noticed, to the extent of 3,500.

(22) In India, the head of damages "for loss of expectation of life" has been long recognised and there is no good reason why that item of damages should be de-recognised. The case of Gobald Motor Service in AIR 1962 SC 1 [LQ/SC/1961/184] , is a case in point. There an award of Rs. 5,000/- inter alia for loss of expectation of life was maintained by the Supreme Court in addition to award of Rs. 25,200/- for loss of dependency. It was further in that case that in awarding damages under both the heads, there was no duplication of the same claim. There have been scrores of decisions by different High Court, including our own, in which "loss of expectation of life" was separately itemised and damages were awarded under this head as loss to the estate of the deceased. The award of sums under this head should however be for conventional sums under this head should however be for conventional sums between five to ten thousand.

(23) Coming to the present case, we are of the opinion that assessment of compensation at Rs. 10,000/- for loss of consortium to claimant Fizabai (appellant No. 1 herein) by the Claims Tribunal was on the higherside of the conventional figure. We are further of the opinion that unlike awards for loss of pecuniary benefit, the awards under this head have not to be kept on being raised with the fall in the value of money, unless the figure of the award under this head becomes contemptuously low. We reduce the award under this head to Rs. 7,000/-. The claimant/appellants are further entitled to compensation for loss of expectation of the life of the deceased, which we fix at a moderate sum of Rs. 10,000/-. In addition, the claimants are entitled to further compensation of Rupees 63,000/-, as already held by us, on account of loss of dependency. The total amount of compensation thus comes to Rs. 80,000/-. It is true that the claimants did not claim compensation under separate heads but laid a claim for an around sum of Rs. 1,80,000/-. In our opinion, this being an application for compensation under S. 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the rules of pleadings would be in applicable, as they would have applied had a suit for compensation been required to be brought. The form of application for compensation as prescribed by R. 277 of M.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1974 i.e. Form C.A.A., itself does not require that compensation claimed should be itemised, expect that total figure of compensation claimed should be mentioned. The limitation in such case should be that the Claims Tribunal should not award compensation exceeding the total figure of compensation mentioned in the application. While the claimants may not itemise their claim, we are of the opinion that the Claims Tribunal should, in order to render clarity and certainty to its award, itemise is award at least broadly. The comments of Shri G. P. Singh, J. at page 162 of his book on law of Torts, 21st (1987) Edition, are pertinent :

"The earlier practice was to make a global award without indicating the sums under different heads. But the current practice is to itemise the award at least broadly. But at the end, the Judge should look at the total figure in the round, so as to be able to cure any overlapping or other source of error. For the separate items, which together constitute a total award of damages, are inter-related. They are parts of the whole, which must be fair and reasonable."

(24) It is mentioned in the claim petition itself that the deceased has left behind, among others a married daughter named Jubeda Bai, who has not joined this claim petition as it is stated that she is no longer dependent. Such a claim is brought on behalf of all legal representatives in a representative capacity, which is clear from the wording of proviso to S. 110A(1) of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (now proviso to S. 166(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988). It is therefore proper to award some compensation to her too, while apportioning the amount of compensation between different legal representatives.

(25) For the foregoing reasons, this appeal is allowed. The dismissal of the claim petition by the Claims Tribunal is set aside. Instead the claim petition is partly allowed and it is directed that the claimant/appellants shall be paid a total compensation of Rs. 80,000/- with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition (i.e. 8-8-1983) till realisation, subject to adjustment of amounts already realised. The respondents 1 to 3 are jointly and severally liable to pay the said amount. It is, however, directed that respondent No. 3; National Insurance Co., shall pay the entire amount. Out of the total compensation, Rs. 30,000/- together with entire sum payable on account of interest, shall be paid to claimant/appellant No. 1 Smt. Fizabai. The rest of the compensation amounting to Rs. 50,000/- shall be equally distributed, that is to say, a sum of Rs. 10,000/- each shall be paid to claimant/appellants 2 to 5 and to Jubeda Bai, the left-out married daughter of the deceased. The claimant/appellants shall also be entitled to costs of the proceedings incurred by them in the Tribunal as also costs of this ppeal, which are quantified at Rs. 500/-, from the respondents.Appeal allowed.