Harries, C.J.This is a plaintiffs second appeal against concurrent decrees of the Courts below dismissing his claim. The suit out of which this appeal arises was for the recovery of money due on certain bahikhata accounts. The plaintiff firm carried on business as wholesale cloth dealers, whereas the defendants carried on a retail cloth business. Over a period of time the defendants had made purchases of cloth from the plaintiff firm, and eventually the parties adjusted the accounts. It was the plaintiffs case that a sum of Rs. 1693 was due from the defendants to the plaintiff firm upon this account. The defendants raised a number of defences, but it is only necessary for me to deal with one of them. Defendants contended that the suit as instituted was not maintainable as at the date of the institution of the suit the plaintiff firm had not been registered in accordance with the provisions of the Partnership Act. The other defences, namely limitation and denial of the accuracy of accounts, do not arise in this appeal.

2. The trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground that it was not maintainable by reason of Section 69, Partnership Act. The lower Appellate Court was of opinion that the suit was not maintainable when instituted but that it became maintainable at a later date when the plaintiff firm was registered. It further held that part of the claim was barred by limitation and that the remainder had been satisfied by payment. It accordingly upheld the decision of the trial Court though upon different grounds. It has been strenuously argued by Mr. Bose in this appeal that the suit was maintainable and that the lower Appellate Court was right in treating the suit as having been instituted on the date when the firm was registered. The suit was instituted on 21st November 1935, and it is common ground that upon that date the firm was an unregistered one. On 10th December 1935, the plaintiff firm applied for registration under the Partnership Act and on 18th January 1936 registration was effected. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that though the suit was not maintainable when instituted, the Court was entitled to treat the suit as properly instituted on 18th January 1936.

3. On behalf of the respondents it has been contended that as the suit was not maintainable when instituted, nothing that happened afterwards could affect the maintainability of this particular suit. Reliance has been placed by the advocate for the appellant upon the case in Radha Charan Saha v. Matilal Saha 41 C.W.N. 534. In that case a suit was instituted by an unregistered firm on 25th May 1934, and no exception was taken in the written statement on the ground of non-registration of the firm. The suit proceeded to trial and was decreed on contest against the answering defendant and ex parte against the others. The answering defendant appealed, but that appeal was not proceeded with, as there was an application to have the ex parte decree set aside by those defendants against whom the ex parte decree was passed. That ex parte decree was set aside and the suit came on for hearing afresh. At that hearing a plea was taken that the suit was not maintainable u/s 69(2), Partnership Act, on the ground of non-registration of the firm at the date of the institution of the suit. The firm was as a matter of fact registered on 20th June 1934. The objection was upheld by the Courts below and the suit dismissed. On appeal Mitter J. held that the suit ought not to have been dismissed merely on the ground of non-registration of the firm at the date of the institution of the suit but that it ought to have been deemed to have been instituted on the date when the firm was registered.

4. This case was followed by Horwill J. of the Madras High Court in Varadarajulu Naidu v. Rajamanika Mudaliar A.I.R (1937) . Mad. 767 In that case an unregistered firm had instituted a suit and during the course of the proceedings had registered itself in accordance with the Partnership Act. On objection being raised that the firm was not registered at the date of the institution of the suit, the suit was dismissed though registration had taken place before the hearing. Horwill J. held that it would be most inequitable for the firm to have its suit dismissed and be forced to file another after paying fresh court-fee. Accordingly the allowed the suit to be treated as instituted at the date when the firm was registered.

These two single Judge cases undoubtedly support the argument of the appellant. But Mr. Mitter on behalf of the respondents has cited a large number of authorities of various Courts which take the opposite view. In Krishen Lal Ram Lal v. Abdul Ghafur Khan A.I.R (1935) . Lah. 893 a Bench of the Lahore High Court held that a suit instituted by an unregistered firm must be dismissed. According to the learned Judge Section 69, Partnership Act, clearly said that no suit falling within its purview should be instituted.

5. It was the institution of the suit that was barred; hence an unregistered firm could not file a suit, nor could it after filing get the suit stayed till it got itself registered. Such a suit would have to be dismissed, though the dismissal of such suit would be no bar to a fresh suit after registration, if such was within time. In this case the Bench certainly took the view that a suit instituted by an unregistered firm was bound to fail and that registration after the filing of the suit could not possibly affect the maintainability of that particular suit. A similar view was expressed by learned single Judge of the Lahore High Court in Chhagan Lal v. Mangal Sain Raj Narain A.I.R (1938). Lah. 767. In that case it was held that a suit by an unregistered firm was invalid and that registration of the firm after the suit had been instituted did not relate back so as to make the suit valid.

6. Another case to the same effect is the case in Subramania Mudaliar v. East Asiatic Co. Ltd. A.I.R (1936) . Mad. 991 . In that case an unregistered firm instituted a suit and after objection was raised, obtained registration under the Partnership Act. Thereafter it applied for amendment praying that the suit should be treated as having been instituted on the date of the application for amendment. It was held that any subsequent amendment of the petition after getting the firm registered under the Partnership Act could not relate back to the date of the institution of the suit so as to cure the defect which existed at the time of institution, as the plaint was not a plaint at all, hence the order of amendment could not be granted.

7. In (Firm) Ram Prasad-Thakur Prasad Vs. (Firm) Kamta Prasad-Sita Prasad, Kendall J. held that before instituting a suit by a partner against a firm, the firm must be duly registered and the Registrar must have recorded the person suing as a partner in the firm. Subsequently registering the firm and amending the plaint did not make a valid institution; merely making an application for registration before suit was not sufficient. Section 69 was mandatory.

8. It is therefore clear that the trend of authority is in favour of the respondents contention in this case, namely that a suit which is not maintainable by reason of non-compliance with Section 69, Partnership Act, cannot become maintainable at a later stage by reason of registration. In my view subsequent registration cannot cure the initial defect. A plaint filed by an unregistered firm is in effect no plaint at all because Section 69 makes claims arising out of a contract unenforceable if the firm is unregistered at the date of the institution of the suit. An unregistered firm has no right to sue, and therefore a plaint filed by it has no legal effect. If at the time the plaint is filed the claim is bound to fail, I cannot see how subsequent registration can improve the position. The single Judge of the Calcutta High Court held that there was no reason why the Court should not treat the plaint as filed on the date of registration. That is possibly a very fair view to take; but I know of no provision of law which permits a Court to treat the plaint as filed on a date subsequent to the date upon which it was actually filed. In neither of the cases cited on behalf of the appellant is any authority cited which would enable a Court to treat a suit as being instituted months later than the date upon which it was in fact instituted. In my view the crucial date is the date of the institution of the suit.

9. If on that date the suit was bound to fail, nothing that happens subsequently can give the plaintiff a right to sue. The case is very similar to a case where a plaintiff brings a suit prematurely. If it is held that he had no cause of action at the date of the institution of the suit, then it does not avail him in the slightest to show that his cause of action did come into existence a few days after the filing of the suit. If the plaintiff had no cause of action when the suit was filed, then such a suit is bound to fail, though a cause of action might come into existence within a very short time after the institution of the suit. For the same reason, I cannot understand how an unregistered firm can file a suit and the defect be cured by subsequent registration. It appears to me that if the suit as filed was not maintainable, then it must be dismissed.

10. For the reasons which I have given, I am satisfied that this suit was not maintainable. In my view the lower Appellate Court rightly dismissed this suit though I am unable to agree with the reasons which it gave for doing so. In my judgment the learned Munsif and not the lower Appellate Court gave the true grounds for dismissing this claim. I would therefore dismiss this appeal with costs.

Yarma J.

11. I agree. Mr. S.N. Bose for the appellants has laid great stress upon the decision in Radha Charan Saha v. Matilal Saha 41 C.W.N. 534 and I should like to examine the reasons given in that judgment for allowing the suit to be deemed to have been filed after the date of registration. The reasons which I gather from the judgment are these; that the plea of non-registration was not taken till the second hearing began, that the plaint was allowed to remain on the file till the date of registration and that the view which the learned Judge took in holding that the plaint should be deemed to have been filed after the date of registration was in accordance with justice. Looking at all these reasons separately and collectively, I find that they may be very good grounds for creating sympathy in favour of the plaintiff, but they do not supply any legal reasons for getting round the provisions of Section 69(2), Partnership Act, which have been declared to be imperative. No reason appears to have been given in that judgment for the proposition that a plaint which is filed on one date may under certain circumstances be deemed to have been filed on a subsequent date.

12. The case which has been referred to in that judgment is the case in Pran Krishna Saha v. Kripa Nath A.I.R (1919) . Cal. 755. But that was a case under the Bengal Tenancy Act. The reasons given in that judgment would be applicable to the facts of the present case only by analogy and it is needless to say that arguments by analogy are not always safe. For these reasons, I fail to see any reason in that judgment for extending the Provisions of Section 69(2), Partnership Act, which are imperative. I agree with the view, expressed in Krishen Lal Ram Lal v. Abdul Ghafur Khan AIR (1935) Lah. 893, (Firm) Ram Prasad-Thakur Prasad Vs. (Firm) Kamta Prasad-Sita Prasad, , Chhagan Lal v. Mangal Sain Raj Narain AIR (1938) Lah. 767 and Subramania Mudaliar v. East Asiatic Co. Ltd. A.I.R (1936) . Mad. 991 and dismiss the suit. The trial Court dismissed the suit on this ground but the lower Appellate Court relying on the Calcutta Weekly Notes decision held that although the suit was not maintainable, it should be deemed to have been filed on a date subsequent to the date of registration. For the reasons given in the earlier part of this judgment I would uphold the view of the trial Court on this point.

13. The appeal is dismissed with costs.