1. Being aggrieved by the judgment of acquittal passed by the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Sakti in CrA No.59/2018, dated 5.12.2018, arising out of judgment in Criminal Case No.199/2013, dated 9.3.2018, whereby the learned JMFC, Malkharoda has acquitted the respondents/ accused of the charges under Sections 147, 447/149 & 427/149 of the IPC, the applicant has preferred the present Revision.
2. Prosecution case is that complainant Firendra Sahu (PW-1) has lodged a written complaint (Ex.-P/1) at PS Malkharoda stating that at village Bade Rabeli, a concrete house has been built up on his private land bearing Khasra No.630. On 19.6.2013, at about 9 am, the accused persons demolished the boundary wall in a forceful manner and also abused and threatened to kill him.
3. Map was prepared vide Ex.-P/2. Nuksani Panchnama was prepared vide Ex.-P/3. Spot Map was prepared vide Ex.-P/4. Statements of the witnesses were recorded and the FIR has been registered vide Ex.-P/13.
4. After completion of the investigation, charge sheet has been filed. The respondents/accused abjured their guilt and claimed to be tried. In order to prove its case, the prosecution has examined as many as 9 witnesses. The respondents/accused have stated that they have been falsely implicated and they have not adduced any defence evidence.
5. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and on the basis of material available on record, the learned trial Court has acquitted the respondents/accused of the charges levelled against them. During trial, one of the accused namely, Mohitram has died. Against the said finding, the complainant has preferred an Appeal under Section 372 of the CrPC, which has also been dismissed by the learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge. Hence this Revision.
6. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that both the Court below have not appreciated the evidence in a proper perspective. The finding arrived at by the trial Court is perverse. The complainant, his brother (PW-2) Balram and (PW-4) Santosh have categorically supported the case of the prosecution and, therefore, the finding recorded by the trial Court is perverse. Learned counsel for the applicant prays to allow the Revision and to direct the concerned Magistrate for re-trial.
7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents/accused would submit that there was no demarcation and the wall was also not demolished, as the material witness (PW-6) Anandram categorically admits that no loss was caused and he has not supported the case of the prosecution. He further submits that (PW-4) Santosh was not aware about the incident. No independent witness has been examined and there was dispute about possession of the land. Therefore, the finding is not perverse. Learned counsel prays to dismiss the Revision.
8. Learned State Counsel has also supported the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the applicant.
9. In the matter of Shlok Bhardwaj Vs. Runika Bhardwaj and Others {2014:INSC:854 : (2015) 2 SCC 721 [LQ/SC/2014/1330] }, scope of criminal revision against acquittal has been highlighted and it was observed that normally the High Court will not interfere in Revision with the order of acquittal except in exceptional cases where the interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice. The High Court will not be justified in interfering with an order of acquittal merely because the trial court has taken a wrong view of the law or has erred in appreciation of evidence. Relevant para-8 reads thus:-
"8. The appellant appearing in person submitted that the parties had taken divorce by mutual consent as per agreement reached before this Court and thereafter, the respondent was not justified in proceeding against the appellant. It was further submitted that the High Court failed to advert to the settlement between the parties and also exceeded its jurisdiction in setting aside the order of acquittal. The Magistrate in its detailed order duly appreciated the entire evidence and found that no case for cruelty was made out against the appellant. In exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the said acquittal could not be set aside in absence of perversity. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of this Court in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar3 laying down as follows: (SCC pp. 654-55, para 12)
"12. We have carefully considered the material on record and we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in reappreciating the evidence on record and coming to a different conclusion in a revision preferred by the informant under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sub-section (3) of Section 401 in terms provides that nothing in Section 401 shall be deemed to authorise a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. The aforesaid sub-section, which places a limitation on the powers of the revisional court, prohibiting it from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, is itself indicative of the nature and extent of the revisional power conferred by Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the High Court could not convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction directly, it could not do so indirectly by the method of ordering a retrial. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the High Court will ordinarily not interfere in revision with an order of acquittal except in exceptional cases where the interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice. The High Court will not be justified in interfering with an order of acquittal merely because the trial court has taken a wrong view of the law or has erred in appreciation of evidence. It is neither possible nor advisable to make an exhaustive list of circumstances in which exercise of revisional jurisdiction may be justified, but decisions of this Court have laid down the parameters of exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in an appeal against acquittal by a private party. (See D. Stephens v. Nosibolla4, K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of A.P.5, Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram6, Pakalapati Narayana Gajapathi Raju v. Bonapalli Peda Appadu7 and Mahendra Pratap Singh v. Sarju Singh8.)"
10. In the matter of K.Ramachandran Vs. V.N. Rajan and Another {(2009) 14 SCC 569 [LQ/SC/2009/1406] }, scope of Revision against acquittal and its principles have been discussed and relevant paras-39 to 41 are reproduced hereunder:-
"39. We have also considered the judgment of the learned Single Judge on merits of the matter. In a revision against acquittal preferred by a private party, there is a very little scope to interfere. Here was a case where the learned Single Judge disapproved of the appreciation of the evidence by the trial court. It is not as if the trial court had ignored any important piece of evidence or it had chosen not to appreciate the same. It is again not as if there was any piece of evidence which was illegally not permitted to come on record. Again, it is also not a case where there was some serious defect in the trial affecting the merits of the matter. Further, the Court trying the appellant-accused did not lack the jurisdiction also to try and convict or acquit the appellant-accused. All that the High Court has observed is that the appreciation of evidence by the trial court was not correct and the trial court should not have taken the view that it has taken of the evidence.
40. This question has been considered in the celebrated judgment of Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram1, where, after considering the judgments of D. Stephens v. Nosibolla2, Logendranath Jha v. Polai Lal Biswas3, K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of A.P.4 and Mahendra Pratap Singh v. Sarju Singh5 this Court came out with categories of cases which would justify the High Court in interfering with the finding of acquittal in revision: (Akalu Ahir case1, SCC pp. 587-88, para 8)
"(i) where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case, but has still acquitted the [appellant-]accused;
(ii) where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce;
(iii) where the appellate court has wrongly held the evidence which was admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible;
(iv) where the material evidence has been overlooked only (either) by the trial court or by the appellate court; and
(v) where the acquittal is based on the compounding of the offence which is invalid under the law."
Of course, these categories were declared by this Court to be illustrative and this Court observed that other cases of similar nature could also be properly held to be exceptional in nature where the High Court could justifiably interfere with the order of acquittal.
41. In this very judgment in Akalu Ahir case1 though in para 10, this Court did not generally approve of the appreciation of evidence by the trial court Judge and held it to be not perfect or free from flaw and further observed "the court of appeal may be justified in disagreeing with the conclusion, but it does not follow that on revision by a private complainant, the High Court is not entitled to reappreciate the evidence for itself as if it is acting as a court of appeal and then order a retrial". The situation, as we will show further, is identical in the present case."
11. In the case at hand, except the statement of complainant and his brother (PW-2) Balram, there is no other evidence. The complainant in his cross-examination admits that the land for which dispute occurred he has not made any demarcation. (PW-6) Anandram has categorically stated that no wall was broken.
12. Considering the aforesaid principles and the evidence available on record, this Court does not find any perversity, infirmity or illegality in the finding of the Court below. It is well settled that benefit of reasonable doubt should be extended to the accused. Therefore, the finding arrived at by the Court below is possible one and no interference is required.
13. Resultantly, the Revision is dismissed.
