S.S. Sudhalkar, J.

1. This writ petition has been filed by the employer challenging the award of the Labour Court dated 4.9.1998, copy Annexure P/3, vide which respondent No. 2 was ordered to be reinstated with continuity of service and full back wages.

2. The award of the Labour Court has been assailed on the following grounds :-

i. Respondent No. 2 has not completed 240 days and even from his pleadings, he cannot be said to have completed 240 days of service.

ii. The Labour Court has accepted the argument of unfair labour practice for which there is no pleading.

iii. The Labour Court has wrongly placed the burden of proving that respondent No. 2 has completed 240 days, on the petitioner.

3. So far as unfair labour practice is concerned, it can be seen that there is no pleading in the demand notice or the claim statement. Therefore, the question is whether the respondent No. 2 has completed 240 days of service and whether the pleadings of the petitioner will come in his way and that the burden is wrongly placed on the petitioner.

4. The case of the petitioner in the deposition is that respondent No. 2 joined service on 1.9.1991 and he worked upto 12.6.1992. Counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention to the Claim statement which is produced on record at Annexure P/1. In the claim statement, it has been stated by the respondent No. 2 that he was appointed on 1.9.1991 and his services were terminated on 15.1.1992.

5. Counsel for the petitioner hence argued that respondent No. 2 cannot therefore be held to be in service on 12.5.1992. However, it can be found that in the subsequent para of the claim statement, respondent No. 2 has stated that his demand notice be also considered part and parcel of the claim statement.

The demand notice is in the record of the labour Court. It is dated 34.6.1994. In said demand notice, respondent No. 2 has stated that his services were terminated on 12.5.1992. This demand notice is made a part of the pleadings i.e. the Claim statement. If the statement appears from the record to be a mistake, then it can be ignored in view of this posit ion. Therefore, if the respondent No. 2 has completed 240 days and it is on record that he has worked upto 12.5.1992, the earlier pan of the claim statement will not come in his way where he has stated that his services were terminated on 15.1.1992.

6. The next question that comes up for consideration is whether respondent No. 2 has completed 240 days of service. The Labour Court in para No. 8 of the award has stated that w.e.f. 1.9.1991 to 30.4.1992, services rendered by respondent No. 2 was of 237 days. This factual position is not shown to be incorrect. The only question is whether respondent No. 2 had worked in the month of May or not. There are, in the record of the Labour Court, copies of the log book and from the copies of Log book, it can be seen that the presence of respondent No. 2 appears on 1.5.92, 2.5.92, 4.5.92, 5.5.92, 6.5.92; 7.5.92, 8.5.92, 9.5.92, 10.5.92 and 11.5.92. Copies of the log book are photo copies. When this is the position, the petitioner also could have produced the relevant Muster rolls or the original log book showing that this position which emerges from the copies of the log book was not correct. This is not done. The record for the monnt of May, 1992 is with the petitioner.

7. Counsel for the petitioner further argued that the petitioner was not bound to produce record of May, 1992 in view of the fact that respondent No. 2 had sub-milted that he had worked upto 15.1.1992. However, as mentioned earlier, this date stated by the petitioner in the earlier part of the claim statement is a mistake in view of the later part of the Claim statement incorporating the demand notice, in which the date of termination is mentioned as 12.5.1992. This being the position, the Labour Court has not erred in drawing adverse inference. I am guided in my own view by the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the case Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mohamed Haji Latif and others, reported as AIR 1968 SC 1418.

No further point has been argued.

Under these circumstances, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. It is hereby dismissed.

8. Petition dismissed.