B.N. Kirpal, J.

1. The challenge in this writ petition is to a notice issued under Section 154 of the Income-tax Act to the petitioner whereby the Commissioner of Income-tax seeks to withdraw the deduction which was allowed under Section 43B of the Income-tax Act.

2. In respect to the assessment year 1985-86 the petitioner had claimed in appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax that the Income-tax Officer ought not to have included in its income the amounts collected by the petitioner by way of sales tax and disallowed the amount payable to the Sales Tax Authorities by the petitioner. At that time the Commissioner of Income tax followed the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported as 173 I.T.R. 708 and held that as there was no contrary decision of the Delhi High Court he was bound by the observations of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and he directed that sum of sales tax which was payable though not actually paid, should be allowed as a deduction under Section 43B. After this order was passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax in appeal, the Income-tax Act was amended and Explanation II was inserted and it was given retrospective effect from 1st April, 1984. It is thereafter that the present notice under Section 154 has been issued seeking to withdraw the deduction which had been allowed by the Commissioner of Income-tax while deciding the appeal.

3. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that there are two views possible with regard to the interpretation of Section 43B and that Patna High Court has interpreted this provision to mean that even though payment has not actually been made, the provisions of Section 43B are applicable.

4. A question with regard to the interpretation of Section 43B came up for consideration before us in the case of M/s Sanghi Motors v. Union of India & Others, C.W. No. 2692 of 1990. Vide our judgment dated 22nd August, 1990 we held that Section 43B, as it now stands, is clear and unambiguous and all that it provides is that the deduction for sales tax would be allowed when the money is actually paid and not when the liability is incurred. It is true that the decision of Patna High Court was not brought to our notice but we have examined the said decision and with respect we cannot agree with the same. What has weighed with the Patna High Court is On the face of Section 43B of the Act, the same appears to be harsh and manifestly unjust.

5. In this situation, it would be permissible and necessary to consider the object of insertion of Section 43B of theas stated by the Finance Minister in his budget which is as follows: In our opinion, merely because a provision of the is harsh, and we dare say that all provisions which levy tax are harsh, is no ground for discarding other of the cardinal principles of interpretation of statutes which is that if the language is clear and unambiguous then resort cannot be had to refer to the aims and objects or to the Ministers speech with a view to interpret the provisions of an Act. It is only if there is any ambiguity in the language that in order to understand the intention of the Legislature aid can be taken of the proceedings in the Parliament including the aims and objects of the. Where, however, as in the present case, the language is plan, clear and unambiguous, the question of referring to the Finance Ministers speech in an effort to find out what is the intention of the Legislature does not arise.

6. The intention of the Legislature is evident from the section itself. The intention is that deduction is to be allowed only when payment is actually made. By verbal gymnastic, we cannot seek to interpret the said provision in a manner to negate the purpose of the section itself.

7. We also cannot agree with the Patna High Court that the proviso has to be given a retrospective effect especially when the Legislature has categorically stated that it is with effect from 1st April, 1984.

8. It was contended that Explanation II is ultra vires. It was submitted by Dr. Pal that under Section 43B if the sales tax is not payable then the said provision does not apply. The example which is given is that for the last quarter sales tax is usually payable after the end of the financial year. Section 43B, it was contended, contemplates a situation where sales tax is payable within the financial year and if sales tax is payable after the financial year then section 43B does not apply. It is precisely in order to plug this loophole that Explanation II was inserted with retrospective effect. Merely because Explanation II plugs a loophole and brings the case of the petitioner within the ambit of Section 43B cannot be a reason for us to hold that Explanation II is ultra vires. The Parliament has the legislative competence to enact the said provision and it is open to the Parliament to see that the loopholes, if any, in a fiscal enactment are blocked. We do not find this provision as being arbitrary or discriminatory and is not violative of any of the fundamental rights and is not in conflict with any provision of the Constitution.

9. As we have already observed in the case of M/s Sanghi Motors (supra), we have interpreted this section and we see no reason to disagree with the view which we have already taken.

10. In our opinion notice under Section 154 was validly issued. It is not possible for us to agree with the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that two view were possible. Two views may have been possible at the time when Explanation II had not been inserted but once Explanation II has been inserted with effect from 1st April, 1984 the ambiguity, if any, stood removed. We find no jurisdictional error in the issuance of the notice under Section 154. Furthermore, with regard to the interpretation of Section 154 and the merits of the case, it is open to the petitioner to raise such contention before the Authority itself and we see no reason as to why the petitioner should be allowed to abandon the proceedings under the and be allowed to take recourse to the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution.

11. For the aforesaid reasons, this petition is dismissed.