1. This appeal is filed under Section 16 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985 (for short TADA) against the judgment of the Designated Court, Khammam. The appellants were found guilty under Section 307 read with Section 34 and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years and under Sections 3 and 3(2)(ii) of the TADA for a period of five years and also to pay a fine of Rs. 100 each for the above offence in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one month each. They were also convicted under Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act and sentenced to three years imprisonment. A-1 is also convicted and sentenced to two years imprisonment for the offences under Section 25(1)(a) of the Indian Arms Act. The prosecution case is as follows

2. These appellants along with another accused A-3 were tried for the abovesaid offence. It is alleged that all these accused are the organising cadre of the CPL(ML) group led by Sri Kondapalli Seetharamaiah, creating terror in the people with the intention to overawe the government established by law in the State of Andhra Pradesh by using firearms, bombs etc. and they were involved in number of cases. On January 12, 1986 in the early hours the Inspector of Police, PW 5, on receiving credible information that A-1, who had gone underground, is organising his party to commit terrorist acts and disruptive activities in a house rented by A-3 at Burhanpuram locality, raided the premises. Observing that the appellants have been surrounded by the police party, A-1 to A-5, who were in the house, hurled a bomb with a view to kill the police. Then PW 5 gave a warning and the accused surrendered and from them several arms and other explosives were recovered. Panchanama was duly prepared in the presence of panch witnesses. A-1 was in possession of loaded revolver, A-2 was in possession of one hand grenade, A-3 to A-5 were in possession of countrymade bombs. The first information report was lodged and a case was duly registered in abovesaid offences. During the investigation it was established that the premises was taken on lease by A-3 and the other four accused A-1, A-2 and A-4 and A-5 were residing therein. After obtaining the sanction from the District Collector, under Section 8 of the Explosive Substances Act and Section 25(1)(a) of Indian Arms Act, the charge-sheet was laid. The charges under the above sections were framed and in support of its case the prosecution examined PW 1 to PW 6. The accused when examined under Section 313 denied the case

3. The evidence for the prosecution mainly consists of the persons who conducted the raid namely PW 1 and PW 5. PW 2 the owner of the premises, having supported the prosecution in his earlier statement, turned hostile. PW 3 and PW 4 are the other material witnesses. The learned Designated Judge accepting the evidence of PWs 1, 3 and 5 reached the conclusion that during the raid the police recovered the firearms and explosive substance from the possession of the appellants. A-3 was however, acquitted on the ground that he was only a tenant and case against him was not established. With the circumstances PW 2, the landlord, himself turned hostile. The learned Designated Judge concluded that the evidence of PW 5 coupled with the evidence of PW 1 establish the prosecution case

4. In this appeal the learned counsel firstly submitted that the acts alleged to have been committed by the appellants did not come within the meaning of terrorist act as defined under Section 3(1). He submits that no section of people were terrorised nor any one of them in the locality was injured because of the hurling of the bomb and that the prosecution did not establish that the appellants acted in a manner with such intention as mentioned in Section 3 and they do not come within the meaning of the word terrorist. Section 2(f) of thedefines the terrorist act and lays down that the expression is the meaning assigned to it under sub-section (1) of Section 3 and the expression terrorist shall be construed accordingly. Section 3 lays down that Whoever with intent to overawe the government as by law established or to strike terror in the people or any section of the people ... does any act or thing by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances ... or firearms etc., it is a terrorist act. Section 3(2), however, lays that Whoever commits a terrorist act shall, if such act has resulted in the death of any person, be punishable with death; and in any other case, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to term of life and shall also be liable to fine. For all purposes it may be necessary to refer to the provisions of Section 4. We may at this stage point out that we have carefully gone through the evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 5 and it is established that the police party raided the premises and that one of the appellants hurled bomb on them. When the appellants surrendered, firearms and explosives substances were recovered from them. That being so the ingredients of Section 2(f) as well as Section 3(1) are attracted. Section 3(1) is very wide and any act which strikes terror in the people or section of the people would attract the said provisions. The fact that the appellants were armed with the firearms as well as explosive substances and also hurled a bomb on the police who were in the premises would go to show that the offence of the appellant was to strike terror in the people or a section of the people including the police. Therefore, we are unable to agree with the learned counsel in this regard

5. The next submission of the learned counsel is that hurling of the bomb has not caused any injury to anyone and that being so act committed by the appellants will not bring them within the meaning of terrorist. It must be remembered that Section 2(f) lays down that the terrorist act is within the meaning of sub-section (1) to Section 3 and expression terrorist shall be construed accordingly. Therefore, the meaning of terrorist has to be gathered from Section 3(1). That being so the facts established by the prosecution would go to show that these appellants were armed with the firearms as well as explosives, come within the meaning of terrorist. Hurling the bomb at the police and other literature recovered from their possession in addition would show that they were indulging in terrorist acts and therefore, accordingly they come within the meaning of the word terrorist

6. Yet another submission by the learned counsel is that there is delay of six hours in lodging the report. We are unable to see as to how this delay would in any manner affect the prosecution case. After raiding, the recoveries were effected and thereafter a report was lodged in the concerned police station. Under these circumstances we do not think that the delay in any manner warrants any adverse inference

7. The last submission is that no sanction was obtained from the Central Government as laid down under Section 7 of the Explosive Substances Act for prosecuting the appellants for the offences under the Explosive Substances Act. From the judgment we do not find that any such objection was taken. In any event from the record we find that the Collector granted permission and this must be pursuant the delegation of powers as contemplated under Section 18(2) of the TADA8. Therefore, for the above reasons we see no merits in any one of the submissions. With the result the appeal is dismissed.