K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY, J.

1.We have heard both the sides and the matter is being disposed off at the admission stage.

2. This petition is directed against the order of a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court confirming the order passed by the Subordinate Judge, Nilgiris. The matter arises under the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (Act for short) and the facts that gave rise to the petition are as follows:

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that both the courts below have erred in holding that the petitioner has no caveatable interest. It is submitted that the petitioner is executor and legate off the will dated June 23, 1975 executed by Miss Zoe Enid Browne daughter of Mrs. Mary Aline Browne and that Miss Zoe has also executed a registered gift deed dated March 29, 1974 in respect of the second item of the estate and that the petitioner was also appointed a trustee of John Browne Trust of June 11, 1975 and therefore, in law the petitioner has an interest in the property which is the subject matter of the will and thus has caveatable interest.

4. Under Section 283 of the Act, the District Judge or District Delegate may, if he think proper, issue citations calling upon all persons claiming to have any interest in the estate of the deceased to come and see the proceedings before the grant of probate or letters of administration. Section 284 provides for loading caveat against grant of probate or administration. Section 285 lays down that no proceeding shall be taken on a petition for probate or letters of administration after a caveat against the grant thereof has been entered until the notice has been given to the caveator. Section 286 deals with the power of a district Delegate and lays down that he shall not grant probate or letter of administration in any case in which there is "contention" as to the grant, or in which it otherwise appears to him that probate or letters of administration, ought not to be granted in this Court. Under Section 288 where there is contention or where the District Delegate thinks that probate or letters of administration should be refused, the documents shall be returned to the applicant. In the instant case the Sub-Judge comes within the meaning of the District Delegate and the necessary powers were conferred on him by a notification which is not in dispute. According to the learned counsel the petitioner duly lodged a caveat against the grant of probate and that both the courts below have not properly appreciated the effect of such a contention and erred in striking off the petitioners caveat.

5. In Nabin Chandra Guha v. Nibaran Chandra Biswas 1932 AIR(Cal) 734 : 36 CWN 635) the Division Bench held that a person who was has a real interest in the estate which is or is likely to be prejudicially affected or adversely affected by the will can oppose the grant of probate or letter of administration. In Gourishankar Chattoraj v. Satyabati Debi 1931 AIR(Cal) 470 : 133 IC 212), it is held that the petitioner therein who was related to the deceased through a common ancestor, can be said to have interest in opposing the application for probate. In Shanti Devi Agarwalla v. Kusum Kumari Sarkar 1972 AIR(Ori) 178 : (1971) 2 Cut WR 704), Justice Ranganath Misra, as he then was, held that the vendor legatee is entitled to enter caveat and the purchaser having stepped into the shoes of vendor in also entitled to enter the caveat. In Narayan Sah v. Devaki 1978 AIR(Pat) 220 : 1978 BLJR 787), considering the locus standi of a person to oppose grant, it is held that any interest, however, slight and even a bare possibility of an interest is sufficient to entitle a person to enter caveat in a probate proceeding.

6. Relying on these decisions the learned counsel urged that the petitioner in the instant case has substantial interest in the estate. The learned counsel for the respondent did not dispute the legal position. He, however, contented that there was absolutely no material before the court below to substantiate the alleged interest of the petitioner in the estate. It is submitted that the so-called will said to have been executed by Miss Zoe Enid Browne, daughter of Mrs. Mary Aline Browne has not been filed. Likewise, the gift deed also was not filed. Coming to the trust of John Browne it is submitted that the trust does not exist and got extinguished. The learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that except mentioning these three aspects in a bare manner no other material was placed before the court. Having gone through both the orders we are inclined to agree with the learned counsel for the respondent that the petitioner did not establish her caveatable interest. We have perused the entire order of the trial court in the context. Admittedly neither the original nor a copy off the will said to have been executed by Zoe Enid Browne, was filed. Now coming to the trust, it is in the evidence of PW 1 that John Browne Trust has come to an end in March 1972 and the same was not in existence. The trial court has considered both the documentary and oral evidence in this regard and has rightly held that the petitioner has no existing benefit from the trust. Likewise the registered gift deed or a copy of it has not been filed. Before the learned Single Judge of the High Court also same contentions were put forward. The learned Judge observed that from the objections filed by the caveator she desires the court in the probate proceedings to uphold her title on the strength of a gift deed and trust deed. It is observed:

Accordingly the learned Judge held that the petitioner has not established that she has a caveatable interest justifying her opposition to the probate proceedings for grant of letters of administration. In this state of affairs, we are unable to agree with the learned counsel that the petitioner has caveatable interest.

7. Learned counsel, however, submitted that the will executed by Zoe Enid Browne on June 23, 1975 in favour of the petitioner though not filed but was subsequently probated in the year 1989 and the fact that probate is granted can be taken into consideration by this Court as a subsequent happening, as the appeal before this Court, is only a rehearing or the continuation of the matter. Reliance is Placed on Section 227 of thewhich reads thus:

It is submitted that since the will executed by Zoe Enid Browne in favour of the petitioner is probated it must be deemed that is was existing since the death of the testatrix namely Miss Zoe Enid Browne and that validates all intermediary acts. According to the learned counsel, the effect of such a probate is that the petitioners interest in the estate gets established even on the date of entering caveat. We are unable to see any force in this submission. The said probate, admittedly, took place in a court in the Madras city. We do not know whether the citations were issued to all the persons interested. This probate also admittedly was granted when the special leave petition was pending in this Court yet the respondent had no notice about this probate proceeding. Under these circumstances, exercising our jurisdiction under Article 136 we do not see that it is expedient to acknowledge this probate proceeding and reopen the matter.

8. Lastly an attempt was made to show that the Sub-Court has no jurisdiction but we find that there is a necessary notification issued by the High court conferring power on the Sub-Court. We see no force in any one of these submissions.

9. The learned counsel, however, lastly submitted that the petitioner in spite of having substantial interest in the estate is losing her right, to prove that the alleged will by Miss Zoe Enid Browne is not a genuine one and that it is a fictitious one. We must point our that by granting a probate, the court is not deciding the disputes to the title. Even with regard to a probate granted, it can be revoked as provided under Section 263 of thein any one of the cases mentioned therein. But the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the findings of the sub-Court and the High Court regarding the caveatable interest will come in the petitioners way in seeking revocation of the grant of probate. It is needless to say that the findings regarding the caveatable interest of the petitioner have a limited effect and are relevant only to the extent of granting of probate. But they cannot deprive his right, if he has any, to invoke Section 263 of theand it is up to the petitioner to satisfy the court.

10. With these observations, the special leave petition is dismissed.