Das, J.This is a court-fee matter. The suit was to recover a sum of money for losses in respect of 38 consignments of mangoes of different dates between the 21st of May and the 18th of August 1920. Before the suit was instituted, the plaintiff, who is the Respondent here, served a notice on the Defendant u/s 77 of the Indian Railways Act claiming a consolidated sum of money in respect of the losses sustained by him by reason of the negligence of the Railway administration. A court-fee of Rs. 130 was paid by him on the consolidated sum of Rs. 2,01 2-14-6 claimed by him. The plaintiffs suit succeeded in the Court of first instance. Thereupon the East Indian Railway Company appealed to the Court below, and, on their memorandum of appeal, they paid a court-fee of Rs. 130. The stamp reporter has taken the view that as each consignment was a distinct subject within the meaning of Section 17 of the Court Fees Act the plaintiff was chargeable with the aggregate amount of the fees to which the plaints in suits embracing separately each of such subjects would be liable under the Act. According to him, the memorandum of appeal in the Court below was insufficiently stamped for the same reason.

2. The schedule annexed to the plaint shows that there were 38 different consignments of different dates, and it is this circumstance which encou" raged the stamp reporter to say that it was open to the Plaintiff to file separate suits in respect of these different consignments. The learned Government Advocate, supporting the report of the stamp reporter, has contended before, us that though it is open to plaintiff to combine separate causes of action in a single suit the position from the point of the Court Fees let must be exactly the same as if he had brought separate suits on his separate causes of action. It has been held in this Court and in the Calcutta High Court that the word "subject" in Section 17 of the Court Fees Act means "cause of action." But the validity of the argument of the Government Advocate must depend on the question whether the plaintiffs suit did embrace thirty-eight distinct causes of action.

3. u/s 77 of the Indian Railways Act, it is necessary for the Plaintiff to give notice of his claim to the Railway Administration before proceeding to & suit. In his notice to the Railway Administration the plaintiff claimed a consolidated sum of money in respect of the losses sustained by him by reason of the negligence of the Railway Administration. It is not disputed that it was open to the Plaintiff to bring one suit in respect of his losses and to claim a consolidated sum of money. This is exactly what the Plaintiff did, and he expressly mentioned the 19th November 1920 the date on which notice was given as one of the dates on which cause of action accrued to him. Now "cause of action" means "every fact which it would be necessary for the Plaintiff to prove, if traversed in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court." Mr. Naresh Chandra Sinha has contended before us that, after the notice of the 19th November 1920, it was impossible for the Plaintiff to maintain separate suits in respect of his separate causes of action. It seems to me that the notice of the 19th November 1920 is part of the cause of action of the Plaintiff, for it is one of these facts which it was necessary for the Plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. The question whether a suit does or does not embrace two or more distinct causes of action must be decided on the terms of the plaint, and I find it impossible to hold, on a perusal of the plaint, that the suit embraced 38 distinct causes of action. As I have said before, the notice was part of the cause of action of the Plaintiff, and it was impossible for the Plaintiff to maintain separate suits after the notice of the 19th November 1920.

4. I hold that the memorandum of appeal in the Court below was sufficiently stamped.

Ross, J.

5. I agree.