Raman Nayar, J.This second appeal is by a Judgment-debtor whose objection to execution on the score of limitation has been overruled by the courts below,

2. The decree in question, a money decree, was passed on 23-3-1119 M. E., and the present application for execution, which is the only application so far, was filed on 21-5-1123, four years and two months after the decree. But even before the decree, the judgment-debtor had, on 20-10-1116, instituted a petition (D. R. P. No. 292 of 1116) in the District Court of Alleppey for a settlement of his debts u/s 16 of the Travancore Debt Relief Act, Act II of 1116.

To this petition, the present decree-holder was impleaded as a party on 14-2-1119 in respect of the very claim on which the decree was passed a month later; and on 26-3-1119 he appeared before court in response to a notice issued u/s 17(2) of the Act and filed a memorandum claiming the amount due to him and demanding priority in the matter of payment.

The petition was eventually dismissed on 14-4-1122 for want of prosecution and with it went the decree-holders memorandum. The only question for decision in this appeal is whether the period of the pendency of the petition can be excluded for purposes of limitation u/s 14(2) of the Limitation Act.

3. We think it can. That D. R. P. No. 292 of 1116, and, in particular the claim made therein by the present decree-holder, were civil proceedings between the same parties in respect of the same matter is not, and indeed cannot, be disputed. Nor is it alleged that, in respect of those proceedings, there was any want of due diligence or good faith on the part of the present decree-holder.

It was solely by reason of the judgment-debtors default that the main petition had to be dismissed; and the main petition having gone, the court found itself unable to deal with the decree-holders claim. That being so the only question that needs to be answered in the affirmative before giving the decree-holder the benefit of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act is whether it can be said that he was prosecuting that proceeding against the present judgment-debtor for the same relief, and whether the court was unable to entertain his claim from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature.

4. We have little difficulty in answering the question in the affirmative. The Travancore Debt Relief Act makes provision for the full settlement of the debt of a person, who is unable to pay his debts and who unconditionally leaves all his assets in the control of the court, in a manner analogous to insolvency proceedings, the principal difference being that one-fourth of the entire assets (not exceeding Rs. 3,000 in value) is saved for the debtor and the balance alone distributed amongst his creditors.

Under Section 16(3) of the Act, the debtor has to furnish full particulars of all claims against him together with the names and addresses of his creditors, (also of all claims he has against others); and u/s 17(2) the court has to give notice of the hearing of the application to all the parties to the proceedings. It is in response to such a notice that the present decree-holder appeared and submitted his claim. u/s 18 of the Act, the court has to determine the admissibility and the amount of each claim, and in determining this has to follow as far as possible the procedure prescribed in the Travancore Insolvency Act.

5. Thus we find that the present decree-holder had, in D. R. P. No. 292 of 1116, made a claim against the present judgment-debtor for the same relief, namely, the payment of the debt which is the subject-matter of the present decree. That in the array of parties in that proceeding he was shown as a respondent and not as a petitioner does not affect the position.

It was not as if he was merely resisting the petition and asking that it should be dismissed. On the contrary, he filed a memorandum claiming payment of the money due to him, and that claim he was prosecuting until the dismissal of the main proceeding in which it was made rendered it impossible for the court to entertain it. It is not only a person who has figured as a plaintiff or a petitioner in the prior proceeding that can claim the benefit of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act.

A defendant or a respondent can equally get the benefit provided he had claimed therein the lights sought in the subsequent proceeding, and was not merely resisting or defending the prior proceeding. (See Note 10 to Section 14 in the AIR Commentary on the Indian Limitation Act at p. 471 of Vol. 1 of the III Edn., and the cases cited therein).

And, even on the strictest construction of the words, "from defect of jurisdiction, or other cause of a tike nature," appearing in Section 14(2) of the Act, we have little doubt that the inability of the District Court of Alleppey to entertain the claim made by the present decree-holder, in D. R. P. No. 292 of 1116, an inability that arose from the dismissal of that petition, was from cause of a nature akin to defect of jurisdiction.

6. This was the view indicated in a Division Bench ruling of the Travancore-Cochin High Court A. Kunju Vasu v. Sankara Kurup ILR 1952 Trav Co. 426: AIR 1954 Trav Co 237 (A), the judgment in which was rendered by one of us, although there no final decision was taken for want of evidence of the necessary facts and the case was remanded to the first court for disposal. This view we affirm.

7. We might notice briefly the decisions cited on behalf of the judgment-debtor. Ravivarma Thirumulpad v. Joseph 1953 Ker LT 778 (B), only lays down that, although the Travancore Debt Relief Act provides for the adjudication of claims due to a person making a petition u/s 16, such a petition filed by a decree-holder cannot be regarded as a step-in-aid of execution for the purpose of Article 182 of the Limitation Act, and it is to be noticed that the applicability of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act was excluded on the ground that the dismissal there was not for defect of jurisdiction or like cause but for want of diligence on the part of the very party seeking the benefit of Section 14, and that the petition there was not a proper petition. Narayana Pillai Kunjan Pillai v. Kesava Pillai Sankara Pillai 1954 Ker LT 82: AIR 1954 Trav Co 369 (C), only repeats what was already said in ILR 1952 Trav Co 426: AIR 1954 Trav Co 237 (A), namely, that the filing of a petition u/s 16 of the Debt Relief Act does not operate as a stay of execution of any decree against petitioner -- Section 21 of the Act makes separate provision for stay -- so as to enable exclusion of time u/s 15 of the Limitation Act.

And what was decided in Yeswant Deorao Deshmukh Vs. Walchand Ramchand Kothari, , in affirming the decision in Walchand v. Yeshwant AIR 1949 Bom 379 (E) was that a petition by a decree-holder for adjudging his judgment-debtor an insolvent was not a proceeding for the recovery of the money due to him under his decree (although that might be a possible consequence) so as to make it a proceeding for the same reliefs as a subsequent application for execution of the decree.

But the proceeding which we are here considering, namely, the claim filed by a decree-holder for payment of the debt due to him, bears no analogy to a petition to adjudge the debtor insolvent. The real analogy is to a proof filed by a creditor in insolvency which the court is unable to entertain by reason of an annulment; but for such a case Section 78(2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act makes special provision and so the applicability or otherwise of Section 14(4) of the Limitation Act has not arisen for consideration.

8. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.