PRITHVI RAJ, J.
( 1 ) THE short point that arises for determination in this appeal Is whether the
brand name highland Chief used in relation to product described as "malted Whisky"
along with the device of the head and shoulders of a Scottish gentleman wearing
feather bonnet and plaid and the tartan edging gives the impression that the
product in relation to which it is used comes from Scotland and is thus likely to
deceive or confuse the unwary purchaser in India.
( 2 ) FACTS relevant for the purpose are these. Dyer Meakin Breweries Limited (now
Mohan Meakin Breweries Limited), hereinafter referred to as the appellant, is a
company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1974, manufacturing
various types of liquors and having its registered office at Solan in Himachal
Pradesh. The appellant filed application with Trade Mark Registry seeking
registration of trademark consisting of label, inter alia, portraying in vivid colours the
bust of what appears to be Scottish soldier with words "highland Chief" in class 33 in
respect of Whisky. The application was admitted by the Assistant Registrar and
advertised in Trade Marks Journal on Oct. 16, 1964. The Scotch Whisky Association,
(hereinafter let erred as the respondent), an Association incorporated under the
English Companies Act, 1948, having its registered office at Edinburgh, Scotland,
which does not itself carry on trade but includes amongst its members the leading
producers and sellers of Scotch Whisky and has one of the principal aims to protect
the interests of the producers and sellers of Scotch Whisky and take action for the
purpose of restraining the sale of any product which deceives the purchaser into
believing that it is Scotch Whisky when it if not, in fact, the case, filed opposition to
the said application on Feb. 11, 1965. It was contended, inter alia, that description
"scotch Whisky" was not generic but related solely to the geographical origin of the
product and meant whisky distilled in Scotland and the words "highland Chief",
when used in relation to malted whisky, would be assumed by purchasers to relate
to a product of Scotland since the highlands of Scotland are an area world-famous
for the production of whisky. It was also stated that the impression created by the
words "highland Chief" would be confirmed as the label bore prominently the device
of the head and shoulders of a gentleman dressed in Scottish Highland costume
wearing, inter alia, feather bonnet and plaid and edged with tartan, a well known
symbol of Scottish origin. If was submitted that the mark in question was one the
use of which was likely to deceive or cause confusion.
( 3 ) IN the counter statement filed by the appellant, the status and functions of the
respondent were not challenged and it was conceded that the description "scotch
Whisky" meant whisky distilled in Scotland and that description could only be used
in relation to a product wholly distilled in Scotland. It was, however, pleaded that
the label bore name and place of manufacture and bottling in bold letters and set
forth that the produce was a product of India and, therefore, no conside ration of
deception or confusion at all could arise.
( 4 ) THE parties filed affidavits and Shri V. H. Mehta, Assistant Registrar of Trade
Marks, on consideration of the material before him, took the view that there was
absence of evidence to indicate that the purchasing public in India associated the
word "highland" with whisky produced in Scotland and held that he was not
prepared to believe that on seeing the picture of a Scottish Highlander or the words
"highland Chief" on a bottle of whisky the purchasers in India would think that the
whisky inside was produced in Scotland. The result was that the opposition was
dismissed and application No. 214480 was ordered to be proceeded with for
registration vide order dated April 21, 1970.
( 5 ) FEELING aggrieved, the respondent preferred appeal under S. 109 of the Trade
and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). The matter
came up before V. D. Misra,. who accepted the same and dismissed the application
vide judgment dated Sept. 6, 1971. This is how the matter has come up in second
appeal.
( 6 ) IT is contended by Mr. R. C. Chadha, learned counsel for the appellant, that
the learned single Judge wrongly assumed that the onus of proof that the trade
mark in question was not likely to deceive or confuse was on the appellant. It is
urged that it is a case where no evidence was produced by the respondent in
support of its opposition and, therefore, it had to be dismissed and had been rightly
dismissed by the Assistant Registrar. These submissions are wholly devoid of merit.
It would be seen that the provision of S. 11 of the Act is so expressed as to lay
down a number of prohibitions in the matter of registration of trade mark and the
one which is relevant in this case is that it should not be likely to deceive or cause
confusion. In the very nature of things it would be for the applicant in such a case
to show that the use of the trade mark would not be likely to deceive or cause
confusion. It is pointed out that the applicant produced no-objections in writing from
two producers of Scotland and this led to the admission of the application and,
accordingly, the burden of proof shifted to the respondent as it does in civil
proceedings. Strong objection has been taken by Shri Anoop Singh, learned counsel
for the respondent, to the reliance on these letters. It is submitted that these letters
do not constitute part of the record inasmuch as according to S. 99 of the Act,
evidence in proceedings before the Registrar should be given by affidavit. It is
conceded that the appellant did not file any such affidavit nor made request to lead
oral evidence under the proviso. It is, therefore, not permissible even to contend
that occasion for the shifting of the onus arose in this case. The concept of shifting
of onus postulates existence of two parties and proceedings to which the provisions
of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 apply. So far as the proceedings before the
Registrar are concerned, there is essentially one party which approaches the
statutory functionary on whom the law enjoins the responsibility to see that the
proposed trade mark would not be likely to deceive or cause confusion or violate
any law etc. as mentioned in els. (a) to (e) of S. ll of the Act and, therefore, the
onus would be on the appellant from beginning to end and it would be of no
moment if opposition is filed or not pursuant to the publication in the Journal. Way
back in the Matter of Dunns Trade Mark, (1890) 7 RPC 311 at pp. 315 and 316
while referring to the provision analogous to the provision contained in S. 11 of the
Act, it was observed: these prohibitory clauses cast upon the applicant the duty of
satisfying the Comptroller, or the Court, that the trade mark which he proposes to
register does not come within their scope. In an inquiry like the present, he does not
hold the same position which he would have occupied if he had been defending
himself against an action for infringement. There, the onus of showing that his trade
mark was calculated to mislead, rests, not on him, but upon the party alleging
infringement; here he is in petitioner, and must justify the registration of his trade
mark by showing affirmatively that it is not calculated to deceive. It appears to me
to be a necessary consequence that, in dubio, his application ought to be
disallowed. "this view found approval with L.. Jenkins in the Matter of Trade Marks
Act 1938, and Koyo Seiko Kahushikd Kaishas application , to register Trade Mark,
1958 RPC 112 at p. 122. Therein it was observed: I have always understood it to be
settled that in cases of this kind the onus is plainly on the applicant for registration
to satisfy the Tribunal or the Court that there is no reasonable likelihood of
contusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I have further always understood that the onus which
is invariably on the applicant lies all the heavier upon the applicant when he is
seeking to register a new mark. "in National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. , Chidambaram
v. James Chadwick and Bros. Ltd. , AIR 1953 SC 357 [LQ/SC/1953/56] , while dealing with a case
under S. 8 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 which corresponds to S. 11 of the Act,
Mahajan,. (as he then was), who spoke for the Court, observed: the principles of
law applicable to such cases are well-settled. The burden of proving that the trade
mark which a person seeks to register is not likely to deceive or to cause confusion
is upon the applicant. It is for him to satisfy the Registrar that this trade mark does
not fall within the prohibition of S. 8 and, therefore, it should be registered. "similar
view has been taken by the Calcutta High Court in Prem Nath Mayer v. Registrar of
Trade Marks, AIR 1972 Cal 261 [LQ/CalHC/1972/23] and in the matter of an application of Smith Hayden
and Co. Ltd. , (1945) 63 RPC 97.
( 7 ) IN regard to the second aspect, namely, there was no evidence in this case, it
is observed that there is clear and cogent evidence which was simply lost sight of by
the Assistant Registrar. On the basis of that evidence the learned single Judge held
that the trade mark sought to be registered was not only likely to deceive or cause
confusion but also of false trade description,
( 8 ) IN para 2 of the opposition it was alleged that the description "scotch Whisky"
was not generic but related solely to the geographical origin of the product in
relation to which it was used. It is also stated that the description "scotch Whisky"
meant whisky distilled in Scotland and that description could only be used in relation
to a product wholly distilled in Scotland. The correctness of these allegations was
conceded in para 2 of the counter statement. The admission arising from the
pleadings is obviously of considerable importance. In paras 4 and 5 of the opposition
it was mentioned that words "highland Chief" indicated that the whisky in relation to
which they were used came from Scotland would be confirmed if they saw those
words used on the label, the subject of application No. 214480, since it bore
prominently the device of the head and shoulders of a gentleman dressed in.
Scottish Highland costume wearing, inter alia, feather bonnet and plaid and edged
with tartan a well- known symbol of Scottish origin, and even if the brand name was
changed, there would be no appreciable difference in the impression. In para 5 of
the affidavit, sworn by Mr. David dark Banks in support of the opposition, it was
stated that Scotch Whisky had been sold throughout India for about a century and
by virtue of extensive sales and consider able amounts spent on advertisement,
Scotch Whisky had acquired a high reputation and prestige throughout India. This
averment was conceded in the counter-affidavit sworn by Shri Narinder Nath Mohan,
Director of the appellant. In para 6 of the affidavit of Mr. David dark Banks, it was
sworn that whisky produced by members of the Association was distilled in several
parts of Scotland but the region which was most famous for whisky was that part of
the Scotland known as "the Highlands". The word "highland" when used in relation
to whisky, it was added, had become synonymous with "scotch" and any one using
the word "highland" as part of a brand name for whisky would denote thereby that
the whisky was Scotch Whisky and the public would understand when they saw the
word "highland" used as part of the brand name of whisky that the whisky was
produced in Scotland. These averments stand uncontroverted in the counter affidavit.
In the same para of the affidavit, details of trade marks in relation to
whisky wholly distilled in Scotland and registered in India bearing words "highland
Queen", "highland Queen Grand Liquor Scotch Whisky Label" "highland Queen
Scotch Whisky Label" "highland Nectar", "highland Club" and "highland Cream
Label", all registered in class 33 in India for whisky have been incorporated and
these facts also stand uncontroverted. In the latter part of para 10 of the affidavit, it
is mentioned that Scotch Whisky like all alcoholic beverages is often ordered by
reference to price lists in a bar or restaurant where a purchaser has no opportunity
of seeing the label at all. This averment, too, stands uncontroverted,
( 9 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the use of the
words "highland" or "highland Chief" is not synonymous with the "highland" in the
minds of Indian public. The uncontroverted averments contained in paras 5 and 6 of
the affidavit are a complete reply to this argument and we are afraid the appellant
cannot be permitted to go out of the admission of fact. It is plain that the
description "scotch Whisky" relates solely to the geographical region of the product
and "the Highlands" is the region of Scotland most famous for Scotch Whisky and is
synonymous with scotch and is used as a part of the label being used for whisky.
This being so, it is very likely tor the public to understand that the word "highland"
used as a part of brand name for whisky is a Scotch Whisky that is one produced in
Scotland.
( 10 ) CONFRONTED with this difficulty, Mr. Chadha has submitted that the use of
the word "chief" along with "highland" and the picture of the Scottish soldier wellknown
as Highlander attired in Scottish dress would make all the difference
inasmuch as the words "highland Chief describe the picture of the Scottish soldier
and not the whisky. This argument conveniently loses sight of the fact that not only
the trade mark is sought to be used in relation to whisky which is malted whisky, the
trade mark, speaking generally, is always used in relation to goods. Furthermore, it
has to be considered as a whole and the crucial question for consideration in each
case is as to how a purchaser who must be looked upon as an average man of
ordinary Intelligence would connect the trade mark with the goods which he is
purchasing. The goods of the appellant are indigenous. They are markedly different
from Scotch Whisky that is the whisky which is the product of Scotland and the
Highlands. The preference for Scotch Whisky amongst the people who Jove wine in
this country is well known. in these circumstances, once it is conceded that the
words "highland Chief" used in relation to whisky are synonymous with Scotch and
any one using the word "highland" as part of a brand for whisky would denote
thereby that the whisky is Scotch Whisky and the public would understand on seeing
the word "highland" used for whisky that whisky was produced in Scotland, the
device of the head and shoulders of a gentleman dressed in Scottish Highland
costume wearing, inter alia, feather bonnet and plaid and edged with tartan, a well known symbol of Scottish origin, would in our opinion, enhance in a great measure,
the impression made by the words "highland Chief" as having undeniably to do
something with Scotch Whisky produced in Scotland rather than to wean away the
mind of the purchaser from the goods and get engrossed with a colourful picture as
having nothing to do with the origin of world famous whisky produced and distilled
in Scotland. Highlanders being Scottish soldiers are well known in history and
literature and highlands are well known as best region of Scotland producing Scotch
Whisky. It is difficult to believe, even to conceive, in the circumstances, that the
words and the picture of the Highlander on being perceived in unison would mitigate
the effect of either of the two in relation to the product, the origin thereof and
relationship with Scotland.
( 11 ) IT is pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant that some of the
labels used by the respondent on whisky produced and distilled in Scotland which
bear word "highland" as part of the brand name would show words "scotch Whisky"
are invariably mentioned. He has referred to the label "highland Queen" which
carries words "scotch Whisky written beneath and the label "highland Nectar"
which carries words "rare old Scots Whisky", It is argued that the inference is that
the "highland" by itself does not denote that the goods for which it is used as part of
the brand name are the produce of Scotland. This is nothing but vain arguing
against uncantroverted averment contained in para 6 of the affidavit of Mr. David
Clerk Banks and cannot be countenanced. Furthermore, the association of the word
"highland" as part of the brand name with Scotch Whisky emphasised by the
appellant clearly goes against it When one has to consider whether the word
"highland" used as part of brand name in respect of something which is not
produced in Scotland is likely to deceive or confuse an unwary customer of ordinary
intelligence, it is to be borne in mind that the impression which is to count is the first
impression created by the word, and the device, one supplementing the other, and
this unmistakably carries the mind to the place known for whisky standing as a claw
and accepted as such.
( 12 ) IT cannot be gainsaid that the word "scotch" when used in relation to whisky
by sheer user has come to be identified with the goods produced in Scotland and
the same is the case with the word "highland" figuring in the trade mark in
question.-On the basis of the admission referred to above and the trade marks
"highland Queen", "highland Nectar" etc. which stand registered in India, it cannot
further be gainsaid "that the "highland" being the name of the place when applied to
whisky would indicate that the goods are the produce of that place. It cannot further
be gainsaid that the word "highland" as part of trade mark in relation to whisky has
acquired reputation amongst, the general public and it is something undeniable that
the public associates that part of the trade mark with whisky produced and distilled
in Scotland. It would, thus, follow inferentially that words "highland Chief" by
themselves or because of the presence of pictorial representation of the Highlander
on being used as trade mark in respect of appellants whisky which admittedly is not
Scotch Whisky would be likely to deceive or confuse the unwary purchaser in
thinking that the whisky is Scotch Whisky.
( 13 ) ANOTHER contention urged on behalf of the appellant is that the words
"highland Chief" on the label of the appellant given an apt description of the picture
or pictorial representation thereof, and, therefore, no consideration of false trade
description arises in this case. We agree that the words and the picture tally. In fact
we have already discussed that the impression gets confirmed and enhanced, but it
is difficult to hold that it is not a case of false trade description. According to Section
2 (1) (f) of the Act "false trade description" means, inter aila, a trade description
which is untrue or misleading in a material respect as regards the goods to which it
is applied. Section 2 (u) (iv) which deals with "trade description" means description
as to the place or country in which any goods are made or produced. Having come
to the conclusion that the use of words "highland Chief in isolation or in conjunction
with the pictorial representation which form part of the trade mark, has the likely
effect of making the purchaser believe that the whisky to which this trade
description is given is the product of Scotland, Section 11 (e) of the Act would at
once be attracted. This section says that a mark which would otherwise be
disentitled to protection in a Court shall not be registered as a trade mark. We,
therefore, respectfully agree with the learned single Judge that this description, in
the circumstances set out above, is a false trade description within the meaning of
Section 2 (1) (f ).
( 14 ) IN Bollinger,. v. Costa Brava Wine Co. Ltd. 1960 RPC l6 at p 31, the tacts
were that wine not grown in Champagne, a district of France, was sought to be sold
as Spanish Champagne. It was held by Danckerts. :"there seems to be no reason
why such licence should be given to a person, competing in trade, who seeks to
attach to his product and name or description with which it has no natural
association, so as to make use of the reputation and goodwill Which has been
gained by a product genuinely indicated by the name or description. In my view, if
ought not to matter that the persons truly entitled to describe their goods by the
name and description are a class producing goods in a certain locality, and not
merely one individual. The description is part of their goodwill and a right of
property. "this case was followed in Vine Products Ltd. v. Mackenzie and Co. Ltd.
1969 RPC 1. Cross,. observed at page 23 "if I may say so without impertinence I
agree entirely with the decision in the Spanish Champagne case " but as I see it, it
uncovered a piece of common law or equity which had till then escaped notice for in
such a case there is not, In any ordinary sense, any representation that the goods of
the defendant are the goods of the plaintiff, and evidence that no one has been
confused or deceived in that way is quite beside the mark. In truth the decision
went beyond the well-trodden paths of passing off into the unmapped Tea of "unfair
trading" or "unlawful competition. "
( 15 ) IT is pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant that the label
bearing words "highland Chief also contains the name of the appellant and the
words "produce of India". As already mentioned above, the trade mark is to be
considered as a whole and the Impression that a man of ordinary intelligence would
carry is the impression which is to be visualised. The words "produce, of India"
appearing at the bottom of the picture of the label are in very small letters and very
insignificant. The name of the appellant "dyer Meakin Breweries Ltd. " is of course
there and is not in small letters but words signifying the place of bottling are again
in small type. What matters most is the first impression. That Impression would
necessarily come from words and representations made in bold letters. They are
really eye catching. It Is 50 Manifest from the words "highland Chief appearing in
great prominence and the device of the head and shoulders of a Scottish soldier
which is even more prominent and pervading. If is difficult to hold that the words
"produce of India" and the other words just noted constitute worthy safeguard,
remembering its situation and, the type of purchaser which alone are relevant when
questions like these are considered.
( 16 ) WE are in respectful agreement with the visual analysis of the learned single
Judge and also the reason given by him that unless persons examine the label
minutely, which usually a customer does not do, and goes by the overall impression
created by the name and the multi-coloured label, the trade mark is definitely going
to confuse the goods with Scotch Whisky and that it would be more so when a
person is familiar with Highland Nectar, Highland Cream, Highland Queen and
Highland Club and that he is more likely to conclude that highland Chief is one of
the familiar brands of Scotch Whisky.
( 17 ) THE last submission of Mr, Chadha is that the Act has conferred discretion on
the Registrar in the matter of allowing registration and in accordance with the wellaccepted principles of law, the discretion exercised by him should not be lightly
interfered with. He has relied upon Lakbir Singh v. Bakhat Singh, AIR 1973 Delhi
225 and Chandra Bhan Agarwal v, Arjundas Agarwal, AIR 1974 Cal 183 [LQ/CalHC/1973/60] . We need
not discuss these authorities as we are whole-heartedly in agreement with the
principle followed therein. In the instant case, the Assistant Registrar fell into an
initial error that the onus lay on the respondent presumably on the view that the
application tor registration had been admitted before notice of opposition was given
by the respondent. We have already held that in view of the nature of the
prohibition contained in Section 11, the onus was on the appellant from beginning to
end and no consideration of shifting of that onus ever arose. Another error that was
committed by the Assistant Registrar was in holding that the respondent had
produced no evidence. We have shown above that there was abundant evidence
coming from the admissions in the pleadings and uncontroverted averments in the
affidavit sworn by David dark Banks. The repeated observations made by the
Assistant Registrar that there was no evidence produced by the respondent is wholly
unwarranted. Once a particular fact is admitted no necessity for production of
evidence to substantiate arises and once the evidence is produced in the manner
required by law, and in this case by affidavits as it was required to be done under
Sec. 99, nothing more was needed after the various statements and claims were
admitted or left unchallenged and uncontroverted. The power of the Registrar to
grant registration is no doubt discretionary but the discretion is to be exercised in a
judicial manner for furthering the intent and purpose of the Act. In this case, for
reasons aforementioned, the Assistant Registrar came to an erroneous view that the
proposed trade mark was not likely to deceive or confuse. His decision suffered from
the vice of illegality besides impropriety. It deserved to be interfered with and was
rightly set aside by the learned single Judge.
( 18 ) IN conclusion the appeal fails and is dismissed, accordingly. The appellant
shall pay the costs throughout.