1. We are invited in this Rule to set aside an order, bywhich the Court below has dismissed an application for reversal of an executionsale under r. 89 of Or. XXI of the Civil Procedure Code of 1908. Thecircumstances under which the order in question has been made have not beendisputed before this Court. The property in dispute is a house which admittedlybelonged to one Naunidh Koer. The case for the Petitioner is that on the 5thNovember 1907 she purchased the house at a sale in execution of a certificateunder the Public Demands Recovery Act issued against Naunidh Koer for recoveryof arrears of road-cess. On the 21st September 1910, in execution of amoney-decree held by one Bansidhari Singh against Naunidh Koer, the house wasbrought to sale and purchased by the decree-holder. The Court was closed fromthe 2nd October till the 3rd November 1910. On the 4th November, when the Courtre-opened, one of the officers of the Petitioner took to the Court anapplication for reversal of the sale under r. 89 of Or. XXI of the Code of1908. The presiding officer, it appears, had for some unexplained reason leftthe Court earlier than usual; and when the application was presented to thesheristadar, at 5 oclock in the afternoon, he made a note upon it to the effectthat it had been so presented, but refused to accept the money on the groundthat he had no authority to receive it. On the next day, the petition waspresented again and registered, and the money was also deposited. Thedecree-holder auction-purchaser objected to the reversal of the sale on threegrounds, namely, first, that the application had been presented beyond the timeprescribed by the law, and was consequently of no avail to the Petitioner ;secondly, that the deposit was not unconditional, and was consequently not avalid deposit within the meaning of the Rule, and, thirdly, that the Petitionerhad no locus standi to make the application, because, upon her own allegation,her interest, if any, had accrued not only before the sale but so long beforethe execution proceedings commenced that it could not be affected thereby. TheSubordinate Judge held that the first two objections taken by the decree-holderauction-purchaser were well-founded, but that the third could not be sustained.In this view, he dismissed the application for reversal of the sale. ThePetitioner has now applied to this Court, and invited us to consider thelegality of the order made by the Subordinate Judge. In our opinion the ordermust be affirmed, but not on the grounds stated by the Subordinate Judge.

2. In so far as the first objection taken by thedecree-holder auction-purchaser is concerned, we are of opinion that there isno substance in it. Upon the facts stated, it is clear that the failure of thePetitioner to make the application accompanied by the deposit on the day theCourt re-opened was due to an act of the Court itself. Consequently, upon theprinciple explained in the case of Mahomed Akbar Zaman Khan v. Sukhdeo Pande 13C. L.J. 467 (1911), the position of the Petitioner could not be prejudiced inany manner. She had done her best to comply with the requirements of thestatute, and the difficulty which has arisen was occasioned, because thepresiding officer had left the Court earlier than usual. Under such circumstances,the fresh presentation of the application and the deposit of the money on theday following would be sufficient compliance with the provisions of the law.

3. In so far as the second objection urged by thedecree-holder auction-purchaser is concerned, it is in our opinion equallyunsubstantial. It appears that the petition which accompanied the depositcontained a statement that the money was not to be paid out to thedecree-holder auction-purchaser till the disposal of a suit which had been commencedby the Petitioner in another Court. Now, it is perfectly true that a depositunder r. 89 of Or. XXI, in order that it may be a valid deposit, must beunconditional, because the deposit is to be made for payment to the purchaserand the decree-holder. When, therefore, a deposit is made with a condition thatthe sum may not be drawn out at once but may be retained in Court until acertain event has happened, it is not a good deposit within the meaning of theRule [see Shakoti v. Jotindra Mohan 1 C. W. N. 132 (1896)]. The case of HanumanSingh v. Lachman Sahu 8 C. W. N. 355 (1904) is not opposed to this view. Therethe deposit when made was unconditional, and it was only subsequently that aninfructuous attempt was made by the Petitioner to fasten a condition thereupon.The Court held that the deposit, if good when made, cannot be invalidated by asubsequent act on the part of the Petitioner not authorised by law. On thisprinciple, it may well be contended that the deposit in this case ought not tobe treated as valid, because a condition was annexed thereto. It appears,however, that the deposit was accepted by the Court without any question and assoon as objection was taken by the decree-holder, the Petitioner withdrew thecondition, so that the money became available for payment to the decree-holderbefore he had made any attempt to withdraw the money from Court. Under suchcircumstances, we are not prepared to hold that the deposit was invalid and notsufficient for reversal of the sale. The position might have been different if,upon objection taken by the decree-holder, the Petitioner had persisted in hereffort to annex a condition to the deposit. The decree-holder was notprejudiced in any manner by the insertion of the prayer in the application of thePetitioner that the money should be retained in Court, and he was substantiallyin the same position in the end as if such prayer had never been made. We mustconsequently hold that there was substantially a valid deposit within the timelimited by law, sufficient for reversal of the sale.

4. In so far, however, as the third objection taken by thedecree-holder auction-purchaser is concerned, it was in our opinion erroneouslyoverruled by the Subordinate Judge. As already stated, the case for the Petitioneris that so far back as the 5th November 1907 she had acquired, by purchase atthe certificate sale, a good title to the property in question, in other words,that at the time when the property was sold on the 21st September 1910 as theproperty of Naunidh Koer, the latter had no subsisting interest therein. It ismanifest, therefore, that the Petitioner has not been in any manner affected bythe sale. Under these circumstances, the question arises whether she isentitled to make an application for reversal of the sale under r. 89 of Or.XXI. That Rule-we quote only so much of it as is relevant to our presentpurpose-provides as follows : "Where immoveable property has been sold inexecution of a decree, any person either owning such property or holding aninterest therein by virtue of a title acquired before such sale, may apply tohave the sale set aside" on certain prescribed conditions. It may seem, atfirst sight, that the language of this Rule is comprehensive enough to includea person in the position of the Petitioner. It may be contended that hereimmoveable property has been sold in execution of a decree. The Petitioner isthe person who owns such property by virtue of a title acquired long before thesale : she is consequently competent to apply to have the sale set aside. Inour opinion, this construction, though it may be justified by the language ofthe Code, is not the right construction of the rule in question. R. 89reproduces sec. 310A, which was inserted in the Code of 1882 by Act V of 1894.That section provided that any person whose immoveable property has been soldunder Ch. XIX of the Code of 1882 may, at any time within 30 days from the dateof sale, apply to have the sale set aside. Upon the construction of thissection, it is well known, two questions arose upon which there was somedivergence of judicial opinion. The first point which arose for considerationwas whether a person who had acquired an interest in the property after thesale sought to be set aside had taken place was competent to avail himself ofthe benefit of the section: the question arose, for instance, whether a personto whom the judgment-debtor sold or mortgaged the property after the sale inexecution was entitled to apply under the section. Upon this point, as we havealready stated, the different High Courts were not agreed [see Hazari Ram v.Badai Ram 1 C. W. N. 279 (1897), Appaya v. Kunhati I. L. R. 30 Mad, 214 (1906)and Manickka v. Rajagopala I. L. R. 30 Mad. 507 (1907), see also Ram Chandra v.Rakhmabai I. L. R. 23 Bom. 450 (1898), Mulchand v. Govind I. L. R. 30 Bom. 575(1906), Erode v. Pulhiedeth I. L. R. 26 Mad. 365 (1902) and Kunja v. Bhupendra12 C. W. N. 151 (1907)]. To settle this divergence of judicial opinion, theLegislature has introduced the words "by virtue of a title acquired beforesuch sale." The second question which arose for consideration was, whetherthe person who sought to avail himself of the provisions of sec. 310A must havebeen full owner of the property sold, or whether it was sufficient that heshould have an interest in the property affected by the sale [Nityananda Patrav. Hira Lal Karmakar 5 C. W. N. 63 (1900), overruled by a Full Bench in PareshNath v. Nabogopal I. L. R. 29 Cal. 1 (1901), Mallikarjunadu v. Lingamurti I L.R. 26 Mad. 332 (1902)]. In order to settle this divergence of judicial opinion,the Legislature has introduced the words "either owning such property orholding an interest therein." In order to give effect, however, to thepolicy of the Legislature upon the two points just mentioned, the rule appearsto have been re-drafted with the result that the phraseology has been soaltered as to lend some colour of support to the interpretation, that anyperson who owns the property or has an interest therein, is entitled to applyfor reversal of the sale, even though his title is such as cannot be affectedby the sale: in other words, the attempt to remove the two difficulties whichhad arisen under the old Code, has resulted in a new obscurity. It is plain,however, that a reasonable interpretation must be given to the provisions ofthe Statute, and it is useful in this connection to bear in mind the well-knowncanon of construction laid down in Stradling v. Morgan Plowden 197 (at 205 a)(1660), and quoted with approval by Lord Halsbury, L. C., in Cox v. Hakes 15 A.C. 506 at p. 518 (1890), and by this Court in the case of Narendra Nath v.Nogendra Nath 13 C. L. J. 471 at p. 475 (1911). "The sages of the lawheretofore have construed statutes quite contrary to the letter in someappearance, and those statutes, which comprehend all things in the letter, theyhave expounded to extend but to some things, and those which generally prohibitall people from doing such an act, they have interpreted to permit some peopleto do it, and those, which include every person in the letter, they haveadjudged to reach to some persons only, which expositions have always beenfounded on the intent of the Legislature which they have collected sometimes byconsidering the cause and necessity of making the act, sometimes by comparingone part of the act with another, and sometimes by foreign circumstances. Sothat they have ever been guided by the intent of the Legislature, which theyhave always taken according to the necessity of the matter, and according tothat which is consonant to reason and good discretion."

5. It would in our opinion be an obviously unreasonableinterpretation of r. 89 to hold that any person might avail himself of thebenefit thereof, even though admittedly he was in no way affected by the salesought to be reversed. In a Under the circumstances, there will be no order asto costs in this Court case of this description a reference to the history ofthe legislation on the subject is perfectly legitimate, as was done by theJudicial Committee in Iswati Prosad v. Chatrapati 3 M. I. A. 100 at p. 130(1842) and Brown v. McLachlan L. R. 4 P. C. 543 at p. 550 (1872). The historyof the legislation here shows conclusively that the extended construction putupon the Rule by the learned Subordinate Judge cannot be supported : we mustafter all take a rational view of the scope and object of the section, andcannot attribute to the Legislature any intention such as would be obviouslyunreasonable ; but we need not for our present purposes determine the preciselimits of the scope of the Rule or define the circumstances under which it maybe applicable. The view we take as to the true interpretation of r. 89 is inaccord with that taken by Stanley, C. J., and Banerjee, J., in Mahamed AhamadullaKhan v. Ahamed Said Khan 8 All. L. J. R. 356 (1911) [see also Asmutunnissa v.Ashruff Ali I. L. R. 15 Cal. 488 (1888), which overruled the contrary viewmaintained by Mr. Justice Field in Panye Chunder v. Hur Chunder I. L. R. 10Cal. 496 at p. 500 (1884)]. As the Petitioner has carried back her title to adate so far anterior to the sale and the execution proceedings that she couldnot possibly be affected thereby, we must hold that she had no locus standi tomake an application for reversal of the sale which according to her own casedoes not concern her in the least.

6. The result, therefore, is that although we disagree withthe Subordinate Judge upon all the three points taken by the decree-holderauction-purchaser, we must affirm his order and discharge the Rule. Under thecircumstance, there will be no order as costs in this Court.

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Dulhin Mathura Das Koer vs. Bansidhar Singh and Ors.(20.04.1911 - CALHC)