Rowland, J.This is an appeal from an order in execution dismissing the objection of the appellant that the decree could not be executed against her property, namely tauzis Nos. 3644 and 3647. The suit has been brought by the respondent against Dula Bibi, the mother of the appellant, as a mortgage suit. There being a question whether the decree would be able to be satisfied out of the mortgaged property, he in the lifetime of Dula Bibi obtained an order of attachment before judgment of these two tauzis. Thereafter he obtained a decree against Dula Bibi and took out Execution Case No. 172 of 1933 against her praying that the decretal amount be realized by sale of the mortgaged property and these two tauzis. During this execution Dula Bibi died and the appellant was substituted in her place. She took an objection, Ex. G, that lots 3 and 4, namely these two tauzis, could not be sold until the mortgaged property was exhausted.

2. On this petition the order passed by the executing Court was Ex. A on 29th September 1934:

Lots 1 and 2 should be sold first and after they are found insufficient to satisfy the decree lots 3 and 4 will be sold.

That execution case was eventually dismissed. The mortgaged properties, it seems, could not be brought to sale because of a regular suit on behalf of a third party claiming them. The decree-holder now seeks to proceed against the two tauzis above mentioned and the judgment-debtor has objected that they are not liable to be taken in execution of the decree, because they are not properties of Dula Bibi which have come into the hands of the appellant but are the appellants own property. The Subordinate Judge on two grounds rejected the objection. First, he said that no such objection having been taken in the previous execution the principle of constructive res judicata was applicable and the judgment-debtor was concluded by the order dated 29th September 1934, and could not raise this point again.

3. Secondly, on the merits he held that each of these tauzis had been the personal property of Dula Bibi and had come to the judgment, debtor as Dula Bibis heir. On both these points the decision pf the Subordinate Judge is challenged, but it is, on both points, in my opinion, correct.

The law is that the doctrine of constructive res judicata is applicable to execution proceedings to this extent, that where a judgment-debtor fails to raise all his objections to the application in execution made by the decree-holder which he might and ought to have raised and the application is ordered to proceed, all such objections will be deemed to have been impliedly decided against him and he will be precluded from raising the same objections in a later execution on the same decree. There are numerous authorities in support of this proposition, and it is not necessary to refer to the repeated decision of the Privy Council which have laid down the general principles to be followed.

4. In Kapur Chand v. Kanhaiya Lal AIR (1924) All 34 a case was considered which is almost exactly on all fours with the facts of the case before us, the objection referred to the question against what property the decree-holder was entitled to proceed and an order passed in a previous execution that the decree-holder was entitled to proceed against certain property was held to be binding between the parties in subsequent execution proceedings. It was not, thereforer open to the objector to raise again in the present proceedings the contention that the execution against these properties could not proceed. On the merits the Subordinate Judge has given good reasons for his finding that tauzis Nos. 3647 and 3644 belonged to Dula Bibi. As regards tauzi No. 3647 there was the unrebutted testimony of a witness for the decree-holder, and as regards tauzi No. 3644 it appears that it became the property of Dula Bibi by virtue of a deed of family arrangement or compromise by which a probate dispute between her and Lakshmi Bibi was settled. The com-promise agreement has been exhibited as Ex. E and it shows that Dula Bibi by it takes the interest which is given to her by the compromise.

5. Substantially the disputed properties were divided, eight annas going to Dula Bibi and eight annas to Lakshmi Bibi. The nature of the interest of each is thus described:

According to these shares we by ourselves and from generation to generation have become owners in possession.

The words described an absolute estate of inheritance, and I do not think it is necessary to go behind so clear an expression. We have been referred to Ex. E, a copy of a notice issued by the Land Registration Department publishing the fact that Lakshmi Bibi and Dula Bibi had got their names registered. Lakshmi Bibi is said to have succeeded by virtue of inheritance and will, Dula Bibi by something which is incomplete, the paper being torn, but it may also be by inheritance and will.

6. There is nothing here to show that she even then represented herself as having succeeded by inheritance from her husband. The last holder of the property had been Jagannath who had left the disputed will. In the result I would affirm the decision of the Subordinate Judge and dismiss this appeal with costs.

Harries, C.J.

7. I agree.