1. The writ appeal is filed by the petitioners in the writ petition challenging the judgment of the learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No. 970 of 2022 dated 10.2.2022. Appellants are doctors practicing modern medicine.

2. Short facts leading to the filing of the writ appeal are as follows:

A consumer complaint C.C. No. 202/2020 was filed by the 1st respondent u/s. 35 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Kannur against the appellants seeking compensation for medical negligence and deficiency of service on the part of the appellants while treating the complainant/1st respondent resulting allegedly in the loss of sight of the left eye of the 1st respondent.
3. On receipt of notice issued from the Consumer Disputes Forum, Kannur the appellants filed I.A. No. 92/2020 in C.C. No. 202/2020 challenging the maintainability of the complaint, for want of jurisdiction for the District Consumer Forum to entertain the above complaint under the new Consumer Protection Act, 2019 and hence, praying for dismissal of the complaint. The main contention raised in the above I.A is that 'medical services/practice' is not included in the list of services specifically referred to in the inclusive definition of 'service' under Section 2 (42) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019. Thus it was contended that diagnosis and treatment of diseases including surgery of a patient by a medical practitioner is not treated as 'service' in the above definition under the present Act, and hence a dispute between a patient and the treating doctor, alleging medical negligence or deficiency of service in respect of the treatment cannot be brought within the purview, scope and ambit of the expression 'service', defined under Section 2(42) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019. After hearing rival parties, the District Consumer Forum dismissed the above I.A. The said order was challenged by the appellants by filing a Revision before the Kerala State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Thiruvananthapuram, however the same was also dismissed.

4. It is thus aggrieved by the orders specified above the Writ Petition was filed seeking to quash the order passed by the District Consumer Forum, Kannur in I.A. No. 92/2020 in C.C. No. 202/2020 and the order of the Kerala State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in Revision No. 16/2021; and for a further declaration that the Consumer Fora under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 does not have the jurisdiction for taking cognizance and entertaining any complaint alleging 'medical negligence' or deficiency of 'medical service' under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019. However the Writ court dismissed the writ petition by judgment dated 10.2.2022; operative portion of which reads thus:

"12. A reading of the inclusive part in Section 2(42) would show that the Parliament intended to specifically underline that certain services like Banking, Financing, Insurance, Transport, etc., which are in the nature of public utility services, would come within the purview of 'services'. The definition is inclusive and not exhaustive. Therefore, all services which are made available to potential users would fall under Section 2(42), except those services rendered free of charge or under a contract of personal service. The words "but not limited to" appearing in Section 2(42) clarifies the intention of the Parliament. The medical services therefore would indeed fall within the ambit of Section 2(42), unless of course the service is free of charge or is under a contract of personal service.

13. The petitioners would contend that the Draft Bill of the new Consumer Protection Act of 2019 originally included the 'Health Sector' among the illustrations of facilities that are treated as 'service' in Section 2(42) and since the 'Health Sector' was excluded in the Act, 2019, it should be held that the Parliament wanted to exclude the Health Sector from the purview of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019. The argument, though looks attractive, is unsustainable in view of the well settled principles of interpretation of statutes. External aid like Draft Bill can be taken for interpreting a statutory provision only when there is ambiguity in the express provisions of the statute. In the case of Section 2(42), the definition is clear and devoid of any ambiguity whatsoever. Furthermore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has already interpreted the identical provision in the Act, 1986 and has held that the Act would take in Medical Services also. The argument based on Draft Bill is therefore only to be rejected.

14. The District Commission considered the issue of maintainability of the complaint and noted that there is no difference to the meaning of 'service' in the old Act and the new Act. The words "Medical Service" were not expressly included in the definition of 'service' in both the Acts. Therefore, the District Commission rejected the objections as to the maintainability of the complaint relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in V.P. Shantha (supra).

15. The State Commission also held that since no conscious change in the definition of "service" was made in the new Act, the contention of the petitioners that Health Sector has been deliberately excluded by the Parliament while enacting the new law, cannot be accepted. This Court finds that there is no reason to interfere with Ext. P4 order or Ext. P6 judgment impugned in the writ petition. The writ petition therefore is dismissed."

5. Mr. Renoy Vincent, learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the learned single judge erred in not properly appreciating the intention of the Parliament in not including 'medical service/practice' in the illustrations in the inclusive definition of the term 'service' u/s. 2(42) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, for the reason that it did not want to include the 'medical service/profession' within the purview of the term 'service' under the new Act. It is further submitted that the learned Single Judge has not taken note of the fact that the draft Bill of the new Consumer Protection Act, 2019 had originally included the 'Health Sector' among the illustrations of facilities that are treated as 'service' under the definition of 'service' in Sec. 2(42) of the new Act but when the new Act came, after being deliberated by the Select Committee and considered by the Union Government, 'Health Sector' was removed from among the illustrations u/s. 2(42) of the Act. This clearly depicts the legislative intention to exclude 'medical service/profession' from the purview of the new Act, is the contention.

6. It is further submitted that while considering the writ petition, writ court relied on the judgment in Indian Medical Association v. Dr. V.P. Shantha, (1995) 6 SCC 651 [LQ/SC/1995/1126] ; but the law on the point had been declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the year 1995, that the medical practice/profession would also come within the purview of the definition of the term 'service' u/s. 2(o) by interpreting the term 'service' under the Act 1986. In such a case, according to the appellants, the Parliament was duty bound to specifically include the 'medical profession/practice' among the facilities included as illustrations of the term 'service' u/s. 2(42) of the Act 2019, since the Parliament was duty bound to incorporate the case law as part of the statutory law, when the old Act was amended materially and substituted by the present new Act of 2019. Since the Parliament had omitted to do so, the learned single judge ought not to have placed reliance on V.P Shantha's case while dismissing the Writ Petition vide impugned judgment, is the further contention.

7. We have heard Mr. Renoy Vincent representing Mr. S. Gopakumaran Nair, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, and Mr. V. Girishkumar, learned Central Government Counsel for the second respondent and perused the material on record.

8. The learned Single Judge, after taking into consideration the imperatives contained under Section 2(1)(o) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and Section 2(42) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 has arrived at the conclusion that the judgment of the Apex Court in V.P. Santha's case (supra) would squarely apply to the facts and circumstances of the case in view of the fact that the term 'service' is defined under the Act, 1986 and the Act 2019 pari materia. It is also found by the learned Single Judge that Section 2(42) of the Act 2019 is an inclusive definition similar to the definition contained under Section 2(1)(o) of the Act, 1986 and since in V.P. Santha's case (supra) the service was interpreted to mean the service rendered in the Health Service sector the proposition of law laid down therein would squarely apply to the service defined under Section 2(42) of Act, 2019. It is thus challenging the legality and correctness of the judgment, the appeal is preferred by the writ petitioners.

9. We have evaluated the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant. We are of the clear opinion that the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in V.P. Santha's case (supra) would apply to the facts and circumstances of this case since service defined under Section 2(1)(0) and Section 2(42) of Act, 1986 and Act 2019 respectively are inclusive definitions and it was after intrinsic consideration of the intention of the Parliament that the Apex Court has arrived at the conclusions in V.P. Santha's case (supra) that the services rendered by the persons in health service sector would come under the purview of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Even Though the Act 2019 has replaced the Act 1986 the definition of 'service' contained under Section 2(42) of Act 2019 remains intact as an inclusive definition, and merely because the inclusion of some of the establishments or organisations specifically there under, under no circumstances it can be said that since health service sector is not specifically mentioned it is excluded from the purview of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019. Such a contention goes against the spirit of the principles of law evolved by the apex court in V.P. Samantha's case supra. That apart, the primary contention advanced by the appellants is that in the draft bill, the health service sector was incorporated but later it was removed which clearly indicates that the Parliament did not intend to include the health service sector in the purview of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019.

10. Having analysed the arguments so advanced, we are of the clear and considered opinion that merely because the health service sector was specifically included in the draft bill and removed later, that is not a circumstance to establish that the Parliament did not intend to incorporate the service of the health service sector in the purview of the Consumer Protection Act. Furthermore, it is well settled in law that a debate or discussion made or incorporation of any particular aspect or removal of the same from a draft bill, would not be a predominant circumstance to think and arrive at a finding that by the removal of the incorporated particular word or words from the draft bill the Parliament intended that an interpretation is to be given that the the intention of the parliament is to exclude the services of the doctors from the purview of the Act 2019. In fact the said question was considered by the Apex Court in a large number of decisions; in State of Travancore-Cochin v. Bombay Company Limited reported in AIR 1952 SC, it was held that a speech made in the course of debate on a bill could at best be indicative of the subject intent to the speaker, but it would not reflect the inarticulate mental process lying behind the majority vote which carried the bill, nor is it reasonable to assume that the minds of all those legislators were in accord.

11. In fact, a Division Bench of Hon'ble Bombay High Court had occasion to consider the very same question in Medicos Legal Action Group v. Union of India. After taking into consideration the judgments of the Apex Court in V.P. Santha's case (supra), State of Travancore-Cochin (supra), Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose [AIR 1952 SC 369 [LQ/SC/1952/61] ], State of West Bengal v. Union of India [ AIR 1963 SC 1241 [LQ/SC/1962/446] ], K.P. Varghese v. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam (1981) 4 SCC 173, [LQ/SC/1981/368] the Bench arrived at the following conclusions:

"8. We see no reason to hold that merely because of enactment of the 2019 Act upon repeal of the 1986 Act as well as the parliamentary debates referred to by the petitioning Trust, the efficacy of the law laid down in the decision in Indian Medical Association (supra) as a binding precedent would stand eroded. The definition of "service" in both the enactments (repealed and new) are more or less similar and what has been said of "service" as defined in section 2(1)(o) of the 1986 Act would apply ex proprio vigore to the definition of the terms "service" in section 2(42) of the 2019 Act. Therefore, we have little reason to hold that services rendered by doctors in lieu of fees/charges therefore are beyond the purview of the 2019 Act.

9. We may, at this stage, travel down memory lane to ascertain what was the view of the Supreme Court on references to speeches in course of debates on the floor of a house. In State of Travancore-Cochin vs. Bombay Co. Ltd., reported in AIR 1952 SC 366 [LQ/SC/1952/53] , Hon'ble Patanjali Shastri, CJI (as His Lordship then was) had the occasion to observe that a speech made in the course of debate on a bill could at best be indicative of the subjective intent of the speaker, but it would not reflect the inarticulate mental process lying behind the majority vote which carried the bill, nor is it reasonable to assume that the minds of all those legislators were in accord. His Lordship, in Aswini Kumar Ghose vs. Arabinda Bose, reported in AIR 1952 SC 369 [LQ/SC/1952/61] , ruled that speeches made on the floor of the Parliament are not admissible as extrinsic aids to the interpretation of statutory provisions. Hon'ble B.P. Sinha, CJI (as His Lordship then was), in State of West Bengal vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1963 SC 1241 [LQ/SC/1962/446] , held that a statute is the expression of the collective intention of the Legislature as a whole and any statement made by an individual, albeit a Minister, of the intention and object of the Act, cannot be used to cut down the generality of the words used in the statute.

10. No doubt, the above rigid view has been on the decline in recent years and there are judgments aplenty where Judges are found to have referred to Constituent Assembly 811-PIL-58-2021 debates or debates on the floor of the house for a particular construction of a statute. Reference in this regard may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in K.P. Varghese vs. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam & Anr., reported in (1981) 4 SCC 173 [LQ/SC/1981/368] . However, we have referred to the aforesaid decisions with the sole intent of gathering guidance on the value to be attached to the speeches when a repealed statute, as earlier read and interpreted by the Supreme Court, bears no ambiguity with the repealing statute and the definition of a particular term in such repealing statute arises for interpretation once again, this time by a High Court.

11. Despite not taking a rigid view, we are of the clear opinion that the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioning Trust, of the Hon'ble Minister having made certain statements in course of parliamentary debates on the Bill that preceded the 2019 Act, is of little relevance. From the pleadings it is found that 'health care' was initially included in the definition of the term "service" appearing in the Bill but after extensive debates, the same was deleted. This is the sheet-anchor of the claim raised in the writ petition that 'health care' not being part of the definition of "service" in section 2(42) of the 2019 Act, as distinguished from the definition in the Bill, deficiency in services relating to 'health care' cannot be the subject matter of complaints before the consumer fora. We wonder, what turns on such deletion. In the context of the 1986 Act and the 2019 Act, there could be no two opinions that the definition of "service" having been read, understood and interpreted by the Supreme Court in Indian Medical Association (supra) to include services rendered by a medical practitioner to his patient upon acceptance of fees/charges, the parliamentarians might have thought of not including 'health care' as that would have amounted to a mere surplusage. If at all the Parliament while repealing and replacing the 1986 Act with the 2019 Act had intended to give a meaning to the term "service" different from the one given by the Supreme Court, such intention ought to have been reflected in clear words by a specific exclusion of 'health care' from the purview of the 2019 Act. While construing a statute, what has not been said is equally important as what has been said.

12. We, therefore, hold that mere repeal of the 1986 Act by the 2019 Act, without anything more, would not result in exclusion of 'health care' services rendered by doctors to patients from the definition of the term "service".

12. The writ petition, thus, stands dismissed.

13. The petitioning Trust shall pay, as costs, Rs. 50,000/- to the Maharashtra State Legal Services Authority within a month from date failing which such sum shall be recovered as arrears of land revenue."

12. Even Though the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Medicos Legal Action Group's case was challenged before the Apex Court in SLP 19374/21, it was dismissed in limine.

13. On going through the provisions of Act 1986 and the Act 2019 and bearing in mind the judgment of the Apex Court in V.P. Santha's case (supra), we have no hesitation to say that we are in respectful agreement with the judgment of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Medicos Legal Action Group v. Union of India, supra.

14. Deducing the factual and legal situations as is discernible from records as well as the deliberations made above, we are of the clear and definite opinion that the appellants have not made out any case for interference with the judgment of the learned Single Judge.

15. In the light of the above, the appeal fails and accordingly it is dismissed.