1. In these writ petitions, the petitioners herein have primarily challenged the order dated 01.04.2022 passed by the respondent-University transferring the petitioners to the various places. In W.P.No.101373/2022, the petitioners have challenged the order of transfer dated 01.04.2022. In W.P.No.101321/2022, petitioner has challenged the order dated 29.06.2022 passed by the 2nd respondent No.2 (Annexure-E) whereby, the respondent-university withdraw the petitioner as Head of the Department of Agricultural Meteorology, College of Agriculture, Dharwad and nominating one Dr. Sumesh to the said post. In W.P.No.100177/2023, petitioner has challenged the order dated 12.12.2022 (Annexure-A) regarding allotment of work.
2. It is the case of the petitioners that, petitioners are working in the respondent-University in the cadre of Professors as well as the Assistant Professors. The petitioner Nos.1 to 3 are the office bearers of the association for Teacher’s welfare, University of Agricultural Science U.A.S. Dharwad (hereinafter referred to as ‘Association’). Petitioner Nos.4 and 5 are the Executive Member of the Association. It is averred in the writ petition that, petitioners are collectively through its Association requested the respondent-University to fulfill the demands of the teachers of the University and in this regard, proceedings of the Association dated 23.08.2021 (Annexure-B), 07.11.2021 (Annexure-C), 30.09.2021 (Annexure-D), 02.10.2021 (Annexure-E), 03.10.2021
(Annexure-F) are produced. It is urged by the Association that, their demands have not been met by the respondent- University and therefore, they decided to go on agitation as per letter dated 03.10.2021 (Annexue-F). Meeting was also fixed on 29.10.2021 as per Annexure-G at Raj Bhavan, Bengaluru to ameliorate their dispute. In the meanwhile, the University has taken steps to appoint posts of Director and Dean in the University as per notification dated 23.11.2018 and same was challenged before this Court by the Association and this Court by order dated 04.12.2021 (Annexure-H) allowed the writ petition, consequently set aside the impugned notification empowering the respondent-University to appoint for the various posts. In the meanwhile, the petitioners were served with charge- sheet dated 17.12.2021 as per Annexure-J to the writ petition. The petitioners have challenged the charge-sheet issued by the respondent-University in W.P.No.100145/2022 and this Court granted an interim order on 13.01.2022 (Annexure-K). Thereafter, the Governing Council of the University in its 59th meeting resolved to take disciplinary action against the employees, particularly noticing the activities of the petitioners herein in the Association. The respondent-University has also issued show cause notice dated 05.02.2022 to the petitioners herein seeking explanation from them alleging that their action which amounts to ‘misconduct’ under the Karnataka Civil Service (Conduct) Rules, vide Annexure-P series. It is the case of the petitioners that, the impugned transfer orders are passed by the respondent-University, with vindictiveness coupled with malafide in nature and to harass the petitioners accordingly, challenged the same in these writ petition.
3. Heard Sri. Prashant S. Kadadevar, and Sri. P.N.Hati, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri. Harsh Desai, learned Additional Government Advocate and Sri. K.L.Patil, learned counsel for the respective respondents.
4. Sri. Prashant S. Kadadevar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that, the reason behind issuing the transfer order by the respondent- University, transferring the petitioners herein who were the office bearers of the Association is on account of the demand made by them on behalf of the Association and the impugned transfer order is with colorable exercise of power by the respondent-University. He further contended that, there is no public interest involved and the transfer of the petitioner is against the circular issued by the respondent- University (Annexure-R2 to R6 to the statement of objections). It is contended by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that, the petitioners herein have been victimized by the respondent-authorities by transferring them to different places. In this regard, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner places the list of Professors/Assistant Professors/Associate Professors and other officers of the respondent-University, who have not been transferred for more than two decades. Accordingly, learned counsel for the petitioner places reliance on the Judgment of this Court in the case of M. Sumitra Vs. Bengaluru University, Gnana Bharati, reported in ILR Kar. 2006 1122 and argued that the intention of the respondent-University is to snub the petitioners activities in the association. It is also argued by Sri. Prashant S. Kadadevar, learned counsel for the petitioners that, the sole intention of the respondent-University is to scuttle the career of the petitioners as they are working for the benefit of the teachers’ community and accordingly, sought for interference of the Court.
5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Sri. Harsh Desai, submitted that, the petitioners herein are working for a considerable period in the existing posting and in terms of the circular dated 20.03.2008 (Annexure-R6), the petitioners have been transferred to the various places along with other employees. He also submitted that, these transfers have been effected during the general transfer period and the University has taken utmost care as per clause 14 of the said circular. He further denied the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner that, the respondent-university with vindictive nature transferred the petitioner and in this regard, he referred to the Judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India and others Vs. S.L.Abbas, reported in (1993) 4 SCC 357 [LQ/SC/1993/420] and in the case of Shilpi Bose (Mrs.) and others Vs. State of Bihar and others, reported in 1991 Supp (2) SCC 659.
6. Sri. K.L.Patil, learned counsel appearing for the University, in addition to the submission made by Sri. Harsh Desai, argued that, this Court is having limited jurisdiction to interfere with the transfer matters and accordingly sought for dismissal of the petition.
7. In the light of the submission made by the learned counsel for the parties, the following points arises for consideration:
(i) Whether, the transfer order dated 01.04.2022 passed by the respondent-university is justifiable
(ii) Whether, this Court is having jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to interfere with transfer orders
(iii) What order
8. In order to answer the aforementioned points, the perusal of the writ petition would indicate that, the petitioners herein are the office bearers of the Association. I have gone through the various proceedings of the meeting of office bearers of the Association and the General Body meeting as per the Annexure-B to F and same would indicate that, the Association persistently, urging the respondent-University to take decision in the matter of fixation of 7th pay commission inter alia process of promotional avenues to be improved for the eligible in service candidates. The matter has also reached the Office of His Excellency, Governor of Karnataka, who is the Chancellor of the University to take decision with regard to the implementation of the 7th pay scale to the teachers. I have also noticed from the minutes of the syndicate meeting as per Annexure-L, whereby, at Item No.59.17, the University has resolved to take disciplinary action against the members mentioned in the said meeting, who are nothing but the Office bearers and particularly, the petitioners in the present case. The syndicate, further resolved to issue show cause notice to these petitioners. The said meeting was held on 02.02.2022 (Annexure-M). In the meanwhile, the show cause notice was issued on 05.02.2022 to the petitioners vide Annexure-P series deterring that the appropriate action would be taken against the petitioners herein. In the guise of these aspects, I have noticed the transfer guidelines dated 20.03.2008 (Annexure-R6 to the statement of objection). Clause 4 of the circular provides as follows:
“4) An employee should serve at least a minimum 5 years in his service in out side places/centers/stations/colleges etc., other than Dharwad campus including Krishi Nagar, Yattinagudda, Prabhu Nagar, Dharwad Farm, (Hebballi), Kumbhapur, Saidapur and Mugad.”
Clause 14 of the circular reads as under:
“14) The office bearers of all the association may not be transferred from their place of work during their tenure as far as possible. However, this privilege will be restricted to only first such tenure of an individual office bearer.”
9. On careful examination of these aforementioned provisions make it clear that, the office bearers of the Association have an edge in the general transfers and the University would take all possible steps to keep the office bearers of the Association in their respective offices and they should not be disturbed from place of work. Though the word ‘may’ is employed in the said clause 14, the said provision has to be read as ‘shall’ taking into consideration the factual aspects on record. Therefore, taking into consideration the aforementioned aspects on record that the show cause notices have been issued to the petitioners, who are the office bearers of the Association and have knocked the doors of the Chancellor to fulfill their demands on behalf of the Association, and that apart the charge- sheet has been issued to these petitioners in the backdrop of the allegations made against them in the syndicate and same would squarely demonstrates that the respondent- University with malafide intention passed the order of transfer.
10. I am also well aware about the fact that, this Court is having limited jurisdiction while exercising judicial review in the transfer matters. In this regard, in the case of S.L.Abbas (supra), paragraph Nos.7 and 8 reads as under:
“7. Who should be transferred where, is a matter for the appropriate authority to decide. Unless the order of transfer is vitiated by malafides or is made in violation of any statutory provisions, the Court cannot interfere with it. While ordering the transfer, there is no doubt, the authority must keep in mind the guidelines issued by the Government on the subject. Similarly if a person makes any representation with respect to his transfer, the appropriate authority must consider the same having regard to the exigencies of administration. The guidelines say that as far as possible, husband and wife must be posted at the same place. The said guideline however does not confer upon the government employee a legally enforceable right.
8. The jurisdication of the Central Administrative Tribunal is akin to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the constitution of India in service matters. This is evident from a persual of Article 323-A of the constitution. The constraints and norms which the High Court observes while exercising the said jurisdiction apply equally to the Tribunal created under Article 323-A. (We find it all the more surprising that the learned Single Member who passed the impugned order is a former Judge of the High Court and is thus aware of the norms and constraints of the writ jurisdiction.) The Administrative Tribunal is not an Appellate Authority sitting in judgment over the orders of transfer. It cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the authority competent to transfer. In this case the Tribunal has clearly exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the order of transfer. The order of the Tribunal reads as if it were sitting in appeal over the order of transfer made by the Senior Administrative Officer (competent authority)”.
11. In the case of Shilpi Bose (supra), paragraph Nos. 4 reads as under:
“4. In our opinion, the Courts should not interfere with a transfer Order which are made in public interest and for administrative reasons unless the transfer Orders are made in violation of any mandatory statutory Rule or on the ground of malafide. A Government servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at one place or the other, he is liable to be transferred from one place to the other. Transfer Orders issued by the competent authority do not violate any of his legal rights. Even if a transfer Order is passed in violation of executive instructions or Orders, the Courts ordinarily should not interfere with the Order instead affected party should approach the higher authorities in the Department. If the Courts continue to interfere with day-to-day transfer Orders issued by the Government and its subordinate authorities, there will be complete chaos in the Administration which would not be conducive to public interest. The High Court over looked these aspects in interfering with the transfer Orders.”
12. I have also noticed at the time of arguments, that the list of employees who were working for more than 25 years in the very same campus and no action has been taken by the respondent-University against such persons who have rooted in the Agricultural University, as a Banyan Tree. Though I am not much influenced by the said list of employees who were working for more than two decades, however, in the present case the petitioners are working in the range of four to six years. In that view of the matter, the petitioners have no personal claim or interest against the respondent-University, however, are working for the benefit of the teachers’ community with collective bargaining by taking decision in the Association. In that view of the matter, I am of the view that, the Judgment referred to by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in Sumitra (supra) is squarely applicable to the facts on record. Para 8 and 10 of the Judgment reads as under:
“8. In the back ground of these settled legal position, we have to find out whether a case for interference of this Court is made out under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. As already stated, this Court has no jurisdiction, and cannot go into the question whether the order of transfer is in public interest or not. That is a defence which is taken up by the respondents. What the petitioner contends is, though the respondents are the competent authority who are vested with the jurisdiction and power to transfer the petitioner, the said power being discretionary is not exercised for bona fide reasons. It is a case of colourable exercise of that power. It is actuated with malafides. Malice in law is patent. Therefore, the question is whether the material on record establishes the mala fide exercise of power or malice in law.
10. It is settled law that for proved misconduct it is open to the employer to impose a punishment. But that misconduct is to be proved in a manner known to law. Before an order of transfer on the ground of misconducted is to be passed, the employer was under a duty to issue a charge sheet setting out the charges/misconduct alleged against the petitioner. After holding an enquiry, if the misconduct was held to be proved, then it was open to the respondents to pass an order of transfer even by way of punishment. Admittedly, in this case, no enquiry to held. Except by issuing a notice without disclosing what is the misconduct alleged against her, by calling upon her to read certain paragraphs in the report of the Committee, she could not have been held guilty of the misconduct. The material on record clearly establishes the order of transfer impugned in this writ petition is not an order of transfer simpliciter. It is an order of punishment. It is an order which is passed by taking into consideration totally extraneous matters and therefore it is liable to be quashed.”
13. It is well established principle in law that scope of judicial review in transfer matter is justified only in the cases of malafide or infraction of any professed norm or principle (See.1994 6 SCC 1998). In the case of Rajendra Singh and Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others reported in (2009) 15 SCC 178, [LQ/SC/2009/1587] Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9 and 10 has held as follows:
9. The courts are always reluctant in interfering with the transfer of an employee unless such transfer is vitiated by violation of some statutory provisions or suffers from mala fides. In the case of Shilpi Bose (Mrs.) & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors.1, this Court held :
"4. In our opinion, the courts should not interfere with a transfer order which is made in public interest and for administrative reasons unless the transfer orders are made in violation of any mandatory statutory rule or on the ground of mala fide. A government servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at one place or the other, he is liable to be transferred from one place to the other. Transfer orders issued by the competent authority do not violate any of his legal rights. Even if a transfer order is passed in violation of executive instructions or orders, the courts ordinarily should not interfere with the order instead affected party should approach the higher authorities in the department. If the courts continue to interfere with day-to- day transfer orders issued by the government and its subordinate authorities, there will be complete chaos in the administration which would not be conducive to public interest. The High Court overlooked these aspects in interfering with the transfer orders."
7. In N.K. Singh v. Union of India & Ors.2, this Court reiterated that: (SCC P.103, para )
“6…. the scope of judicial review in matters of transfer of a Government Servant to an equivalent post without adverse consequence on the service or career prospects is very limited being confined only to the grounds of mala fides or violation of any specific provision…..
14. The Division Bench of the Himachal Pradesh, in the case of Sheela Suryavanshi vs. State of HP and others, at paragraphs 5, 6, 8, 9 held as follows;
“5. In Black's Law Dictionary 'malafide' is said to be an intentional doing of a wrong act without just cause or excuse, it is done with an intention to inflict an injury or under such circumstances that the law will imply an evil motive to the act.
6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the question of malafide in case of transfer and the following principles . are laid down in the case of B. Varadha Rao vs. State of Karnataka & Others, AIR 1986 SC 1955 [LQ/SC/1986/281] :
"The Government is the best judge to decide how to distribute and utilize the services of its employees. However, this power must be exercised honestly, bonafide and reasonably. It should be exercised in public, interest. If the exercise of power is based on extraneous consideration or for achieving an alien purpose or an oblique motive it would amount to malafide and colourable exercise of power. Frequent transfers, without sufficient reasons to justify such transfers, cannot but be held as in fide. A transfer is mala fide when it is made not for professed purpose, such as in normal course or in public or administrative interest or in the exigencies of service but for other purpose than is to accommodate another person for undisclosed reasons. It is the basic principle of rule of law and good administration that even administrative actions should be just and fair."
7. xxxx
8. Thereafter, in the Case of Rajendra Roy vs. Union of India and another, AIR 1993 SC 1236 [LQ/SC/1992/816] , the principle is laid down in the following manner:-
"It may not be always possible to establish malice in fact in a straight cut manner. In an appropriate case, it is possible to draw reasonable inference of malafide action from the pleadings and antecedent facts and circumstances. But for such inference there must be firm foundation of facts pleaded and established. Such inference cannot be drawn on the basis of insinuation and vague suggestions."
9. Thus, on malafide, it can be said that the principal test of a due and proper exercise of the power is to ask the question: Was the transfer made for real administrative exigency In finding the answer the Court might have to pierce the veil of the transfer order and see what was the operative reason for the transfer. If the findings reveal a nexus with administrative necessity, the exercise of the power will be upheld. If however, the operative reason has no such nexus then the transfer will be vulnerable. In the latter case it will be a malafide use of power and will take within its sweep all situations where the nexus and administrative exigencies is absent. It needs to be emphasised that in the present context malafide is not limited to the personal malice of the authority making the transfer. Malafide has two components i.e. malice in law and malice in fact.”
15. Hon'ble Apex Court had an occasion deal with case of malafides by the employer in the case of Rajneesh Khajuria vs. Wockhardt Limited and Another reported in (2020) 3 SCC 86 [LQ/SC/2020/63] at paragraph 16 to 19 held as follows:
“16. The act of transfer can be unfair labour practice if the transfer is actuated by mala fide. The allegations of mala fide have two facets – one malice in law and the other being malice in fact. The challenge to the transfer is based upon malice in fact as it is an action taken by the employer on account of two officers present in Conference. In a judgment reported as State of Bihar & Anr. v. P.P. Sharma, IAS & Anr.6, this Court held that mala fide means want of good faith, personal bias, grudge, oblique or improper motive or ulterior purpose. The plea of mala fide involves two questions, namely (i) whether there is a personal bias or an oblique motive, and (ii) whether the administrative action is contrary to the objects, requirements and conditions of a valid exercise of administrative power. As far as second aspect is concerned, there is a power of transfer vested in the employer in terms of letter of appointment. Even in terms of the provisions of the Act, the transfer by itself cannot be said to be an act of unfair labour practice unless it is actuated by mala fide. Therefore, to sustain a plea of mala fide, there has to be an element of personal bias or an oblique motive. This Court held as under: (SCC pp.260 & 264-64, paras 50-51 and 59)
“50. Mala fides means want of good faith, personal bias, grudge, oblique or improper motive or ulterior purpose. The administrative action must be said to be done in good faith, if it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not. An act done honestly is deemed to have been done in good faith. An administrative authority must, therefore, act in a bona fide manner and should never act for an improper motive or ulterior purposes or contrary to the requirements of the statute, or the basis of the circumstances contemplated by law, or improperly exercised discretion to achieve some ulterior purpose. The determination of a plea of mala fide involves two questions, namely (i) whether there is a personal bias or an oblique motive, and ( ii) whether the administrative action is contrary to the objects, requirements and conditions of a valid exercise of administrative power.
51. The action taken must, therefore, be proved to have been made mala fide for such considerations. Mere assertion or a vague or bald statement is not sufficient. It must be demonstrated either by admitted or proved facts and circumstances obtainable in a given case. If it is established that the action has been taken mala fide for any such considerations or by fraud on power or colourable exercise of power, it cannot be allowed to stand.
xx xx xx
59. Malice in law could be inferred from doing of wrongful act intentionally without any just cause or excuse or without there being reasonable relation to the purpose of the exercise of statutory power. Malice in law is not established from the omission to consider some documents said to be relevant to the accused. Equally reporting the commission of a crime to the Station House Officer, cannot be held to be a colourable exercise of power with bad faith or fraud on power. It may be honest and bona fide exercise of power. There are no grounds made out or shown to us that the first information report was not lodged in good faith. State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : JT 1990 (4) SC 650 [LQ/SC/1990/744] ] is an authority for the proposition that existence of deep seated political vendetta is not a ground to quash the FIR. Therein despite the attempt by the respondent to prove by affidavit evidence corroborated by documents of the mala fides and even on facts as alleged no offence was committed, this Court declined to go into those allegations and relegated the dispute for investigation. Unhesitatingly I hold that the findings of the High Court that FIR gets vitiated by the mala fides of the Administrator and the charge-sheets are the results of the mala fides of the informant or investigator, to say the least, is fantastic and obvious gross error of law.”
17. In another judgment reported as Prabodh Sagar v. Punjab State Electricity Board & Ors.7, it was held by this Court that the mere use of the expression “mala fide” would not by itself make the petition entertainable. The Court held as under: (SCC p.640, para 13)
“13. … Incidentally, be it noted that the expression “mala fide” is not meaningless jargon and it has its proper connotation. Malice or mala fides can only be appreciated from the records of the case in the facts of each case. There cannot possibly be any set guidelines in regard to the proof of mala fides. Mala fides, where it is alleged, depends upon its own facts and circumstances. We ourselves feel it expedient to record that the petitioner has become more of a liability than an asset and in the event of there being such a situation vis-à-vis an employee, the employer will be within his liberty to take appropriate steps including the cessation of relationship between the employer and the employee. The service conditions of the Board's employees also provide for voluntary (sic compulsory) retirement, a person of the nature of the petitioner, as more fully detailed hereinbefore, cannot possibly be given any redress against the order of the Board for 7 (2000) 5 SCC 630 [LQ/SC/2000/850] voluntary retirement. There must be factual support pertaining to the allegations of mala fides, unfortunately there is none. Mere user of the word “mala fide” by the petitioner would not by itself make the petition entertainable. The Court must scan the factual aspect and come to its own conclusion i.e. exactly what the High Court has done and that is the reason why the narration has been noted in this judgment in extenso. …”
18. In a judgment reported as HMT Ltd. & Anr. v. Mudappa & Ors.8, quoting from earlier judgment of this Court reported as State of A.P. & Ors. v. Goverdhanlal Pitti9, it was held that ‘legal malice’ or ‘malice in law’ means ‘something done without lawful excuse’. It is an act done wrongfully and willfully without reasonable or probable cause, and not necessarily an act done from ill feeling and spite. The Court held as under: (HMT Ltd. case, SCC pp.775- 76, para 24)
“24. The Court also explained the concept of legal mala fide. By referring to Words and Phrases Legally Defined , 3rd Edn., London Butterworths, 1989 the Court stated:(Goverdhanlal case [(2003) 4 SCC 739] [LQ/SC/2003/355] , SCC p. 744, para 12)
“12. The legal meaning of malice is ‘ill will or spite towards a party and any indirect or improper motive in taking an action’. This is sometimes described as ‘malice in fact’. ‘Legal malice’ or ‘malice in law’ means ‘something done without lawful excuse’. In other words, ‘it is an act done wrongfully and wilfully without reasonable or probable cause, and not necessarily an act done from ill feeling and spite. It is a deliberate act in disregard of the rights of others.’ ”
It was observed that where malice was attributed to the State, it could not be a case of malice in fact, or 8 (2007) 9 SCC 768 9 (2003) 4 SCC 739 [LQ/SC/2003/355] personal ill-will or spite on the part of the State. It could only be malice in law i.e. legal mala fide. The State, if it wishes to acquire land, could exercise its power bona fide for statutory purpose and for none other. It was observed that it was only because of the decree passed in favour of the owner that the proceedings for acquisition were necessary and hence, notification was issued. Such an action could not be held mala fide.”
19. In a judgment reported as Union of India & Ors. v. Ashok Kumar & Ors.10, it has been held that allegations of mala fides are often more easily made than proved, and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high order of credibility. The Court held as under: (SCC p.770, para 21)
“21. Doubtless, he who seeks to invalidate or nullify any act or order must establish the charge of bad faith, an abuse or a misuse by the authority of its powers. While the indirect motive or purpose, or bad faith or personal ill will is not to be held established except on clear proof thereof, it is obviously difficult to establish the state of a man's mind, for that is what the employee has to establish in this case, though this may sometimes be done. The difficulty is not lessened when one has to establish that a person apparently acting on the legitimate exercise of power has, in fact, been acting mala fide in the sense of pursuing an illegitimate aim. It is not the law that mala fides in the sense of improper motive should be established only by direct evidence. But it must be discernible from the order impugned or must be shown from the established surrounding factors which preceded the order. If bad faith would vitiate the order, the same can, in our opinion, be deduced as a reasonable and inescapable inference from proved facts. (S. Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab.) It cannot be overlooked that the burden of establishing mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. The allegations of mala fides are often more easily made 10 (2005) 8 SCC 760 [LQ/SC/2005/1063] than proved, and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high order of credibility. As noted by this Court in E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N. courts would be slow to draw dubious inferences from incomplete facts placed before them by a party, particularly when the imputations are grave and they are made against the holder of an office which has a high responsibility in the administration. (See Indian Rly. Construction Co. Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar.)”
16. Following the law declared by this Court and having taken note of the factual aspects on record, where the initiation of the departmental enquiry by issuing charge memo, simultaneously issuing the impugned order of transfer at the period where the petitioners herein are the office bearers of association, made a claim for implementation of the welfare of the employees in the University and in the background of the same, discussion was held at the office of the chancellor, Bangalore, the same fact would indicate the malafides on the part of the respondent-University to transfer the petitioners. Therefore, I am of the opinion that, I am of the view that, the transfer order passed by the respondent-university is patently malice in nature and therefore, the writ petitions are required to be allowed by setting aside the impugned transfer orders produced at Annexure-A series.
17. Insofar as the arguments advanced by the petitioner in W.P.No.103121/2022, as the transfer order referred to in Reference No.4 in the impugned order dated 29.06.2022 is being set aside in W.P.No.101373/2022, I am of the view that, the impugned order dated 29.06.2022 in the said writ petition is to be set aside.
18. Taking into account the cumulative aspects on record, and the observation made above, the impugned order dated 12.12.2022 passed by the respondent- university (Annexure-A) in W.P.No.100177/2023 is required to be set aside as these impugned orders in the aforementioned writ petitions is a mirror of the vindictiveness shown by the respondent-University against the office bearers of the Association, who are working for the teachers’ community and in that view of the matter, I am of the view that, these writ petitions are to be allowed. Having causing mental agony to these petitioners, respondent-University is directed to pay cost of litigation of Rs.5,000/- each to the petitioners in each of the writ petitions.
