A.S. Supehia, J. - The present application has been filed seeking quashing of the First Information Report dated 25.12.2016 being Cr.No.II-640 of 2016 registered at Karelibaug Police Station, Vadodara City for the offences punishable under Sections 166 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (the IPC) and Section 3(1) (p,q,r,u,zc) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (the Atrocities Act).

2. The brief contents of the prolix F.I.R. are incorporated a under:

a) The first informant in the F.I.R. has alleged that when he was serving as a Marksman during the period from 17.11.2000 to 05.11.2011 at the Excavation Branch, Archaeological Survey of India, Karelibaug at Vadodara, he was subjected to vindictiveness by the applicants.

b) It is narrated in the F.I.R. that on 20.10.2014, when he was posted at Vadnagar site, he had asked for leave from Dr.Madhulika Samanta-applicant No.1, on account of the injuries sustained by his wife due to a scooter accident, however, the same was refused and thereafter, he was suspended from services immediately by the applicant on.1, which he came to know vide communication dated 24.10.2014. He has further alleged that he received the letter dated 06.01.2015 in which false allegations were leveled against him and with a view to harass him a charge sheet was issued for holding a departmental inquiry with statement of the bogus witnesses.

c) It is also narrated that he made a representation on 22.01.2015 to the applicant No.1 that the allegations leveled against him were false. It is stated that he has also made a representation regarding the same before the Commission for Schedule Caste, New Delhi and the Commission had sought for a reply from the office of Archaeological Survey of India. The Director Office, Archaeological Survey of India, New Delhi had directed the Excavation Branch-V, Vadodara to revoke the suspension of the first informant and accordingly,vide letter dated 24.07.2015 his suspension was revoked and thereafter, he rejoined his duties at the Excavation Branch-V, Vadodara. It is alleged by the first informant that he was made to sit and discharge his duties by changing his seating place from where he used to work since many years and his seating arrangement was made in front of the ladies toilet solely used by Dr.Madhulika Samanta-applicant No.1. He has submitted that he was provided with a table and a chair with an intention to take revenge and humiliate him in the eyes of the public by changing his seating position. It is further stated that responsibilities of aforementioned seatings were given to one Shri Hemant Lahute, Head clerk and accordingly, the first informant made a representation to Shri.Hemant Lahute to change his seating position since the same was inconvenient and derogatory to his caste.

d) Thereafter, he had gone on leave from 28.07.2015 and also sent his leave letter to Dr.Madhulika Samanta-applicant No.1 through an E-mail. He had also informed the Director General, New Delhi that he was made to sit near the toilet because he belongs to Dalit Caste with an intention to harass him. Along with that, a complaint regarding Atrocities was made on 29. 07 . 2015 . The same was also sent by E-mail to the Director General, New Delhi, Scheduled Caste Commission, New Delhi, Prime Ministers Office, New Delhi and D.O.P.T., New Delhi. It is also alleged that though there was balance in his leave account, no leave was sanctioned with a view to harass him. It is stated that aforesaid complaint was forwarded to Shri Sanjeev Mittal, Nodal Officer, Ministry of Culture who had given him an assurance that further action would be taken on the same, which he had received on 30.08.2015. Thereafter, on 31.08.2015, the first informant went to re-join his duties but he was denied to resume and his seating position was not changed and salary for the month of August, 2015 was also not given and hence he made a written representation on 03.08.2015 demanding his salary. It is further stated that he had demanded for installation of CCTV Camera in the room, where he was made to sit, for the purpose of safety apprehending that Dr.Madhulika Samanta may trap him in a false acquisition. It is further alleged that on 03.09.2015 Dr.Madhulika Samanta also issued a circular to the office employees that they shall not communicate with him. Due to the said circular, he was made to undergo the social boycott. It is further alleged that Dr.Madhulika Samanta had thereafter, reduced his regular salary and the increment at par with the new recruitees. It is further alleged that the said salary was not disbursed and without any order or prior intimation the salary has been reduced, to which he had again made a representation making allegations against accused namely (1) Hemant Lahute, Head clerk (2) Sharad Chandra Vyas (3) Smt. Sunita Parmar.

e) The F.I.R. further reveals that thereafter, there were some communications between the first informant and Additional Director General regarding the entire episode as narrated hereinabove.

f) It is further narrated in the F.I.R. that Dr.Madhulika Samanta-applicant No.1, Superintendent Archaeologist along with applicant No.2 Mr.Dinesh Modi and Hemant Lahute, Sharad Chandra Vyas and Smt.Sunita Parmar, in collusion with each other and by keeping grudge against the first informant, suspended him from services and also initiated departmental proceedings dated 20.10.2014 by misusing power and on 27.07.2015, when he resumed his duties, he was forced to sit near the ladies toilet situated near Sedimentology Lab in the office to insult him and also passed a written order to the office staff not to communicate with him. Thus, it is alleged that, the offences under the Atrocities Act and the IPC are clearly established.

3. Learned advocate Mr.Sabyasachi Chatterjee for learned advocate Mr. Dhruv Toliya, appearing for the applicants, has submitted that the contents of the F.I.R. do not reveal that the offences under the IPC or the Atrocities Act are committed by the applicants. He has submitted that the allegations made in the F.I.R are made by the first informant due to holding of the departmental inquiry against him. It is submitted that the first informant has proceeded on leave without informing the head of the Department i.e. applicant No.1. He has further stated that vide letter dated 20.10.2014, he informed the Superintendent Archaeologist that he is leaving since his wife had met with a scooter accident and got injuries. It is submitted that the work which was assigned to him was very important in nature and he should have left only after getting sanction to leave. It is submitted that the complaint with regard to his seating arrangement in front of the toilet is concerned the same is false since his table and chair were placed near the Sedimentology Lab, which is adjoining to the toilet. He has submitted that two other staff members were also asked to sit in the same room and the ladies toilet is attached to the lab which is only meant to use by the Superintendent Archaeologist. Therefore, under no stretch of imagination, it can be said to be a derogatory behaviour.

3.1 As regards the Departmental inquiry is concerned, learned advocate has submitted that by order dated 27.02.2018, the Superintending Archaeologist at Vadodara Branch had in fact warned the first informant to refrain from such activities and he shall have to obtain prior approval/permission of the competent authority before availing leave. Thus, it is submitted that at the time of the Departmental inquiry, the first informant was warned not to avail leave without prior approval or permission of the competent authority.

3.2 With regard to the office order dated 03.09.2015 alleging the social boycott by informing various office staff members not to talk with the first informant, it is submitted by the learned advocate that no such directions were given by the impugned order dated 03.09.2015 asking the staff members not interact with him. It is submitted that in fact the office order dated 03.09.2015 was only to inform the staff members that in view of the various allegations made by the first informant against various office members, the undersigned or this office will not take any responsibility for any individual communication with the first informant by any office staff without a written order of the undersigned in future. Thus, it is submitted that the same cannot be said that the first informant was socially boycotted.

3.3 Learned advocate has also invited that attention of this court to the communication dated 03.09.2015 written by the first informant to the director of the archeology wherein various allegations have been made by the first informant against the applicants as well as other employees.

3.4 Lastly, learned advocate has invited the attention of this Court to the provision of various offences lodged against the applicants under the IPC and the Atrocities Act. He has referred to Section 3(1)(p,q,r,u,zc) of the Atrocities Act and Sections 166 and 114 of the IPC. It is contended that the same will clarify that in the present case no ingredients of the alleged offences under the Atrocities Act or the IPC are satisfied.

3.5 In support of his submissions, learned advocate has placed reliance on the judgment of this court reported in the case of Dhiren Prafulbhai Shah vs. State of Gujarat and Ors., 2016 (4) GLR 2785 [LQ/GujHC/2016/248] for the proposition of law that the alleged offences under the Atrocities Act have not been committed in the office which can be termed in "public view" as envisaged in the aforesaid Sections of the Atrocities Act.

3.6 The reliance is also placed by him on the judgment dated 13.06.2018 passed by the High Court of Kerala in Criminal Misc. Case No.1918 of 2016. He has also placed reliance on the judgment dated 17.02.2017 passed by the High Court of Calcutta in CS No.11 of 2006.

3.7 As regards the applicant No.2, he has submitted that he is a store keeper and in the entire F.I.R. he is only named once since he was the only witness in the departmental proceedings and except that nothing is mentioned against him. He has submitted that the allegations are made in the F.I.R. only to rope the applicants in the offences since they have initiated departmental proceedings against him for going on unauthorized leave.

3.8 Thus, he has submitted that the present case is classic case of the misuse of the provisions of the Atrocities Act by the first informant. Thus, he has submitted that the present F.I.R. is absolutely abuse of provisions of the Atrocities Act and the same is only filed in order to harass the applicants.

3.9 Further he has submitted that the impugned F.I.R. is required to be quashed and set aside on the ground of delay since the alleged incident had occurred on 27.07.2015 whereas, the impugned F.I.R. has been registered on 26.10.2016.

4. Vehemently opposing the submissions advanced by the learned advocate appearing for the applicants, learned advocate Mr.A.R.Lakhia appearing for the first informant, has submitted that the applicants have in fact socially and economically boycotted the first informant. He has submitted that first informant was deliberately made to sit on the table and chair which were placed opposite to the toilet used by the Dr.Madhulika Samanta-applicant No.1. He has also submitted that the entire departmental proceedings were initiated only to humiliate him and ultimately he was exonerated in the departmental proceedings. He has further submitted that the first informant was not granted any leave though his wife had suffered injuries in the scooter accident. He has submitted that the first informant had left the place of work after completing his work as clarified in the letter dated 20.10.2014. It is further submitted that at this stage, this Court cannot examine the allegations leveled against the applicants. He has also submitted that the incident has occurred in the Government office hence, the same is said to have been committed in the "public view". It is submitted by him that the applicant No.1 was knowing the caste of the first informant and deliberately he was compelled to sit at the place which was opposite to the ladies toilet. Thus, he has submitted that it is the matter of investigation and the same may also be allowed to be proceeded further.

4.1 In support of his submissions he has placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel vs. State of Gujarat and Ors 2018 (1) GLH 186, and the judgment reported in the case of Deepak Shyamsunder Agrawal vs. State of Gujarat and Ors., 2017 (4) GLR 3164. [LQ/GujHC/2017/269]

4.2 As regards the contents of delay, the learned advocate has submitted that the first informant had made complaints to the higher authorities and the Commission and since no action was taken by them the first informant was constrained to lodge an F.I.R.

5. In rejoinder, the learned advocate for the applicants has submitted that the definition of "economical boycott" is provided under Section 2(b) (c) of the Atrocities Act and "social boycott" is defined under Section 2(e)(b) of the Atrocities Act. He has submitted that in the present case there is an employee and employer relationship and the same is not covered under the definition of "social boycott" because the employee and employer relationship is not mentioned. It is asserted by the learned advocate for the applicants that there is nothing mentioned in the F.I.R. that he was subjected to Departmental inquiry only because he belongs to a particular caste. In support of his submissions, he has placed reliance on the judgment Dhiren Prafulbhai Shah (supra). It is submitted that the first informant was only asked to sit near the Sedimentology Lab which is adjoining to the toilet and the same cannot in any manner said to be committing the offences as alleged by the applicants.

6. Maintaining the arguments made by the learned advocate appearing for the first informant, learned Additional Public Prosecutor Mr.H.K.Patel, appearing for the respondent-State, has placed reliance on the statements of various witnesses and has submitted that the witnesses being Vipul Rana, Daxaben Parmar, Sukhsagar Rai, Husmukh Tadvi and Khumansing Parmar have stated that the table and chair of the first informant were placed near the toilet adjacent to the Sedimentology Lab. Thus, he has submitted that the seating position was arranged by the applicant No.1 and hence, the first informant had taken leave due to his changed seating arrangement. He has submitted that all the ingredients of the offences as alleged against the applicants are satisfied. He has submitted that the applicant No.1 had issued a circular boycotting the first informant from the office and hence, at this stage, the impugned F.I.R. may not be quashed.

7. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the learned advocates for the respective parties. The documents on which the reliance is placed by the learned advocates for the respective parties are also taken on record.

8. The impugned F.I.R. reveals that the offences under Section 3(1)(p,q,r,u,zc) of the Atrocities Act are registered against the applicants. In order to appreciate the controversy, it would be apposite to incorporate the provisions of the aforesaid Sections.

"3. Punishments for offences atrocities-

(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,-

(p) institutes false, malicious or vexatious suit or criminal or other legal proceedings against a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe;

(q) gives any false or frivolous information to any public servant and thereby causes such public servant to use his lawful power to the injury or annoyance of a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe;

(r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;

(u) by words either written or spoken or by signs or by visible representation or otherwise promotes or attempts to promote feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will against members of the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes;

(zc) imposes or threatens a social or economic boycott of any person or a family or a group belonging to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to five years and with fine."

9. It is not in dispute that the first informant had proceeded on leave without obtaining prior sanction from the applicant No.1, who is the head of the Department. Thereafter, he was also subjected to departmental proceedings and ultimately, the same resulted in issuing of a "warning" on the first informant and he was also warned by the applicant No.1 to obtain prior approval or permission of the competent authority before availing leave. Thus, it cannot be said that the first informant was exonerated in the departmental proceedings. It is contended that the offence under Section 3(1)(p) of the Atrocities Act is committed by the applicant no.1 since the holding of the departmental proceedings will amount to instituting a false and vexatious suit or criminal or other legal proceedings against a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. In the considered opinion of this Court the institution of the disciplinary proceedings will definitely fall under the expression "legal proceedings", but correspondingly it has to be examined that whether such proceedings are vexatious or instituted with an intention to humiliate the member of a schedule caste or a schedule tribe. In the present case the first informant had proceeded on leave without obtaining sanction and ultimately he was also warned of such conduct. Thus, it cannot be said that the disciplinary proceedings were instituted for a false reason with vexatious intention to humiliate the first informant. If such allegations are allowed to be maintained then each and every misconduct committed by the member of the schedule caste and schedule tribe will be encompassed by the provisions of Section 3(1)(p) of the Atrocities Act. The concerned employee, who is the member of the schedule caste and schedule tribe has to allege that such proceedings are instituted fallaciously bereft of any misconduct with a vexatious intention to humiliate him since he belongs to schedule caste and schedule tribe. The disciplinary proceedings though will fall under the expression "legal proceedings" the same do not attract the rigors of the "criminal" proceedings or "suit" and stand at different pedestal which are confined to the misconduct of an employee governed by the service rules. Thus, the allegations leveled under the Section 3(1)(p) against the head of the department or the disciplinary authority in a Government office or an undertaking who institutes the proceedings are to be scrutinized strictly and minutely since the same vitally affects the employer and employee relationships resulting to a biased and detrimental atmosphere to its functioning. In the facts of the present case the departmental proceedings instituted against the first informant cannot be stretched to the extent that the same would amount to an offence under Section 3(1)(p) of the Atrocities Act. The applicant no.1 had instituted the departmental proceedings since the first informant had left the office without permission, hence under no circumstances it can be said that such proceedings were instituted with mala fide intention of humiliating the first informant.

10. As regards the offence under Section 3(q) of the Atrocities Act is concerned, this Court, despite threadbare analysis of the contents of the F.I.R. did not find that any offence under the said Section is established since it is not the case of the first informant that the applicants have given any false or frivolous information to any public servant which has resulted to use the lawful power to injure or annoy of the first informant. Hence, no offence under Section 3(q) of the Atrocities Act is made out against the applicants.

11. The primary allegation leveled by the first informant against applicant No.1 is that when he resumed his duties he was made to sit near the Sedimentology Lab, opposite to the ladies toilet used by the applicant No.1 which amounts to an offence under Section 3 (r) of the Atrocities Act. It is contended that the seating arrangement near the toilet of the applicant no.1 amounts to intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe any place within "public view" as envisaged under Section 3(r). This Court shall endeavor to examine the facts narrated in the F.I.R. in context, whether the incident has occurred in "public view" as envisaged under the said Section. The entire episode as narrated by the first informant has occurred in the Government office. This Court, in the case of Dhiren Prafulbhai Shah (supra), after survey of the judgments of the Apex Court interpreting the expression "public view" has observed thus:

"23. Basic ingredients for the offence under Clause (x) of Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act, revealed through the bare reading of this section are as follows:-- "(a) there should be intentional insult or intimidation by a person, who is not a member of SC or ST; (b) the insult must be with an intent to humiliate the member of the SC or s the intent to humiliate is necessary, it follows that the accused must knowledge or awareness that the victim belongs to the SC or ST, This can be inferred even from long association; and (c) the incident must occur in any place within the public view. There cannot be any dispute that the offence can be committed at any place whether it is a private place or a "public view" as long as it is within the "public view". The requirement of "public view" can be satisfied even in a private place, where the public is present."

24. The difficulty is only as regards the true and correct import of the expression "public view" which is used by the Legislature in contra distinction to the expression "private view". The View here means sight or vision and hearing. Only meaning of the word "public" is left to be found in the context in which it is used.

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27. The S.C./S.T. Act was enacted with a laudable object to vulnerable Section of the society. Sub-clauses (i) to (xv) of Sec. 3(1) of the enumerated various kinds of atrocities that might be perpetrated against Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, which constitute an offence. However, sub-clause (x) is the only clause where even offending "utterances" have been made punishable. The Legislature required intention as an essential ingredient for the offence of "insult", "intimidation" and "humiliation" a member of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribe in any place within "public view". Offences under the are quite grave and provide stringent punishments. Graver is the offence, stronger should be the proof. The interpretation which suppresses or evades the mischief and advances the object of the has to be adopted. Keeping this in view, looking to the aims and objects of the, the expression "public view" in Sec. 3(1)(X) of the has to be interpreted to mean that the public persons present, (howsoever small number it may be), should be independent and impartial and not interested in any of the parties. In other words, persons having any kind of close relationship or association with the complainant, would necessarily get excluded.

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31. In the case of Asmathunnisa (supra), the Supreme Court considered the question whether in the absence of real aggrieved person present at that point of time, when the offence is alleged to have occurred, could it be said that such person was insulted "within public view". The Supreme Court took notice of the Kerala High Court decision in Para 9, which reads as under:

"9. In this connection, learned Counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on a judgment of the Kerala High Court in E. Krishnan Nayanar vs. Dr. M. A. Kuttappan, 1997 Cri.LJ 2036. The relevant Paragraphs of this judgment are Paras 12, 13 and 18. The said Paragraphs read as under:

"12. A reading of Sec. 3 shows that two kinds of insults against the member of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes are made punishable one as defined under subsec. (ii) and the other as defined under sub- sec. (x) of the said Section. A combined reading of the two sub-sections shows that under sub-sec. (ii) insult can be caused to a member of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes by dumping excreta, waste matter, carcasses or any other obnoxious substance in his premises or neighbourhood and to cause such insult, the dumping of excreta etc., need not necessarily be done in the presence of the person insulted and whereas under subsec. (x) insult can be caused to the person insulted only if he is present in view of the expression "in any place within public view". The words "within public view", in my opinion, are referable only to the person insulted and not to the person who insulted him as the said expression is conspicuously absent in sub-sec. (ii) of Sec. 3 of Act of 1989 . By avoiding to use the expression "within public view" in subsec.

(ii), the Legislature, I feel, has created two different kinds of offences : An insult caused to a member of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, even in his absence, by dumping excreta etc., in his premises or neighbourhood and an insult by words caused to a member of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes "within public view" which means at the time of the alleged insult the person insulted must be present as the expression "within public view" indicates or otherwise the Legislature would have avoided the use of the said expression which it avoided in sub-sec. (ii) or would have used the expression "in any public place".

13. Insult contemplated under sub-sec. (ii) is different from the insult contemplated under sub-sec. (x) as in the former a member of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes gets insulted by the physical act and whereas in the latter he gets insulted in public view by the words uttered by the wrong-doer for which he must be present at the place.

XXX XXX XXX

18. As stated by me earlier the words used in sub-sec. (x) are not "in public place", but "within public view" which means the public must view the person being insulted for which he must be present and no offence on the allegations under the said Section gets attracted. In my view, the entire allegations contained in the complaint even if taken to be true do not make out any offence against the petitioner."

12. In the present case, the alleged incident has occurred in a Government office dealing with Archeology. The same cannot satisfy the expression "within public view" in absence of any presence of member of public. It cannot be said that the first informant was subjected to insult or humiliation which was visible and audible to the public. The office was a closed cabin and in absence of any stranger, it can hardly be said that the alleged accusation made by the applicants to the first informant was "within public view". It is contended by the first informant that since it was a government office, the same automatically assumes the place having a "public view". Such an assumption will be hazardous to the expression having a "public view". The allegations of humiliation to a member of a schedule caste and schedule tribe should specifically contain the element that he was subjected to the humiliation in place having a "public view" in front of the members of public, who are present at the time of such humiliation. In the present case, it is alleged by the first informant that he was made to sit near the Sedimentary Lab adjoining to the toilet used by the applicant no.1. A seating arrangement of an employee belonging to a schedule caste or a schedule tribe in a Government office cannot in any manner attract the offence under Section 3(1) (r) of the Atrocities Act. The first informant was not isolated in the office. There were other employees also who were in occupation and were seated in that office. An office with a toilet facility will have some seating arrangement near its vicinity. The proximity of the seating arrangement near the toilet in the office cannot be an enticement for humiliation. Thus, the interpretation assigned to the expression "within public view" by the learned advocate for the first informant does not merit acceptance and is liable to be rejected.

13. Finally, it is alleged by the first informant that he has been socially and economically boycotted by the applicants by attracting the offence under Section 3(1)(zc) of the Atrocities Act, which postulates imposing or threatening a social or economic boycott of any person or a family or a group belonging to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. The first informant has alleged that he was economically boycotted since he was not paid one month salary and socially boycotted by issuing the office order dated 03.09.2015 by the applicant no.1 in which the staff members were asked not to interact with him.

13.1 The Office order dated 03.09.2015 issued by the applicant no.1 is incorporated as under:

"Office Order No. 127/2015 Shri B.M. Rohit, Marksman has submitted his joining letter and e-mail along with allegations on various staff members, on 03.09.2015. In this regard all the officials of this office are hereby informed that the undersigned or this office will not take any responsibility for any individual communications with Shri B.M. Rohit Marksman by any staff without written order of the undersigned in future.

Superintendent Archaeologist."

14. The applicant no.1 was constrained to pass the aforesaid order in view of the letter and e-mail written by the first informant leveling various allegations on various staff members on 03.09.2015 and on applicant No.1. The recital of the aforesaid order conveys that the applicant no.1 had only informed that she or the office will not take any responsibility for any individual communications with Shri B.M. Rohit Marksman by any staff without written order of the undersigned in future. This Court has perused the contents of the letter dated 03.09.2015 written by the first informant to the Superintending Archeology. A perusal of the same reveals that the first informant has made shocking and disturbing allegation against the applicants as well as other employees which would be inappropriate to refer to in the present order. Looking to the contents of the Letter dated 03 . 09. 2015, it can be said that the applicant no.1 was justified in issuing the order of even date. In the considered opinion of this Court, issuance of the office order dated 03.09.2015 by the applicant No.1 to the staff members in the capacity of the employee and employer relationship cannot be termed as "social boycott" as envisaged in Section 3(1)(zc) of the Atrocities Act. Section 2(eb) of the Atrocities Act stipulates the definition of "social boycott". The same reads as under:

"Section 2(eb) "social boycott" means a refusal to permit a person to render to other person or receive from him any customary service or to abstain from social relations that one would maintain with other person or to isolate him from others;"

14.1 A plain and literal construction of the language of the Section defining "social boycott", envisages boycott of a person from any customary service or to abstain him from social relations. The expression "or to isolate him from others", is not be read in segregation and is to be construed that a person is isolated "socially" with an intention that he does not interact socially with others. It will be deleterious to include the isolation of a Government employee working in a Government office having company of coemployees within the contour of "social boycott". A Government employee is not rendering any customary service in the office and he is not maintaining any social relationship. He is working in his official capacity performing his official duties and carrying his administrative functions in terms of his appointment and service rules. Thus, the office order dated 03.09.2015 of not taking the responsibility of the communication of other employees with the first informant without the permission of the Head of Department does not amount to a social boycott. It was an administrative instruction issued by the applicant no.1 in the interest of the office and the employees, hence, the same would not amount to socially boycotting the first informant and will not fall within the expression "to isolate him from others".

15. It is also contended that the first informant was also economically boycotted since he was not paid one month salary. The definition of economic boycott finds place in Section 2(bc) of the Atrocities Act, the same reads as under:

"2(bc) "economic boycott" means

(i) a refusal to deal with, work for hire or do business with other person; or

(ii) to deny opportunities including access to services or contractual opportunities for rendering service for consideration; or

(iii) to refuse to do anything on the terms on which things would be commonly done in the ordinary course of business; or

(iv) to abstain from the professional or business relations that one would maintain with other person;"

15.1 A plain and simple reading of the definition economic boycott reveals that the same pertains to a refusal to deal with, work for hire or do business with other person, deny him opportunities including access to services or contractual opportunities, to refuse things commonly done in the ordinary course of business or to abstain from the professional or business relations. Thus, the alleged action of the applicant no.1 in not paying salary to the first informant due to his abstaining from work does not mean that he was economically boycotted. The applicant No.1 had withheld the salary since the first informant left the office without obtaining any leave on the pretext that his seating arrangement was made near the toilet. Thus, withholding of a salary of a Government employee who is the member of the schedule tribe and schedule caste for any misconduct cannot be construed as economically boycott and such action does not satisfy the ingredient of Section 3(1)(zc) of the Atrocities Act.

16. As regards offences under Sections 166 and 114 of the IPC which are registered against the applicants, the contents of the F.I.R. reveal that no such offence is established against them. The aforesaid Sections read as under:

"114. Abettor present when offence is committed. Whenever any person, who is absent would be liable to be punished as an abettor, is present when the act or offence for which he would be punishable in consequence of the abetment is committed, he shall be deemed to have committed such act or offence.

166. Public servant disobeying law, with intent to cause injury to any person.-Whoever, being a public servant, knowingly disobeys any direction of the law as to the way in which he is to conduct himself as such public servant, intending to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will, by such disobedience, cause injury to any person, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both."

16.1 In wake of the aforesaid facts and foregoing observations the offences under Section 114 and 166 of the IPC are not established against the applicants.

17. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604 [LQ/SC/1990/744] , has laid down the following parameters wherein the powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1974 (the Code) is to be exercised:

"(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under sec. 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of sec. 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under sec. 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

17.1 The contents of the F.I.R. reveal that the same is manifestly attended with mala fide and are maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the applicants. Hence, the present case will indubitably fall under exception (7) of the foregoing parameters. Thus, this Court is constrained to exercise its inherent powers conferred by the provisions of Section 4 82 of the Code.

18. Before parting with the judgment, I may with profit quote the laudable observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Subhash Kashinath Mahajan vs. State Of Maharashtra, 2018 (6) SCC 454 [LQ/SC/2018/357 ;] ">2018 (6) SCC 454 [LQ/SC/2018/357 ;] [LQ/SC/2018/357 ;] ">2018 (6) SCC 454 [LQ/SC/2018/357 ;] ">2018 (6) SCC 454 [LQ/SC/2018/357 ;] [LQ/SC/2018/357 ;] [LQ/SC/2018/357 ;] . The Apex Court while raising concern on the abuse of the provisions of the Atrocities Act has observed thus:

"We have already noted the working of the in the last three decades. It has been judicially acknowledged that there are instances of abuse of the by vested interests against political opponents in Panchayat , Municipal or other elections, to settle private civil disputes arising out of property, monetary disputes, employment disputes and seniority disputes . It may be noticed that by way of rampant misuse complaints are largely being filed particularly against Public Servants/quasi judicial/judicial officers with oblique motive for satisfaction of vested interests.

67. Innocent citizens are termed as accused, which is not intended by the legislature. The legislature never intended to use the Atrocities Act as an instrument to blackmail or to wreak personal vengeance. The Act is also not intended to deter public servants from performing their bona fide duties. Thus, unless exclusion of anticipatory bail is limited to genuine cases and inapplicable to cases where there is no prima facie case was made out, there will be no protection available to innocent citizens. Thus, limiting the exclusion of anticipatory bail in such cases is essential for protection of fundamental right of life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution."

19. The present case maintains the observations made by the Supreme Court. It is a classic case of abuse of provisions of the Atrocities Act. The array of the offences invoked in the present case depicts the magnitude of the abuse. The genesis of the allegations of the alleged offences is non-sanctioning of leave of the first informant and holding of the disciplinary proceedings by the applicant no.1 against him for the misconduct of going to leave without obtaining prior permission. The employee and employer dispute has been given the colour of offence under the Atrocities Act. As regards the applicant No.2, there is no specific allegation against him and it appears that he has been roped in only because he was the witness in the Departmental inquiry. The impugned F.I.R. is a blatant abuse of the provisions of the Atrocities Act and is only filed with an oblique motive in order to wreck vengeance on the applicants. None of the ingredients of the offences under Section 3(1) (p,q,r,u,zc) of the Atrocities Act and Sections 114 and 116 of the IPC are established in the present case.

20. In the considered opinion of this Court, the present applicants cannot be embroiled in the rigmarole of the criminal trial in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case. Considering the facts of the present case, it appears that further continuation of criminal proceedings in relation to the impugned F.I.R. against the original accused would be unnecessary harassment to the applicants and would amount to abuse of process of law and court and hence, to secure the ends of justice, the impugned F.I.R. is required to be quashed in exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code.

21. Resultantly, the present writ application is allowed. The impugned F.I.R. being Cr.No.II-640 of 2016 registered at Karelibaug Police Station, Vadodara City as well as all other consequential proceedings arising from the impugned F.I.R. are hereby quashed and set aside qua the applicants. Rule is made absolute.