SHAJI P.CHALY,J

1. Review petitions are filed by the appellant in Appeal Nos.1506 & 1703 of 2013, seeking to review the judgement of a Division Bench of this Court dated 1st July, 2015. As per the common judgement in the writ appeals filed by one and the same appellant, the judgement of the learned single Judge was affirmed, having found that there is no illegality in the judgement so as to interfere with in an intra court appeal.

2. In fact, the writ petition was filed by the review petitioner seeking a declaration that the review petitioner is entitled to be absorbed in the service of the University of Kerala – the 1st respondent, and get all service benefits including continuity of service holding her termination as bad and illegal being violative of Articles 21 & 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India; for a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to make good the loss of her employment with S.N.College, Kollam by paying compensation for the mental and financial loss sustained by her to the tune of Rs.3.67 Crores and further, for a writ of mandamus commanding the University of Kerala and the Vice Chancellor of the University of Kerala – respondents 1 & 2 to consider Exhibit P11 representation and pass orders absorbing her in the service of the University to any of the existing vacancies or by creating a supernumerary post. However the learned Single Judge declined the relief sought for absorption and compensation.

3. Anyhow, in the appeals filed by the review petitioner, the Division Bench found that the appointment of the review petitioner in the University was set aside as per a judgement of this Court in W.P.(C) No.15330/2005, which was affirmed in writ appeals Nos 403 and 409 filed by the appellant and the University, and therefore, the University cannot be directed to absorb the appellant. So far as the compensation claimed by the review petitioner is concerned, it was held that the University is not responsible for the loss of her employment and unless and until negligence or vitiated mala fides on the part of the University is proved, compensation cannot be ordered. In order to arrive at the said conclusion, the Division Bench has relied upon the judgments of the Apex Court in Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K.Gupta [(1994) 1 SCC 243] [LQ/SC/1993/978] ; Common Cause v. Union of India and others [(1996) 6 SCC 530] [LQ/SC/1996/1572] ; and Shivsagar Tiwari v. Union of India and others [(1996) 6 SCC 588]. Also it was held that the appellant could not make out any case of malicious, deliberate or injurious wrong on the part of the University for loss of employment of the appellant. It was accordingly that the appeals were dismissed.

4. Anyhow, in the judgement of the learned single Judge, the appellant was granted liberty to submit a detailed representation to the University in regard to the caste status of the 3rd respondent, in whose writ petition viz., W.P.(C) No.15330/2005, the employment of the appellant was terminated. Anyhow the review petitions are filed basically contending that the Division Bench has not considered the principles of equity, justice and good conscience in order to arrive at any decision on the reliefs sought for by the appellant. It is also contended that it was on the basis of the notification invited by the University that the appellant has applied and on securing employment in the University her employment in S.N.College, Kollam was resigned by her. Therefore it is submitted that if there was any mistake on the part of the University in conducting the selection and consequent to which the termination had to be made, the University is liable to compensate the appellant.

5. We have heard learned counsel for appellant Sri.P.K.Ibrahim, learned standing counsel for University Sri.Thomas Abraham and perused the pleadings and material on record.

6. It is an admitted fact that though the University has appointed the appellant, it was interfered with in W.P.(C) No.15330/05 filed by the 3rd respondent in W.A.No.1703/2011. The said judgement was affirmed in the writ appeals as specified above.. It was on the basis of the judgement rendered by this Court in the said writ petition, which was affirmed by the Division Bench, the University had to terminate the services of the review petitioner. After a deep seated consideration, the learned single Judge as well as the Division Bench in the appeal found that since there being no negligence, malafides or injurious action on the part of the University, no compensation can be ordered.

7. In fact the issues raised by the review petitioner relying upon the various judgments of the Apex Court was considered by the Division Bench in the appeals and it was following the principles of laid down in the judgments of the Apex Court that the Division Bench has arrived at the conclusion that the review petitioner is not entitled to get compensation, there being no negligence or malafide action on the part of the University. It is a well settled proposition in law that unless and until the judgments suffer from any error apparent on the face of the record or other illegalities as are enumerated under law, a review cannot be entertained and considered. A review also cannot be considered in the manner in which an appeal is considered.

8. Therefore, bearing in mind the settled proposition of law laid down in the matter of consideration of a review, we are of the view that appellant has not made out any ground for interference with the judgement of the Division Bench. In order to arrive at a logical conclusion, we also propose to refer to the following judgments of the Apex Court relevant to the context viz., Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik [(1995) 1 SCC 170] [LQ/SC/1994/1078] and Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati [(2013) 8 SCC 320] [LQ/SC/2013/872] .

In Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik, the Apex Court held as follows:

“13. In order to appreciate the scope of a review, Section 114 CPC has to be read, but this section does not even adumbrate the ambit of interference expected of the court since it merely states that it “may make such order thereon as it thinks fit”. The parameters are prescribed in Order 47 CPC and for the purposes of this lis, permit the defendant to press for a rehearing “on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the records or for any other sufficient reason”. The former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not possible. Neither of them postulate a rehearing of the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the court and thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict. This is amply evident from the Explanation to Rule 1 of Order 47 which states that the fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment. Where the order in question is appealable the aggrieved party has adequate and efficacious remedy and the court should exercise the power to review its order with the greatest circumspection. This Court in Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P. [(1964) 5 SCR 174 [LQ/SC/1963/239] : AIR 1964 SC 1372 [LQ/SC/1963/239] ] held as follows: (SCR p. 186)

“[T]here is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by ‘error apparent’. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. ... where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say here is a substantial point of law which stares one in the face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out.”

14. In Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury [(1995) 1 SCC 170 [LQ/SC/1994/1078] : AIR 1995 SC 455 [LQ/SC/1994/1078] ] it was held that:

“8. It is well settled that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In connection with the limitation of the powers of the court under Order 47 Rule 1, while dealing with similar jurisdiction available to the High Court while seeking to review the orders under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court, in Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma[(1979) 4 SCC 389 [LQ/SC/1979/73] : AIR 1979 SC 1047 [LQ/SC/1979/73] ] speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J. has made the following pertinent observations:

‘It is true there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude the High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found, it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.’ ”

(SCC pp. 172-73, para 8)

15. A perusal of Order 47 Rule 1 shows that review of a judgment or an order could be sought: (a) from the discovery of new and important matters or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the applicant; (b) such important matter or evidence could not be produced by the applicant at the time when the decree was passed or order made; and (c) on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or any other sufficient reason.”

In Kamlesh Verma (supra), the Apex Court held as follows:

“… A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. A mere repetition, through different counsel, of old and overruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered ground or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are obviously insufficient ...

16. Error contemplated under the Rule must be such which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error which has to be fished out and searched. It must be an error of inadvertence. The power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. This Court, in Lily Thomas v. Union of India [(2000) 6 SCC 224 [LQ/SC/2000/899] : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1056] [LQ/SC/2000/899] held as under :

…

56. It follows, therefore, that the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review...

17. In a review petition, it is not open to the Court to reappreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion, even if that is possible. Conclusion arrived at on appreciation of evidence cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on the face of the record or for some reason akin thereto. This Court in Kerala SEB v. Hitech Electrothermics & Hydropower Ltd. [(2005) 6 SCC 651] [LQ/SC/2005/793] held as under : (SCC p. 656, para 10).

“10. ... In a review petition it is not open to this Court to reappreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion, even if that is possible. The learned counsel for the Board at best sought to impress us that the correspondence exchanged between the parties did not support the conclusion reached by this Court. We are afraid such a submission cannot be permitted to be advanced in a review petition. The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court. If on appreciation of the evidence produced, the court records a finding of fact and reaches a conclusion, that conclusion cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on the face of the record or for some reason akin thereto. It has not been contended before us that there is any error apparent on the face of the record. To permit the review petitioner to argue on a question of appreciation of evidence would amount to converting a review petition into an appeal in disguise.”

9. Considering the facts, law and the circumstances deliberated above, we have no hesitation to hold that the appellant has not made out any case of error apparent on the face of the record or other legal infirmities justifying us to review the common judgement in the appeals. Needless to say, review petitions fail, accordingly they are dismissed.