P.K. Bahri, J.

1. This appeal has been brought against order dated December 17, 1982 of the District Judge, Delhi, by which he had dismissed the objection petition filed by the appellant under Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, for annulment and revocation of letters of administration already granted in favour of respondent No. 2 Inderjit Marwah on the basis of a Will allegedly executed by Hakumat Rai. The appellant was held to be having no locus standi to challenge the letters of administration granted in favour of respondent No. 2.

2. Admittedly, the appellant is a tenant in a portion of house No. 10/2461, Beadon Pura, Karol Bagh, New Delhi. Hakumat Rai and his wife had brought an eviction case against the appellant on the ground of bona fide requirement for residence but they remained unsuccessful in that effort upto the High Court. After the death of his wife, Hakumat Rai is stated to have brought another eviction case against the appellant in which he pleaded that his wife had executed a Will in his favour. The ground of eviction set up again was bona fide requirement for residence. The Additional Rent Controller negatived the said ground giving the finding that the Will has not been proved and Hakumat Rai was not the sole owner of the property inasmuch as there were daughters etc. also co-owners of the property having inherited the property from Hakumat Rais wife. In appeal the finding was given that Hakumat Rai, being admittedly one of the co-owners, could plead the ground of bona fide requirement but the ground of bona fide requirement was negatived on merits. It must be made clear that Hakumat Rai had died during the pendency of the appeal and respondent No. 2 was substituted in his place on the basis of letters of administration obtained by respondent No. 2 with regard to the estate left by Hakumat Rai. Respondent No. 2 has filed an appeal against judgment of the Rent Control Tribunal and the same is pending in this Court which is S.A.O. No. 363/82. Inderjit-respondent No. 2 has filed another eviction case against the appellant on the ground of non-payment of rent and it has been pleaded in that case that the tenant had already enjoyed benefit of Section 15(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act in a previous eviction case brought on the ground of non-payment of rent and he is not entitled to have benefit of Section 15(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act again. The appellant, has initially filed a petition under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the District Judge seeking setting aside of the order dated April 3, 1980 of the District Judge granting probate and letters of administration in favour of Inderjit in respect of the estate of Hakumat Rai. He has filed the objection petition under Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act on April 24, 1980.

3. It was pleaded in this petition by the appellant that Inderjit is not son of Hakumat Rai, deceased and in fact, he is son of one Mr. Prem Nath, who is also one of the tenants in the property in question and no issue was born out of the wedlock of Hakumat Rai and Amrit Rani and Inderjit after practising fraud on the Court had obtained the aforesaid probate and letters of administration on the basis of a forged will. It was also pleaded by the appellant that no adoption deed of any kind was executed to show that Inderjit was adopted son of Hakumat Rai. It was also pleaded that Hakumat Rai had no daughters but Inderjit had shown Smt. Ajit Chopra and Smt. Madhu Bala as daughters of Hakumat Rai while in fact, Smt. Ajit Chopra is the real sister of Inderjit while Smt. Madhu Bala is a daughter of Joginder Singh Bhalla (wifes brother of Hakumat Rai). Then reference was made to a statement made by Hakumat Rai in the Court of Smt. Kanwal Inder, Additional Rent Controller, in the eviction proceedings that Inderjit was not born from the womb of Smt. Amrit Rani.

4. This petition was contested by respondent No. 2 Inderjit pleading that the appellant-tenant had no locus standi to challenge the order granting the probate and letters of administration in his favour as he is not the heir of Hakumat Rai and is in possession of the portion of the property only as a tenant. It was further pleaded in the reply that this appellant has himself shown Hakumat Rai as his father in the petition and moreover in the proceedings brought by Hakumat Rai under Section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act against the appellant, the appellant had filed an affidavit in which he pleaded that after the death of Smt. Amrit Rani, Hakumat Rai and his adopted son are the owners of the property in question. It was also pleaded that in the statement made by the appellant in the judicial proceedings, he made a statement that Hakumat Rai has a son and also a grandson which apparently referred to Inderjit and Inderjits son. It has been averred in the reply that Hakumat Rai had adopted him as a son and also had adopted two daughters Ajit and Madhu. In the rejoinder the appellant pleaded that he had made an averment in the affidavit before the Competent Authority under the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act that Inderjit is adopted son of Hakumat Rai but later on it was found by him that in fact, Inderjit was not adopted as a son by Hakumat Rai at any time. The appellant did not disclose as to how and from where he confirmed this fact. A preliminary issue was framed by the District Judge as to whether the appellant had locus standi to file the petition under Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act.

5. By the impugned judgment, the District Judge held that issue against the appellant and dismissed his petition. The appellant at the stage of final arguments in this appeal has filed an application with a view to amend his petition in order to incorporate the facts regarding the filing of different eviction cases against the appellant firstly by Hakumat Rai and his wife and thereafter by Hakumat Rai and now by Inderjit. The appellant wants to plea these facts in order to show that his interests as a tenant are being adversely affected because of spate of eviction cases being brought against him from the very inception of his tenancy and thus, he has a right to challenge the grant of probate and letters of administration in favour of Inderjit as Hakumat Rai and his wife had left behind no legal heirs and their estate was liable to be escheated in favour of the Government. The crucial question which needs decision in the present appeal is whether the appellant could be deemed to be interested person for the purpose of bringing a petition under Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act.

6. Counsel for the appellant has argued that the tenancy rights are covered by the definition of property and the appellants interests are being put in jeopardy because of grant of probate and letters of administration in favour of Inderjit and thus, the appellant has the interest in the property in question which he is entitled to protect by filing a petition under Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act for challenging the grant of said probate. Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act does not lay down as to who can file a petition seeking annulment or revocation of the grant of probate and letters of administration. But it has been settled by a catena of authorities that only a person interested in the estate can bring such a petition under the aforesaid Act. It is true, as held in Niresh Chandra Das v. Paresh Chandra Routh, AIR 1959 Assam 61, that tenancy rights can be treated as property but that would not lead to any inference that a tenant could be considered to be interested in the estate so as to have the locus standi to file a revocation petition under Section 263 of the said Act. In Smt. Dular Kuer v. Smt. Kesar Kuer and others, AIR 1964 Patna 518, it has been laid down that a person having no possible chance of succeeding to the testators estate has no locus standi to oppose the grant of probate. In the cited case, the testator had died leaving behind two daughters and other heir but the person who had no right of succession had filed a petition for revocation of the probate on the ground that the proceedings to obtain the grant were defective. It was held that the said person had no locus standi because she had no possible chance of succeeding to testators estate. Similarly in Sadananda Pyne v. Harinam Sha and Another, AIR 1950 Calcutta 179, it was held that a person, who is a trespasser in the estate of the deceased, has no locus standi to apply for revocation of probate inasmuch as he has no interest in the estate of the deceased.

7. Counsel for the appellant has cited Banwarilal Mr.niwas v. Kumari Kusum Bai and others, AIR 1973 Madhya Pradesh 69, wherein it was laid down that it is well settled that any interest, however slight, and even the bare possibility of an interest, is sufficient to entitle a party to oppose a testamentary document. He has also cited Smt. Sima Rani Mohanti v. Pushpa Rani Pal, AIR, 1978 Calcutta 140, in which the same principle was reiterated. If we peruse the facts of the two cases it would be obvious that the persons challenging the grant of probate had an interest in the estate which was being affected adversely by grant of the probate and the letter of administration. Counsel for the appellant has also cited Devi Das v. Mohanlal, AIR 1982 SC 1213 [LQ/SC/1980/135] . In the cited case, a tenant challenged the sale deed, on the basis of which the vendee claimed to have become the owner-landlord, pleading that the said transaction was a bogus one and has been brought into existence only for seeking his eviction. It was held by the Supreme Court that tenant has a right to plead and prove that particular transaction is a sham and bogus and has been brought into existence to seek his eviction. It is always a question of fact to be established whether the tenants rights are being jeopardised by bringing into existence a particular document. If, prima facie, it is shown that the tenants rights are liable to be jeopardised by grant of probate or letter of administration, such a tenant can be considered to be a person interested in the estate and thus, has a locus standi to file the petition under Section 263 of the said Act. Normally, a tenant has obviously no interest in the estate of his deceased landlord. It is thus held by a Single Bench of this Court in M/s. International Buildings and Furnishing Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. J.S. Rikhy and Others, 1985 (2) RCR (Delhi) 289, that the tenant has no right to challenge the Will executed by his landlord-owner.

8. In the present case, what is to be seen is whether the appellant has locus standi to challenge the grant of probate and letters of administration in favour of Inderjit. It is, indeed, not in dispute before me that the appellant has made admissions not only in affidavit but also in his testimony on oath in earlier proceedings that Inderjit is adopted son of Hakumat Rai. If these admissions are to be taken into consideration it is obvious that the appellant could not possibly challenge the Will of Hakumat Rai set up by Inderjit because even if there was not to be any Will, even then Inderjit being the adopted son of Hakumat Rai would inherit the estate. The necessity of obtaining probate and letters of administration by Inderjit arises only because it was the case of Inderjit that Hakumat Rai had left behind two adopted daughters and those two adopted daughters did not challenge the grant of probate and letters of administration in favour of Inderjit. If the admissions of the appellant are given due importance, then obviously appellant has no interest in the estate of deceased Hukumat Rai and thus, the District Judge was right in giving the finding that he had no locus standi to file the petition under Section 263 of the said Act.

9. Counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued that erroneous admission of fact made by the appellant has been withdrawn by him and the said admission should not be given any importance. It is, no doubt, established law that an erroneous admission of fact can be allowed to be withdrawn if it is shown to the satisfaction of the Court that the same had been made under some misapprehension, but present is not such a case. The appellant has intentionally made an admission before the Slum authorities mentioning that Inderjit is adopted son of Hakumat Rai in order to defeat the claim of Hakumat Rai because Hakumat Rai alone was seeking permission to evict the appellant on the basis of a Will allegedly executed by his wife bequeathing the property in question in his favour. The appellant wanted to show that in fact, there was no Will made by the owner and the owner had left behind not only Hakumat Rai but an adopted son Inderjit as well, as her heirs and thus, the petition by one of the co-landlords was not competent. It is because of this reason also that while giving a sworn testimony in Court in an eviction petition, the appellant again made reference to Hakumat Rais son and Hakumat Rais grandson. So, it cannot be said that these admissions have been made by the appellant under some misapprehension. The appellant did not explain as to how and from what material he confirmed this fact that in fact, Inderjit was not adopted son of Hakumat Rai.

10. Counsel for the appellant has cited Nagubai Ammal and Others v. B. Shama Rao and Others, AIR 1956 SC 593 [LQ/SC/1956/39] , wherein it was observed by the Supreme Court that an admission is not conclusive as to the truth of the matters stated therein. It is only a piece of evidence, the weight to be attached to which must depend on the circumstances under which it is made. It can be shown to be erroneous or untrue, so long as the person to whom it was made has not acted upon it to his detriment, when it might become conclusive by way of estoppel. There is no dispute about the legal principle enunciated by the Supreme Court. The question which arises for decision in the present case is whether the appellant has or has not brought any material on the record to show that he had made an erroneous admission of fact. Counsel for the appellant made reference to certain statements of Hakumat Rai made in various proceedings where he admitted that Inderjit was not his real son while in one of the statements he described Inderjit as his real son. The mere fact that Hakumat Rai had stated at one time that Inderjit was his real son would not mean that Inderjit was not his validly adopted son and that appellant had made an admission of an erroneous fact. The appellant in the rejoinder has tried to explain his admission in the judicial proceedings that Hakumat Rai had a son and a sons son by mentioning that he made that admission with regard to some other son of Hakumat Rai. It is admitted fact that Hakumat Rai had no real son. So this explanation given by the appellant regarding his admission made on oath in his statement obviously referred to Inderjit.

11. Thus, examined from any angle, it is evident that the appellant did not try to explain his categorical admissions made from time to time admitting Inderjit to be adopted son of Hakumat Rai. He has not given any explanation as to why and how he came to make such an admission of fact if the same was not correct. The District Judge appears to have relied on unreported judgment of Om Parkash, J., in S.A.O. No. 268/69 Arian Dass v. Madan Lal, in support of his finding that a tenant had no right to bring the petition under Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act. It appears that the learned District Judge draw wrong inferences from the said judgment which was on a different point. This judgment is now reported as 1970 RCR (Delhi) 785. In the cited case, a tenant wanted to prove that the property, which was subject-matter of Will, was ancestral property of the testator and thus, the Will could not be made in respect of such a property. It was held by this Court that the tenant had no locus standi to show that the particular property of the testator is ancestral. It was not a case where tenant was challenging the factum of execution of a Will, However, keeping in view the facts, as enumerated above, it is clear that the appellant has no interest in the estate left by Hakumat Rai, particularly when he had made categorical admission in judicial proceedings admitting that Inderjit was adopted son of Hakumat Rai. Thus, Inderjit had succeeded to the estate of Hakumat Rai as one of the heirs and the grant of probate and letters of administration in favour of Inderjit by no stretch of reasoning could be deemed to affect the appellants tenancy rights. Hence, the appellant had no locus standi to file the petition seeking revocation of such grant of probate and letters of administration in favour of Inderjit.

12. For deciding this appeal, I have also considered the facts mentioned in the application seeking amendment. So, there is no need to pass any separate order in that application.

13. I find no merit in this appeal which I, hereby, dismiss with costs. Counsels fee Rs. 500.