Mansoor Ahmad Mir, Judge

1. The grievance projected by the writ petitioner in this writ petition is that he laid a motion before the Superintendent Central Jail, Srinagar, seeking his release from detention on the ground that he has already served the period of sentence, i.e., imprisonment for life. It is averred that since the respondents have failed to redress his grievance, he was left with no option but to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court by the medium of the present writ petition. It is prayed that the respondents be directed to release him from detention/custody/jail forthwith, as he has already completed 20 years and 11 days of sentence as on 31.05.2012. The petitioner was facing trial before the Presiding Officer, Designated Court under TADA (P) Act, Jammu. After completion of the trial, he was acquitted vide judgment and order dated 14.07.2001. Respondent-State questioned the said judgment before the Apex Court by the medium of appeal, Criminal Appeal No. 889/2001. The said criminal appeal came to be allowed and the order of acquittal was set aside. The petitioner was convicted for the commission of offences punishable u/s 3 of Terrorists & Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (for short, TADA Act) read with Sections 302 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code (for short, IPC), and was sentenced to life imprisonment vide judgment and order dated 30.01.2003.

2. It is averred that the petitioner, after undergoing 14 years and 23 days of sentence, made an appeal to the respondents to consider his case for premature release in accordance with the provisions of J&K Jail Manual, 2000 (for short, Jail Manual). The respondents, however, vide order dated 14.09.2009, rejected his claim on the ground of being premature. Aggrieved by the same, petitioner challenged the said order by the medium of writ petition, OWP No. 997/2009. The writ petition was allowed and the impugned order of rejection was set aside vide order dated 05.06.2010, with a direction to the respondents to consider the case of petitioner for his premature release in accordance with the recommendations of the Review Board read with the law applicable. Respondent-State questioned the same by the medium of appeal, LPA No. 120/2010. A Division Bench of this Court, vide order dated 05.10.2010, allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Writ Court, with the observation that rejection of the claim of petitioner for premature release would not deprive him from working out other remedies as might be available to him.

3. Respondents have filed reply and resisted the petition on the grounds, which are summarized as under:

4. That the respondents have not, in any way, violated any constitutional, fundamental or legal right of the petitioner; that no cause of action has accrued to the petitioner; that the petitioner has to undergo sentence for entire natural life, as the provisions contained in the Ranbir Penal Code, Svt. 1989 (1932 A.D.) (for short, RPC), the Code of Criminal Procedure, Svt. 1989 (1933 A.D.) (for short, Cr.P.C.), the Prisons Act, 1977 (1920 A.D.) (for short, Prisons Act) and the Prisoners Act, 1977 (1920 A.D.) (for short, Prisoners Act) nowhere provide that a life convict has to undergo imprisonment for only 14 years or 20 years.

Further, it is stated that for the purposes of carrying mandate of Jail Manual read with the provisions of Prisons Act, completion of 20 years sentence is just for the purposes of remission of sentence and would be one of the factors seeking review of sentence by the Government, but no life convict can claim, as a matter of right, that he is entitled to be released after completion of 20 years sentence. It is, thus, contended that no indefeasible right has accrued to the petitioner to claim his unconditional automatic release after the expiry of twenty years sentence. However, as per the claim of petitioner, his case was considered in detail and rejected vide Order No. 731 of 2012 dated 23.08.2012.

5. In paragraph-1 of the reply, the respondents have given the details of the period of sentence which the petitioner has undergone till 31.05.2012.

6. In order to deal with the issue in its right perspective so as to arrive at a just conclusion of the case, the following questions are required to be considered:

i. Whether life imprisonment means entire natural life or undergoing 20 years of sentence

ii. Whether a life convict can be released automatically after completion of twenty years without any orders from the State, including the jail authorities

iii. Whether the provisions contained in the Jail Manual, Prisons Act and Prisoners Act have overriding effect over the provisions of Ranbir Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code

iv. What is the scope of Section 57 of Ranbir Penal Code and when does it apply

7. In order to determine the questions framed hereinabove, it is to be seen what life means in terms of the provisions contained in Cr.P.C. and RPC. Therefore, before dealing with this case further, I deem it proper to reproduce the relevant provisions of RPC, Cr.P.C. Prisons Act, Prisoners Act and Jail Manual herein, which read as under: Sections 45, 54, 55 and 57 of RPC

45. Life The word life; denotes the life of a human being unless the contrary appears from the context.

54. Commutation of sentence of death In every case in which sentence of death shall have been passed, (the Government) may, without the consent of the offender, commute the punishment for any other punishment provided by this Code.

55. Commutation of sentence of imprisonment for life In every case in which sentence of imprisonment for life shall have been passed (the Government) may, without the consent of the offender, commute the punishment for imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding fourteen years.

57. Fractions of terms of punishment In calculating fractions of terms of punishment, imprisonment for life shall be reckoned as equivalent to imprisonment for twenty years.

Sections 35(2), 401(1) and 402 Cr.P.C.

35(2) In the case of consecutive sentences, it shall not be necessary for the Court, by reason only of the aggregate punishment for the several offences being in excess of the punishment which it is competent to inflict on trial before a Higher Court;

Maximum term of punishment - Provided as follows:-

(a) In no case shall such person be sentenced to imprisonment for a longer period than fourteen years;

(b) if the case is tried by a Magistrate (other than a Magistrate acting u/s 34), the aggregate punishment shall not exceed twice the amount of punishment which he is, in the exercise of his ordinary jurisdiction, competent to conflict.

401. Power to suspend or remit sentences (1) When any person has been sentenced to punishment for an offence, (the Governor) may at any time without conditions or upon any conditions which the person sentenced accepts, suspend the execution of his sentence or remit the whole or any part of the punishment to which he has been sentenced.

402. Power to commute punishment.

(1) The Governor, may, without the consent of the person sentenced, commute any one of the following sentences for any other mentioned after it:-

death, life imprisonment, rigorous imprisonment for a term not exceeding that to which he might have been sentenced, simple imprisonment for a like term, fine.

(2) Nothing in this section shall affect the provisions of section 54 or section 55 of the Ranbir Penal Code.

Section 3(1) and 3(5) of Prisons Act.

3. Definitions.

In this Act

(1) prison means any jail or place used permanently or temporarily under the general or special orders of the Government for the detention of prisoners, and includes all lands and buildings appurtenant thereto, but does not include-

(a) any place for the confinement of prisoners who are exclusively in the custody of the police;

(b) any place specially appointed by (the Government) u/s 541 of the Code of Criminal Procedure;

(c) any place which has been declared by (the Government), by general or special order, to be a subsidiary jail;

(5) remission system means the rules for the time being in force regulating the award of marks to and the consequent shortening of sentences of prisoners in jails.

Sections 32 and 51 of Prisoners Act

32. Appointment of places for confinement of persons under sentence of imprisonment for life and removal thereto.

The Government may appoint places within the State to which persons under sentence of imprisonment for life shall be sent; and the Government, or some officer duly authorized in this behalf by the Government, shall give orders for the removal of such persons to the places so appointed, except when sentence of imprisonment for life is passed on a person already undergoing imprisonment for life under a sentence previously passed for another offence.

51. Power to make rules under this Part.

(1) The Government may make rules-

(a) for regulating the escort of prisoners to and from Courts in which their attendance is required and for their custody during the period of such attendance;

(b) for regulating the amount to be allowed for the costs and charges of such escort; and

(c) for the guidance of officers in all other matters connected with the enforcement of this Part.

(2) All rules made under sub-section (1) shall be published in the Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette, and shall, from the date of such publication, have the same force as if enacted by this Act.

Relevant provisions of Chapter 2, 21 and 51 of Jail Manual

2.25. Life means the life of a human being unless the contrary appears from the context.

21.2. For the purpose of execution, a sentence of imprisonment for life shall mean a sentence for 20 years.

21.27. Irrespective of the remissions granted to a life convict he shall be replaced only after the State Government has issued specific orders about his release.

51.1. Remission is a concession which can be granted to prisoners by the State Government/ Inspector General/Superintendent. This concession is subject to withdrawal/forfeiture/ revocation. It is not a right. The State Government reserves the right to debar/ withdraw any prisoner or category of prisoners from the concession of remission.

51.4. Remission will be of the following types:-

(i) ordinary remission;

(ii) special remission; and

(iii) State Government remission.

51.5. The Superintendent or an officer nominated by him on his behalf is authorized to grant ordinary remission. 51.20. Life sentence shall be reckoned as twenty years for purposes of calculation of remission. In the case of a prisoner having more than one life sentences, 20 years shall be treated as the total of his sentences for the purpose of calculating remission. Grant of remission to a life convict shall not mean actual remission in his sentence. When his case will be examined by the Review Board, the remission to his credit will be one of the factors on the basis of which the review of his sentences will be done.

8. While going through the said provisions of law, one comes to an inescapable conclusion that life imprisonment means imprisonment for life and it does not automatically come to an end without any order from the competent authority.

9. A similar matter came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Ajay Sharma vs State of J&K & others, 1995 SLJ 178, and the Division held that life imprisonment means imprisonment for life. It would be appropriate to reproduce paragraphs 15 & 16 hereunder.

15. It thus comes out loud and clear that the life imprisonments as prescribed in Sec. 53 of the Ranbir Penal Code must be treated to mean an imprisonment for the whole of the convicted persons natural life. As on today there is no provision either in the Ranbir Penal Code or in the State Code of Criminal Procedure which treats such imprisonment for a definite period of fourteen or twenty years. The result is that no convict sentenced to life imprisonment can claim release as a matter of right after serving a sentence of 14 years or 20 years, any formal remission or commutation by the Government under law notwithstanding.

16. We would, therefore, answer the reference as follows:

(1) That the Life imprisonments means an imprisonment for the whole of a convicts natural life and does not automatically expire on his serving a sentence of fourteen years or twenty years unless, of course, the sentence is remitted or commuted by the Government in accordance with law. There is no provision in the Ranbir Penal Code or the State Code of Criminal Procedure providing to the contrary or prescribing any definite period for life imprisonment.

(2) That it falls within the exclusive domain of the Government to remit or commute the sentence in accordance with the relevant provisions of law and rules in force.

10. The High Court of Allahabad in Mahak Singh vs State of UP, AIR 1999 Allahabad 274, has laid down the same principle of law. It would be advantageous to reproduce paragraph 14 of the said judgment hereunder::

14. The expression life imprisonment means an Imprisonment for the whole of a convicts natural life and does not automatically expires on his serving sentence of 14 years and 20 years, unless of course, the sentence is remitted or commuted by the Government in accordance with law. There is no provision in law that the life imprisonment expires on serving out the sentence for 14 years or 20 years..

11. The Apex Court also in Life Convict Laxman Laskar Vs. State of West Bengal and Another, , has held that life imprisonment means entire life.

12. Similarly, the Apex Court in Md. Munna vs Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 3440 , while minutely examining the issue and taking into consideration all the laws applicable, has held that life imprisonment means imprisonment for entire life. It would be appropriate to reproduce paragraphs 15, 17 & 19 of the said judgment hereunder:

15. The counsel contended that by virtue of Rule 751(C) of the West Bengal Jail Code, the petitioner was liable to the released from jail on completion of twenty years. He also relied on the Explanation to Section 61 of the West Bengal Correctional Services Act, 1992 (W.B. Act No. XXXII of 1992) wherein the imprisonment for life is equated to a term of twenty years simple imprisonment for the purpose of remission. But there is no provision either in the Indian Penal Code or in the Code of Criminal Procedure whereby life imprisonment could be treated as fourteen years or twenty years without there being a formal remission by the appropriate government.

17. The Prisons Rules are made under the Prison Act and the Prisons Act by itself does not confer any authority or power to commute or remit sentence. It only provides for the regulation of the prisons and for the terms of the prisoners confined therein. Therefore, the West Bengal Correctional Services Act or the West Bengal Jail Code do not confer any special right on the petitioner herein.

19. We are bound by the above dicta laid down by the Constitutional Bench and we hold that life imprisonment is not equivalent to imprisonment for fourteen years or for twenty years as contended by the petitioner.

13. Mr. Qayoom, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, vehemently argued that in terms of Section 57 of RPC, life imprisonment means imprisonment for 20 years.

14. The argument, though attractive, is devoid of any force. The object of said Section relates as to how to calculate the fractions of terms of punishment and provides that imprisonment for life shall be reckoned as equivalent to imprisonment for twenty years, when punishment is to be awarded to a co-accused, who is also involved in the same offence either by abetment, conspiracy or attempt, in which the main accused is awarded the sentence of imprisonment for life.

15. My aforesaid view is fortified by the judgment of Apex Court in case, titled Swamy Shraddananda @ Murali Manohar Mishra Vs. State of Karnataka, , paragraphs 54, 55, 56 & 58 whereof read as under.

54. At this stage, it will be useful to take a very brief look at the provisions with regard to sentencing and computation, remission etc. of sentences. Section 45 of the Penal Code defines "life" to mean the life of the human being, unless the contrary appears from the context. Section 53 enumerates punishments, the first of which is death and the second, imprisonment for life.

Sections 54 and 55 give to the appropriate Government the power of commutation of the sentence of death and the sentence of imprisonment for life respectively. Section 55A defines "appropriate Government". Section 57 provides that in calculating fractions of terms of punishment, imprisonment for life shall be reckoned as equivalent to imprisonment for twenty years. It is now conclusively settled by a catena of decisions that the punishment of imprisonment for life handed down by the Court means a sentence of imprisonment for the convict for the rest of his life. (See the decisions of this Court in Gopal Vinayak Godse Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Others, ; Dalbir Singh and Others Vs. State of Punjab, ; Maru Ram and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, ; Naib Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Others, ; Ashok Kumar alias Golu Vs. Union of India and others, ; Life Convict Laxman Laskar Vs. State of West Bengal and Another, ; Zahid Hussein and Others Vs. State of West Bengal and Another, ; Kamalanantha and Others Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, ; Mohd. Munna vs. Union of India, (2005) 7 SCC 416 and C.A. Pious Vs. The State of Kerala and Another, .

55. It is equally well-settled that Section 57 of the Penal Code does not in any way limit the punishment of imprisonment for life to a term of twenty years. Section 57 is only for calculating fractions of terms of punishment and provides that imprisonment for life shall be reckoned as equivalent to imprisonment for twenty years. (See : Gopal Vinayak Godse (supra) and Ashok Kumar alias Golu (supra). The object and purpose of Section 57 will be clear by simply referring to Sections 65, 116, 119, 129 and 511 of the Penal Code.

56. This takes us to the issue of computation and remission etc. of sentences. The provisions in regard to computation, remission, suspension etc. are to be found both in the Constitution and in the statutes. Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution deal with the powers of the President and the Governors of the State respectively to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions of punishment or to suspend, remit or commute the sentence of any person convicted of any offence. Here it needs to be made absolutely clear that this judgment is not concerned at all with the Constitutional provisions that are in the nature of the States sovereign power. What is said hereinafter relates only to provisions of commutation, remission etc. as contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Prisons Acts and the Rules framed by the different States.

58. From the Prison Act and the Rules it appears that for good conduct and for doing certain duties etc. inside the jail the prisoners are given some days remission on a monthly, quarterly or annual basis. The days of remission so earned by a prisoner are added to the period of his actual imprisonment (including the period undergone as an under trial) to make up the term of sentence awarded by the Court. This being the position, the first question that arises in mind is how remission can be applied to imprisonment for life. The way in which remission is allowed, it can only apply to a fixed term and life imprisonment, being for the rest of life, is by nature indeterminate.

16. Learned counsel appearing for petitioner further argued that the provisions contained in the Jail Manual, Prisons Act and Prisoners Act mandate that imprisonment for life means 20 years. The argument has no force for the simple reason that the provisions contained in the Jail Manual, Prisons Act and Prisoners Act only lay down the provisions as to how to regulate and manage the prisoners in the prisons.

17. The Apex Court in G. V. Godse vs State of Maharashtra, AIR 1961 SC 601, has laid down the same principle. It would be relevant to reproduce paragraphs 4, 5 & 7 hereunder.

4...Under that section, a person transported for life or any other term before the enactment of the said section would be treated as a person sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life or for the said term. 5. if so, the next question is whether there is any provision of law where under a sentence for life imprisonment, without any formal remission by appropriate Government, can be automatically treated as one for a definite period. No such provision is found in the Indian Penal Code, Code of Criminal Procedure or the Prisons Act. A sentence of transportation for life or imprisonment for life must prima facie be treated as transportation or imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the convicted persons natural life.

7. It is common case that the said rules were made under the Prisons Act, 1894, and that they have statutory force. But the Prisons Act does not confer on any authority a power to commute or remit sentences; it provides only for the regulation of prisons and for the treatment of prisoners confined therein. Section 59 of the Prisons Act confers a power on the State Government to make rules, inter alia, for rewards for good conduct. Therefore, the rules made under the Act should be construed within the scope of the ambit of the Act. Under the said rules the orders of an appropriate Government under s. 401, Criminal Procedure Code, are a prerequisite for a release. No other rule has been brought to our notice which confers an indefeasible right on a prisoner sentenced to transportation for life to an unconditional release on the expiry of a particular term including remissions. The rules under the Prisons Act do not substitute a lesser sentence for a sentence of transportation for life.

18. The grounds urged in the petition that after completion of 20 years of life imprisonment the convict is automatically entitled to be released, is not tenable for the reason that if the jail authorities take into consideration the conduct of convict and make a recommendation for remission or release of convict after 20 years or 14 years, the sanction of the Government is pre-requisite. It is the domain of the Government to consider the case along with the recommendation made and pass an order in the facts and circumstances of each case. Writ of mandamus cannot lie to command the Government for passing such order or to release the convict after expiry of 14 years or 20 years without any specific order.

19. The Apex Court in case Shri Bhagwan Vs. State of Rajasthan, , in this connection, has held as under:

20. Section 57 IPC provides that in calculating fractions of terms of punishment, imprisonment for life is to be reckoned as equivalent to the imprisonment for twenty years. In our view, considering the heinous barbaric offence committed by the accused, in no set of circumstances accused should be released before completion of 20 years of imprisonment

21. In case of Subash Chander v. Krishan Lal, the said principle is followed by this Court and it was ordered that accused shall be incarcerated for the remainder of his life and that he shall not be let loose upon the society as he is a potential danger.

22. This question is considered by various decisions rendered by this Court and by the Privy Council and it has been reiterated that a sentence of imprisonment for life imposed prima facie be treated as imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the convicted persons natural life. It is also established law that rules framed under the Prisons Act do not substitute a lesser sentence for a sentence of transportation for life..

It is, therefore, manifest from the decision of this Court that the Rules framed under the Prisons Act or under the Jail Manual do not affect the total period which the prisoner has to suffer but merely amount to administrative instructions regarding the various remissions to be given to the prisoner from time to time in accordance with the rules. This Court further pointed out that the question of remission of the entire sentence or a part of it lies within the exclusive domain of the appropriate Government u/s 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and neither Section 57 of the Indian Penal Code nor any Rules or local Acts can stultify the effect of the sentence of life imprisonment given by the court under the Indian Penal Code. In other words, this Court has clearly held that a sentence for life would ensure till the lifetime of the accused as it is not possible to fix a particular period the prisoners death and remissions given under the Rules could not be regarded as a substitute for a sentence of transportation for life.

23. In Maru Ram v. Union of India, Constitutional Bench of this Court reiterated the aforesaid position and observed that the inevitable conclusion is that since in Section 433-A we deal only with life sentences, remissions lead nowhere and cannot entitle a prisoner to release. Further, in Laxman Naskar v. State of W.B. after referring to the decision of the case of Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra the Court reiterated that sentence for imprisonment for life ordinarily means imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the convicted persons natural life; that a convict undergoing such sentence may earn remissions of his part of sentence under the Prison Rules but such remissions in the absence of an order of an appropriate Government remitting the entire balance of his sentence under this section does not entitle the convict to be released automatically before the full life term is served. It was observed that though under the relevant Rules a sentence for imprisonment for life is equated with the definite period of 20 years, there is no indefeasible right of such prisoner to be unconditionally released on the expiry of such particular term, including remissions and that is only for the purpose of working out the remissions that the said sentence is equated with definite period and not for any other purpose.

20. The Apex Court in Life Convict Laxman Laskar Vs. State of West Bengal and Another, , has also held that life imprisonment means imprisonment for entire life. It would be relevant to reproduce paragraph 4 of the aforesaid judgment hereunder.

4. In Naib Singh v. State of Punjab, it was noticed that a distinction between imprisonment for life and imprisonment for a term has been maintained in the Indian Penal Code in several of its provisions and moreover, whenever an offender is punishable with imprisonment for life he is not punishable with imprisonment which may be of either description within the meaning of Section 60 I.P.C. and therefore, we cannot come to the conclusion that the court, by itself, could release the convict automatically before the full life term is served. This aspect was highlighted in Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra wherein it was held that sentence for imprisonment for life ordinarily means imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the convicted persons natural life; that a convict undergoing such sentence may earn remissions of his part of sentence under the Prison Rules but such remissions in the absence of an order of an appropriate Government remitting the entire balance of his sentence under this Section does not entitle the convict to be released automatically before the full life term is served. It was observed that though under the relevant rules a sentence for imprisonment for life is equated with the definite period of 20 years, there is no indefeasible right of such prisoner to be unconditionally released on the expiry of such particular term, including remissions and that is only for the purpose of working out the remissions that the said sentence is equated with definite period and not for any other purpose. In view of this legal position explained by this Court it may not help the petitioner even on the construction placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on Section 61(1) of the West Bengal Correctional Services Act 32 of 1992 with reference to explanation thereto that for the purpose of calculation of the total period of imprisonment under this Section the period of imprisonment for life shall be taken to be equivalent to the period of imprisonment for 20 years. Therefore, solely on the basis of completion of a term in jail serving imprisonment and remissions earned under the relevant rules or law will not entitle an automatic release, but the appropriate Government must pass a separate order remitting the un-expired portion of the sentence.

21. Further, the Apex Court in a latest judgment, titled State of UP vs Sanjay Kumar, (2012) 5 SCC 766 , has held that life imprisonment cannot be equivalent to imprisonment for 14 years or 20 years; rather it means the whole natural life. It would be appropriate to reproduce paragraph 16 of the said judgment hereunder:

16. In view of the above, we reach the inescapable conclusion that the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the State are unfounded. The aforesaid judgments make it crystal clear that this Court has merely found out the via media, where considering the facts and circumstances of a particular case, by way of which it has come to the conclusion that it was not the "rarest of rare cases, warranting death penalty, but a sentence of 14 years or 20 years, as referred to in the guidelines laid down by the States would be totally inadequate.

Life imprisonment cannot be equivalent to imprisonment for 14 years or 20 years, rather it always meant as the whole natural life. This Court has always clarified that the punishment so awarded would be subject to any order passed in exercise of the clemency powers of the President of India or Governor of State, as the case may be. Pardons, reprieves and remissions are granted in exercise of prerogative power. There is no scope of judicial review of such orders except on very limited grounds for example non-application of mind while passing the order; non-consideration of relevant material; or if the order suffers from arbitrariness. The power to grant pardons and to commute sentences is coupled with a duty to exercise the same fairly and reasonably. Administration of justice cannot be perverted by executive or political pressure. of course, adoption of uniform standards may not be possible while exercising the power of pardon. Thus, such orders do not interfere with the sovereign power of the State. More so, not being in contravention of any statutory or constitutional provision, the orders, even if treated to have been passed under Article 142 of the Constitution do not deserve to be labelled as unwarranted. The aforesaid orders have been passed considering the gravity of the offences in those cases that the accused would not be entitled to be considered for premature release under the guidelines issued for that purpose i.e. under Jail Manual etc. or even u/s 433-A Cr.P.C. With these observations, the Petition is dismissed.

In view of what has been discussed hereinabove and in light of the law laid down by the judgments supra, coupled with the fact that the respondents vide order dated 23.08.2012 have dismissed the representation of petitioner, this writ petition merits dismissal. Dismissed as such along with all connected CMPs. However, the petitioner is at liberty to work out a remedy, if any, available under law.