Director Of Income Tax (exemption)
v.
Lovely Bal Shiksha Parishad
(High Court Of Delhi)
Income Tax Appeal No. 17 of 2002 | 20-10-2003
1. This appeal by the Revenue under Section 260A of the IT Act, 1961 ( the for short) is directed against order dt. 19th Jan., 2001, passed by the Tribunal, Delhi, F Bench, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) in ITA No. 6994/Del/94-pertaining to the asst. yr. 1991-92.
2. By the impugned order the Tribunal has dismissed Revenues appeal against the order passed by the CIT(A) whereby the CIT(A) had come to the conclusion that the respondent-assessed was entitled to exemption under Section 10(22) of the. While holding so the CIT(A) had observed that there had been no instance of any expenditure being incurred by the assessed-society for purposes other than educational and no personal benefit had been derived by any member of the society or persons close to the society. It has been further observed that the society will also not lose exemption under Section 10(22) of themerely because it has claimed depreciation.
3. While agreeing with the CIT(A), the Tribunal has observed that the assessed had been granted exemption under Section 10(22) of thein the past as well. The Tribunal has found that during this year also the assessed-society has existed for carrying out only educational activities with no profit motive and merely because there were certain surpluses the society will not lose exemption under Section 10(22) of the. Hence, the appeal.
4. Assailing the order passed by the Tribunal, Mr. R.D. Jolly, learned Senior Standing Counsel for the Revenue, has strenuously urged that the aforenoted findings recorded by the Tribunal are not correct in as much as the. AO had noted in the assessment year some other activities carried on by the assessed, which could not be said to be educational activities. However, on a pointed query by the Court as to whether there was any change in the nature of activities of the assessed in the present assessment year as compared to the earlier years, learned counsel would submit that he has no instructions in this behalf.
5. Mr. Kalra, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent on the other hand, points out that not only in the past, even after the passing of assessment order for the present assessment year the assessed has been consistently getting exemption under Section 10(22) of thefrom the asst. yr, 1994-95 onwards.
6. In view of the aforenoted factual petition and keeping in view the fact that no change in the nature of activities has been pointed out and the assessed has been granted exemption under Section 10(22) of thenot only in respect of the earlier years but subsequent years as well, we are of the opinion that the order of the Tribunal does not involve any substantial question of law.
7. In this regard we may usefully refer to the decision of the apex Court in Radhaswami Satsang v. CIT : [1992]193ITR321(SC) , wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court had observed that though strictly speaking res judicata does not apply to Income Tax proceedings but where a fundamental aspect permeating through the different assessment years has been found as a fact one way or the other and parties have allowed that position to be sustained by not challenging the order, it would not be at all appropriate to allow the position to be changed in a subsequent year. These observations squarely apply to the facts in hand.
8. Resultantly, we decline to entertain the appeal and the same is accordingly, dismissed.
2. By the impugned order the Tribunal has dismissed Revenues appeal against the order passed by the CIT(A) whereby the CIT(A) had come to the conclusion that the respondent-assessed was entitled to exemption under Section 10(22) of the. While holding so the CIT(A) had observed that there had been no instance of any expenditure being incurred by the assessed-society for purposes other than educational and no personal benefit had been derived by any member of the society or persons close to the society. It has been further observed that the society will also not lose exemption under Section 10(22) of themerely because it has claimed depreciation.
3. While agreeing with the CIT(A), the Tribunal has observed that the assessed had been granted exemption under Section 10(22) of thein the past as well. The Tribunal has found that during this year also the assessed-society has existed for carrying out only educational activities with no profit motive and merely because there were certain surpluses the society will not lose exemption under Section 10(22) of the. Hence, the appeal.
4. Assailing the order passed by the Tribunal, Mr. R.D. Jolly, learned Senior Standing Counsel for the Revenue, has strenuously urged that the aforenoted findings recorded by the Tribunal are not correct in as much as the. AO had noted in the assessment year some other activities carried on by the assessed, which could not be said to be educational activities. However, on a pointed query by the Court as to whether there was any change in the nature of activities of the assessed in the present assessment year as compared to the earlier years, learned counsel would submit that he has no instructions in this behalf.
5. Mr. Kalra, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent on the other hand, points out that not only in the past, even after the passing of assessment order for the present assessment year the assessed has been consistently getting exemption under Section 10(22) of thefrom the asst. yr, 1994-95 onwards.
6. In view of the aforenoted factual petition and keeping in view the fact that no change in the nature of activities has been pointed out and the assessed has been granted exemption under Section 10(22) of thenot only in respect of the earlier years but subsequent years as well, we are of the opinion that the order of the Tribunal does not involve any substantial question of law.
7. In this regard we may usefully refer to the decision of the apex Court in Radhaswami Satsang v. CIT : [1992]193ITR321(SC) , wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court had observed that though strictly speaking res judicata does not apply to Income Tax proceedings but where a fundamental aspect permeating through the different assessment years has been found as a fact one way or the other and parties have allowed that position to be sustained by not challenging the order, it would not be at all appropriate to allow the position to be changed in a subsequent year. These observations squarely apply to the facts in hand.
8. Resultantly, we decline to entertain the appeal and the same is accordingly, dismissed.
Advocates List
For Petitioner : R.D. JollyAjay Jha, AdvsFor Respondent : S.P. KalraTarun Diwan, Advs.
For Petitioner
- Shekhar Naphade
- Mahesh Agrawal
- Tarun Dua
For Respondent
- S. Vani
- B. Sunita Rao
- Sushil Kumar Pathak
Bench List
HON'BLE JUSTICE D.K. JAIN
HON'BLE JUSTICE MADAN B. LOKUR, JJ.
Eq Citation
[2004] 266 ITR 349 (DEL)
[2004] 135 TAXMAN 34 (DEL)
(2004) 186 CTR (DEL) 384
LQ/DelHC/2003/1243
HeadNote
Indirect Taxes — Appeal — Appeal preferred by Revenue against order of Tribunal granting exemption under S. 10(22) of IT Act — No change in nature of activities of assessed in present assessment year as compared to earlier years — Assessed granted exemption under S. 10(22) not only in respect of earlier years but subsequent years as well — No substantial question of law involved — Appeal dismissed — Income Tax Act, 1961, S. 10(22)
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