Jayant Patel, Acting C.J.(Oral)

1. As common order has been passed by the learned single Judge in all the main Special Civil Applications, these appeals are considered simultaneously.

2. All the appeals are admitted. Mr. P.K. Jani, learned Additional Advocate General appearing with Mr. D.M.Devnani, learned AGP waives notice of admission for respondent nos. 1 and 2, Mr. Niraj Ashar, learned AGP appears and waives notice of admission for respondent nos. 3 through its custodian who is the govt. officer and respondent no.4 who is Deputy Collector and Election Officer of respondent no.3. Mr. Pahwa, learned counsel appears and waives notice of admission for respondent no.5 who was the objector to the membership of the original petitioners, With the consent of the learned counsel appearing for both the sides, the appeals are finally heard.

3. All the appeals are directed against the common judgment and order passed by the learned single Judge dated 16.12.2015 in Special Civil Application Nos. 19834 of 2015, 19842 of 2015, 20294 of 2015 and 20295 of 2015 with Civil Application No. 13138 of 2015.

4. We have heard Mr. Mihir Joshi, learned Senior Advocate appearing with Mr. Dipen Desai, learned counsel for the appellants-original petitioners, Mr. P.K. Jani, learned Additional Advocate General with Mr. D.M. Devnani, learned AGP for respondent nos. 1 and 2, Mr. Niraj Ashar, learned AGP for respondent no. 3 and 4 and Mr. Pahwa, learned counsel for respondent no. 5. We have considered the judgment and the reasons recorded by the learned single Judge.

5. It appears that the following facts have come on record.

(a) The original petitioners concerned were admitted as individual members of respondent no. 3 bank in 2006.

(b) As per the respondent authority, bye-laws of the bank did not permit admission of any new individual member, in spite of the same, office bearers of the bank, by misusing their position, permitted admission of the original petitioners as member in the year 2006 who were close relatives of the office bearers of the bank.

(c) The decision of the Board of Directors of the bank for admission of the respective original petitioners as member of the bank is approved by general body of the bank.

(d) Share certificates have been issued to the original petitioners as individual members of the bank. Not only that, but thereafter, they have exercised the rights including of voting right as individual members, may be in the election of delegates or may be in the election of the directors from amongst the individual members, as the case may be, from the year 2006 onwards till the question raised in the present litigation.

(e) There is no specific declaration made in a prescribed form as that of ekrarnama or otherwise or declaration declaring that the petitioners concerned are holding a particular position or are qualified to be admitted as the member of the bank. However, they made an application to be admitted as the member of the bank as back as in the year 2006 and while making the application, the format of admission of membership prescribed for the society was used. As per the respondents, since the admission of new individual member was prohibited, no form was prescribed for getting membership of the bank as new individual members and only the societies were entitled to be admitted with the bank as the member of the bank. However, in spite of the same, the application form used was of the societies to be admitted as members of the bank.

(f) Even the record of this Court shows that there were lot of litigations at the stage when the elections were to be held. At one point of time, the petitioners and their group contended that the election of delegates is already held and, therefore, there should not be any fresh election of the delegates from amongst the individual members, whereas as per the respondent officials, the said election was not in accordance with law. This Court, in the earlier proceedings, directed for completion of election and in spite of the same, as the direction was not complied with as per the petitioner, contempt proceedings were filed. Thereafter, the election was proceeded further in respect of other members of the Board of Directors, namely, 12 members of the Board of Directors. There were also other litigations, which are not of much concern in the present litigation, but suffice it to observe that thereafter, the elections are held and the result of the elected directors from other constituencies, namely, other than the individual constituencies is declared. As per the petitioners, at the said result, six persons are elected from the group of the petitioners, whereas six persons are elected from the opposite group. So far as the individual members are concerned, it is the case of the petitioners that they are supporting one group of six persons and they are also only directors from the individual member constituency and, therefore, if they are removed, then only the other group of six persons who is supported by other political party may be benefited and as per the petitioners, proceedings are initiated with the mala fide purpose.

(g) It may be recorded that as per the respondent officials and even the objector, the allegations of mala fide are not denied and it has been stated that since the powers were wrongly exercised for admission of the petitioners as member, that too, by the then office bearers of the bank who were close relatives of the original petitioners and such admission of the original petitioners as member of the bank was in contravention to the bye-laws, actions are initiated in accordance with law.

(h) Initially, the custodian of the bank had issued notice, calling upon the original petitioners to show cause as to why they should not be removed as member. The said notices were challenged by the original petitioners before this Court by filing Special Civil Application Nos. 19437, 19438 of 2015 and 19439 of 2015 and when the matters came up for hearing before the learned single Judge of this Court on 24.11.2015, declaration was made on behalf of the bank that the said notices are withdrawn with liberty to take recourse to further remedy available under the law and the order to that effect was passed on 24.11.2015 in the said petitions.

(i) It appears that thereafter, the impugned show cause notices were issued under Section 23 of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961 (hereafter referred to as "the Act") to the two petitioners which are the subject-matter in Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1459 of 2015 and 1460 of 2015, arising from Special Civil Application Nos. 19834 of 2015 and 19842 of 2015. In the said Special Civil Applications, the learned single Judge, vide order dated 1.12.2015 had issued notice and granted interim stay against the show cause notices.

(j) In the meantime, again notices dated 3.12.2015 came to be issued by the Registrar under Section 11 of the Act to show cause as to why the original petitioners should not be removed as member of the bank. Both the said show cause notices which were issued to original petitioners are the subject-matter of Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 1461 of 2015 and 1462 of 2015, arising from Special Civil Application Nos. 20294 of 2015 and 20295 of 2015. The learned single Judge, thereafter heard all the four petitions and ultimately, vide order dated 16.12.2015 dismissed the petitions observing, inter alia, that the impugned notices issued to the original petitioners cannot be said to be outside the jurisdiction or without jurisdiction and further it was at the stage of show cause notice and once having found that the notices could not be said to be without jurisdiction, the learned single Judge declined to entertain the petitions and ultimately dismissed the petitions. It is under these circumstances that these four Letters Patent Appeals are before the Division Bench of this Court from the common order passed by the learned single Judge.

6. We may first address ourselves on the question as to whether the impugned notices could be said to be without jurisdiction or ultra vires and beyond the scope and ambit of Sections 23 or 11 of the Act. As the notices under Section 23 for removal of the original petitioners as member of the bank were issued, at the first instance, we may consider the scope and ambit of Section 23. After having considered the scope and ambit of Section 23, we will consider the scope and ambit of Section 11.

7. Section 23 of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act reads as under:

"23. Removal from membership in certain circumstances.- (1) Where a person becomes a member of any society on his making a declaration as required by the bye-laws of the society or otherwise and such declaration is found to be false, then such person shall be disqualified to continue as a member of the society.

(2) Where a person continues as a member of the society notwithstanding the disqualification incurred by him under sub-section (3) of Section 22 or under sub-section (1), he shall be removed from the society by the Registrar:

Provided that the Registrar shall, before making an order of removal give the person an opportunity of being heard."

The aforesaid shows that where a person becomes a member of any society on making his declaration as required by the bye-laws of that society or otherwise, and such declaration is found to be false, then, such person shall be disqualified to continue as the member of the society. Sub-section (2) of Section 23 provides that where a person continues to be a member of the society notwithstanding the disqualification incurred by him, he shall be removed from the society by the Registrar. However, the Registrar, before exercise of such power has to give an opportunity of being heard to the member concerned.

8. Therefore, on plain reading of section (1) of Section 23, requirement for initiation of the action or incident of disqualification is a declaration made by any person and such declaration should be required by the bye-laws of the society or otherwise. Therefore, two aspects; (i) requirement of making declaration as per the bye-laws and (ii) the declaration having been made as required under the bye-laws. The case of the respondent authority as found in the show cause notice is that the bye-laws did not permit admission of any individual member as member of the bank, meaning thereby, the bye-laws did not provide for any requirement of declaration to be made by any person for admission as individual member since the bye-laws did not contemplate admission of any new person as individual member. When the bye-law itself did not prescribe requirement for making declaration to be made by any individual member, subsection (1) of Section 23 could not be attracted at all. If a declaration was required to be made as per the bye-laws and thereafter if the declaration is found to be false, it may attract disqualification. In the present case, as observed earlier, the bye-laws did not provide any requirement for making declaration since even as per the respondents, admission of any new individual member was prohibited by the bye-laws.

9. Even if the contention is considered for the sake of examination that in the application made before the society any incorrect or wrong information was provided, then also, such cannot be equated with the declaration as conceived and contemplated under Section 23 (1) of the Act since Section 23 (1) does not only speak for only declaration, but it further speaks for requirement of such declaration as per the bye-laws of the society or otherwise. As observed earlier, when the bye-laws did not permit admission of any individual member nor did it provide for any declaration required for any of the individual members, the question of declaration found to be false or incorrect would hardly arise because no declaration is prescribed as per the bye-laws. Learned counsel for the respondents have not been able to show any express provision made in the bye laws requiring filing of declaration for admission of any person as individual member of the bank. The only contention was that the bye-laws prohibited admission of any individual member and in spite of the same, the Board of Directors of the bank admitted the original petitioners as the members in the year 2006.

10. In view of the above, in the absence of requirement to submit a declaration as per the bye-laws of the bank, the first and foremost ingredient provided under Section 23 would be unavailable. When the bye-laws did not prescribe for any declaration to be filed, the so-called proforma of application used which was for admission of society, can hardly be pressed in service. Further, even for admission of any member of a co-operative society, the bye-laws do not provide for filing of any declaration nor it is the case of the respondents that declaration as was required for co-operative society to become a member of the bank and such was filed by the original petitioners in capacity as the individual member and the said declaration was found to be false. Under these circumstances, we find that the condition precedent for invoking exercise of power under Section 23 of the Act is not satisfied in the cases of both the petitioners. Therefore, the action can be said to be beyond the scope and ambit of Section 23 of the Act and hence, there would be lack of jurisdiction to issue show cause notice in purported exercise of power under Section 23 as sought to be canvassed. At this stage, we may refer to the decision of the learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Vikrambhai D. Patel v. A.S. Jog, District Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Mehsana & Anr, reported at 1989 (1) GLR 690 [LQ/GujHC/1989/3] and more particularly, the observations made at paragraph-6, which reads as under:-

"6. As discussed above, the District Registrar has passed order in exercise of power under sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Act on the allegation that the petitioner had made false declaration that he was permanent resident of Khorsam village. Under the bye-laws permanent residence was not necessary qualification and therefore, such declaration was not required to be made and, therefore, the respondent No. 2-Khorsam Khedut Seva Sahakari Mandali Ltd. would not have proceeded on admitting the petitioner to the membership of the said Society on the basis of such declaration. The disqualification to continue as member of the Society under sub-section (1) of Section 23 and the occasion to exercise the power of removal under sub-section (2) of Section 23 arises only in case the member has acquired the membership of the Society on his making a declaration as required by the bye-laws of the Society or otherwise and such declaration is found to be false. In view of the bye laws produced on record it was not necessary that the declaration was required to be made that the petitioner was the permanent resident of village Khorsam. No such declaration was necessary as bye-laws did not provide for permanent residence of Khorsam village, as necessary qualification for the membership of the said Society. For that reason also the power of removal cannot be exercised under sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Act by the District Registrar, Co-operative Societies."

(emphasis supplied)

11. In the aforesaid matter also, the question arose about the requirement of declaration as per the bye-laws and proceedings were initiated which were challenged before this Court and this Court found that the bye-laws did not provide for permanent residence of Khosaram village, as necessary qualification for the membership of the said society, and therefore, quashed the exercise of power. We may also refer to another decision of the learned single Judge of this Court (Jayant Patel, J.) in the case of Narendra bhai Magan bhai Patel v. District Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Vadodara, reported at 2010 (4) GLR 3092. This Court, in the said decision, after considering the scheme of Section 23 and also after referring to the above-referred earlier decision of this Court in the case of Vikram bhai D.Patel (supra), observed at paragraphs 4 to 7 as under:

"4. The aforesaid shows that if any declaration is filed by any person at the time of admission as member as per the bye-laws and such declaration is found to be false, then only such person shall be disqualified to continue as the member and in spite of such declaration, if he continues as member, the Registrar has the power for removal. At this stage, the reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in the case of Vikrambhai Dhirajbhai Patel v. A.S. Jog, District Registrar v. reported at 1989 (1) GLR 690 [LQ/GujHC/1989/3] , wherein the view taken by this Court is that it is only that the upon the contingency that the declaration as per the bye-laws having been found false, the power can be exercised.

5. If the facts of the present case are examined in light of the aforesaid legal position, it appears that the District Registrar has not exercised the power on the premise that the declaration was filed and was found to be false, but the basis of the order passed by the District Registrar is that the admission of 39 members is in contravention to the Act and the Rules. Therefore, under these circumstances, it can be said that the exercise of the power by the District Registrar under Section 23 of the Act so far as removal of 39 members are concerned was beyond the scope and ambit of power under Section 23 of the Act, therefore, rightly set aside by the Additional Registrar (Appeal) and the State Government.

6. However, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners further contended that such powers are not read with the Registrar under Section 23 of the Act in spite of the fact that those 39 members are admitted in contravention to the bye-laws, the petitioners would be left with no remedy and such members would continue to function as the member.

7. The examination of the said contention shows that it is not a case where there is no remedy. If any person is admitted as member by the Managing Committee of the Society, may be in contravention to the bye-laws or the rules, and any other members of the Society has any grievance, it will be for such aggrieved member to challenge the legality and validity of the resolution of the Society admitting the person concerned as member and it is only if such resolution is set aside, the legal consequences may follow. Such can be agitated by resorting to the remedy provided under Section 96 of the Act. At that stage, the appropriate forum may examine the legality and validity of the resolution and also the right, if any to be affected of the person concerned who is already admitted as the member and the creation of an irreversible situation, alteration of the position or otherwise. Therefore, it is not that there is no remedy under the Act, but certainly the remedy under Section 23 of Act which is invoked in the present case, could not have been resorted to."

(emphasis supplied)

12. Under the circumstances, we do not find that much discussion is required on the said aspect. Hence, we cannot accept the contention of the learned Additional Advocate General that notices cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. In view of the aforesaid observations and discussion, we find that the purported initiation for exercise of power under Section 23 of the Act is beyond the scope and ambit of Section 23 and is without jurisdiction.

13. We may now consider the other two show cause notices issued in purported exercise of power under Section 11 of the Act. Section 11 of the Act, for ready reference is quoted as under:-

"11. Power of Registrar to decide certain questions.- When any question arises whether for the purpose of formation, or registration or continuance of a society, or the admission of a person as a member of a society under this Act or a person is an agriculturist or non-agriculturist, or whether any person is a resident in a town, or village or group of villages, or whether two or more villages, shall be considered to form a group, or whether any person belongs to any particular tribe, class or occupation, the question shall be decided by the Registrar."

The aforesaid provision shows that when any question arises, whether for the purpose of formation or registration or continuance of a society or the admission of a person as a member of the society, such question can be decided by the Registrar. In the present appeals, there is no question of formation or registration or continuance of any society and therefore, we may not concentrate on the said aspect, but as the impugned show cause notices are issued in respect of admission and removal as member, the aspect of admission of any person as member of any society would be required to be considered as referred to in the language of Section 11 of the Act. From the plain and simple reading of Section 11 of the Act, it transpires that the question should arise for the purpose of admission of a person as the member of the society, it does not conceive the situation of removal as the member. Section 11 can be invoked if any dispute arises as to admission of a person as member and the condition precedent would be that he or she has not been admitted as the member and the admission is pressed in service or society is of the view that such person is not entitled to be admitted as the member of the society. It is at the entry point or admission of any person as member and the dispute arising therein, reference may be made to Registrar under Section 11 of the Act and the power may be exercised.

14. So far as the removal of any person as member is concerned, above-referred Section 23 is the express mechanism provided. However, Mr. Jani, the learned Additional Advocate General and Mr. Pahwa, learned counsel for the private respondent contended that when the question is pertaining to admission of any person as member as per the General Clauses Act, the same authority will have the power to remove a person who has already admitted such person as member and therefore, it can be said that Section 11 of the Act can be invoked in a case where a person is wrongly admitted as member and is to be removed as member.

15. The contention raised may prima facie appear to be attractive, but upon further scrutiny, it appears that Section 11 which has been provided under Chapter-II which is under the heading of Registrar and Registration, whereas so far as the rights and liabilities of the members are concerned, they are provided in Chapter-III. Section 23 is part of Chapter-III which expressly provides for mechanism of removal of any person as member by the Registrar. The other words used under Section 11 of the Act as that of formation or registration of the society shows at the threshold in respect of any society. It is true that the word is also used for continuance of a society which may be later to the formation or registration, but at the same time, it cannot be lost sight of the fact that whenever the legislature wanted Section 11 to apply even in respect of continuance of the society beyond the threshold, it has expressly used the language by inserting the words, "continuance of a society", whereas such is not provided and rather consciously omitted for continuance of any person as member after admission and the language used is only for "admission of a person as member".

16. At this stage, we may usefully refer to the decision of this Court in the case of Narendrabhai Maganbhai Patel (supra), more particularly the observation made at paragraph-7 which is already referred herein above which provides that if any member is aggrieved by any action of a society for wrong admission of any person as member of the society, he has the remedy under Section 96 of the Act. We may also refer to another decision of this Court by one of us, (Jayant Patel, J.) in the case of Shantiniketan Cop-Op. Housing Society Ltd. v. District Registrar, Co-Op. Societies & Ors, reported at 2002 (2) GLR 1768 [LQ/GujHC/2002/369] , wherein the Court had occasion to examine the question of wrong admission and removal of a person as member of the society. In the said decision, this Court, after considering the scheme of the Act at paragraph-18, observed thus:

"18. Therefore, a perusal of aforesaid relevant provisions of the Act shows that once the person is admitted as a member, his voting right can be restricted but he can be removed as a member or that he can be declared as ceased to be the member or he can be expelled as the member only if the condition precedent as provided under respective sections, i.e. sections 23, 26 or 36, as the case may be, are followed. So far as sections 23 & 26 are concerned they are not within the powers of the society, but section 36 can be resorted to by the general body of the society if the conditions precedent are satisfied. Therefore, it is clear that once a person is admitted as a member, it is not open to the society to remove such person as a member except the statute so authorises as indicated herein above or other provisions of the Act. If the law does not provide for removal or expulsion by any other mode, the society can not be permitted to create a situation which results into cessation of the rights of a member and such mode can not be permitted by challenging the status of a person subsequently on the ground of eligibility as a member once having taken decision of admitting such person as a member, more particularly, in the facts of the present case."

(emphasis supplied)

17. In view of the aforesaid when there is express provision which provides for remedy of removal by the Registrar as well as by the society as well as by any aggrieved member and further in view of the language used in Section 11 of the Act as referred to herein above, the contention raised by relying upon Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, cannot be accepted. Hence, the said contention fails.

18. In view of the aforesaid observation and discussion, we find that the action taken for removal of the original petitioners as member in purported exercise of power under Section 11 by issuance of the impugned notices, can be said to be without jurisdiction and is beyond the scope and ambit of Section 11 of the Act.

19. The aforesaid discussion leads us to record the conclusion that both the impugned notices under Section 23 of the Act as well as both the impugned notices under Section 11 of the Act are beyond the scope and ambit of the respective sections and are without any authority and jurisdiction.

20. However, Mr. P.K. Jani, learned Additional Advocate General as well as Mr. Pahwa, learned counsel appearing for the private respondent did attempt to contend that the facts are so gross that the power was exercised by the then office bearers of the society/bank in favour of the original petitioners who were their nearest relatives. It was submitted that in spite of complete prohibition for admission of new person as individual member under the bye-laws, wrong format was used by making application for admission as member and without considering the bye-laws, powers were exercised for admission and, therefore, this Court may decline the entertainment of the petitions by exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution.

21. Mr.Pahwa additionally contended that it is not satisfactorily demonstrated by the original petitioners before this Court that there is any breach of their any legal or fundamental rights, and therefore, this Court may not entertain the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution or in any case may not entrust the writ to the petitioners.

22. When any grievance or litigation is brought before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, it is true that one of the grounds for declining the entertainment of the petition would be the conduct of the petitioner concerned. But if the facts of the present case are examined, the petitioners are not the persons who are said to have committed any wrong when they were admitted as member. The power is said to have been exercised by the then office bearers of the bank. Had the action of the then office bearers of the bank not been approved by the general body of the bank, it might stand on different footing. Further, since 2006 by now about 9 years have passed and the original petitioners have continued as member of the society. In addition to the same, the purported exercise of power is beyond the scope and ambit of Sections 23 and 11 of the Act, coupled with the aspect of mala fide alleged by the original petitioners that it is on account of equal number of elected members in the other constituency than individual members constituency, the action is initiated. In any case, when action is without restriction or there is no power under the law to initiate action and if any citizen is made to face proceedings, there would be a breach of his right under the law apart from the aspect that the officer concerned has no authority under the law to initiate action. Under these circumstances, we find that when the actions are without jurisdiction and that too after a period of 9 years of membership already enjoyed by the original petitioners, it would not be a case to decline the entertainment of the petitions or decline the writ to the petitioners on the ground as sought to be canvassed on behalf of the respondents.

23. Mr. Jani, learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State and its officers did submit that all contentions raised on behalf of the State should be reflected in the order and he further narrated that the petitions are at the stage of show cause notices, and the conduct of favour shows that the then office bearers including father of the concerned original petitioner may be considered by this Court when this Court has observed that the action is initiated after 9 years. He also relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Vipulbhai Mansingbhai Chaudhari v. State of Gujarat in Letters Patent Appeal No. 1343 of 2015 decided on 2.11.2015 and the interim stay granted by the Apex Court in the proceeding of Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 32004/2015. He also relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of V.J. Patel, Chairman, v. Registrar Cooperative Societies and others, reported at 2010 (1) G.L.H. 633 and submitted that as observed by this Court in the above decision that the office bearers of the society were in fiduciary capacity and when power is exercised in breach of the trust reposed by the members, that too, for favouring close relatives like son and son of the sister, such would be a strong ground to decline the entertainment of writ in favour of the petitioners under Article 226 of the Constitution and therefore, such contention may be considered and may be dealt with by this Court.

24. It is hardly required to be stated that in the judgment, all the contentions raised by the parties need not be referred to, but the contention which the Court finds relevant for taking decision, are required to be considered. In the case of V.J. Patel (supra), it was a matter of exercise of power by the office bearers of the district level bank in the matter of recruitment of large number of public posts and the procedure to be followed. The observations extracted in the decision of V.J. Patel (supra) by the Division Bench were pertaining to disposal of property by the office bearers of the market committee and also of the society. In the present case, there is no question of any manipulation in the recruitment process where large number of posts are to be filled in nor there is any question of disposal of any property where any loss is caused to the society or the market committee. The present case is limited to the admission of individual persons as member. Such admission has taken place as back as in the year 2006, thereafter, 9 years have passed and the general body of the society which is supreme has approved the decision. At no point of time during the period of 9 years, the action is initiated by any member or any other office bearers, may be in the opposite group/party. If the history of past litigation is considered, in series of actions taken, the resulting litigations show that it is clear that there was election between two groups, may be one group might be supported by the Government officials, but that does not mean that the law is to be given a go bye. If the law made by the legislature is not authorising initiation of action, it can hardly be backed by showing the conduct as sought to be canvassed. In any case, the admission of the petitioners has continued for about 9 years. After the admission as member in the year 2006, they have participated in various elections and for the first time, action is sought to be taken. If the allegations of mala fide are considered as against the Government officials, though it is an allegation, but considered with the litigation, it can be said that it is lacking bona fide of quasi-judicial authority who is supposed to discharge the function in an independent manner and cannot be an instrument at the instance of any group though there is duty upon him to discharge the same independently. In any case, the function of the quasi-judicial authority is subject to judicial review of this Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution. Under the circumstances, we find that it is not the case where writ should be declined on the ground as sought to be canvassed by the learned Additional Advocate General. Hence, the contentions are rejected.

25. If the order of the learned single Judge is considered in the light of the observations and the conclusion recorded by us, we find that the order passed by the learned single Judge deserves to be set aside. Hence, the same is set aside. Both the impugned notices in the respective petitions issued against the original petitioners under Section 23 and Section 11 of the Act, as the case may be, are quashed and set aside. The appeals are allowed to the aforesaid extent. Considering the facts and circumstances, no order as to costs.