1. Heard Mr. Syed Imran Ibrahim, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Amit Singh Chauhan, learned AGA for the Staterespondent.
2. The present criminal appeal under Section 14A(2) of SC/ST Act, 1989, has been filed challenging the order dated 07.10.2023 passed by learned Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Mathura, in S.S.T. No.1999 of 2016 (State vs. Dinesh Kumar Agrawal), arising out of Case Crime No.374 of 2014, under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC and Sections 3(1)IX SC/ST Act, Police Station-Highway, DistrictMathura.
3. Brief facts of the case; that an FIR has been lodged through an application u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. by Dwarika Prasad S/o Bhoop Singh against the appellant with the allegations that Bhoop Singh was owner of Khasra No.97, Gata No.67, situated at Village-Nawada, DistrictMathura along with Kishan Singh and Dwarika Prasad. The eyes of the appellant was on this property and he wanted to purchase the same in less value, for which he pressurized Bhoop Singh father of the informant. He also used caste indicative words in order to take the property in question. When Bhoop Singh was alive, partition of the property was done and as per the mutual consent between the family members of the Bhoop Singh, the property was divided amongst Dwarika Prasad his brother and mother and application in this regard was given, on which, order dated 14.07.2008 was passed by SDM making partition of the property in accordance with the settlement between the parties. An application was given by Bhoop Singh for declaring the land as Abadi, on which order dated 02.05.2001 was passed by the SDM. In the records of the aforesaid case, an application as well as affidavit having signatures of Bhoop Singh were found. The signatures in the aforesaid application were sent for being verified with the signatures as made by Bhoop Singh in the proceedings for cancellation of Mukhtarnama, which were found in the records in the office of the registry, Mathura.
4. The signatures of Bhoop Singh as accepted to be made in the proceedings for cancellation of power of attorney, did not tally with that of the application as well as affidavit moved for declaration of Abadi. Thus, alleging that the appellant has conspired to forged signatures of Bhoop Singh in the application and affidavit. Thus, the allegations in the FIR in short was that the application and affidavit alleged to be given by Bhoop Singh wherein order dated 02.05.2001 was passed by SDM, was not at all moved by him and the application and affidavit so placed before the S.D.M. were having forged signatures of Bhoop Singh.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that present criminal proceedings initiated against the appellant are an after thought, as such the same is not only malicious but also amount to abuse of process of Court. He further submits that the concerned Court below has rejected the discharge application of the applicant without assigning any reason, therefore, the impugned order dated 07.10.2023 passed by the concerned Court below is illegal and the same is liable to be quashed.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed the brief facts of the case which are as follows:-
(i) The First Information Report has been lodged on 27.04.2014 at 12:10 PM by Dwarika Prasad s/o Late Bhoop Singh against the appellant Dinesh Kumar Agarwal with the allegations that father of the first informant, namely, Bhoop Singh was in possession of land of Khasra No.97, Khata No.67 situated in village Nawada DistrictMathura along with his co-sharer, namely, Kishan Singh and Dwarika Prasad. When Bhoop Singh expired on 30.12.2010, the first informant became the owner of the property by law of succession along with his brother Mahesh Chandra, Vijendra Singh and mother Ram Kumari.
(ii) It has further alleged that on 14.07.2008 when father of the first informant was alive, a partition suit u/s 176 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act was decreed in favour of Bhoop Singh, as a consequence of which partition of the property was allowed. A restoration application was filed by the appellant against the order dated 14.07.2008, on 29.08.2013, in which he has stated that he had filed an application u/s 143 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act (in short ‘of the Act’) and has got the property declared as Abadi as such the jurisdiction of the Court under U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act does not lie. It has been categorically alleged by the first informant in the first information report that the application u/ s 143 of the Act which was the basis of the restoration application is a forged document as his father had never submitted any application to get the land declared as Abadi. As such the appellant has filed a forged and fabricated application, on the basis of which the order dated 14.07.2008 was being sought to be restored. On the said forged application, the order dated 02.05.2001 was passed by S.D.M. The signatures of Bhoop Singh were sent for examination by Private Forensic Science Laboratory expert, namely, Ms. Shruti Agarwal to be examined comparing the same with the signatures of the appellant made in an application for cancellation of power of attorney as available in the Registry office. It has been alleged that the report as placed by Ms. Shruti Agarwal proved that the signatures were not of Bhoop Singh, thus, the present FIR was lodged.
(iii) The investigation was conducted in different police stations of different districts and finally charge sheet was submitted by Investigating Officer of Police Station- Highway, District- Mathura.
(iv) While conducting the investigation, the Investigating Officer tried to get copy of original document for getting the signatures of Bhoop Singh examined by Government Forensic Science Laboratory and went to the extent for sending notices under Section 160 Cr.P.C. requesting the appellant to provide original documents at the earliest. Thus, without getting the original documents, the Investigating Officer solely relying upon the alleged Forensic Report of Ms. Shruti Agarwal (Private Forensic Expert) as supplied by the first informant himself, has submitted the charge sheet against the appellant on 09.07.2015 on which the Court below took cognizance on 08.10.2015 and summon the appellant to face the trial.
7. On an application moved by the appellant before the Investigating Officer requesting to conduct further investigation after getting the signatures of Bhoop Singh verified by Government Forensic Laboratory and the SSP, Mathura, directed for further investigation by order dated 09.04.2016. The aforesaid fact is evident from Parcha No.7 placed at Page-98 of the affidavit.
8. The discharge application was filed by the appellant on 24.08.2023 on the following grounds:-
(i) That the original document containing the handwriting of Bhoop Singh was never examined and solely relying upon the report of Private Forensic Expert, the charge sheet has been submitted.
(ii) That the supplementary charge sheet was submitted after order of further investigation by the SSP, Mathura, which has not been taken into consideration while taking cognizance.
(iii) The FIR is a counterblast to the case filed by the company of the appellant.
(iv) Despite the pendency of matters before Civil Court, the FIR has been lodged to give a criminal color to the civil proceedings, which has been ignored by the concerned Court while taking cognizance.
(v) The forensic handwriting report from private person cannot be taken as an authentic document relying upon which charge sheet has been submitted.
(vi) The report of handwriting expert is based on photo-copy of the documents, hence, the same is not valid.
9. The discharge application was rejected by order dated 07.10.2023 in an illegal manner, without application of judicial mind, ignoring two aspects, (i) that the charge sheet has been submitted on the basis of defective investigation as the report of Private Forensic Expert based on photo-copy of the documents has been taken into consideration, (ii) there being two reports on record, and supplementary report has not been taken into consideration, hence, the same is liable to be quashed.
10. Learned counsel for the appellant relying upon the judgements of High Courts passed in cases of Bheri Nageswara Rao vs. Mavuri Veerbhadra Rao & Ors., 2006 SCC Online AP 330 and Abhay Jain and Others vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another, 2018 SCC Online MP 1839, submits that law is clear that the opinion of handwriting expert is relevant but not conclusive. It is a fragile type of evidence and it is only corroborative evidence. It’s probative value is that only on the basis of expert opinion no conclusion can be drawn if there is no other supportive evidence. It is to be accepted with good amount of circumspection. Thus, without analyzing that the expert report was not based on verification from original documents, the charge sheet has been submitted and Court concerned has ignored the aforesaid fact.
11. After further investigation, supplementary report was not taken into consideration, hence, the impugned order rejecting the discharge application without considering the aforesaid is bad in the eyes of law. It is settled position that when there are two reports, both have to be read conjointly and it is cumulative efforts of the reports and documents annexed thereto which the Court is expected to apply its mind to determine whether there exist ground to presume that the appellant has committed offence or not. Hence, after considering both the reports, the Court shall decide the discharge application of the alleged accused in compliance of the provision of Section 227 of Cr.P.C. In support of his submission he has relied upon the judgement of Apex Court passed in case of Vinay Tyagi vs. Irshad Ali Alias Deepak And Others, (2013) 5 SCC 762.
12. Per contra learned AGA has opposed the contention raised by learned counsel for the appellant by submitting that in the impugned order itself it has been mentioned that documents placed with the discharge application are to be seen at the time of evidence. From perusal of the records, prima facie it cannot be said that at this stage no offence has been committed by the appellant.
13. Before appreciating the contentions as raised by learned counsel for the parties, it will be appropriate to refer the position of law with respect to the scope of exercise of power under Section 227 of Cr.P.C.:-
“227. Discharge.—If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing.”
14. From bare reading of Section 227 of Cr.P.C., the meaning of the expression “the record of the case and documents submitted therewith” is clear and there cannot be any doubt with respect to the position that at the stage of consideration of such an application for discharge, defence case or material, if produced at all by the accused, cannot be looked at all. Once “the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith” are before the Court they alone can be looked into for considering the application for discharge and thereafter if it considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused concerned then he shall be discharged after recording reasons therefor. The aforesaid has been held in the case of State of Orissa vs. Debendra Nath Padhi, 2005 (1) SCC 568.
15. The words “not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused” appearing in Section 227, Cr.PC, postulate exercise of judicial mind on the part of the Judge to the facts of the case revealed from the materials brought on record by the prosecution in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out. Thus, at the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the Court has to proceed with an assumption that the materials brought on record by the prosecution are true, and evaluate the materials to find out whether the facts taken at their face value disclose the existence of the ingredients constituting the offence. At this stage, only the probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter to hold a mini-trial.
16. The Apex Court in the case of BK Sharma v. State of UP, 1987 SCC Online ALD 314, has held that the standard of test and judgement which is finally applied before recording a finding of conviction against an accused is not to be applied at the stage of framing the charge. It is just a very strong suspicion, based on the material on record, and would be sufficient to frame a charge.
17. Thus, in the opinion of this Court, strong suspicion, in order to be sufficient to frame a charge should be based on the material brought on record by the prosecution and should not be based on supposition, suspicions and conjectures.
18. In P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala and Anr., after extracting Section 227, Cr.PC, the Court in paragraph No.10 and 11 held thus: -
“10. If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal. Further, the words “not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused” clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts.
11. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. In other words, the sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him.”
19. In paragraph 13 in P. Vijayan’s case (supra), this Court took note of the principles enunciated earlier by this Court in Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal which reads thus: -
“10.…
(1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out.
(2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.
(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused.
(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.”
20. From the aforesaid decisions, it is, thus, obvious that it will be within the jurisdiction of the Court concerned to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused concerned has been made out.
21. Be that as it may, though it is permissible to sift and weigh the materials for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case is made out against the accused, on appreciation of the admissibility and the evidentiary value such materials brought on record by the prosecution is impermissible as it would amount to denial of opportunity to the prosecution to prove them appropriately at the appropriate stage besides amounting to exercise of the power coupled with obligation under Section 232, Cr.PC, available only after taking the evidence for the prosecution and examining the accused.
22. It can be said in that view of the matter that the intention embedded is to ensure that an accused will be made to stand the ordeal of trial only if ‘the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith’ discloses ground for proceeding against him. When that be so, in a case where an application is filed for discharge under Section 227, Cr.PC, it is an irrecusable duty and obligation of the Court to apply its mind and answer to it regarding the existence or otherwise, of ground for proceeding against the accused, by confining such consideration based only on the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. To wit, such conclusion on existence or otherwise of ground to proceed against the accused concerned should not be and could not be based on mere suppositions or suspicions or conjectures, especially not founded upon material available before the Court.
23. In case of Ram Prakash Chadha (supra), the Apex Court has held that while considering the discharge application, it is just a very strong suspicion, based on the material on record and it is sufficient to frame a charge.
24. As regards the submission of learned counsel for the applicant regarding non consideration of supplementary report dated 25.05.2016, Parcha No.7, annexed as Annexure-13, while passing the order impugned, this Court finds that nothing has been placed on record to show that the aforesaid supplementary charge sheet dated 25.05.2016 was placed before the concerned Court nor any such specific ground has been taken in the discharge application.
25. Perusal of the discharge application goes to show that all the grounds as taken by learned counsel for the applicant have been dealt with by the concerned Court while rejecting the same, thus, there is no illegality in the order impugned.
26. Be that as it may, all the grounds as taken in the discharge application can be examined at any/appropriate stage of trial and this Court while exercising inherent powers cannot go to conduct mini trial.
27. The second supplementary report dated 25.05.2016 is of no relevance and this Court is of the opinion that, even if it is presumed that supplementary report dated 25.05.2016 has not been considered by the concerned Court while rejecting the discharge application, there can be no illegality in the order as the second supplementary report has been submitted by the Investigating Officer on the basis of signature being verified by photocopy of the documents, which has been the position in the first report as placed before the Court. In other words, the second report is of no value when the same has been prepared after verification from photocopy of the documents as is the case wherein first signature verification report has been placed on the basis of photocopy of the documents.
28. Even otherwise, learned counsel for the applicant has not been able to make out the case as to what was the illegality in the first report except the fact that it is by a Private Forensic Laboratory (which as per record is recognized by the Government), when the same has been placed by verifying from photocopy of the documents as is the position of the second report. Thus, in such circumstances which report has to be relied upon and how the same is going to effect the applicant is subject matter to be considered and examined at appropriate stage.
29. To sum up, reliability is to be placed on first report, which has been first forensic verification report as the second one has not been placed before the concerned Court and is also based on verification from photocopy of the documents and has not been verified by the original signatures or documents.
30. The Court in the case of Sheoroj Singh Ahlawat vs. State of U.P., 2013 (11) SCC 476, has held that if two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused irrespective of result of the trial. It has been further held that at the time of framing of charge the Court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record to decide whether there is a ground for presuming that the accused had committed the offence. There is no need to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence to convict the accused. Materials brought on record by the prosecution can be believed to be true, but their probative value cannot be decided at that stage. The accused is entitled to urge his contentions while entertaining the discharge application only on the material submitted by the prosecution, but he is not entitled to produce any material at that stage and the court is not required to consider any such material.
31. In the present case, both the signature verification reports are based on photocopy of the documents, thus, there is no chance of any suspicion and as to which report has to be considered, is to be seen at the time of trial at the appropriate stage when the aforesaid report is placed before the trial Court.
32. In the present facts of the case, the Court has applied its mind and on the basis of necessary material collected during the course of investigation and as placed before the Court concerned, has proceeded to pass the order impugned, hence, there is no illegality in the aforesaid.
33. Before proceeding to adjudge the validity of the impugned order, in opinion of this Court, it would be useful to cast a fleeting glance to some of the representative cases decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court which have expatiated upon the legal approach to be adopted at the time of framing of the charge or at the time of deciding whether the accused ought to be discharged. It shall be advantageous to refer to the observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar vs. Ramesh Singh 1977 (4) SCC 39 which are as follows :-
"4. Under S. 226 of the Code while opening the case for the prosecution the prosecutor has got to describe the charge against the accused and State by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Thereafter, comes at the initial stage, the duty of the Court to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and to hear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either u/s. 227 or u/s. 228 of the Code. If "the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing", so enjoined by s. 227. If, on the other hand, "the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which ................................…
(b) in exclusively triable by the court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused," as provided in S. 228.
Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at this stage of deciding the matter under s. 227 and 228 of the Code. At that stage the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under S. 227 or S. 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under S. 228 and not under S. 227."
34. Aforesaid case was again referred to in another Apex Court's decision Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal Versus Anil Kumar Bhunja AIR 1980 (SC) 52 and the Apex Court proceeded to observe as follows:-
"18. It may be remembered that the case was at the stage of framing charges; the prosecution evidence had not yet commenced. The Magistrate had, therefore, to consider the above question on a general consideration of the materials placed before him by the investigating police officer. At this stage, as was pointed out by this Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, AIR 1977 SC 2018, the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. The standard of test, proof and judgment which is to be applied finally before finding the accused guilty or otherwise, is not exactly to be applied at the stage of Section 227 or 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. At this stage, even a very strong suspicion founded upon materials before the Magistrate, which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged; may justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence."
35. In yet another case of Palwinder Singh Vs. Balvinder Singh reported in AIR 2009 SC 887, the Apex Court had the occasion to reflect upon the scope of adjudication and its ambit at the time of framing of the charge and also about the scope to consider the material produced by the accused at that stage. Following extract may be profitably quoted to clarify the situation:-
"12. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the High Court committed a serious error in passing the impugned judgment insofar as it entered into the realm of appreciation of evidence at the stage of the framing of the charges itself. The jurisdiction of the learned Sessions Judge while exercising power under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is limited. Charges can be framed also on the basis of strong suspicion. Marshalling and appreciation of evidence is not in the domain of the Court at that point of time. This aspect of the matter has been considered by this Court in state of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005) 1 SCC 568 wherein it was held as under :
"23. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, in our view, clearly the law is that at the time of framing charge or taking cognizance the accused has no right to produce any material. Satish Mehra's Case holding that the trial Court has powers to consider even materials which the accused may produce at the stage of Section 227 of the Code has not been correctly decided."
36. The following observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sanghi Brothers (Indore) Pvt. Ltd. v. Sanjay Choudhary reported in AIR (2009) SC 9 also reiterated the same position of law :-
"10. After analyzing the terminology used in the three pairs of sections it was held that despite the differences there is no scope for doubt that at the stage at which the Court is required to consider the question of framing of charge, the test of a prima facie case to be applied.
11. The present case is not one where the High Court ought to have interfered with the order of framing the charge. As rightly submitted by learned counsel for the appellant, even if there is a strong suspicion about the commission of offence and the involvement of the accused, it is sufficient for the Court to frame a charge. At that stage, there is no necessity of formulating the opinion about the prospect of conviction. That being so, the impugned order of the High Court cannot be sustained and is set aside. The appeal is allowed."
37. Lastly, at the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the Court has a very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider “whether any sufficient materials is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not”.
38. In any case, at this stage, what is required to be considered is a prima facie case and the material collected during the course of the investigation, which warranted the accused to be tried. The same has been held in the case of CBI v. Aryan Singh etc., 2023 SCC Online SC 379. It has also been held in the aforesaid case that as per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Sections 482 Cr.P.C., the Court is not required to conduct the mini trial.
39. In fact, while exercising the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or while wielding the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the quashing of the complaint or charge sheet can be done only if it does not disclose any offence or if there is any legal bar which prohibits the proceedings on its basis. The Apex Court decisions in R.P. Kapur Vs. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 and State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal 1992 SCC(Cr.) 426 make the position of law in this regard clear recognizing certain categories by way of illustration which may justify the quashing of a complaint or charge sheet.
40. The submissions made by the learned counsel for the applicants counsel call for adjudication on pure questions of fact which may be adequately adjudicated upon only by the trial court and while doing so even the submissions made on points of law can also be more appropriately gone into by the trial court in this case. This Court does not deem it proper, and therefore cannot be persuaded to have a pretrial before the actual trial begins. A threadbare discussion of various facts and circumstances, as they emerge from the allegations made against the accused, is being purposely avoided by the Court for the reason, lest the same might cause any prejudice to either side during trial. But it shall suffice to observe that the perusal of the F.I.R. and the material collected by the Investigating Officer on the basis of which the charge sheet has been submitted makes out a prima facie case against the accused at this stage and this Court does not find any justifiable ground to set aside the impugned order refusing the discharge of the accused. This court has not been able to persuade itself to hold that no case against the accused has been made out or to hold that the charge is groundless.
41. The prayer for quashing or setting aside the impugned order dated 07.10.2023 is refused as I do not see any illegality, impropriety and incorrectness in the impugned order or the proceedings under challenge. There is absolutely no abuse of process of the Court perceptible in the same. The present matter also does not fall in any of the categories recognized by the Supreme Court which might justify interference of this Court in order to upset or quash them.
42. With the above observations, this application is rejected.
