J.S. VERMA, A.C.J.

(1.) The challenge made in this petition is to the constitutional validity of S. 170-A and S. I70-B of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Code) as well as the notification No. F-16-1-81-II-XXV, dated 15th April 1981 (Annexure-A) issued by the Governor of Madhya Pradesh in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-para (1) of para 5 of the Fifth Sch. to the Constitution of India. This order shall also dispose of the entire batch of petitions in which the validity of these provisions has been challenged on account of which all these petitions were heard together.

(2.) The history of legislation together with the relevant provisions may be stated at the outset. The M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, came into force with effect from 2-10-1959. Section 165 relates to rights of transfer and in sub-sec. (1) it says that a Bhumiswami may transfer any interest in his land subject to the other provisions of this section and the provisions of S. 168. Section 168 deals with leases and restricts the grant of lease by a Bhumiswami beyond the period specified except by a Bhumiswami belonging to one of the specified categories, for example, a widow, a minor etc., in whose case cultivation of the land directly is considered impracticable. Section 169 provides for the effect of an unauthorised lease resulting in accrual of rights of an occupancy tenant on the lessee giving rise to the further consequences mentioned in Ss. 189 and 190 of the Code. i.e. conferral of Bhumiswami rights on an occupancy tenant in the circumstances mentioned therein. Sub-sec. (6) of S. 165, as originally enacted, prohibited transfer of the right of a Bhumiswami belonging to a tribe which had been declared to be an aboriginal tribe by the State Government by notification in that behalf to a person not belonging to such tribe without the permission of a revenue officer not below the rank of a Collector given for reasons to be recorded in writing. As a consequence thereof, S. 170 was enacted for avoidance of transfers in contravention of S. 165. As originally enacted, S, 170 provided for recovery of possession of the holding by any person who if he survived the Bhumiswami without nearer heirs would inherit the holding by an application to the Sub-Divisional Officer within two years of such transfer made in contravention of sub-sec. (6) of S. 165. These provisions in the Code prohibited transfer by such a Bhumiswami of his rights in the land to a non-tribal without the written permission of the Collector and also provided for avoidance of a transfer in contravention of this provision in the manner indicated. It is also significant that sub-sec. (6) of S. 165, as originally enacted, dealt with the right of a Bhumiswami in the land which meant any right in the immovable property.

(3.) By M. P. Act No. 37 of 1973 the original sub-sec. (7) of S. 165 was amended. The original sub-sec, (7) laid down that only that part of a holding of Bhumiswami shall be liable to attachment or sale in execution of any decree or order which was in excess of five acres of irrigated or ten acres of unirrigated land. By this amendment made in 1973, it was also provided that no land comprised in a holding of a Bhumiswami belonging to such an aboriginal tribe shall be liable to be attached or sold in execution of a decree or order.

(4.) The next significant amendments made in the Code were by M. P. Act. No, 61of 1976 with effect from 29-11-1976. By this amendment, sub-sec. (6) of S. 165, S. 169 and S.170 were amended and S. 170-A and S. 257A were inserted in the Code. Briefly stated, the amended sub-sec. (6) of S. 165 laid down that in areas predominantly inhabitated by aboriginal tribes, transfer of land by sale or otherwise by a tribal could not be made to a non-tribal and in the remaining areas the land by a tribal could not be transferred by way of sale or otherwise without the permission in writing of a revenue officer not below the rank of Collector given for reasons to be recorded in writing. An Explanation was added to this sub-section to say that the expression "otherwise" shall not include lease to indicate thai leases were not covered by the amended section. Section 169 was also amended to provide that the provisions in the Code laying down the consequences of unauthorised lease resulting in conferral of rights of an occupancy tenant and then a Bhumiswami on the lessee were not to apply to a Sand comprised in the holding of a Bhumiswami belonging to a tribe which had been declared to be an aboriginal tribe under sub-sec. (6) of S. 165. Section 170 relating to avoidance of transfer in contravention of S. 165(6) was also amended to enable recovery of possession in such a case within the prescribed period so as to cover all such transfers made from the time of enforcement of the Code. Section 170-A and S.257-A inserted in the Code are as under :

"170-A, Certain transfer to be set aside. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Limitation Act, 1963 (No. 36 of 5963), the Sub-Divisional Officer may, on his own motion or on an application made by a transferor of agricultural land belonging to a tribe which has been declared to be an aboriginal tribe under sub-sec. (6) of S. 165 on or before the 31st Dec. 1978, enquire into a transfer effected by way of sale, or in pursuance of a decree of a Court of such land to a person not belonging to such tribe or transfer effected by way of accrual of right of occupancy tenant under S. 169 or of Bhumiswami under sub-sec.(2-A) of S. 190 at any time during the period commencing on the 2nd Oct. 1959 and ending on the date of commencement of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code (Third Amendment) Act, 1976 or satisfy himself as to the bona fide nature of such transfer. (2) If the Sub-Divisional Officer on an enquiry and after giving a reasonable opportunity to the persons owning any interest in such land, is satisfied that such transfer was not bona fide, he may notwithstanding anything contained in this Code or any other enactment for the time being in force,- (a) subject to the provisions of Cl.(b), set aside such transfer if made by a holder belonging to a tribe which has been declared to be an aboriginal tribe under sub-sec. (6) of S. 165 and restore the land to the transferor; or (b) where such land has been diverted for non-agricultural purposes, he shall fix the price of such land which it would have fetched at the time of transfer and order the transferee to pay the difference, if any, between the price so fixed and the price actually paid to the transferor within a period of six months."

"257-A. Burden of proof and bar of legal practitioners in certain proceedings.- (1) In any proceedings under sub-sec. (6) of S. 165 or under the proviso to S. 169 or under sub-sec. (1) of S. 170 or under S. 170-A or under S. 250 in which one of the parties is a Bhumiswami belonging to a tribe which has been declared to be an aboriginal tribe under sub-sec. (6) of S. 165, the burden of proving the validity of transfer thereunder shall. notwithstanding anything contained in this Code or in any other law for the time being in force, lie on the person who claims such transfer to be valid. (2) No legal practitioner shall appear, plead or act on behalf of any party in any proceedings specified in sub-sec. (1) in which one of the parties is a Bhurniswami belonging to a tribe which has been declared to be an aboriginal tribe under sub-sec. (6) of S. 165 except with the written permission of the Revenue Officer/Court before whom the case is pending."

(5.) The next significant amendment in the Code was made by M. P. Act No. 15 of 1980 with effect from 24-10-1980 which inserted S. 170-B, which reads as under: -

"170-B. Reversion of land of member of aboriginal tribe which was transferred by fraud.-(1) Every person who on the date of commencement of the Madhya Pradesh Land. Revenue Code (Amendment) Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the Amendment Act of 1980) is in possession of agricultural land which belonged to a member of a tribe which has been declared to be an aboriginal tribe under sub-sec. (6) of S. 165 between the period commencing on the 2nd Oct. 1959 and ending on the date of the commencement of Amendment Act of 1980 shall, within one year of such commencement, notify to the Sub-Divisional Officer in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed, all the information as to how he has come in possession of such land: (2) If any person fails to notify the information as required by sub-sec. (1) within the period specified therein it shall be presumed that such person has been in possession of the agricultural land without a ny lawful authority and the agricultural land shall, on the expiration of the period aforesaid, revert to the person to whom it originally belonged and if that person be dead, to his legal heirs: (3) On receipt of the information under sub-sec. (1), the Sub-Divisional Officer shall make such enquiry as may be deemed necessary about all such transactions of transfer and if he finds that the member of aboriginal tribe has been defrauded of his legitimate right he shall declare the transaction null and void and pass an order revesting the agricultural land in the transferor and, if he be dead, in his legal heirs."

It may here be mentioned that the period of one year prescribed in S. 170-B was increased by Ordinance No. 12 of 1981 to one and a half years and then to two years by M.P. Act No. 19 of 1982 which was brought into force retrospectively with effect from 23-10-1981 i.e. before the expiry of the period of one year from the date of enforcement of M. P. Act No. 15 of 1980 which inserted S. 170-B. The result, therefore, is that the limitation of one year provided originally in S. 170-B has to be read as two years at all relevant times. Another significant provision made by M. P. Act No. 19 of 1982 was contained in S. 3 thereof as under: - "3. Removal of difficulties.-(1) It is hereby declared that the consequences ensuing under sub-sec. (2) of S. 170-B of the Principal Act shall, in respect of any person who failed to notify information as required by sub-sec. (1) of the aforesaid section within the period specified therein, be and shall always be deemed never to have ensued, and the agricultural land never to have reverted to the person to whom it originally belonged and accordingly the position of agricultural land as on the date immediately preceding the 23rd Oct. 1981 shall stand restored for all purposes. (2) If any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of this section, the State Government may, by order, do anything not inconsistent with the provisions of the Principal Act, for the purpose of removing the difficulty: Provided that no such order shall be made after the expiration of one year from the date of commencement of this Act. (3) An order issued under sub-sec. (2) shall be laid on table of the Legislative Assembly.

(6.) The above legislative history shows the manner in which the impugned provisions contained in Ss. 170-A and 170-B of the Code came into existence. Before dealing with the impugned provisions and the arguments on which the challenge to the constitutional validity is based reference may also be made to the impugned notification dt. 15-4-1981 and the subsequent notifications issued by the Governor in exercise of the power conferred in para 5(1) of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution.

(7.) By notification No. P-16-1-81-II-XXV, dt. 15th April 1981, the Governor of Madhya Pradesh, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-para (1) of para 5 of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution directed that the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 shall apply to Scheduled Areas in the State subject to the exceptions and modifications specified therein. These exceptions and modifications were made by inserting sub-secs. (6-a) to (6-f) after sub-sec. (6) of S. 165. These provisions related to transfers made by non-triabals and not by tribals with which we are concerned. Another notification No. F. No. 1-70-VII-N-2-83, dt. 5-1-1984 was issued by the Governor of Madhya Pradesh in exercise of the same powers by which sub-sec. (3) of S. 57 was inserted. Cl. (a) of sub-sec. (2) of S. 170-A was amended and sub-sec. (3) of S. 170-B was substituted in addition to inserting S. 170-C and S. 170-D and making some other modifications. Thereafter another notification No. 37-4-VII-M-II-84, dt. 4-6-1984, was issued making further amendments as a result of which agricultural lands were excluded from the applicability of the amendments made by these notifications. The cumulative effect of these notifications, therefore, is that the amendments made thereby do not apply to transfer of agricultural lands by a Bhumiswami belonging to a tribe, which has been declared to be an aboriginal tribe under sub-sec. (6) of S. 165 of the Code. Since we are concerned in these petitions only with transfer of agricultural lands by Bhumiswamis belonging to tribes, which have been declared to be aboriginal tribes under sub-sec. (6) of S. 165 of the Code, the effect of these notifications is no longer of any consequence for our purpose. For this reason, no further reference to these notifications is necessary and it is only the constitutional validity of Ss. 170-A and 170-B which requires consideration.

(8.) Challenge to the validity of S. 170-A was rejected by a Division Bench in 1981 RN 382 (Gandibai v. Chief Secretary, Govt. of M.P.) In respect of this provision, the question is whether a case has been made out to doubt the correctness of that decision. However, there is no earlier decision in which the question of validity of S. 170-B has been considered and, therefore, that question has to be examined for the first time.

(9.) The constitutional validity of S. 17OA and S. 170-B is challenged on the ground of violation of Arts. 14, 19(1)(f) and (g), 31 and 300A. An attempt was also made to assail sub-sec. (2) of S. 170-B on the ground that it violates Art. 21 as it results in deprivation of means of livelihood without any enquiry. It was also contended that S. 170-B is repugnant to the Limitation Act, the Transfer of Property Act and the Contract Act and, therefore, to the extent of repugnancy, it is void by virtue of Art. 254 of the Constitution since the assent of the President was not obtained while enacting S. 170-B. Several arguments were also advanced relating to the construction of these provisions. The main thrust of the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners was against sub-sec. (2) of S. 170-B even though the validity of the entire Ss. 170-A and 170-B has been challenged.

(10.) The history of legislation resulting in enactment of the impugned provision has already been given. It clearly indicates that the impugned provisions formed a part of the scheme enacted to implement the principles of distributive justice by avoidance of illegal transactions of transfers of agricultural land by members of the aboriginal tribes who were unequals with the non-tribals in these transactions; and the legislation is also in implementation of the directive principle contained in Art. 46 of the Constitution, which enjoins the State to protect the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes from all social injustice and from all forms of exploitation. No doubt, Art. 31-B of the Constitution is not available to prevent the challenge since the impugned provisions were enacted after inclusion of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 in the Ninth Schedule and Art. 31-C also is not relied on by the learned Additional Advocate General and, therefore, the question of validity of the impugned provisions has to be examined without the benefit of the protection contained in Arts. 31-B and 31-C. However, we have formed the opinion that the challenge to the constitutional validity of the impugned provisions must be rejected even without the aid of Arts. 31-B and 31-C since no case of violation of any of the constitutional rights relied on by the petitioner has been made out. In our opinion, decision of the Supreme Court in Lingappa Pochanna v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1985 SC 389 [LQ/SC/1984/326] following its earlier decision in Manchegowda v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1984 SC 1151 [LQ/SC/1984/109] is alone sufficient to repel all these arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners.

(11.) The substance of the meaning of Ss. 170-A and 170-B may be mentioned at this stage. Sub-sec. (1) of S. 170-A Says down that the Sub-Divisional Officer, on his own motion or on an application on or before 31st Dec. 1978 made by a transferor of agricultural land belonging to a tribal, shall enquire into the bona fide nature of such transfer effected in any manner including accrual of right of occupancy tenant at any time, during the period commencing on the 2nd Oct. 1959 and ending on the date on which the 1976 Amendment came into force. Sub-sec. (2) then lays down that if the Sub-Divisional Officer is satisfied as a result of an enquiry that such transfer was not bona fide, he may notwithstanding anything contained in this Code or any other enactment set aside such transfer and restore the land to the transferor; or where such land has been diverted for non-agricultural purposes, he shall fix the price of such land and direct payment of the deficiency in the amount to be paid to the transferor within a period of six months. In short, S. 170A was enacted to enabl e the Sub-Divisional Officer to enquire into the bona fide nature of all transfers made of agricultural land belonging to a tribal during the period commencing on 2nd Oct. 1959 when the Code came into force and ending on the date on which the amendment of 1976 came into force, on his own motion or on an application made by the transferor up to 31st Dec. 1978.

(12.) Section 170-B was inserted later for the same purpose with a view to cover the remaining transfers of agricultural land belonging to tribals under which they had been exploited resulting from their unequal bargaining capacity at the time of the transaction. By enacting S. 170-B, a duty was cast on every person in possession of agricultural land, which belonged to a tribal at any time between 2nd Oct. 1959 and the date of commencement of the amendment Act of 1980 to notify the Sub-Divisional Officer within the period specified in the prescribed manner all the information as to how he had come in possession of such land. Obviously, the provisions enacted in S. 17OA for initiation of the proceedings was not found sufficient and. therefore, such a provision became necessary to ensure that every such transaction of transfer of land belonging to a tribal at any time after 2nd Oct. 1959 when the M. P. Land Revenue Code. 1959 came into force was brought to the notice of the Sub-Divisional Officer to enable examination of its validity on the basis of information supplied by the person in possession. Sub-sec. (3) provides that on the receipt of such information, the Sub-Divisional Officer shall make such enquiry as may be deemed necessary about all such transactions of transfer and if he finds that the tribal transferor has been defrauded, the transaction shall be declared null and void and an order would be made revesting the agricultural land in the tribal transferor or his legal heirs, as the case may be. The order contemplated by sub-sec. (3) is to be passed only as a consequence of a finding reached after due enquiry that in the transaction of transfer, the tribal transferor had been defrauded of his legitimate right. Unless such a conclusion is reached, no question arises of declaring the transaction null and void and passing an order revesting the agricultural land in the tribal transferor or his legal heirs.

(13.) Sub-sec. (2) of S. 170-B merely lays down a rule of evidence. It says that where the person in possession fails to notify the information, as required by sub-sec. (1) within the specified period, it shall be presumed that such person has been in possession of the agricultural land without any lawful authority and the land shall revert to the transferor or his legal heirs, as the case may be. Obviously, the presumption arising by virtue of sub-sec. (2) is based on the ground that if the person in possession has nothing to say nor show that his possession is under any lawful right and that the same is not derived as a result of a transaction defrauding the tribal transferor, the logical consequence must follow to presume that the transfer was void. The rule of evidence contained in sub-sec. (2) providing for such a presumption obviously dispenses with any further enquiry in such a case and the final order contemplated by sub-sec. (3) is required to be made taking into account this presumption arising under sub-sec. (2).

(14.) It is obvious that in all cases including those in which a presumption arises under sub-sec. (2), a final order contemplated by sub-sec. (3) has to be made and it is only the making of such an order which results in the declaration that the transaction is null and void and the agricultural land revests in the transferor or his legal heirs. Unless such an order is made even in cases in which the presumption under sub-sec. (2) arises, there, would be no order for implementation to bring about the desired result. The contention on behalf of the petitioners that no order is contemplated in a case covered by sub-sec. (2), has no merit and the further argument, based thereon does not, therefore, require any consideration.

(15.) It may also be mentioned that the learned Additional Advocate General and the learned Deputy Advocate General who appeared on behalf of the State fairly stated that this was the construction to be made of S. 170-B and they also informed us that in respect of each such transaction, a separate case has been registered by the Sub-Divisional Officer irrespective of the fact whether the person in possessi on has notified the information as required by sub-sec. (1) or not and a final order as contemplated by sub-sec. (3), is to be made in each case. The apprehension of the petitioners that in cases covered by sub-sec. (2), no order is required to be passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer is not justified either on the meaning of the provision or even on the actual practice adopted in disposal of such matters.

(16.) The challenge to validity of S. 170-A and S. 257-A of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 inserted therein by M. P. Act No. 61 of 1976 based on Art. 14 of the Constitution was rejected by a Division Bench of this Court in Gandibai v. Chief Secretary, Govt, of M. P., (1981 RN 382) (supra). We do not find any additional ground made out to doubt the correctness of that decision or to take a different view about validity of S. 170A,

(17.) The argument based on Art. 19(1)(f), Art. 31 or Art. 300 of the Constitution proceed on the fallacy that any property belonging to the non-tribal transferee is being taken as a result of the impugned provisions. Obviously, it is not so. These provisions are enacted only to declare invalid those transactions which were invalid from the outset and had not conveyed any title to the non-tribal transferee. It is now well settled that there is nothing like nullity in the absolute sense and even a nullity continues to operate unless so declared by a proper forum in a proper proceeding. The impugned provisions, therefore, enabled declaration as nullity of transactions which were nullity from inception being unconscionable transactions between unequals in which the consent of the tribal transferor was not a free consent and the contract resulting in the transfer was void on account of absence of the essentials to make a valid contract. The arguments based on the repealed Art. 19(1)(f) and Art. 31 and the existing Art. 300-A of the Constitution have therefore, no foundation and do not require any further consideration.

(18.) The argument based on the existing sub-cl. (g) of Cl. (1) of Art. 19 of the Constitution is also misplaced. Apart from the fact that the freedom contained in sub-cl. (g) is subject to reasonable restrictions in public interest, the same is not even affected by the impugned provisions. It was urged by some counsel appearing for the petitioner that his being the only land in possession of some non-tribal transferees, taking away the same results in depriving them of their freedom to carry on their occupation as agriculturists. In our opinion, the contention has no merit. If the transfer was void from the inception and the impugned provisions have only the result of enabling such a declaration, no right can be claimed on its basis and it is equally clear that there can be no case of deprivation of the land which was never validly transferred to such a transferee. This argument is also, therefore, of no merit.

(19.) The main challenge in S. 170-B is to sub-sec. (2) thereof. It was contended that the effect of sub-sec. (2) is to usurp the judicial function. It was also urged that there is repugnancy between Central enactments like the Limitation Act, Transfer of Property Act and Contract Act, for sub-sec. (2) it was also argued by some counsel that its effect results in deprivation of means of livelihood necessary for existence with dignity of a non-tribal transferee without any enquiry, which contravenes Art. 21 of the Constitution. In short, the argument is that the procedure prescribed by sub-sec. (2) is not fair and reasonable and, therefore, it also offends Art. 21. In substance, these are the arguments to assail S. 170-B and particularly sub-sec. (2) therein.

(20.) The construction we have made earlier of S. 170-B including sub-sec. (2) therein is sufficient to repel most of the arguments advanced to assail its validity. The mere fact that an order contemplated by sub-sec. (3) has to be passed even in cases falling within the ambit of sub-sec. (2), as practice which is admittedly being followed, is sufficient to indicate that there is no usurpation of judicial function thereby and there is no arbitrariness in the procedure nor is there the vice of absence of enquiry. In fact, none of the counsel appearing for the petitioners was in a position to make any serious challenge even to sub-sec. (2) of S.17-B on the above construction made thereof by us and indicated even by the learned Additional Advocate General of the hearing of these petitions.

(21.) The only thing suggested was that there may be some hard cases in which due to unforeseen difficulties it has not been possible for the transferee to put up his case by notifying the requisite particulars within the period specified and he will then have no chance to do so in a case falling under sub-sec. (2). In our opinion, this apprehension also is not justified. Once it is held, as was conceded by the learned Additional Advocate General, that an order contemplated by sub-sec. (3) has to be passed invariably in every such case including a case falling within the ambit of sub-sec. (2), all the incidents attaching to such an order made under the Code are automatically attracted. It would be open at least to the appellate authority in suitable cases, if proper cause is shown to reopen the matter to direct the Sub-Divisional Officer to give a fresh decision under sub-sec. (3) on merits taking into account the cause shown by the transferee. This also ensures reasonability of the procedure in all cases including those falling within the ambit of subsec. (2). Such an order may also be treated as an ex parte order which may be set aside by the Sub-Divisional Officer himself on sufficient cause being shown to explain the transferees default in notifying the particulars within the period prescribed. This construction also shows that the procedure prescribed is fair and reasonable so that there is no violation of Art.14.

(22.) The argument of repugnancy based on Cl. (2) of Art.254 with reference to the Limitation Act, Transfer of Property Act and the Contract Act can be disposed of on a short ground only. Cl.(2) of Art.254 relates to matters enumerated in the concurrent list. It is settled that the impugned legislation is under Entry 18 of the State List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution on account of which Cl.(2) of Art.254 of the Constitution is not attracted. The fact that such a legislation falls within Entry 18 in the State List (List II) is beyond controversy in view of the Supreme Court decision in Lingappa Pochanna v. State of Maharashtra. (AIR 1985 SC 389 [LQ/SC/1984/326] ) (supra). It may also be mentioned that previous assent of the President was obtained while enacting S.170A and this argument is only in relation to S. 170-B since this argument can be disposed of on this short ground, it is not necessary to show at length that there is in effect also no repugnancy between any Central enactment and the impugned S.170-B. Declaration as void of a contract which was void ab initio is not repugnant to any provision in the T.P. Act or Contract Act and is really consistent therewith, So far as the Limitation Act is concerned, S.29(2) therein itself lays down that any special law of limitation supersedes the general limitation prescribed thereby. There is also, therefore, no repugnancy between S.170-B and any of these Central enactments.

(23.) The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court in Lingappa Pochanna v. State of Maharashtra, (supra) repelling similar arguments while upholding the validity of a similar enactment in Maharashtra is alone sufficient to reject the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners. It is not necessary to reiterate the contents of that decision. Following that decision, we reject these arguments to the validity of S.170-A and S.170-B of the M. P. Land Revenue Code.

(24.) As a result of the above conclusion, this petition as well as the entire batch of petitions governed by this order in which the constitutional validity of S.170-A and S.170-B is challenged, must be dismissed. The challenge on merits apart from the question of constitutional validity of Ss.170-A and 170-B has to be considered and decided in the first instance by the Sub-Divisional Officer and thereafter the appellate and revisional authority under the provisions of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, As a result of dismissal of these petitions, there would be no difficulty in cases where some proceeding is pending before the Sub-Divisional Officer or the appellate or revisional authority. However, in many cases that remedy has not been resorted to by the petitioners. It is quite likely that the remedy has become time barred in those cases during the pendency of these petitions, In view of the fact that ail these petitions were admitted by this Court for hearing parties, we consider it proper to make a suitable direction enabling such petitioners to resort to the alternative remedy available under the Code, which has not yet been exhausted by them without any impediment on the ground of limitation. Accordingly, we direct that in all such cases where the remedy of appeal/revision available to the petitioners in connected matters, ail of which are being disposed of today by us, has become time barred, it will be open to such petitioners to avail the remedy of appeal/revision within the period of one month from the date of this order and to apply for condonation of delay on the ground of filing the petition in this Court; and the concerned authority shall accept this fact as constituting sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing the appeal/revision.

(25.) Consequently, this petition as well as the entire batch of petitions connected with this petition are dismissed, Separate order in each of these petitions is being passed by us today on the basis of the view we have taken in this petition. No costs. The outstanding amount of security, if any, shall be refunded to the petitioners. Petitions dismissed.