1. This is an appeal by the judgment-debtors against anorder for execution of a decree for arrears of rent. On the 25th February 1911,the respondents as plaintiffs instituted a suit for rent against the appellantsas defendants, who held under them three distinct tenancies under threeseparate contracts. In ordinary course the landlords would have institutedthree different suits for rent in respect of the arrears due But they preferredto institute one suit for the recovery of the arrears, as they were entitled tounite in one suit different causes of action against the same set of defendantsunder Rule 3, Order II, of the Code of Civil Procedure. They realised, however,that if a decree was obtained for the entire sum due, such decree could not, asheld in a long line of authorities in this Court, be executed as a decree forrent against any of the tenures Malick Chand Das v. Satish Chandra Das 3 Ind.Cas. 306 : 11 C.L.J. 56 : 16 C.W.N. 335 and Rashmohni Dasi v. Debendra NathSingh Roy 13 ind. Cas. 604 [LQ/CalHC/1911/499] : 16 C.W.N. 395. They accordingly pray, ed that thedecree might specify the sums due in respect of each of the tenancies and thatan order might be made for the realisation of the sums in arrear from therespective tenancies. This was carried out, and the result was that on the 5thJune 1911 a decree was drawn up which specified that a certain sum, which, forthe sake of brevity, may he, called A, was to be realised by sale of tenure X,that a similar sum B was to be realised by sale of tenure Y, and that a thirdsum C was to be payable by the judgment-debtors. There was also a directionthat in the event of non-satisfaction of the sums due in respect of X and Y,the balance might be recovered from the person and property of thejudgment-debtors. On the 27th August 1913 the decree-holders applied, forexecution of the decree. They stated specifically that in respect of the thirdtenancy a separate decree had been passed and prayed, first, that the sum duethere from might be realised by attachment and sale of the moveable propertiesof the judgment-debtors; and secondly, that if the whole amount due was notrealised, the balance might be recovered by attachment of their persons. It isremarkable that in the 7th column of the application, for execution, the sumshown as due was the sum realisable in respect of the third tenancy alone; inother words the application for execution sought relief only in respect of thesum decreed with regard to the third tenancy. It is not necessary for ourpresent purpose to narrate what took place on the basis of this application, aswe are now concerned with an application for execution made on the 16thSeptember 1914. The decree-holders stated therein that a decree had been passedin respect of the first tenure for a certain sum, that a decree had been passedin respect of the second tenure for another sum and that a decree had beenpassed in respect of a third tenure for a different sum." They prayed thatthe first two sums due might be realised by sale of the first two tenanciesrespectively and that if the whole amount was not thereby obtained, processesmight issue against the persons and other properties of the judgment-debtors.The judgment-debtors contended that the application was barred by limitation,in so far as the decree-holders sought to realise by sale of the first twotenures the sum directed by the decree to be levied therefrom. The SubordinateJudge has over ruled this contention. The question for determination,consequently, is whether the application for execution is barred by limitationon the ground assigned by the judgment-debtors.

2. The answer to the question in controversy depends uponthe true construction of Article 18a of the First Schedule to the IndianLimitation Act, 1908. The clauses relevant for this purpose are those numbered1, 5 and 6 in the third column. The first Clause provides that an applicationfor execution of a decree of any Civil Court not provided for by Article 183 orby Section 48, Civil Procedure Code of 1908, must be made within three yearsfrom the date of the decree. As the application for execution now underconsideration was made after three years from the date of the decree, the firstClause by itself is of no assistance to the decree-holders. Reliance is,consequently, placed on their behalf on Clauses (5) and (6). Clause (5) refersto a case where an application has been made in accordance with law to theproper Court for execution of the decree. Clause (6) applies to a case wherenotice has been issued to the person, against whom execution is applied for, toshow cause why the decree should not be executed against him when the issue ofsuch notice is required by the Code of 1908; that is, in cases where theapplication for execution is made after the lapse of a year from the date ofthe decree or is made against the legal representatives of a deceased judgmentdebtor. The decree-holders contend that on the 27th August 1913 an applicationwas made in accordance with law to the proper Court for execution of the decreeand that they are accordingly entitled to the benefit of Clause (5). Theyfurther contend that on such application for execution, notices were issued tothe judgment-debtors on the 24th September 1913, and that they are thusentitled to the benefit of Clause (6). The appellants contend that neitherClause (5) nor Clause (6) is of real assistance to the decree-holders, becausethey took steps in respect of the decree for rent of the third tenancy and notwith regard to the decree for rent of the first and the second tenancies. Thecontention in substance is that although there is nominally one decree in thislitigation, there are in substance three decrees in one sheet of paper Thejudgment-debtors argue that the term decree as used in Clauses (5) and (6) mustbe read along with the term "decree" in column 1 of the Article andthat the decree-holders are not entitled to the benefit either of Clause (5) orof Clause (6) on proof that they have taken action with regard to what is inessence a distinct decree from the two decrees they now seek to enforce. Wehave not been able to trace any authority directly in point; but we are ofopinion that the contention of the appellants is supported by a principle.which underlies the decision of the Full Bench in Wise v. RajnarainChuherburty. It may be observed that so far back as 1866 it was recognised bythis Court in the Case of Stephenson v. Annoda Dossee that there might benominally one decree passed in a suit, which is essentially of a compositecharacter and contains a number of decrees: it may be that some decrees, thoughbased nominally on one document, are in reality separate decrees againstseparate individuals. In such cases, the Court might and properly would considerthem to be separate, and in execution put the law of limitation in forceagainst different defendants as if they were separate." This doctrine wasignored in the case of Mohesh Chunder Chowdhry v. Mohim Lal Sircar 8 W.R. 80,which ruled that when a decree has been passed against several defendants, eachof whom is declared to have a separate liability in respect of a definiteamount, execution against one or more of such judgment-debtors keeps the decreein force against all simultaneously. The Court, however, reverted to the viewindicated in the earlier case in Khema Debea v. Kumolakunt Bakshi 10 B.L.R.259n : W.R. 10. The result was that when the question arose again in the caseof Wise v. Rajnarain Chukerburty 19 W.R. 30 : 10 B.L.R. 258 (F.B.), the matterwas referred for decision to a Full Bench. The question turned upon the trueconstruction of Section 20 of Act XIV of 1859 which was then in force, and wasin these terms: No process of execution shall issue from any Court notestablished by Royal Charter to enforce any judgment, decree or order of suchCourt, unless some proceeding shall have been taken to enforce such judgment,decree or order, or to keep the same in force within three years next precedingthe application for such execution." With reference to this provision, itwas argued that when the decree granted to the plaintiff separate reliefsagainst separate defendants, if proceedings had been taken to enforce thedecree against one judgment-debtor, the requirements of Section 20 were sufficientlyfulfilled and that the effect was to keep alive the decree as against the otherjudgment-debtors. The substance of the contention was that the term decreeshould be liberally construed, and as there could be only one decree in a suit,Section 20 should be so interpreted as to cover cases as well of joint decreesas of several decrees disguised under one decree. This contention was overruledby the Fall Bench. Couch, C.J., observed with reference to the decree beforehim that although the decree was made in one suit, it was in reality andsubstance a separate decree against each for the portion for which each wasdeclared to be liable. See also Chowdhary Hureehur Singh v. Baboo Hridoy Narain25 W.R. 310. The principle which underlies the decision of the Full Bench hasnow met with legislative approval and is embodied in explanation 19 W.R. 30 :10 B.L.R. to Article 179 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, which is in termsidentical with explanation (1) to Article 179 of the Indian Limitation Act,1877. On behalf of the decree-holders, however, endeavour has been made to drawa distinction between decrees made against different defendants and decreesmade against the same defendants in respect of different properties. In ouropinion there is in principle no distinction between the two classes of cases.In the case before us, the defendants held, from the plaintiffs as theirlandlords, distinct tenancies under Separate contracts. The obligations for theenforcement whereof the suit was brought, were distinct and arose fromdifferent contracts. The decree recognised this and entitles the plaintiffs tobring to sale distinct tenancies for the realisation of the arrears livablerespectively there from. The position is precisely the same as if theplaintiffs had brought the distinct suits for rent against the defendants, onein respect of each tenancy. If they had instituted such suits, there would havebeen on three different sheets of paper the very decrees which we now find setout on one sheet of paper. If three suits were so brought, it is plain that therule of limitation would have been applicable to each decree separately; and itcould not have been urged for a moment that because the plaintiffs had takenout execution in respect of one decree for rent against the defendants, theywere protected from the bar of limitation in respect of the other decrees. Weare of opinion that although there was in the present case only one suit, yet,at the instance of the plaintiff, three distinct decrees have been made fortheir benefit to enable them to proceed with execution under the provisions ofthe Bengal Tenancy Act with all the consequences which result there from,namely, to sell the tenures free of incumbrances imposed thereupon by thetenants. The plaintiffs sought this advantage and were awarded reliefaccordingly. If they now find themselves at a disadvantage from a differentpoint of view which they had not possibly realised at the time, the difficultyis entirely of their own creation. There is, in our opinion, no escape from theposition that the present application for execution is barred by limitationwith regard to the sums claimed from the first two tenancies; but in respect ofthe sum due from the third tenancy, the application is in time, because made withinthree years from the date of the first application.

3. The result is that this appeal is allowed in part. Theapplication for execution will stand dismissed in respect of the sums due fromthe first two tenancies stated in the seventh column. The execution, however,will proceed in respect of the sum decreed with regard to the third tenure withinterest thereon. The appellants are entitled to their costs in this Court. Weassess the hearing-fee at two gold mohurs.

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Dhirendra Nath Sarkar and Ors. vs. Nischintapore Company (17.08.1916 - CALHC)