Authored By : Henry Thoby Princep, S.C. Ghose

Henry Thoby Princep and S.C. Ghose, JJ.

1. The matter on which this rule has been granted relates toproceedings taken under Section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, by theMagistrate of Purneah on notice given to the parties. Written statements havebeen put in, and the case was transferred by the order of the DistrictMagistrate, under Section 528, from the Sub-divisional Magistrate of Arrareahto a Magistrate holding his Court in Purneah, the head-quarters of the district.The trial of the case has not yet commenced. The rule has been granted on twogrounds taken on behalf of Rai Dhanput Singh, one of the parties to the case;first, that the Magistrate does not state the grounds of his being satisfiedthat a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning certainlands within his jurisdiction in setting out the facts, and his belief in themupon which he considers such breach of the peace as imminent; further, that hedoes not set out that such is imminent in regard to any specified property;and, secondly, that he transferred the case to the Magistrate sitting atPurneah without notice to the parties so as to give them an opportunity ofstating their objections to such a transfer.

2. In regard to the first point, we have heard learnedCounsel for both parties to these proceedings at considerable length, and havebeen referred to numerous cases in the reports expressing the opinions ofvarious Benches in regard to the proper institution of proceedings underSection 145, and similar provisions of the Codes of Criminal Procedure of 1861and 1872 now repealed. The substance of the decisions cited to us seems to bethat the Magistrate is bound to satisfy himself on grounds which are reasonablethat a breach of the peace is imminent in regard to properties of thedescription specified by Section 145, that a dispute likely to cause a breachof the peace exists concerning them, and that the grounds stated by him must besuch as to satisfy a Court of Revision before which such case may be brought byany of the parties concerned.

3. In the case before us it is objected in the firstinstance that no proceeding was drawn up by the Magistrate as contemplated bythe law We find, however, that there was an order passed by the Magistratewhich, if not in form, was at least in substance sufficient to comply with therequirements of the law, and that on this notice was served in the firstinstance on the agents of the parties now before us, and on their representation,on the principals themselves to appear and put in written statements such asthey have now put in; we, therefore, think that the proceedings are valid inrespect to the manner of their institution.

4. It appears that in consequence of several cases beforehim relating to various acts amounting to breaches of the peace between thepartizans of the parties now before us, the Magistrate directed the Police toenquire whether there were sufficient grounds for proceeding under Section 145,and that thereupon a report was made suggesting that, for the reasons stated,such proceedings were necessary. If, therefore, the Police report which theMagistrate has made the foundation of the proceedings instituted under Section145 does sufficiently set out substantial reasons for believing that a disputelikely to induce a breach of the peace between the parties now before usrelating to certain lands exists, there are no valid grounds for impugning theregularity of the proceedings under which the matters contemplated by Section145 are now about to be tried. The report of the Police officer sets out astatement made by the agent of Baboo Chatterput Singh that he is prepared toresist any attempt made by Rai Dhanput Singh to obtain possession of certainlands. A statement was also taken by the Police officer, and forms portion ofthe report from the agent of Rai Dhanput Singh, the petitioner before us, whichshows good reason to suppose that Rai Dhanput Singh was prepared to assert hispossession of certain lands either held by Chatterput Singh or claimed byChatterput Singh as in his possession. There are also statements of variousPolice officers that disputes are going on between the parties relating tolands within their respective jurisdictions and, amongst these, we may refer tothe statement of one Police officer who alleges that there has already been abreach of the peace and a case in Court, and that in his opinion there islikely to be a repetition of this disturbance unless the Magistrate shouldinterpose. For the purposes of notice to the parties, we think it sufficientfor the Magistrate to cite, as the ground of his proceeding, the Police reporton which he is satisfied that a dispute within the terms of Section 145 doesexist. It is open to the parties if they dispute the necessity for suchproceedings either within the terms of the last clause of Section 145 to showbefore the Magistrate that no such dispute exists or has existed or, if theyare so advised, to move the Court of Revision that the Magistrate has proceededon grounds which are not reasonable or which cannot be held to be sufficient tosatisfy him that such a dispute exists. So far as concerns this Court as aCourt of Revision, we think that the proceedings of the Magistrate sufficientlyfulfil the requirements of the law.

5. It is next objected that the proceedings of theMagistrate are indefinite so far as describing the particular lands concerningwhich the dispute between the parties exists. We observe that, in the firstinstance, the Magistrate specifies this land as estate Purwaha, and that onreceipt of the written statement of the parties he has narrowed the subject ofhis enquiry to the possession of certain specified properties which, it isadmitted before us, all form portions of estate Purwaha. There cannot, in ouropinion, be any objection to such a proceeding of the Magistrate in thuslimiting the subject-matter of his enquiry so as to confine it only to landswhich the written statement of the parties have satisfied him were the solematters in dispute. We think, therefore, that we should not be justified as aCourt of Revision in obstructing the course of the proceedings so instituted bythe Magistrate, having the object to maintain the peace and to settle thedisputes between the parties, rival zemindars, in such a manner as, at leasttemporarily, to quiet the tenantry of the particular lands. It is open toeither of the parties, if so advised, to show to the Magistrate that no disputelikely to induce a breach of the peace exists or has existed regarding any ofthese lands.

6. The second point on which the rule was granted relates tothe order of the District Magistrate transferring the proceedings from theSub-divisional Court of Arrareah to that of the Magistrate at Purneah withoutnotice to the petitioner. It has been stated on behalf of Chatterput Singh thatthe application for transfer was made by consent of the agents of Dhanput Singhor, at least, after notice to them that such application was about to be made,and without any objection. This has been contradicted, and we may take it,therefore, that there has been a misunderstanding, or that any consent that mayhave been given has been given without proper authority. However that may be,we think it unnecessary to interfere directly with the order passed by theDistrict Magistrate, because it is still open to the District Magistrate toreconsider his order on any objection made by the petitioner, and we have nodoubt that on such objection being made the District Magistrate will give dueconsideration, and will thereupon make such orders as may be best calculated toensure an early decision of the matters in dispute to the convenience of theparties and in the interests of justice. The law leaves it open to theMagistrate to deal with this matter and to direct the trial to be held eitherat the Purneah or the Arrareah Court as he may think proper on furtherconsideration of the matter as represented by the parties.

7. For these reasons we think that the rule should bedischarged.

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Dhanput Singh vs.Chatterput Singh (19.01.1893 - CALHC)