Chapman, J.

1. The findings of the Sessions Judge in appeal in this case amount, I understand, to this. That the petitioner Dhanpat Singh is a head constable: that during the temporary absence of the Sub-Inspector he was the senior Police Officer in the Police Station: that one Kamleswari Prasad entered the Police Station and that with the permission of the head constable Dhanpat Singh, the literate constable Abdul Majid took a first information from the almirah and gave it to Kamleswari Prasad. Thereafter the three persons sat down together at a table and the literate constable Abdul Majid dictated the contents or part of the contents of the first information to Kamleswari Prasad, who took them down. The evidence that the bead constable had received any illegal gratification for this concession has been disbelieved. Upon these findings the Sessions Judge has convicted the petitioner Dhanpat Singh of criminal breach of trust under section 409, or if section 409 be held to be inapplicable, then under section 379 of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner has also been convicted under section 29 of the Police Act (Act V of 1861) for breach of a rule which forbids a Police Officer not specially empowered to communicate directly or indirectly to non-official persons any document or information which has come into his possession in the course of his public duty. The convictions which have been first assailed in this motion are the convictions under sections 409 and 379. In my opinion those convictions must be set aside, firstly, upon the ground that there appears to be no evidence that the head constable used this document within the meaning of section 409 or moved it within the meaning of section 379 out of the possession of any person. The convictions are also bad upon the ground that there was no finding which would justify a finding of dishonest intention. The conviction under section 29 has been assailed in the first place upon the ground that it was not open to the Sessions Court to convict under that section, inasmuch as the head constable had been acquitted by the Magistrate of that charge. The decision of Sir Arnold "White in the case of Sami Ayya v. Emperor 26 M. 478 : 2 Weir. 483 : 13 M.L.J. 263 was relied upon. The question is not free from difficulty, inasmuch as there is no doubt that the general intention of the Code is that an acquittal should stand until appealed against by the Local Government under section 417. On the other hand the provisions of clause (b) of sub-section 1 of section 423 are very wide and enable a Court in disposing of an appeal from a conviction to alter the finding. There is no express restriction of this provision to the effect that a finding of acquittal cannot be converted into a finding of conviction upon the facts which have resulted in a conviction in the First Court under another provision of the law: And in support of the Judge's order the Government Advocate has been able to cite a considerable body of authorities, viz., Satis Chandra Das Base v. Queen-Empress 27 C. 172 : 4 C.W.N. 166 : 14 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 113, Appanna v. Pethani Mahalakshmi 7 Ind. Cas. 861 : 34 M. 545 : 8 M.L.T. 313 : (1910) M.W.N. 474 : 11 Cr. L.J. 534 and Golla Hanumappa v. Emperor  10 Ind. Cas. 372 : 35 M. 243 at p. 246; 21 M.L.J. 805 : 10 M.L.T. 66 : (1911) 2 M.W.N. 106 : 12 Cr. L.J. 269. The conclusion, therefore, to which I come is, that the finding reversing the acquittal in this case being upon facts upon which there was a conviction in the First Court under another provision of the law against which there was an appeal to the Sessions Judge, the Sessions Judge had power to come to a finding reversing the acquittal in this case. It is then contended that the findings do not amount to a finding of an offence under section 29 of the Police Act. The rule a breach of which is alleged to have been committed is to this effect: "A Police Officer may not unless specially empowered communicate directly or indirectly any document or information which has come into his possession to a non-official person in the course of his public duty." The head constable permitted his literate constable to take this first information from the almirah and to dictate the contents to a non-official person. It is difficult to say that this does not come within the meaning of the rule and that it is not indirectly communicating a document to a non-official person. It is open to doubt whether the rule was intended originally for an act of this kind, but it does appear to come technically within the wording of the rule.

2. The sentence of six weeks rigorous imprisonment is manifestly far too severe. I understand the petitioner has been upwards of a week already in imprisonment and this is more than sufficient. I reduce the sentence to the period already undergone.

3. It might be well for the Local Government to consider whether facility should not be given to accused persons to obtain copies from the Police of first information's at least even before the trial commences in the Magistrate's Court. It is vitally necessary that an accused person should be granted a copy of the first information at the earliest possible stage in order that he may get the benefit of legal advice. To put difficulties in the way of his obtaining such a copy is only creating a temptation in the way of the officers who are in possession of the originals.