Sinha, J.This is an application for recording a compromise in the pending appeal made by respondents 1 to 3 in the following circumstances. On 20th January 1922, one Ranbahadur Singh executed a simple mortgage bond in favour of the petitioners, that is to say, Dharnidhar Eoy and his brothers, securing the payment of the principal sum of Rs. 1,30,000 on the mortgage of a number of properties, including villages Mohuda and Telmucho. In 1932, the petitioners assigned the mortgage bond to two persons, called Phul Kumari Debi and Shardamoyee Debi. Phul Kumari is the wife of one Amulya Krishna Roy, and Shardamoyee was the mother of Nakul Chandra Roy, and the grandmother of Anadi Nath Roy. The petitioners case further was that the assignees aforesaid of the petitioners rights under the mortgage did not pay the consideration for the assignment in cash, but the arrangement between the parties was that the assignees will finance the litigation, which was anticipated, for the enforcement of the mortgage bond aforesaid. The parties had agreed that the assignees would bring a suit for the enforcement of the mortgage bond, and whatever properties will be acquired as a result of the litigation would be divided half and half between the assignees on the one part and the original mortgagees on the other. Accordingly, a mortgage suit was instituted in 1933, and a jnort-gage decree obtained by the assignees on 26th June 1935, for a large sum of money exceeding four lacs. Between January and September 1937, all the mortgaged properties except Mohuda and Telmucho were sold and purchased by the decree holders themselves for Rs. 41,000 only. They also obtained delivery of possession in April 1937. In December 1939, the petitioners instituted the suit, out of which First Appeal No. 102 of 1942 arose, for specific performance of the contract between them and the assignees to the effect that they would share the fruits of the decree half and half. They also prayed for delivery of possession in respect of their moiety share in the properties already purchased as aforesaid. The defendants to that suit were Phul Kumari Debi, Nakul Chandra Roy and Anadi Nath Roy (a minor under the guardianship of defendant 2, Nakul Chandra Roy, his uncle). By judgment and decree dated 30th June 1942, the suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiffs. Defendant 1 only, that is to say, Phul Kumari, preferred the appeal, which was numbered as First Appeal No. 102 of 1942, the other two defendants being satisfied with the judgment and decree of the trial Court. The plaintiffs were respondents 1 to 3, and defendants 2 and 8 aforesaid were respondents 4 and 5 in this first appeal. On 1st August 1942, defendants 2 and 8 aforesaid conveyed, their share in the decree to one Narsingb Prasad Lala. On 12th November 1942, on the application of the appellant, Phul Kumari, this Court ordered the stay of execution of decree of the trial Court in respect of her share in the properties purchased, on her depositing Rs. 10,000 odd rupees in the Court below by way of security. Thus, the plaintiffs, respondents in this Court, obtained delivery of possession in respect of their four annas share of the properties out of the moiety share belonging to defendants 2 and 3 by virtue of the purchase aforesaid. The petitioners, who are respondents 1 to 3 in the appeal, further allege that there was a compromise of the litigation between them and the appellant Phul Kumari, on terms which were incorporated in a sale-deed, bearing date SOth January 1943, executed by her as also by the plaintiff-respondents in favour of one Rukmini Debi, wife of Jagdamba Prasad Lala. By this sale deed, Phul Kumari Debi aforesaid conveyed her moiety share in the decree which still remained unsatisfied after the sale of the mortgaged properties except villages Mohuda and Telmucho to Rukmini Debi aforesaid, and it was specifically admitted by the petitioners that they had no interest in the decree conveyed by the sale deed. Hence, in substance, though not in form, it was a sale deed by not only Phul Kumari Debi but by the petitioners also of whatever interest they had in the unrealised portion of the mortgage decree, that is to say, their right to enforce the mortgage decree against villages Mohuda and Telmucho. The sale deed also recited the result of the mortgage decree, namely, the purchase by the decree-holders of the other properties covered by the mortgage deed and delivery of possession in their favour. Then the following material statements appear in that deed:

Be it stated that Dharnidhar Roy and Ors. brought the title suit No. 46 of 1939 claiming half of the properties mentioned above auction purchased by me and Nakul Chandra Eoy and minor Anadi Nath Boy and the said suit has been decreed in favour of the plaintiffs and I have preferred an appeal in the Honble High Court against the said decree. I shall withdraw the appeal and neither of the parties will be entitled to claim any cost of Sub-Judges Court or of High Court from the other party.

2. These are the relevant recitals in the deed of sale which now form the subject-matter of enquiry in this case. It was also recited in the sale deed that the petitioners will have no claim in respect of the decree which had been obtained for the usufruct of the auction purchased properties or the decree obtained for rent or royalty against certain persons named in the deed. It was also agreed between the parties to the deed that Phul Kumari Debi had received the entire consideration of the deed, namely, twenty thousand rupees. Thus, as a result of the alleged compromise, the decree obtained by the respondents for specific performance of the contract and for possession in respect of their moiety share in the properties purchased in execution of the mortgage decree was made final between the parties, the appeal pending in this Court having been agreed to be withdrawn. The sale deed treated the assignees as the decree-holders, and in that view Phul Kumari Debi only was to receive the consideration money. The respondent-petitioners further agreed to give up, in favour of Phul Kumari Debi, the amount realised by her in execution of decrees for rents or royalties in respect of the properties auction-purchased by her. The only advantage which the petitioners would get under the alleged compromise was that their moiety share in the properties purchased by the decree-holders would be recognised by the vendor and the vendee. The respondents on their part gave up their claim in respect of the unrealised portion of the decree which could be enforced against the two villages not yet sold in execution of the decree. The next important event which happened after, the alleged compromise was that respondents 4 and 5 in this Court, who were defendants 2 and 3 in the Court below, made an application some time in April 1943, for being transposed to the category of appellants. That application was vehemently opposed by respondents 1 to 3 who filed a long affidavit in opposition to the application. It is noteworthy that, in the long affidavit filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 3, no mention is made of the fact that the appeal had already been compromised by the sole appellant who had agreed to withdraw the same. This is a circumstance which, as will presently appear, has been sought to be utilised by the appellant in these proceedings for recording the compromise. Ultimately, on 21st October 1943, the application was rejected by this Court.

3. It is also necessary to state that the respondents, who had obtained a decree for costs, amounting to over two thousand rupees, against the defendants, put the same into execution against defendant-respondents 4 and 5, and realised the whole amount from them. It was stated on behalf of the appellant that those respondents had instituted a suit for contribution against her. These events have also been sought to be used by the appellant as the foundation for the contention that the decree-holder respondents had repu. diated the compromise, if any. This matter will be discussed in its proper place in this judgment. Another noteworthy feature of this case is that it was not until 8th April 1944, about sixteen months after the alleged compromise, that the application was made by the respondents for recording the compromise. An application was also filed on behalf of the respondents to the effect that respondent 2, Anildhar Roy, who had been described in the memorandum of appeal as a minor, had attained majority before the execution of the sale deed, dated 30th January 1943, and had executed and signed the same as major. It was also stated that the compromise sought to be recorded at their instance was for the benefit of the minor respondent 3, Gunadhar Roy, under the guardianship of respondent 1, Dharnidhar Roy, and, therefore, the necessary leave to compromise on the terms aforesaid was prayed for. Certainly, there has been a considerable delay in the filing of this application, and the effect of this delay will be dealt with presently.

4. The application for recording the compromise filed by the plaintiff-respondents has been vehemently opposed by the appellant both on the question of factum of the compromise as also on the legality of the same. A counter-affidavit, sworn by one Bholanath Roy as the mukhtar-am of the appellant, has been filed, denying the fact that, by virtue of the sale deed aforesaid, the appeal has been agreed to be withdrawn. It was further alleged on her behalf that she is an illiterate purdanashin lady, and that she was given to understand by her husband, Amulya Chandra Roy, that she was only executing a deed of sale in respect of the unrealised portion of the mortgage decree, and that she was never apprised of the fact that the plaintiff-respondents were also figuring in the sale deed as executants. If she had been informed that the plaintiff-respondents were parties to the deed, and that there was a stipulation in the deed that she will withdraw her appeal against them, she would not have executed the sale deed. By way of explanation as to how the aforesaid stipulations appeared in the deed, it was suggested in the affidavit that her husband is a close relation of the plaintiff-respondents, and that, for the last few years, "the appellant is not on best of terms with her husband, he having another wife, Padmabati Debi." It was also stated in the counter-affidavit that all documents executed by the appellant used to be admitted for registration by the said Bholanath Roy; but the sale deed in question was admitted for registration by her husband who, it was suggested, had got those false recitals made in the deed with a view to helping his close relations, the respondents in the appeal. It was also stated that, though the compromise is said to have taken place on 30th January 1943, the application for getting it recorded has been filed as late as April 1944, when the paper-book was in the course of preparation. A point was also made of the fact that, during the hearing of the application by respondents i and 5 to be transposed to the category of appellants, it was never argued or suggested on behalf of the plaintiff-respondents that the appeal itself had been compromised, as a result of which it stood withdrawn. It was also stated that, although the plaintiff-respondents had stipulated in the deed of sale that they would not execute the decree for costs, they took out execution of the entire decree for costs in Execution Case No. 125 of 1944, mentioning therein that there had been no adjustment. The only question of law raised in the counter-affidavit is that the compromise is not lawful, inasmuch as the sanction of this Court had not been obtained on behalf of the guardian ad litem in terms of Rule 7 of Order 32, Civil P. C, respondent 3, at least, being a minor.

5. The matter was placed before this Court for the determination of the question of whether there had been a compromise, as alleged on behalf of the plaintiff-respondents and denied by the appellant. The appellant applied to have her evidence as also that of her husband and Bholanath Eoy aforesaid, having the power of attorney on her behalf, recorded on commission. By consent of the parties, it was directed by this Court that the oral evidence to be adduced by the parties in this case should be recorded by the Court below and forwarded to this Court for the purpose of the enquiry relating to the compromise. In the, Court below, the appellant examined herself only on commission, but did not examine her husband, who, on all hands, had played a very prominent part in the matter of the compromise, nor her mukhtar-am, Bholanath Roy, aforesaid, nor Jamini Kant Eoy, who is admittedly her husbands sisters son, and had made the following endorsement on the deed:

The purport of the deed has been read over and explained to Fulkumari Debi and she put her thumb impression in my presence.

6. On behalf of the respondent-petitioners were examined Bisheshwar Chakravarty (their manager) and Nirmal Chandra Kundu, a pleader practising in the Dhanbad Court. It is regrettable that none of the plaintiff-respondents, and particularly Dharnidhar Roy, respondent 1, was examined in support of their case of compromise. Hence, it must be said that both parties have withheld persons from the witness box, who could have given very material evidence in this enquiry. It must first be determined whether there was, in fact, a compromise as alleged on behalf of the petitioners. (After considering the evidence his Lordship proceeded.) The other evidence in; support of the petitioners case that the deed was read out and explained to her (Fulkumari) is that of the pleader, Nirmal Chandra Kundu. He is a young man of thirty-one years who has put in a few years at the bar. He has been working as a junior pleader in the ease, even though he must have known that he was a very material witness in this enquiry. Though there were other witnesses to the deed, they have not been examined on behalf of the respondents. The pleader would make it out in his evidence that he, along with others, went to Belrui where the parties reside. Then he was taken to the baithakakhana on the second storey of Amulyas house where the document was read over and explained to the lady by Jamini Kant Roy. But it is significant that he did not sign the deed as a witness at Belrui. Admittedly, he signed the document a few days later at Dhanbad. It has naturally been vehemently argued by Mr. Das that we should not accept the testimony of this witness when he says that he was taken to Belrui to be a witness to the execution of the deed. Admittedly, there was no other reason for his being there. This pleader has been guilty of gross professional misconduct in conducting the case on behalf of the petitioners, when he knew that he was a very material witness in the case. He should have known better than he appears to have done, He should have known that, having figured in. the deed as a witness, he had been included in the list of witnesses to be cited on behalf of the respondents, and with that knowledge he should not have agreed to work as a pleader on their behalf. By doing so, he has laid himself open to the charge of professional misconduct. If he had not been a junior practitioner, this Court would have taken a more serious view of his conduct; but I cannot refrain from observing that the pleader has shown a regrettable want of sense of pro-fessional etiquette. With these observations on the pleaders conduct in acting as he did, I would prefer not to act on his testimony. But even so, in my opinion, the testimony of Bisheshwar Chakravarty, supported as it is by the recitals in the deed, which have not been proved to be false, I would hold that the compromise, as alleged by the petitioners, has been proved.

7. The next question which arises for determination in this case is whether there has been a repudiation of the compromise, as contended on behalf of the appellant. Mr. Das has relied upon three circumstances in support of his contention that the plaintiff-respondents must be deemed to have repudiated the compromise. The first is the delay of about 16 months in filing the petition for recording the compromise. He has conceded that delay by itself is not very helpful to him. The delay is sought to be explained on behalf of the plaintiff-respondents by showing that they depended upon the appellant to perform her promise of withdrawing the appeal, and, therefore, they did not take any steps in the matter until, in the beginning of April 1944, their advocate was served with the notice of the appellants list. With reference to the order-sheet of the appeal, it appears that between February 1943 and 3rd April 1944, the appellant did not take any active steps in the prosecution of the appeal. She filed her list on 3rd April 1944, as a result of the peremptory order passed by the Bench for doing so. In my opinion, the circumstances of this case do lend support to the respondents case that they did not take steps earlier, as they expected the appellant to withdraw the appeal, and it was only after the appellant had taken steps towards the preparation of the paper-book that they were apprised of the attitude of the appellant in the matter of the compromise.

8. The next circumstance relied upon by Mr. Das was that the plaintiff-respondents did not rely upon the compromise when they filed their affidavit in opposition to the application made by respondents 4 and 5 for being transposed to the category of appellants. The answer to this contention given by the respondents is that respondents 4 and 5 were no parties to the compromise, and, as the petition for withdrawing the appeal had not been filed till then on behalf of the appellant, they could not properly raise the question of the compromise at that stage. They also suggested that they fought out that application chiefly on the ground of limitation, and succeeded in getting that application thrown out by the Court. It was next contended by Mr. Das that the petitioners, having realised the entire decree for costs from respondents 4 and 5, who in their turn have brought a suit for contribution against the appellant, had given a go-by to one of the material terms of the compromise. Mr. Das suggested that the proper translation of the term in the deed relating to the costs of the suit is that the plaintiffs had given up all claims to costs not only against the appellant but also against the other defendants, respondents 4 and 5. In my opinion, this contention, is not well founded. The compromise was only between the parties to the deed. Respondents 4 and 5 were no parties to the compromise. Hence neither in law nor on facts could respondents 4 and 5 take any advantage out of the compromise. Mr. Bose on behalf of the plaintiff-respondents suggested that such a suit for contribution as between joint tort-feasors does not lie. But as that is a question between parties who are not before us, it is neither necessary nor expedient to express any opinion on that question. To Mr. Dass contention that in the execution petition it had not been alleged by the decree-holders that there had been any adjustment in the matter of costs, it was pointed out on behalf of the respondents that though in the column of judgment-debtors all the defendants are named, it is distinctly stated in the execution petition that the decree-holders wanted to proceed against respondents 4 and.5 only. Mr. Das placed reliance upon the case in Morgan v. Bain (1875) 10 L. R. 15. But the facts and circumstances of that case were entirely different from those in the present case. There the circumstances and the conduct of both parties to the contract were consistent only with the belief in both the parties that they had abandoned the contract. Hence, the Court held that there had been a rescission of the contract by conduct of the parties. In the present case each of the circumstances relied upon in support of the case of repudiation has been explained by the respondents as being referable to other reasons than any intention to abandon their rights under the contract. It may also be stated that, in their written answer to the respondents application for recording the compromise, no such case had been made out. Those facts had been alleged by the appellant only in support of her case of denial of the existence of the compromise. It must, therefore, be held that the appellant has failed to make out that there has been a repudiation of the contract.

9. It now remains to consider Mr. Dass most serious objection to the validity of the compromise, founded on the terms of Rule 7 of Order 32, Civil P. C. Mr. Das contended that there being a minor on the respondents side the guardian ad litem though he may have been the natural guardian, could not have entered into the agreement on behalf of the minor also without the leave of the Court being previously obtained to such a compromise. Mr. Dass contention amounted to saying that, so far as the minor respondent 3 was concerned, the alleged compromise was void, and therefore the appellant also is not bound by the compromise for the reason that there was want of mutuality. In this connexion he relied upon the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Mir Sarwarjan v. Fakhruddin Mahomed (12) 39 Cal. 232, in which their Lordships have observed as follows:

that as the minor in the present case was not bound by the contract there was no mutuality, and that the minor who has now reached his majority cannot obtain specific performance of the contract.

10. Mr. Das placed great reliance on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Awadhesh Prasad v. Widow of Tribeni Prasad AIR 1940 Pat. 663 [LQ/PatHC/1939/222] , for his contention that a guardian ad litem cannot enter into a compromise without the leave of the Court being previously obtained and expressly recorded by the Court. Mr. S. N. Bose, on the other hand, contended, in the first instance, that it is enough if, at the time of recording the compromise, the Court grants leave to the guardian ad litem to enter into the compromise the terms of which have been reduced into writing and presented to the Court at the instance of the parties who are sui juris. He contended, in the second instance, that, even assuming that the compromise had been arrived at without the leave of the Court previously obtained by the guardian ad litem, such a compromise is binding on all the parties other than the minor himself : it is the minor only who can impeach the compromise which is not altogether void, but only voidable at his instance, Mr. S.N. Bose, placed great reliance on the following observations of their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court in Srimati Taru Bala Dassi Vs. Sourendra Nath Mitra and Others, :

The first is that the agreement or compromise is not lawful as mentioned in Order 23 Rule 3, Civil P.C., as no leave of the Court to enter into the compromise was obtained under Order 32, Rule 7 of the Code by the next friend of the minor plaintiff. Tbe argument is twofold, (1) that on the terms of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 7, Order 32, the agreement is voidable by the defendant as against the adult plaintiffs, as it provides that such agreement shall be voidable against all parties other than the minor. I cannot accept this argument as it seems to me clear that that sub-rule contemplates the case of a minor on one side ranged against adults on the other, as regards the matter of compromise, and that it can have no reference to the effect of any compromise between adults, although a minor may be a party to the suit. The question as between adults must be governed by the general law and not by this sub-rule. Secondly, it is said that the compromise was entered into by the next friend of the minor against the imperative provision of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 7, and therefore it was not lawful. But sub Rule (2) lays down what should be the effect of a breach of the provision of Sub-rule (1), and 1 do not think that the agreement can on that ground be set aside as not being lawful. I should state here that application was made by the next friend of the minor plaintiff for leave of the Court to compromise on the terms set out on 12th January 1924, during the course of the argument in the Court below, and that Court sanctioned the compromise on behalf of the minor by the order under appeal. In my opinion this ground urged by the appellant fails.

11. Mr. Bose further contended that this case was taken in appeal to His Majesty in Council, and the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee is reported in AIR 1930 158 (Privy Council) . Though their Lordships reversed the decision of the Calcutta High Court on the question of the authority of counsel to enter into a compromise on behalf of his client, they have not said anything in their judgment against the observations aforesaid of their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court to the effect that the compromise was not vitiated with reference to the terms of Rule 7 of Order 32 of the Code. At page 143 of the report, their Lordships held that the compromise was a lawful one, and directed the same to be recorded and a decree passed in accordance therewith. Mr. Bo&es contention was that, if the compromise was vitiated on the ground suggested by Mr. Das, that question would have been put at the forefront of the arguments by the respondents in England who were represented by eminent counsel, and, therefore, it should be taken that their Lordships of the Judicial Committee must be deemed to have approved of the observations, quoted above, made by their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court. Mr. Das has referred to the observations of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in 40 cal. 391 to the effect that their Lord-ships decisions should be taken to have been given only on such points as have been raised for decision before them. Mr. Bose also relied upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in 18 Pat. 70S7 to the , effect that a decree based on an award made on a reference which is in contravention of Order 82, Rule 7 of the Code is not void but voidable at the instance of the minor, and, therefore, could not be impeached in an execution pro-seeding relating to that decree.

12. The strongest case which appears to favour Mr. Dass contention is the case in Awadhesh Prasad v. Widow of Tribeni Prasad AIR 1940 Pat. 663 [LQ/PatHC/1939/222] . The observations made in that case certainly go a long way to lend countenance to Mr. Dass contention based on the terms of Rule 7 of Order 32 of the Code. But it must be noted that in that case, as would appear from the statement of the facts at pp. 346 and 347 of the report the guardian ad litem of the minors concerned did not appear before the Court, and was no party to the compromise. The vakalatnamas which had been filed were on behalf of the adult members of the family to which the minors belonged, but those vakalatnamas in terms did not entitle the advocates to act oh behalf of the minors. Hence, the compromise in that case had been arrived at without any reference to the guardian ad litem for the minors who were no parties to the compromise Hence, the general observations made in that judgment are, more or less, in the nature of obiter dicta, and that case cannot be taken as an authority for the proposition that, after the adult members had entered into a compromise and filed the terms thereof in Court, it was not open to the guardian ad litem to make an application for leave to compromise on behalf of the minors on those terms, if the Court could be, in a position to grant the leave asked for on being satisfied that the compromise was for the benefit of the minors concerned. The prohibition contained in Rule 7 of Order 32 against a next friend or a guardian ad litem entering into an agreement or compromise without the leave of the Court being expressly recorded, in my opinion, does not go to the length of saying that a compromise entered into by the adult members may not be sanctioned by the Court even if the application for recording the compromise is accompanied by an application on behalf of the guardian ad litem for the leave of the Court.

13. In the present case the application for recording the compromise filed on behalf of the respondents was, as a matter of fact, filed along with an application on behalf of the guardian ad litem for minor respondent 3 for leave to enter into the compromise on the terms indicated in the application on behalf of the minor concerned. In actual practice, it must always be the case that, where the parties to the compromise include both adult members as well as minors, the terms of the settlement between the parties would ordinarily be settled as between adult members some of whom themselves may be the guardian ad litem for the minors concerned. In such a case the adult members have first to be satisfied, so far as they themselves are concerned, that the bargain was worth entering into. On being so satisfied, they would strike the bargain with their adversary, and then make an application to the Court for sanctioning the compromise so far as any minor may be concerned. In my opinion, the CPC does not insist upon the guardian ad litem first obtaining the leave of the Court to negotiate the terms of the compromise. It is only when negotiation has reached the stage of settlement that the guardian ad litem would be in a position to know the exact terms on which the contending parties would agree to settle their differences. Only when that stage has been reached, it is possible for the guardian ad litem to obtain the necessary sanction of the Court. Hence, in my opinion, if the leave of the Court is granted to the guardian ad litem before the compromise is actually recorded, the terms of Rule 7 of Order 82 of the Code would be substantially complied with, because, until the compromise has been recorded, it does not become operative between the parties so far as the pending litigation is concerned.

14. In the present case such an application being there, and there being no doubt that the compromise is for the benefit of the minor concerned, the appeal against the judgment and decree in bis favour being withdrawn, the Court has no difficulty in according the sanction prayed for. That being so, in my opinion, the question whether a compromise of a pending litigation without the necessary sanction of the Court being obtained by the guardian ad litem on behalf of the minor, and its effect on ,the compromise as a whole, does not fall to be determined. But the terms of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 7 of o. 32 make it reasonably clear that such a compromise is not altogether void but only voidable, and that also at the instance of the minor concerned. Hence, the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in 39 I.A. l2 cannot be pressed in aid of the appellants contention. That case relates to an agreement which is void, and not to one which is voidable as in the present case. It must further be noted that the application for recording the compromise is made on behalf of the minor also. Hence, it is not a case in which a compromise without the leaye of the Court being granted is being sought to be enforced against a minor. On the other hand, it is a case of a minor seeking to enforce the terms of a compromise after obtaining the necessary sanction of the Court. Hence in this case we have not reached the stage at which the question may arise whether the compromise should be enforced as a whole or should be avoided at the instance of the minor concerned. In the present case we are at a stage where the Court has to determine whether there has been a lawful compromise as between the adult members on each side, and then to consider whether such a compromise can be sanctioned with reference to the interests of the minors on either side. In this case there is no question of a minors interests being affected on the appellants side. On the respondents side, respondent 3 is a minor, represented by the karta of his family as the guardian ad litem. He has entered into an agreement for settling the dispute in the present case on terms which cannot be said to be too onerous, and, therefore, not beneficial to the interests of the minor respondent 3. It must, therefore, follow that the compromise should be ordered to be recorded with the leave of the Court granted to the guardian ad litem for entering into the compromise.

15. The application is accordingly allowed, and First Appeal No. 102 of 1942 disposed of in terms appearing in the sale deed aforesaid as quoted above, that is to say, (i) the appeal in this Court stands withdrawn, and (2) the respondent-petitioners give up their costs both of the sui and of the appeal. The respondent-petitioners are entitled to their costs of this enquiry which has been rather protracted one. I would, therefore, fix the pleaders fee at ten gold mohurs.

Chatterji, J.

16. I agree.