T.S. Thakur, J.

Writ petition No. 5026/1999 filed in this court was disposed of by an order dated 18th December, 2001 holding that the questions raised by the petitioner for consideration could be more appropriately decided in proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act. A reference was, in that backdrop, made by the Central Govt. to the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court on 1st April, 2003 to determine whether the demand raised by the union for regularisation of the services of the employees named in the reference order was just, fair and legal and, if so, the relief that the workmen were entitled to. During the pendency of the proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal, the Cement Corporation of India, of which the respondents are the Chairman, General Manager and the Deputy Manager respectively, terminated the contract of the labour contractor and issued consequential directions restraining the members of the petitioner union from entering the factory premises. Aggrieved by the said order, WP(C) 990-1071/2004 were filed in this court in which it was inter-alia contended that while the proceedings were pending before the Industrial Tribunal, the Cement Corporation could not terminate the services of the employees working under it by treating them as employees of the labour contractor. Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Steel Authority of India Limited and others V. National Union Water Front Workers and Others, VI (2001) SLT 225=2001 (7)SCC 1 , a single bench of this court held that an equally efficacious alternate remedy was available to the petitioner by way of an application before the tribunal under Section 33 of the Labour Court concerned and that if such an application was moved the Labour Court could, upon appreciation of the available material, issue appropriate interim directions. The court also directed expeditious disposal of any such application if filed by the petitioner before it.

2. An application for an interim direction restraining the corporation from terminating the employment of the concerned employees was accordingly filed by the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court which was allowed by the said court in terms of an order dated 18th March, 2004 with the following direction:

The application of the applicants is allowed. The Management is directed to set aside the order dated 13.11.2003 and 25.11.2003 and restore the services of the complainants and maintain status quo till the industrial dispute case is decided. The applicants are also entitled to get the wages as they had been getting either as contract labourer or as employee from 25.11.2003. The order is applicable to all the LCA Cases referred to above and a copy of the order be placed in all the LCA Cases.

3. In the present contempt petition, the petitioners grievance is that the respondents have, despite expiry of 30 days from the date of the publication of the aforementioned order in the Government Gazette, declined to restore the services of the workmen and thereby committed contempt of the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court. Appropriate proceedings for punishing the respondents for the disobedience of the said orders need, therefore, be started according to the petitioner.

4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at some length and perused the record.

5. The order passed by the Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court is referable to Section 33 and 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act inter-alia forbids an employer from altering to the prejudice of the workmen concerned, the conditions of his service during the pendency of any conciliation proceedings before the conciliation officer, Labour Court or Tribunal. Section 33A of the Act, on the other hand, provides a remedy to the employee aggrieved of any such contravention to file a complaint in writing before the conciliation officer, Labour Court or the Tribunal, as the case may be, who are, in turn, competent to adjudicate upon the complaint as if it were a dispute referred to or pending before it in accordance with the provisions of the. The Arbitrator, Labour Court, Tribunal or the National Tribunal, as the case may be, is then required to submit its award to the appropriate Government to which the provisions of the are applicable accordingly.

6. That the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court has, in the instant case, made an award in terms of Section 33A which has been published and has, therefore, become operative upon the expiry of a period of one month from the date of such publication is not disputed. The only question that was debated at some length at the bar was whether the obedience of the award, so made by the Labour Court, can be enforced through the medium of the proceedings envisaged under the and if so, whether the non-implementation of the award can constitute disobedience so as to call for action under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act.

7. In so far as the first part of the said question is concerned, namely the enforcement of the awards made under the Industrial Disputes Act, the provisions contained in Chapter V-C and those contained in Chapter VI and VII are, in my opinion, sufficiently clear and provide an effective mechanism for enforcement of the awards made by the Labour Court or Tribunals, as in the instant case. Section 25T appearing in Chapter VC forbids the employer, workmen or trade unions, whether registered under the Trade Unions Act or otherwise, from committing any unfair labour practice. Section 25U, on the other hand, stipulates the penalty for the commission of any unfair labour practice. Section 2 sub-section (ra) of the defines unfair labour practice to mean any of the practices specified in the fifth schedule to the. Item 13 of the said schedule, in turn, declares failure to implement the award made by the Tribunal exposing those responsible for such failure to imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to Rs.1,000/- or with both under Section 25T read with Section 25U of the Industrial Disputes Act.

8. Chapter VI of the stipulates the penalties leviable for different acts of omission and commission mentioned in Sections 26 to 31 appearing under the said chapter. The breach of a settlement or award is made punishable under Section 29 of thewith imprisonment of a term which may extend to six months or with fine or with both and where a breach is a continuing one with a further fine, which may extend to Rs.200/- for everyday the breach continues after the conviction for the first offence.

9. The third and yet another remedy which is available to a person complaining of breach of an award made in his favour lies in proceedings under Section 33C of thewhich provides the machinery for recovery of money due from an employer under any settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapters VA and VB of the. Some of the beneficiaries of the award made by the Labour Court in the present case have, according to learned counsel for the respondents, already instituted proceedings under Section 33C of thewhich are pending adjudication.

10. It is, in the light of the above, incorrect to suggest that the beneficiaries of an award made by the Labour Court do not have any remedy for enforcement of the said award except by way of a petition for initiating contempt proceedings against those alleged to be disobeying the award, whether such award be interim or final in nature. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is a complete code in itself which not only creates rights but provides effective machinery for adjudication of disputes relating to such rights and enforcement of the judgments, awards and settlements delivered in regard thereto by Courts, Tribunals and authorities competent to do so. That being the position, I see no reason why the petitioner cannot complain of the alleged violation of the award by the respondents in appropriate proceedings under anyone of the provisions referred to earlier. The legal position regarding the maintainability of contempt proceedings for execution of decrees or implementation of orders which are otherwise executable in accordance with the regular procedure prescribed for the same is fairly well settled. The Supreme Court has in R.N. Dey and Ors. v. Bhagyabati Pramanik and Ors., IV (2000) SLT 20=(2000) 4 SCC 400 [LQ/SC/2000/744] authoritatively held that weapon of contempt proceedings cannot be used for purposes of execution of a decree or implementation of an order for which the law provides an appropriate procedure. The purpose of vesting the courts with discretion to punish for contempt of court is to maintain the dignity of the court and the majesty of the law. A power so vested cannot be exercised in cases where the complainant has an effective remedy for enforcement of the decree or the order passed in his favour. Contempt is a matter between the court and the contemner and an aggrieved party has no right to insist that the court should exercise its jurisdiction. The following passage from the said decision is in this regard instructive :-

The weapon of contempt is not to be used in abundance or misused. Normally, it cannot be used for execution of the decree or implementation of an order for which alternative remedy in law is provided for. Discretion given to the court is to be exercised for maintenance of the courts dignity and majesty of law. Further, an aggrieved party has no right to insist that the court should exercise such jurisdiction as contempt is between a contemner and the court.

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Further, the decree-holder, who dies not take steps to execute the decree in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, should not be encouraged to invoke contempt jurisdiction of the court for non-satisfaction of the money decree. In land acquisition cases when a decree is passed the State is in the position of a judgment-debtor and hence the court should not normally lend help to a party who refuses to take legally-provided steps for executing the decree. At any rate, the court should be slow to haul up officers of the Government for contempt for non-satisfaction of such money decree.

11. That apart, the present is not, in my opinion, a case in which the respondents can be accused of any contumacious and deliberate conduct that aims at or tends to bring down the dignity or the efficacy of the process of this court or that of a Labour Court which has passed the award against them. The respondents are the employees of a Govt. Corporation which has been declared sick by the BIFR. Production of the cement in the factory where the employees restoration, of whose services is the subject matter of the entire proceedings, has been stopped more than five years back. The order issued by the Labour Court directing status quo to be maintained would not, in that view, entitle them to insist on entering the factory premises which has been shut down years back and in which no commercial or industrial activity is going on. It may even be possible to say that the order directing status quo does not grant any benefit to the employee except the benefit of receiving wages to which they were entitled from the dates stipulated in the operative part of the order. The determination of the amounts payable to the employees on that account is a process that can be undertaken only in proceedings under Section 33C and not in the present contempt petition.

12. Suffice is to say that there is no case even on a prima facie basis made out for this court to initiate contempt proceedings against the respondents. This contempt petition, therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed reserving liberty for the petitioner and its beneficiary members to institute appropriate proceedings for enforcement of the award before the appropriate authority in accordance with the provisions of the. It is made clear that nothing said in the body of this order shall prejudice any such proceedings which the concerned Tribunal/Court shall be free to dispose of in accordance with law influenced by any observation made in the body of this order.