1. This is defendant’s petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, challenging the order dated 27.1.2024, passed by Civil Judge (Jr. Div.), Kashipur, District Udham Singh Nagar in Original Suit No.98/ 2018. By the said order, issue no 2 and 3 were decided against him and in favour of plaintiff. I ssue no. 2 and 3, as fram ed by the Trial Court, are as follows:
“I ssue No. 2: Whether the plaintiff has undervalued the suit and court fee paid is also deficient I f yes, its effect
I ssue No. 3: Whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear the suit”
2. The aforesaid order was challenged by petitioner in a revision, which was dismissed vide judgment dated 03.09.2024, passed by 1 st Additional District Judge, Kashipur. The said judgment is also challenged in this petition.
3. Heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record.
4. Suit for cancellation of sale deed was filed by respondent. As per the plaint averm ent, he had executed a sale deed in favour of defendant (petitioner herein) for consideration of ₹84,04,000/- however entire sale consideration was not paid and ₹44,00,000/- is yet to be paid by the defendant. I t is not disputed that subject-m atter of the sale deed is agricultural land. Defendant (petitioner herein) filed written statem ent in which he raised objection that suit is undervalued, court fee paid is less and the court in which suit was filed do not have pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit. Based on objections raised by defendant, learned Trial Court fram ed aforesaid two issues which were decided as preliminary issue in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. The Revisional Court affirmed the findings returned by Trial Court on these preliminary issues. Thus feeling aggrieved, petitioner/ defendant has approached this Court.
5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that in view of the provision contained in Clause (1) of Section 7(iv-A) of The Court Fees Act, 1870, plaintiff was liable to pay court fee on the valuation of the property as mentioned in the sale deed, however, the plaintiff paid only ₹237.50 as fees for the relief of cancellation of sale deed and ₹35/- for perpetual injunction, which is not as per law, therefore, the order passed by the Trial Court, as affirmed by the Revisional Court, is liable to be set aside.
6. Section 7(iv-A) of the Act relied by petitioner’s counsel, is extracted below:
“I n suit for or involving cancellation of or adjudging void or voidable a decree for m oney or other property having a m arket value, or an instrument securing money or other property having such value:
(1) where the plaintiff or his predecessorin-title was a party to the decree or the instrum ent, according to the value of the subject-m atter; and
(2) where he or his predecessor-in-title was not a party to the decree or instrum ent, according to one-fifth of the value of the subjectm atter, and such value shall be deemed to be—
if the whole decree or instrum ent is involved in the suit, the am ount for which or value of the property in respect of which the decree was passed or the instrum ent executed, and if only a party of the decree or instrum ent is involved in the suit, the am ount or value of the property to which such part relates.
Explanation.—The value of the property for the purposes of this sub-section, shall be the m arket-value, which in the case of im movable property shall be deemed to be the value as com puted in accordance with sub-sections (v), (vA) or (v-B), as the case m ay be.”
7. Per contra, learned Counsel appearing for respondent/ plaintiff, refers to explanation to Section 7(iv-A) of the Act and submits that in respect of the revenue paying land, valuation for the purpose of suit would be 30 times of the revenue so payable, if the explanation is read in conjunction with Section 7(v) of the Act. Section 7(v) of the Act is extracted below:
“7(v) For possession of lands, building or gardens. (v) I n suits for the possession of land, buildings or gardens-
according to the value of the subject-m atter; and such value shall be deem ed to be-
(1) where the subject-m atter is land, and-
a) where the land form s an entire estate or a definite share of an estate paying annual revenue to Governm ent, or forms part of such an estate, and is recorded in the Collector's register as separately assessed with such revenue and such revenue is perm anently settledthirty times the revenue so payable;
(b) where the land form s an entire estate or a definite share of an estate paying annual revenue to Government, or form s part of such estate and is recorded as aforesaid and such revenue is settled by not perm anently-
ten times the revenue so payable;
(c) where the lands pays no such revenue or has been partially; exem pted from such payment, or is charged with any fixed paym ent in lieu of such revenue, and net profits have arisen from the land during the three years im m ediately preceding the date of presenting the plaint-
twenty tim es the annual average of such net profits; but when no such net profits have arisen therefrom the market value which shall be determined by m ultiplying by twenty the annual average net profits of sim ilar land for the three years im m ediately preceding the date of presenting the plaint;
(d) where the land form s part of an estate paying revenue to Governm ent, but is not a definite share of such estate and does not come under clause (a), (b) or (c) above-
the m arket value of the land which shall be determ ined by m ultiplying by fifteen the rental value of the land, including assum ed rent on proprietary cultivation, if any;
(II ) where the subject-m atter is a building or garden- according to the m arket-value of the building or garden, as the case m ay by.”
8. Mr. Siddhartha Singh, learned counsel for the respondent relies upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Suprem e Court in Agra Diocesan Trust Association v. Anil David & Ors (Civil Appeal No. 1722 of 2020). Parra 15, 16 and 17 of the said judgment are reproduced below:
“15. I t is evident from the above discussion that it is undisputed that the point in issue was with respect to valuation for purposes of court fee; equally, it is not in issue that since the plaintiff (i.e. petitioner herein) sought, in addition to a declaration, in both the suits, decrees of cancellation, the crucial point was what the correct value for purposes of court fee was. Now, m arket value has been specifically defined, in the context of a litigation like the present one. According to Section 7 (iv-A), in case the plaintiff (or his predecessor-in-title) was not a party to the decree or instrument, the value was to be according to one-fifth of the value of the subject m atter, “and such value shall be deemed to be” under Section 7 (iv-A), “if the whole decree or instrument is involved in the suit, the am ount for which or value of the property in respect of which the decree is passed or the instrument executed”. Im portantly, the explanation to Section 7 (iv-A) created a deem ing fiction as to what constitutes the “value of the property” by saying that “in the case of im m ovable property shall be deemed to be the value as com puted in accordance with the subsection (v), (v-A) or (v-B) as the case may be.”
16. The plaintiff/ petitioners’ contention was and continues to be that the value determ inable is in term s of clause (v) of Section 7, by reason of Section 7 (iv-A). Section 7 (v) (i) contains two clauses- (a) and (b): both are in respect of revenue paying lands. The petitioner valued its suits on the basis of revenue which according to it, was payable. While so stating, the value (for purposes of court fee) was determ ined to be ₹ 3000/- in each of the suits.
17. A plain reading of the im pugned judgment reveals that what weighed heavily with the High Court was the fact that the plaintiff valued the suits differently for the purposes of court fees and jurisdiction, and secondly that:
“no other m arket value has been proved by the petitioners/ plaintiff that the settled revenue of the land is Rs. 3,000/ - and in the absence of any evidence in this regard, the trial court has rightly considered the m arket value of the property in dispute in accordance with the m arket value fixed by the Collector in order to charge the stam p duty, which is the correct m arket value.”
I n the opinion of this court, there was no com pulsion for the plaintiff to, at the stage of filing the suit, prove or establish the claim that the suit lands were revenue paying and the details of such revenue paid. Once it is conceded that the value of the land [ per explanation to Section 7 (iv-A)] is to be determ ined according to either sub clauses (v), (va) or (vb) of the Act, this m eant that the concept of “market value” – a wider concept in other contexts, was deemed to be referrable to one or other m odes of determ ining the value under sub clauses (v), (va) or (vb) of Section 7 (iv-A). This aspect was lost sight of by the High Court, in the facts of this case. The reasoning and conclusions of the High Court, are therefore, not sustainable.”
9. Learned Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on para 15 of the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Agra Diocesan Trust Association (supra). However, the same do not support case of the petitioner and it provides that value of the property in case of immovable property shall be deem ed to be the value as computed in terms of sub-section (v),(v-A) or (v-B), as the case may be.
10. I have gone through the judgment rendered by learned Trial Court. Learned Trial Court, by relying upon the judgm ent rendered by this Court in the case of Sm t. Savita Agarwal v. Sharda Math Nyas, 2006 (100) RD 568, came to the conclusion that where revenue is settled in respect of the land, then its m arket value shall be assessed at 30 times of such revenue. Learned Revisional Court relied upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Agra Diocesan Trust Association (supra) for affirming the order passed by the Trial Court.
11. Since the view taken by both the learned courts below is as per law, therefore, this Court does not find any reason to interfere in the m atter. Accordingly, writ petition fails and is dismissed.