Das, J.The appellants with four other persons were tried in the Sessions Court of Ranchi of charges under Sections 395,396 and 395 read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellants were convicted of the offences with which they were charged and have been sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. Some of the appellants have also been directed to pay fines varying from Rs. 300 to Rs. 2,000,

2. The facts are stated with clearness and precision in the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge and it is not necessary to recapitulate them. The first information was laid by Kisto Majhi, nephew of Sridhar Majhi, in whose house the dacoity was committed. It is necessary to mention that the names of the persons concerned in the dacoity were not given in the first information. The dacoity was committed on the night of the 7th July last and the first information was laid at 8 a, m, on the 8th July, At 5 pm, of the 8th July the appellant Kunja. Ray was arrested, On the 9th July the appellant Balaram Kandu was arrested. Meanwhile, on the 8th July, the appellant Prabhudas gave information to the Police of the theft of a double-barrel gun from, his house.

I may mention that a gun was used in the course of the dacoity and the Police took the view that Prabhudas and his brother Jamunadas were concerned in the dacoity. On the 10th July the appellants Prabhudas and Jamunadas were both arrested. On the 11th July Balai, a brother of the appellant Debendra, approached Raja Udha Chandra Singh of Jhalda and told him that his brother Debendra was in some danger and asked the Raja to save him. On the 12th July Balai came to the Raja with the appellants Debendra and Kishori. Debendra and Kishori made confessions to the Raja and to the Sub-Inspector of Police who was present. As a result of the confessions the house of Gopal Majhi, the father of Ratan, and Balai was searched on the morning of the 13th July. The Police recovered a bag of money and certain articles from that house and forthwith arrested Gopal Majhi. Thereupon Ratan and Balai, sons of Gopal, and Saroban, the servant of Gopal, made certain confessions to the Police and they were arrested on the morning of the 14th July. I may mention that nothing being proved against Gopal he was discharged by the committing Magistrate. The appellants Debendra and Kishori were arrested about midday on the 13th July. All the five confessing prisoners were subsequently produced before a Magistrate at Ranchi and their confessions were recorded in accordance with law. The remaining appellants were subsequently arrested. The case as against the appellants rests on the confessions made by five of the appellants Debendra, Kishori, Ratan, Balai and Saroban, and on what the learned Sessions Judge calls the corroborative evidence as to certain particulars. The confessions have been subsequently retracted and although they are nevertheless evidence against the persons making them, it is obvious that they cannot be used as against the co-accused without substantial corroboration.

3. I will first deal with the confessions of Debendra and Kishori. It is contended before us that these confessions are irrelevant as the making of these concessions was caused by an inducement proceeding from a person in authority, and sufficient to give the accused persons grounds which would appear to them reasonable for supposing that by making them they would gain an advantage of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against them. The ease of these appellants is that Raja Udhab Chandra Singh of Jhalda induced them to make the confessions on a promise made by him to them that they would be made approvers in the case and a free pardon granted to them.

4. The learned Sessions Judge thought that there was no substance for this contention on merits and he also came to the conclusion that the Raja was not a person in authority. The term a person in authority has not been defined in the Evidence Act, and although the English decisions cannot be regarded as authorities they may still serve as a valuable guide. I do not propose to go through the cases which have been cited before us on this point; it is sufficient for me lo cite the following passage from Taylor on Evidence, Vol. I:

And first, as to the person by whom the inducement is offered. Here ft is very clear, that if the promise or threat be made by anyone having authority over the prisoner in connextion with the prosecution as, for instance, by the prosecutor, the master or mistress of the prisoner, when the offence concerns such master or mistress, the chairman of the company which is prosecuting him, the constable, or other officer, having him in custody, a Magistrate, or the like the confession will be rejected and not being voluntary. And the same rule will perhaps prevail, though the inducement was not actually offered by the person in authority, if it were held out by any one in his presence, and he by his silence has sanctioned its being made. 11th Edition Vol. I, Section 373.

5. Now the Raja was not only a very important person in the village whom the appellants might reasonably have regarded as having authority in the matter, but was also a Magistrate, and, in my opinion, there can be no doubt whatever that he was a person in authority within the meaning of that term as used in Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act.

6. The next point is whether there was inducement offered by the Raja of Jhalda. Now, on this point the evidence of the Raja is perfectly clear. (After examining the evidence his Lordship proceeded. I have no doubt whatever that the appellants Debendra and Kishori thought that by making the confessions they would gain an advantage or avoid an evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against them, and, as in my opinion, the Raja was a person in authority, these confessions must be rejected as irrelevant.

7. So far as the confessions of Ratan, Balai and Saroban are concerned, I agree with the learned Sessions Judge that they are admissible in evidence. It has been suggested before us that the Police forced them to make the confessions by arresting their father Gopal; but Gopal was properly arrested inasmuch as certain articles which have been properly identified belonging to Sridhar were discovered in his house; and although the committing Magistrate was forced to discharge him, as there was no evidence against him, it is impossible on the evidence to take the view that the Police arrested Gopal only to secure confessions from his sons Balai and Eatan and his servant Saroban.

8. In my opinion these confessions are admissible in evidence, as against the makers thereof. It is quite true that these confessions have been retracted and as a matter of practice the Courts decline to convict accused persons on retracted confessions unless these confessions receive material corroboration; but this is a rule of prudence, not a rule of law; and in this case I am satisfied that the confessions were true and that the appellants Ratan, Balai and Sarobhan have been properly convicted by the learned Sessions Judge. I do not consider that the sentences passed on them are severe and I must, therefore, dismiss the appeals of Ratan, Balai and Sarobhan.

9. The next question is whether the appellant other than Ratan, Balai and Saroban have been properly convicted. I have held that the confessions of Debendra and Kishori are irrelevant. Both Debendra and Kishori are mentioned in the confessions of Rafcan, Balai and Sarobhan; but there is no other evidence against them.

10. It is quite true that u/s 30 the Court may take into consideration a confession made by an accused person as against the co-accused; but as Sir Lawrence Jenkins pointed out in Emperor v. Noni Gopal Gupta [1918] 38 Cal. 559:

While admissions, a word which embraces confessions, are by Section 21 relevant, and may be proved as against the person making them, all that Section 30 provides is, that the Court may take them into consideration, as against other persons.

11. Sir Lawrence Jenkins proceeds to say as follows:

This distinction of language is significant, and it appears to me that its true effect is, that the Court can only treat a confession as lending assurance to other evidence against a co-accused. Thus to illustrate my meaning in the view I take, a conviction on the confession of a co-accused alone would be bad in law. This reading of the section appears to me to gain confirmation from the language of Section 5.

12. When it is remembered that in this case these confessions have been retracted, it will appear how unsafe it would be to place any reliance on these confessions as against the co-accused. Now apart from these confessions, there is absolutely no evidence either against Debendra or Kishori. The case is one of very great suspicion against both of them; but we must guard ourselves against basing convictions on suspicions when there is no legal evidence against the accused persons. In my opinion the appeals of Debendra and Kishori succeed and their conviction and the sentences passed on them must be set aside and they must be forthwith released. (Then dealing with the case of Kunja Ray his-Lordship upheld his conviction. The judgment then further dealing with the case of Prabhudas and Jamunadas proceeded.) I am unable to agree with the learned Sessions Judge that the facts found by him are corroborative of the story told against them in the confessions.

13. Now it has been held that where there are two sets of evidence neither of which alone can be accepted without corroboration, they cannot each in its turn be taken to corroborate the other and joined together so as to justify any Court in acting on such evidence: Empress v. Jadab Das [1900] 27 Cal. 295 The question is: Was there the minimum amount of evidence against them in the case to go to the Jury If there was, then the confessions might be treated as lending assurance to the evidence against them. In my opinion there was not that minimum evidence against either of them which would enable a Judge to send the case before the jury. In other words a conviction on such evidence as there is in the record apart from the confessions would be bad in law. This being the position, their conviction stands on the confessions of the co-accused and on nothing else and is, therefore, bad in law.

14. It is only fair to the learned Sessions-Judge that I should deal with this matter a little more in detail. A gun undoubtedly belonging to these appellants was found in a tank as a result of the statement made to the Police by some of the accused persons; but Prabhudas had already informed the Police that his gun was stolen from his house. It is quite true that his laying information about the gun is consistent with his being in complicity with dacoity; but it is also consistent with his being entirely innocent. If there was nothing else in the case except the fact that a gun belonging to him had been discovered in a tank and that he had laid information to the Police that that gun "was stolen from his house, it would be impossible altogether to convict him. This is why I say there is not that minimum evidence against him to go before the jury. This being the position, the conviction of these appellants rests on the confessions and on nothing more. I would allow the appeals of Jamunadas and Prabhudas, set aside the conviction and the sentences passed on them and direct that they be forthwith released. The fines if paid will be refunded.

15. I will now deal with the case of the appellants Balaram, Sheikh Madari and Sheikh Ibrahim. Each of them has been convicted u/s 396, Indian Penal Code. Balaram has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years and each of the other appellants has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years each. They are mentioned in the confessions of Batan, Balai and Sarobhan but in my opinion there is no other evidence against them. Now these appellants were under Police surveillance and the learned Sessions Judge has based the conviction of these appellants on the ground that they were visited on the night of the occurrence and were found absent from their respective houses. The learned Sessions Judge takes the view that this circumstance in itself corroborates the confession. I am unable to take the view. If there was no other evidence in the case except the fact that on the night of the occurrence these appellants were found absent from their houses, they could not be convicted. That being the position, their conviction rests on the confessions and on nothing else and is, therefore, bad in law. I would allow their appeals, set aside the conviction and the sentences passed on them and direct that they be forthwith released.

16. There remains the case of the appellant Bishundhari Singh who has been convicted u/s 396, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years. Bishundhari Singh has bean mentioned in the confessions of Ratan and Balai; but in my opinion there is no other evidence against him. The learned Sessions Judge has based his conviction on the fact that he absconded and gave a false account of his movements. It is established in the case that he was in Jhalda at or about the time of the occurrence. He was however arrested in Gaya District and told the Police that he was in his kome distriet for several months. The learned Judge has taken the view that the giving of a false account of his movements by Bishundhari Singh is corroborative of the truth of the confessions. I am again unable to agree with the learned Sessions Judge. If there was no other evidence in the case except the fact that he had absconded and when arrested gave a false account of his movements, he could not possibly be convicted of the offence with which he was charged. That being so, his conviction rests Only on the confessions and is, therefore, bad in law.

17. I would allow his appeal, set aside the conviction and the sentence passed on him and direct that he be released from custody.

Scroope, J.

18. I have had the advantage of reading the judgment of my learned brother and I agree that the confessions made by the appellants Debendra Nath Bhattacharya and Kishori are not admissible in evidence having regard to Section 24 of the Evidence Act. The Zamindar of Jhalda locally styled as Baja Udhab Chandra Singh has given his evidence in a very fair and straightforward fashion in this case and after reading it, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that both confessions were the result of hopes held out to the confessing persons that they would be made approvers. In fact the learned Assistant Government Advocate hardly disputes this, but he contends that the "Raja" was not a person in authority within the meaning of the section. The learned Sessions Judge holds the view that even assuming that the confessions were made under such an inducement the Baja had no authority in the matter of the proceedings against the accused, in that it did not lie within him to decide whether they should be made aprovers. The expression "person in authority" has not been defined in the Evidence Act but there is nothing in the section justifying us limiting its application on the line indicated by the learned Sessions Judge. The Zamindar was an Honorary Magistrate with third class powers and in this case moreover it is not disputed that he was called in by the Police as a prominent landlord in the locality to assist them in the investigation and that he did give them valuable assistance. Having regard to these facts and circumstances the conclusion must be that he was a person in authority within the meaning of the section.

19. As regards those appellants who were under Police surveillance, namely, Balaram, Kondu, Sheikh Madari and Sheikh Ibrahim the position is that they are implicated in the retracted confessions of the three appellants Ratan Majhi, Balai Majhi, and Sarohan Mahto and the learned Sessions Judge has rightly gone on the principle that there must be corroboration of the retracted confessions and he finds such corroboration in the fact that they were absent when the Police went to their house on the night of the occurrence. But this is a mere suspicious circumstance stinted consistent with the innocence of the accused and it is not, in my opinion, sufficient corroboration of the retracted confessions.

20. There are numerous rulings on the subject of extent of corroboration required for a retracted confession, for example Emperor v. Noni Gopal Gupta [1918] 38 Cal. 559 and Empress v. Ashootosh Chuckerbutty [1879] 4 Cal. 483 where in effect it has been held that corroboration by circumstantial evidence is not sufficient unless the circumstances constituting corroboration would, if believed to exist, themselves support a conviction. Obviously this is not the case here and these four accused must likewise be acquitted. Applying the same principle to the case of Bishundhari Singh the corroborative evidence is not sufficient for his conviction, as it consists merely in the fact that he gave & false account of his movements after the dacoity and he must be acquitted.

21. As regards Jamuna and his brother Prabhu Das there was direct evidence from Sridhar and Trilochan respectively that they had recognized them. But the learned Sessions Judge has rightly discarded this evidence and the corroboration of the retracted confession consists in their case of the recovery of the gun belonging to both and the fast that Prabhu gave information to the Police on the morning after the dacoity that the gun had been-stolen. It seems to me that if Prabhu was so cool and calculating as to try to put the Police off the scent with the false information of the before of the gun, it is incredible that before lodging an information he would not have assured himself that the gun would never fall into the hands of the Police, There was no necessity for him to report the loss of the gun. It might have been discovered at the time of the renewal of the license, but that would have been some four or five months later, I find it extremely difficult to believe that if he were one of the dacoits, ha would immediately after the dacoits have gone out of his way to put the Police on the right track. This is clearly the position.

Thus the corroborating evidence relied on by the learned Sessions Judge not being inconsistent with the innocence of both these appellants in fact being in favour of it I would hold that they must be acquitted.

23. I concur with my learned brother in his view of the cases of Kunja Rai, Ratan Balai sad Saroban appellants and the sentences passed on them are obviously not excessive having regard to the desperate nature of their offences.