1. Leave granted. Heard the learned counsel for the parties

2. The short and simple question that requires an answer in this appeal is whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the finding of the Sessions Judge, Sonbhadra, that the accused Respondent 2 was not a "juvenile" under the Juvenile Justice Act. The record reveals that in arriving at its above finding the Sessions Judge detailed and discussed the evidence, both oral and documentary, adduced in the enquiry he held pursuant to an earlier direction of the High Court to ascertain the age of Respondent 2 at the material time. The High Court set aside the above finding in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction with the following observation

"It is undisputed that the date of birth mentioned in the student register is admissible in evidence (see Harpal Singh v. State of H. P. ( 1981 (1) SCC 560 [LQ/SC/1980/467] : 1981 SCC(Cri) 208 : 1981 (87) CrLJ 1)). Further in the judgment passed by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Bhoop Ram V. State of U.P. ( 1989 (3) SCC 1 [LQ/SC/1989/214] : 1989 SCC(Cri) 486 : 1989 AIR(SC) 1329) it has been stressed upon that where there is difference in date of birth between school certificate and medical certificate, school certificate should be preferred as the certificate of MO is based on guess." *

3. From the order of the Sessions Judge we find that Respondent 2 examined, amongst others, his father to prove his age but the learned Judge did not find his evidence acceptable. Curiously enough the High Court did not at all advert to this aspect of the matter. Coming now to the above-quoted reason of the High Court for setting aside the impugned order, there cannot be any dispute with its observation that an entry in the school register as to the date of birth of a student is "admissible in evidence" but the High Court was required to decide, keeping in view the judgment of this Court in Dayachand v. Sahib Singh ( 1991 (2) SCC 379 [LQ/SC/1991/127] : 1991 SCC(Cri) 438 : 1991 AIR(SC) 930) (on which reliance was placed by the Sessions Judge), whether the assessment of the Sessions Judge regarding its probative value in the instant case was proper or not

4. In view of the above infirmities in the impugned order we set aside the same and direct the High Court to re-hear and dispose of the revision petition of Respondent 2 in accordance with law. Since the matter is long pending the High Court is requested to comply with this direction as expeditiously a possible. The appeal is thus allowed.