M. R. A. ANSARI, J.

( 1 ) THE appeal and the cross objections arise out of the order of the Motor

Accidents Claims Tribunal, Delhi, (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) dated 20.

3. 1964 in suit No. 6 of 1962 by which the learned Tribunal passed a decree for Rs.

20,000. 00 in favour of the respondents in this appeal. Respondents Nos. 1 and 3

before the Tribunal, namely, Delhi Transport and Mr. Inder Raj, a DTU driver

respectively, have filed the appeal against the order and decree of the learned

Tribunal and the petitioners before the Tribunal have filed the cross objections for

enhancement of the decretal amount to Rs. 89. 600. 00. Both the appeal and the

cross objections, can, therefore, be disposed of by a common judgment. The

appellants and the respondents in this appeal will hereinafter be referred to by their

designation in the lower court.

( 2 ) THE petitioners filed an application before the Tribunal under section 110-A of

the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) claiming a sum of

Rs. 89, 600. 00 by way of compensation for the death of one Jagatri Lal, who is

alleged to have been killed in a motor accident on 12. 11. 1961. According to the

averments in this application, deceased Jagatri Lal, who was employed as a

Manager in the Moti Mahal Hotel and Moti Mahal Restaurant, situated in Darya Ganj,

Delhi, was coming to the Hotel at about 6 P. M. and was crossing the road in front

of the Hotel when he was caught between a D. T. U. Bus No. DLP 564 which had

stopped in front of the Moti Mahal Resturant and had just started from that place

and another DTU bus No. DLP 345 which was coming at a high speed from the Delhi

Gate side. The deceased sustained serious injuries and was removed to the Irwin

Hospital where he succumbed to the injuries later the same night. According to the

petitoners, the accident occurred due to the rashness and negligence of the drivers

of the two DTU buses. The Deceased was earning Rs. 290. 00 per month by way of

salary and was also getting free meals and other amenities at the Hotel. He was

aged about 30 years and was of sound health. The petitioners were the wife and the

minor children of the deceased. They estimated the pecuniary loss suffered by them

as a result of the untimely death of the deceased at Rs. 89,600. 00 and claimed this

amount by way of compensation from the respondents.

( 3 ) THE application was resisted by the respondents mainly on the ground that the

accident occurred only due to the negligence of the deceased himself and not due to

any rashness or negligence on the part of either of the drivers of the two buses. The

following issues were framed by the Tribunal : 1. Whether the vehicles of the Delhi

Transport Undertaking are exempt from provisions of Chapter VIII of the Motor

Vehicles Act If so, what is its effect 2. Whether the death of the Jagatri Lal,

husband of Raj Kumari father of other petitioners, was due to accident caused by

the rash and negligent driving of buses No. DLP 564 and DLP 345 on 12. 11. 1961 at

6. 15 P. M opposite Moti Mahal, Darya Ganj, Delhi . 3. To what amount of

compensation the petitioners are entitled to and from whom . 4. Whether the

deceased was guilty of contributory negligence If so, what is its effect 5. Whether

the applicants are legal heirs of the deceased . 6. Relief.

( 4 ) THE Learned Tribunal held all the issues in favour of the petitioners and against

the respondents and passed a decree for Rs. 20,000. 00 in favour of the petitioners

and against the respondents.

( 5 ) THE first question for determination in this appeal as well as in the cross

objections is whether the deceased met with his death as a result of the negligence

or rashness of either of the drivers of the two buses. It is denied by the respondents

that the deceased received injuries on being hit by one of the buses or by both of

them and that he succumbed to these injuries on the same night. The controversy is

with regard to the manner in which the accident occurred. According to the

petitioners, the deceased was coming to the Moti Mahal Restaurant and for that

purpose, had got down from the Central Patri of the road and had crossed the road

towards the Restaurant when he found that the bus No. DLP 564 which had stopped

near the Moti Mahal Restaurant suddenly started from that place. The deceased

wanted to avoid this bus, and, therefore, re-crossed the road towards the central

patr. Just then, the other bus No. DLP 345 came at a high speed from the Delhi

Gate side and struck against the deceased. The deceased was caught between the

two buses and was crushed. According to the respondents, the deceased was

coming out of the Moti Mahal Restaurant and was crossing the road towards the

central patri in front of the stationary bus and at that time, he saw the bus DLP 345

coming from the Delhi Gate side and wanted to re cross the road in order to come

back to the Hotel. Just, then, the bus No. DLP 564 had started and in order to avoid

this bus, the deceased again went towards the central part. He was obviously

puzzled and started running to and fro recklessly. The driver of the bus DLP 564

stopped it immediately but the driver of the other bus DLP 345 who had found a

clear road ahead of him and who suddenly found the deceased crossing the road in

front of him, could not stop the bus immediately inspite of his best efforts. The

accident could not, therefore, be avoided and it occurred only due to the negligence

of the deceased himself.

( 6 ) BOTH sides have adduced evidence in support of their respective cases. The

evidence adduced on behalf of the petitioners consists of the evidence of 4 alleged

eye witnesses, two of whom, namely. Public witness 4 and 5, are employees of the

Moti Mahal Restaurant, and the other two namely Public witness 8 and 10, are

residents of the locality. The evidence of Public witness 4 and 5 is assailed on the

ground that they are interested witnesses being employees of the Moti Mahal

Restaurant where the deceased also was employed. This is, however, not a valid

reason for rejecting their evidence inasmuch as the presence of Public witness 4 and

5 is natural and probable. The evidence of these two witnesses is corroborated by

the evidence of Public witness 8 and 10 against whom the same charge of being

interested witnesses cannot be levelled. The fact that these witnesses are residents

of the locality makes their presence at the time of the accident both natural and

probable. One of these witnesses, namely, Public witness 8 actually gave the report

to the police which was treated as the first information report in this case. The

evidence of these witnesses is consistent. On the other hand, the evidence adduced

on behalf of the respondents is of doubtful nature. R. Ws. 1 and 3 are the

Conductors of the two buses which were involved in the accident and R. Ws. 6 and

7 are the drivers of the two buses. They are interested witnesses and they would

naturally be anxious to absolve themselves from any responsibility in respect of this

accident. These witnesses, it is doubtful whether R. Ws. 1 and 3 were at all in a

position to witness the accident. Conductors usually stay at the back of the bus and

they would not know of what would be happening in front of the bus. As a matter of

fact, both these witnesses admit that it was only when the passengers raised an

alarm that they became aware of the accident having occurred. R. Ws. 2, 4 and 5

are said to be passengers travelling in one or the other of the two buses involved in

the accident. R. W. 2 has admitted that he did not witness the accident before the

other passengers raised an alarm. R. W. 4 has stated that he was on the 5th seat

from the front of the bus. It is doubtful whether he was in a position to witness the

accident. He did not sign the complaint books in the bus nor was he examined by

the police during the investigation of this case. Similarly, R. W. 5 was also sitting on

the 5th seat from the front of the bus and he was also not examined by the police

during the investigation of this case. As a matter of fact, he was not present when

the police arrived at the scene of the accident. The evidence adduced on behalf of

the respondents is not sufficient to rebut the evidence adduced on behalf of the

petitioners.

( 7 ) THERE is, however, very little difference between the evidence adduced on

behalf of both sides with regard to the manner in which the accident occurred.

Whichever evidence is accepted it will prove that the accident occurred due to the

culpable negligence of the driver of the bus No. DLP 345. It matters little whether

the deceased was crossing the road towards the Moti Mahal Restaurant or to some

other place. The admitted facts are that he was crossing the road in front of the

Moti Mahal Restaurant. The road which runs in front of the Moti Mahal Restaurant is

a very busy thoroughfare and a duty is cast upon the drivers of motor vehicles to

drive their vehicles carefully and in such a manner that they would be able to stop

the vehicles immediately in any emergency. Admittedly, the bus DLP 345 did not

stop immediately after knocking down the deceased but stopped after travelling a

distance of 25 to 30 yards. This would indicate that the bus DLP 345 was travelling

at a fairly high speed. High speed and low speed are relative terms depending upon

the circumstances of each case. A speed of say 20 or 30 miles an hour on a National

High way cannot be called excessive, but the same speed on a busy thoroughfare

would be called excessive. Apart from the duty cast on the driver of the bus DLP 345

to drive it in such a way as to avoid any accident in case of people suddenly crossing

the road, there was an additional duty cast upon the driver of this bus to drive it

more carefully in view of the fact that he was approaching a stationery bus and was

overtaking it while it had just started. He ought to have anticipated that some

person might cross the road just in front of the stationary bus after it had started to

move and might suddenly come in front of his own bus. But if the evidence of Public

witness 4, 5, 8 and 9 is to be accepted and there is no reason why it should not be

accepted it is clear that the driver of the bus DLP 345 was able to see the deceased

when he was crossing the road from the central patri towards the Hotel when the

stationary bus started to move and he ought to have anticipated that the deceased

might re-cross the road in order to reach the central patr. The driver of the bus DLP

345 did not act as a prudent driver under the circumstances and in not taking any

precautions to avoid the accident, he was guilty of culpable negligence. I have,

therefore, no difficulty in agreeing with the finding of the learned Tribunal that the

accident occurred because of the rashness or the negligence of the driver of the bus

DLP 345. Even if it is assumed for a moment that the deceased was guilty of

contributory negligence, it would not absolve the driver of the bus DLP 345 from the

consequences of his own culpable negligence.

( 8 ) THE next question for consideration is whether the petitioners are entitled to

claim any compensation from the respondents and if so, what is the amount of

compensation which they are entitled to claim. Before considering this question, I

have to decide whether the cross-objections filed by the petitioners are

maintainable, because an objection has been raised on behalf of the respondents

against the maintainability of the cross objections. It is contended by Mr. R. L.

Tondon, learned counsel for the respondents that the Act, while providing for the

filing of an appeal by an aggrieved person against the order of the Tribunal, does

not provide for the filing of any cross objections by the respondents in the appeal.

On the other hand, it is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that

although the Act does not specifically provide for the filing of cross objections in

appeal, the provisions of Order 41, Rule 22 Civil Procedure Code will enable the

respondents in the appeal to file the cross objections. The learned counsel for the

respondents has not been able to cite any decision under the Act in support of his

contention. He has, however, relied upon a decision of the Patna High Court

reported in Mjs Bokaro and Bangur Ltd. and others v. Kathara Coal Co. Ltd. and

others1. That was a case under the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and

Development) Act, 1957. Section 20 of that Act provided for the filing of an appeal

against the order of the Tribunal constituted under the said Act determining the

compensation payable in respect of the land acquired by the Government. There

was no specific provision in the said Act for the filing of cross objections. Cross

objections were, however, filed within one month of the service of the notice of the

hearing of the appeal. An objection was taken against the maintainability of the

cross objections on the ground that the said Act did not provide for the filing of the

cross objections. The objection was upheld with the following observations: There is

no provision in the Act analogous to that of Order 41, Rule 22 the Code of Civil

Procedure,: Right of cross objection, like a right of appeal is a creature of statute.

The determination (of compensation) has been expressly made appealable, but

short of an appeal under and in accordance with section 20 of the Act it cannot be

canvassed in the Civil Court. The only manner in which that determination by the

Tribunal, viz. its award can be subjected to a review is by appealing against the

whole or part of it under section 20. Cross Objection is thus ruled out. "

( 9 ) THESE observations undoubtedly support the contention of the learned counsel

for the appellant. But there is a decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Manjula

Devi Bhutta and another v. Manjusri Raha and others. 2 Which is a direct decision

on this point in which it was held that cross objections could be filed in an appeal

under section 110-D of the Act. The reasoning on which it was so held was that as

soon as the Court becomes seized of an appeal, even where an appellate jurisdiction

is conferred under a special statute, the rules of practice and procedure of this court

applicable to a civil appeal will, in the absence of any specific rule to the contrary,

govern such appeal. In laying down the above rule, the Madhya Pradesh High Court

followed the decision of the Privy Council in Secretary af State far India v. Chelikani

Rama Rao3, and the decision of the Supreme Court in National Sewing Thread Co.

Ltd. v. James Chandwick and Brother Ltd. 4. I have myself followed the decision of

the Madhya Pradesh High Court in W. S. Bhagsinh and Sons and mother v. Om

Prakash Kaith and another.

( 10 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents, however, challenges the correctness

of the rule laid down by the Madhya Pradesh High Court on the ground that that

judgment has not fully appreciated the significance of the word "decree" appearing

in Order 41 Rule 22 Civil Procedure Code. According to the learned Counsel, the

judgment or order of the Tribunal does not amount to a decree and that it is only

where an appeal is filed against a decree that Rule 22 of Order 41, Civil Procedure

Code provides for the filing of cross- objections. I am unable to accept this

contention. I am doubtful whether the order of the Tribunal does not amount to a

decree. The order of the Tribunal is an executable order. But even assuming for a

moment that order of the Tribunal does not strictly amount to a decree within the

meaning of section 2 (2) Civil Procedure Code, the applicability of the provisions of

Rule 22, Order 41, Civil Procedure Code does not depend upon the question whether

the judgment or order appealed against is a decree. When once an appeal reaches

the High Court, it has to be determined according to the rules of practice and

procedure of that court, no special procedure having been prescribed under the Act

for the disposal of the appeal. Order 41 Civil Procedure Code prescribes the

procedure for the disposal of an appeal by an appellate Court. When no special

procedure is prescribed under the Act under which the judgment or order appealed

against is passed, then, the appeallate court has to follow the procedure prescribed

under Order 41 Civil Procedure Code for the disposal of the appeal. Rule 22 of Order

41 Civil Procedure Code forms part of the procedure prescribed under order 41 Civil

Procedure Code for the disposal of the appeal. In the case of National Sewing

Thread Co, Ltd, referred to above, the Supreme Court was dealing with a case of an

appeal in the High Court against the order of the Registrar of Trade Marks under the

Trade Marks Act, 1940. The order of the Registrar certainly cannot be called a

decree within the meaning of section 2 (2) Civil Procedure Code But even in such a

case, the Supreme Court held that when once an appeal was filed in the High Court

against the order of the Registrar of Trade Marks, that appeal was to be determined

according to the rules of practice and procedure of that court. Therefore, applying

the same principles to the present case, I see no legal impediment in

entertaining ,the cross objections filed by the petitioners

( 11 ) ANOTHER objection regarding the maintainability of the cross objections has

been advanced by the learned, counsel for the respondents on the ground that the

cross objections are barred by time even under Rule 22 of Order 41 Civil Procedure

Code Under the said Rule, the cross objections have to be filed within one month

from the date of the service of the notice of the date fixed for the hearing of the

appeal. In the present case, the notice of appeal was served on the petitioners on 1-

12-1964, but the cross objections were filed on 2-2-1965. There is thus a delay of

31 days in filing the cross objections. The petitioners have filed an application C. M.

No. 1179/71 for condonation of the delay in filing (he cross objections. In this

application, it is stated that the first petitioner was an illiterate lady and was not

conversant with the technicalities of law and procedure of the court and was under

the bonafide belief that as for normal appeals the period of limitation for filing the

cross objections was 90 days. This explanation obviously is unacceptable because

ignorance of law is not an excuse and as the petitioners were represented by a

counsel in the lower court, they would have been properly advised by the counsel

with regard to the period of limitation for filing the cross objections. But there is a

special circumstance to be taken into consideration in this case and, that is, that two

of the petitioners are minors. The period of their minority has to be taken into

account for the purpose of limitation. Further, the period of limitation for filing the

cross objections is not one which is prescribed under the Limitation Act and the

period of limitation prescribed under Rule 22 of Order 41 Civil Procedure Code need

not be as strictly applied as in cases coming under the Limitation Act. Rule 22 itself

provides for condonation of the delay in filing the cross objections, because it

provides for the filing of the cross objections within such further time as the

appellate court may see fit to allow. This is a case where the rights of minor are

involved, I deem it necessary in the interest of justice to condone the delay in filing

the cross objections.

( 12 ) THIS leads me to a consideration of the quantum of compensation to which

the petitioners would be entitled. According to the petitioners, the deceased was

getting a salary of Rs. 290. 00 per month in addition to free meals in the Hotel and

other amenities. One of the partners of the Moti Mahal Restaurant has been

examined as A. W, 11 to prove this fact. According to A. W. 11, the deceased was

getting a salary of Rs. 270. 00 per month as Manager of the Moti Mahal Restaurant

and Hotel. He also produced the Hotel register which showed that the deceased was

getting a salary of Rs. 170. 00 per month. This part of the evidence of A. W. 11 has

not been challenged by the respondents and has also been accepted by the learned

Tribunal. But A. W. 11 has proceeded to state that in addition to Rs. 170. 00 per

month, the deceased was getting Rs. 120/ per month by way of remuneration for

attending to the parties arranged by the Hotel outside. Although this portion of A.

W, 11s evidence has also not been seriously challenged by the respondents, the

learned Tribunal has not accepted this evidence on the ground that this is not

supported by any entries in the Hotel Registers. I am afraid that the learned

Tribunal has made a mistake in his assumption that this portion of A. W. 11s

evidence is not supported by any entries in the Hotel Registers. A. W. 11 has stated

in his evidence that he has produced the Rokar of the Hotel in which it is shown that

the deceased was getting Rs. 120. 00 per month by way of remuneration for

attending to the parties arranged outside the Hotel. It was open to the respondents

to have challenged A. W. 11s evidence with reference to the entries in this Rokar.

The respondents did not choose to do so and, therefore, it must be assumed that

the Rokar did contain entries which showed that in addition to the salary of Rs. 170.

00 per month, the deceased was getting Rs 120. 00 per month by way of

remuneration. The learned Tribunal, was therefore, not justified in rejecting this

portion of A. W. 11s evidence.

( 13 ) IT would, therefore, appear that the deceased was getting salary and

remuneration amounting to Rs. 290. 00 per month. It is not disputed that the

deceased was getting free meals in the Hotel. The learned Tribunal was, therefore,

quite right in estimating the personal expenditure of the deceased at Rs. 50. 00 per

month. That would leave balance of Rs. 240. 00 per month which the deceased was

able to save and which was available to the petitioners for their maintenance. The

deceased appears to have been anxious to give a proper education to his children,

because it is in evidence that both the children are studying at Cambridge School,

Darya Ganj Delhi. In the normal course, it would be reasonable to expect that the

income of the deceased would increase as years passed by. But even without taking

this factor into consideration, there can be no difficulty in concluding that the

petitioners were deprived of financial assistance from the deceased to the tune of

Rs. 240. 00 per month. The deceased was aged about 30 years at the time of his

death. The learned Tribunal has estimated the span of life which has been cut short

by the accident at 15 years. In other words, the teamed Tribunal has estimated the

life expectancy of the deceased at 46 years. I think this is a very conservative

estimate. It would be reasonable to expect that the deceased would have at least

lived up to the age of 55 years. That would mean that the span of life that was cut

short by the untimely death of the deceased ought to be estimated at 25 years.

Taking all the relevant factors into consideration, I determine the compensation

which the petitioners would be entitled to receive at Rs. 50,000. 00. The

compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal would, therefore, be enhanced by

Rs. 30,000. 00

( 14 ) IN the result, the appeal is dismissed to costs in the appeal and the cross object

and the cross objections are partly allowed to the extent indicated above. No order as to costs.