Sinha, J.This is an appeal from the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge of -Cuttack in execution proceedings, dismissing the appellants objection u/s 47, Civil P. C. The facts leading up to this appeal are as follows : In 1913, the decree-holder-respondent obtained a decree for maintenance against her husband at the rate of Rs. 100 per mensem. The decree for maintenance at the rate aforesaid was charged upon certain properties belonging to her husband. There were a large number of items of properties thus charged. The appellant purchased a moiety share in a certain estate in which a six annas share was purchased by a third party, and the remaining two annas was purchased by the decree-holder herself in execution of her decree for maintenance in a previous execution case. The present execution case relates to recovery of Rs. 3600 being arrears of maintenance for three years for the period August, 1938 to July 1941. The decree-holder proposed to proceed against the eight annas share purchased by the appellant.

2. It appears that most of the properties charged with the payment of maintenance as decreed in favour of the respondent have passed out of the hands of her husband. The appellant made an application u/s 47, Civil P. C, objecting to the realisation of the entire sum of Rs. 3600 by sale of his share in the property aforesaid. His contention in the lower Court as also in this Court was that the decree-holder, having purchased a portion of the properties charged with the payment of her maintenance, has herself become one of the judgment-debtors, with. the result that the indivisibility of the mortgage has been broken and that, therefore, the appellant was liable only for the payment of the proportionate sum out of the entire decretal amount. His contention, therefore, amounts to this that he is liable to contribute only that portion out of the amount, for which execution has been taken out, as would represent the value of his property in proportion to the value of the entire properties charged in relation to the entire decretal sum. The Court below has negatived this contention which has been repeated in this Court in appeal. In my opinion, there is a short answer to-this contention. It appears that the decree-holder purchased the two annas share in the estate, that is to say, in one of the items of the properties which were the subject-matter of the charge, free from all encumbrances. In other words, when that item of property was published for sale, it was advertised that the sale would be held without any liability for future maintenance attaching to that property. If the decree-holder had purchased that property burdened with, the liability for the payment of future maintenance, there may have been some ground for the contention raised on behalf of the appellant. If the appellants contention were given effect to, the decree-holders purchase of the property in the previous execution would go for nothing.

3. Again, the provisions of the last paragraph of Section 60, T. P. Act, cannot be applied to a decree which is not for a lump sum, as in the present case. The liability of the properties charged is a recurring one until a certain contingency happens. Until the happening of that event, the amount goes on accumulating from month to month, and the decree-holder is entitled to proceed in execution after every month that her monthly allowance falls due. Hence, it cannot be said that the principle of splitting up of the mortgage security is applicable in its full force to a decree of this nature. Every part of the property charged is liable for the payment of the decretal debt, and this liability is a recurring one. By purchasing a portion of the property charged, the decree-holder cannot be said to have split up a claim which had not accrued on the date of the purchase but which was to accrue in the future. It is a little difficult to understand how a charge which had not ripened into a present claim could be said to have been split up by an act of the decree-holder in relation to execution proceedings taken for realisation of a debt which had accrued due at the date of the proceedings.

4. Another difficulty in the way of the applicability of Section 60 (last paragraph), T. P. Act, to this case is that, by virtue of Section 100 of the Act, it is only where immovable property of one person has been made security for the payment of money to another person by act of parties or by operation of law, that such a charge has been made analogous to a simple mortgage on that property. In the present case, can it be said that the charge has been created either by act of parties or by operation of law It has been held in Mt. Basumati Kuer v. Mt. Harbansi Kuer A. I. R. 1941 Pat. 95 that where a decree incorporates a compromise creating a specific charge upon the immovable property of a judgment-debtor, it is a charge within the meaning of Section 100, T. P. Act, on the well established principle that a compromise decree is nothing more than a contract between the parties with the seal of the Court superimposed, but, nevertheless, it is an act of the parties. In this case it does not appear that the charge was created by consent of the parties. If that is so, the charge was created by a decree of the Court which, on the authority of the decisions in AIR 1940 163 (Nagpur) and Durga Prasad v. Mt. Tulsa Kuar A. I. R. 1989 ALL. 579 is neither a charge created by act of parties nor one created by operation of law. Hence, Section 100, T. P. Act, cannot be said to apply to the present case. That being so, Section 60 also is out of the way of the decree-holder.

5. Another possible view is that every time the decree-holder is proceeding by way of execution, it is a fresh decree that is being put into execution, that is to say, it is a decree for maintenance, creating a charge on a certain property of the judgment-debtor and entitling the decree-holder to realise the same by taking out execution, without the necessity for fresh suits after every default in the payment of the decree, and is in the nature of a composite decree which is not one single decree, but comprises as many decrees for payment and realisation by sale of the properties charged as there are defaults. If this view is correct, it must be held that the purchase by the decree-holder in the previous execution case of one of the items of the properties charged would not attract the operation of Section 60, when a fresh execution is taken out for realisation of further amounts of maintenance accruing, due by the default of the judgment-debtor-see in this connexion the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Kabul Chand Vs. Badri Das where their Lordships are reported to have held that where the same property has been charged or mortgaged several times, and the mortgagee realises a prior charge by sale of one of the properties, that does not make him liable to the disability created by the last. paragraph of Section 60 in enforcing his charge in its entirety against some only of the properties mortgaged to him in the later deed. The decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Bohra Thakur Das v. Collector of Aligarh 32 All. 612 is a clearer authority on this point. In that case their Lordships of the Judicial Committee held that where village K was. mortgaged in 1861, and that village as also-another village A was mortgaged in 1870, and; the mortgagee purchased village K in execution of his mortgage decree on the first mortgage, the owner of the equity of redemption in village A could not compel the mortgagee to agree to redemption of A on payment of the proportionate sum only, and that the village A was liable for the whole mortgage debt in respect of the second mortgage. For the reasons given above, it must be held that the decision of the Court below is entirely correct in law, and the appeal must accordingly be dismiased with costs.

Das, J.

6. I agree.