B.K. Mullick, J.On the 5th January 1925 the petitioner Daraga Gope laid an information before the Police complaining that his landlord Bajrangi Singh and others had forcibly carried off 9 maunds of paddy from his house because he had refused the landlords request for the customary gift of milk and curds. Previous to this on the same day a counter-information had been lodged before the Police by the landlord against the petitioner charging him and his brothers with wrongfully seizing and confining the landlords ploughman while the latter was passing the petitioners house. It was alleged that, previously there had been a quarrel between the petitioners party and the zemindars servants about the sowing of some paddy and that the zemindars servant was seized in order to annoy the zemindar.
2. The Police investigated both cases and reported that the zemindars complaint was true and the petitioners complaint was false. The zemindars information, which was numbered by the Police as Case No. 1 of 1925, has ended in the conviction of the petitioner and is now under appeal.
3. On the 15th January the officer, who investigated into the petitioners information submitted his final report declaring it to be false and On the 3rd February under the orders of the Inspector he submitted a formal complaint to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Patna charging the petitioner with offences under Sections 182 and 211, Indian Penal Code. In the meantime on the 5th January the petitioner, finding that the Police had reported his case to be false, filed a formal complaint before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate repeating the allegations made in his information to the Police and on the 6th February, 1925, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, after perusing the Police report above referred to, dismissed the complaint u/s 203, Cr.P.C. On the same day he passed the following order on the Sub-Inspectors written complaint of the 3rd February; "Summon Daroga Gope under Sections 211/182, Indian Penal Code for 21th February 1925."
4. We are now asked in revision to set aside this order on the ground that the prosecution of the petitioner cannot proceed without the written complaint of the Magistrate who took cognizance of the petitioners complaint of the 25th January.
5. Now Clause (6) of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. directs that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under the following sections of the Code, namely, Sections 193, 194, 195, 196, 199, 200, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the complaint in writing of such Court or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate. In the present case the recording of the complaint of the 25th January was a judicial proceeding, and the first question is whether laying a false information before the Police on the 5th January was an offence committed in; or in relation to the complaint, which was lodged by the petitioner before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate on the 25th January.
6. Admittedly the offence was not, committed in the judicial proceeding. But was it committed "in relation" to it This raises a point upon which there has been some diversity of opinion but the tendency seems to be to give the words of Section 195(b) as wide an application as possible It is clear that some of the offences enumerated in the clause are capable of being committed in relation to a judicial proceeding which did not exist, False evidence, for instance, may be fabricated for a contemplated in or property may be fraudulently concealed in contemplation of an execution proceeding. The clause applies if the judicial proceeding is in existence at the time when it, is sought to prosecute the offender for the offence in question.
7. With regard to a false information to the Police, it may be argued that the offence is a contempt which cannot possibly be said to have been committed "in relation to" any subsequent contempt, each repetition being a separate independent and complete act. On the other hand if two offences are even remotely connected by the relationship of cause and effect, then the first may be said to have been committed in relation to the second. It may be that the commission of the latter offence may never have been intended, but if it is in fact the consequence of the former offence, then Section 195 applies. Here it may be said that the laying of the false charge on the 5th January caused the Police to submit a report against the petitioner which in its turn caused the petitioner to institute a judicial proceeding before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate by lodging the complaint of the 25th January and that, therefore, the offence of the 5th January was committed, in relation to a judicial proceeding.
8. This was the line of reasoning in Hardwar Pal v. Emperor 16 Ind. Cas. 510 : 34 A. 552 : 10 A.L.J. 61 : 13 Cri.L.J. 702. On the other hand in Jagat Chandra Mazumdar v. Queen Empress 26 C. 786 : 3 C.W.N. 491 : 13 Ind. Dec. 1103, the offence of fabrication of false evidence was said to have been committed by a Police Officer in the course of an investigation; but it does not appear that any judicial proceeding followed as a result of that investigation and, therefore, it was held that no sanction under the Cr.P.C. of 189 was required. In Brown v. Ananda Lal Mullick 36 Ind. Cas. 857 : 20 C.W.N. 1347 : 18 Cr.L.J. 25 : 25 C.L.J. 59 : 44 C. 650, a charge of theft was laid before the Police and was followed up by a complaint in Court upon which process was issued and a trial held. After the discharge in this trial the accused sought to prosecute the complainant for laying a false charge before the Police and it was held that this could not be done without a complaint under Clause (b) of Section 195, Cr.P.C. from the Court which discharged the accused. In In re Parameswara Nambudri 31 Ind. Cas. 161 : 39 M. 677 : 18 M.L.T. 322 : 16 Cr.L.J. 721 , the difference between Clause (e) and Clause (b) of Section 195 was pointed out and. it was held that Clause (b) was applicable in a case where the offence of fabricating false evidence was committed in respect of a promissory note before the institution of a trial suit for its enforcement, and where the application to prosecute the offender u/s 193, Indian Penal Code was made after the institution of such suit. In Shaikh Muhammad Yassin Vs. Emperor, , a complaint was lodged before the Magistrate after the Police had reported the information lodged by him to be false. It was sought to prosecute the complainant for laying a false charge before the Police without a complaint in writing by the Magistrate who took cognizance of the complaint. It was held that Section 195 applied.
9. I think, therefore, that in the present case the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of the 3rd February summoning the petitioner u/s 211, Indian Penal Code, was without jurisdiction on the ground that the offence was committed in relation to a judicial, proceeding instituted before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate on the 25th January and that the complaint in writing of the Court was necessary under Clause (b) of Section 195.
10. The next question is whether even if the proceedings in respect of Section 211, Indian Penal Code are bad, a prosecution under s 18, Indian Penal Code can continue. On this point it is urged on behalf of the petitioner that if the offence of the 5th January was one falling u/s 211, Indian Penal Code, the Magistrate cannot split un the offence so as to give himself jurisdiction.
11. It is true that the Bombay High Court has taken this view in Empress v. Arjun 7 B. 184 : 4 Ind. Dec. 124 but the Calcutta High Court in Bhokteram v. Heera Kolita 5 C. 181 : 2 Ind. Dec. 728 has held that it is open to the Court to convict under the minor offence u/s 182, Indian Penal Code, even though the major offence u/s 211, Indian Penal Code has been committed. It is clear that an offence u/s 211 must always include an offence u/s 182 and I do not see why the Court should not convict of the minor offence if it so chooses. Reliance is placed by the learned Vakil for the petitioner on Giridhari Naik v. Empress 5 C.W.N. 727. In that case it was held that a false charge of theft having been laid before the Police there should be a prosecution u/s 211 and not u/s 182. The decision purports to have been based on Karim Baksh v. Queen-Empress 17 C. 574 : 8 Ind. Dec. 922, but with the greatest respect it does not appear that the Full Bench in that case laid down any such proposition. What the Full Bench decided was that a person who sets the Criminal Law in motion by making a false charge to the Police of a cognizable offence institutes criminal proceedings within the meaning of Section 211 of the Penal Code. The difference between an offence u/s 182 and an offence under s 211 was noticed in Raghavendra v. Kashinathbhat 19 B. 717 : 10 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 480. Every false charge made to the Police is not necessarily an offence u/s 211. If the intention to injure is absent, then the offence falls u/s 182 and there is no reason why, if the prosecutor is unable or unwilling, to prove intention, that is to say, malice, he should not be permitted to take a conviction u/s 182.
12. In the present case, therefore, although the Sub-Divisional Magistrate will have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence u/s 211, the will be competent to investigate the complaint as regards Section 12 which does not require the complaint in writing of the Magistrate who took cognizance of the complaint of the 25th January.
13. It appears, however, that the petitioner has already been convicted in the counter-case and the necessity for prosecuting him for making a false charge is not clear. If the Appeal Court maintains the sentence of imprisonment which we learn has been passed upon the petitioner, there is little object in punishing him again for giving false information to the Police.
14. The application in revision is dismissed.
Jwala Prasad, J.
15. I agree.