At the hearing of this application to review the judgment given by Mr. Justice Bakewell and myself in S.A. No. 1928 of 1918 it was argued (1) that it was competent for the appellant to prefer a single combined appeal against the preliminary and the final decrees if the dates permitted him to do so;

(2) that the grounds of appeal to the District Court referred to both the preliminary and final decrees;

(3) that the Court-fee calculated upon the amount ascertained and embodied in the final decree was sufficient to enable the appellants to appeal against the preliminary decree also.

The first two contentions are right and do not require to be refuted. The first is supported by the decisions of Balwantsing Ramchandra v. Sakharam Mancharam (33 I.C., 137), and Dattatraya v. Ajmuddin (18 Bom., L.R., 76). In our judgment, which is sought to be reviewed, it was conceded that the appellant in the District Court was entitled to appeal from both decrees and that he was not too late when he appealed against the final decree, to appeal also against the preliminary decree. It was also conceded that the District Judge might have had regard to the nature of the grounds of appeal as stated in the appeal memorandum. At the same time it is undeniable that the date of the original decree and the valuation of the appeal are far more material than the grounds of appeal for determining whether the appeal is to be treated as one against the preliminary or the final decree or against both, and it was in that view that our judgment proceeded to find that the respondents before us had in the District Court appealed only against the final decree.

The third contention cannot stand in face of the decision in Srinivasacharlu v. Perindevamma (I.L.R., 39 Mad., 725) [LQ/MadHC/1915/294] , which decided that if the appeal in a suit for accounts is from the whole decree the appeallant is bound by the plaintiff's valuation in the plaint. This is a Full Bench decision of this Court which followed Samiya Mavali v. Minammal (I.L.R., 23 Mad., 490), and I am bound by it. It was argued before the Full Bench that as sub-Sect. 4 of Sect, 7 of the Court Fees Act differs from other sub-sections in that it refers to the Memorandum of Appeal as well as to the plaint, the appellant was at liberty to value the appeal as he pleased but their Lordships did not accept that argument. Reference under Court Fees Act 1870 (I.L.R., 29 Mad., 367), and Ramakrishna Reddi v. Kotta Kota Reddi (I.L.R., 30 Mad., 96) [LQ/MadHC/1906/81] , Subramania Chetty v. Palachakrapani Chettiar (13 I.C., 386), and Lakshmi v. Maru Devi (I.L.R. 37 Mad., 29), being cases which dealt with the valuation of appeals in suits based on mortgages have no application to the valuation of appeals in suits falling under sub-Sect. 4 of Sect.

7. In the Allahabad High Court there is a decision of a single Judge in Bhola Nath v. Parsotam Das (I.L.R., 82 All., 517) which takes a different view of Sect. 7, Court Fees Act, from that taken by this High Court, but I must follow the ruling of the Full Bench.

I am told that the practice in the office is to collect only one fee for an appeal against both the preliminary and the final decrees according to the value of the subject matter in dispute in the appeal. If the practice of the Court is in any way opposed to the ruling of the Full Bench it cannot be taken as a guide for deciding the point which has now arisen. If the amount ascertained to be due when the final decree is passed is greater than the amount at which the plaintiff valued his relief in the first instance and if the court-fees on the appeal against both the preliminary and final decrees are paid on the larger amount, it would be reasonable to treat the greater as including the lessor amount; but in the present case the relief sought was valued in the plaint at Rs. 2,600 and the amount decreed in the final decree was Rs. 353-8-0 and although this latter amount was on a petition corrected into Rs. 2,860 the appellant in the District Court who presented his appeal on 10th September 1917 before the amendment was made on 26th September 1917, paid court-fees on Rs. 353 only. It seems obvious from this fact that no competent appeal was presented within the limitation period against the preliminary decree; and this being so, the review petition must fail. I dismiss it with costs.