N.M. Golvalker, J.

This is an appeal by the Defendant No. 1 against the decision of Bhutt J. (as he then was) in Second Appeal No. 112 of 1950 decided on the 22nd November 1956 reversing the decrees of both the lower Courts dismissing the Plaintiff-Committees suit for possession.

The Plaintiff Municipal Committee filed a suit challenging the validity of the sale of its property to the Defendant No. 1 by Defendant. No. 2 in his capacity as its Officer-in-Charge during its supersession. Defendant No. 2 died during the pendency of the second appeal. Briefly stated the relevant facts are these. The Plaintiff-Committee was superseded in 1943 and the Defendant No. 2 was appointed by the Provincial Government as its Officer-in-Charge. The Plaintiff-Committee owned plots Nos. 166 and 169 within the Burhanpur municipal area. These plots were acquired by the Provincial Government under the Land Acquisition Act for the Plaintiff-Committee with a view to keep them open and remove congestion in that area. The Defendant No. 1 was the owner of the neighbouring house. He was in need of some area from these plots for better enjoyment of his own house property. He thereupon persuaded the Defendant No. 2 and prevailed upon him to transfer to him site A from plot No. 166, and site B from plot No. 169 under the sale deed dated the 21st December 1944, site C from plot No. 166 on the 26th November 1945, and site D from plot No. 169 on the 26th February 1946. These sites have been delienated on the plaint map. The Plaintiff-Committee contended that the Defendant No. 2 had no power to transfer this municipal property under the provisions of the C. P. and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922, and the transfers were also fraudulent effected by the Defendant No. 2 acting in collusion with the Defendant No. 1, and were, therefore, not binding on the Committee. The Plaintiff-Committee therefore, claimed possession of those sites. In the alternative, the Committee claimed damages from the Defendant No. 2. Both the Defendants contested the claim of the Plaintiff-Committee. The original Court as also the first lower appellate Court found against the Plaintiff-Committee in all respects and dismissed the suit mainly on the ground that the Defendant No. 2 as Officer-in-Charge had power to transfer the property. In second appeal, it was held by the learned single Judge that the Defendant No. 2 had no power under the Act to transfer the property which had vested in His Majesty during the period of the Committees supersession. Accordingly he allowed the appeal and directed the Defendant No. 1 to place the Plaintiff-Committee in vacant possession of all the four sites in suit after removal by him of the materials of the structures erected thereon within a period of three months failing which the Plaintiff-Committee was allowed to obtain possession through Court. As against the Defendant No. 2 the appeal was dismissed as he had died during the pendency and no legal representatives had been brought in his place.

Before us, the only ground that was pressed was with regard to the power to the Defendant No. 2 to sell the property vested in the Municipal Committee during the period of its supersession. The question turns on Sub-section of Section 57 of the C. P. and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922. Sub-section (2) of Section 57 gives to the Government power to supersede a Municipal Committee. The third Sub-section states the consequences of supersession. It runs as follows:

If a committee is so dissolved or superseded the following consequences shall ensue:

(a) all members of the committee shall, as from the date of the order, vacate their offices as such members;

(b) all powers and duties of the committee may, until the committee is reconstituted, be exercised and performed by such person or persons as the Provincial Government may appoint in that behalf;

(c) all property vested in it shall, until the committee is reconstituted, vest in His Majesty for the purposes of the Province.

Learned Counsel for the Appellant urged that Clauses (b) and (c) of Sub-section (3) of Section 57 had to be read conjunctively and not disjunctively and together with the Rules framed under Section 42 of the Act. It was said that under Section 42 and Rule 2 the Committee was authorized to transfer any immovable property vested in it if such property was no longer required or was not likely to be required in the near future for the purpose of the Act or if the transfer was in the interest of the Committee; that as under Clause (b) the person appointed as administrator of the Municipal Committee could exercise all powers and duties of the Committee, therefore the Defendant No. 2 was competent to sell the property; and that the land, which was sold to the Appellant, was not required by the Municipal Committee and did not yield any income to it.

We are unable to accept this contention. It is no doubt true that the administrator appointed under Clause (b) exercises all powers and duties of the Committee without distinction or restriction and can, therefore, sell property belonging to the Municipal Committee. The sites in question no doubt vested in the Municipal Committee under Section 40 of the Act when they were acquired by the Government under the Land Acquisition Act for the Municipal Committee.

But when the Committee was superseded, these sites along with other property vested in "His Majesty for the purposes of the Province" until the reconstitution of the Committee. The effect of this vesting under Clause (c) in His Majesty was that not only the beneficial interest but the title to the property also vested in His Majesty for the purposes of the Province and so long as the Municipal Committee was not reconstituted the ownership of the property stood transferred by the operation of law to the Provincial Government who became its legal owner. On the Committee being superseded, it lost all right, title or interest in the property in question. It follows, therefore, that the administrator had no power whatsoever to sell this property to the Appellant in exercise of his powers under Clause (b). The property did not belong to the Municipal Committee while it was under supersession and, therefore, the administrator could not sell it as belonging to the Committee. It must be noted that when the Committee was superseded, all property vested in the Committee vested in His Majesty not for the purposes of the Committee but for the purposes of the Province, that is to say, for the purposes of the Government of the Province. In Municipal Committee, Raigarh v. Ramkaran (1) there are no doubt observations to the effect that the vesting in His Majesty under Section 57(3)(c) means vesting in equity and that this vesting passes only so much interest in the property to the State as is necessary to enable the State Government to control or maintain the functions of the municipality. These observations appear to us obiter. The learned Judges deciding the case in Municipal Committee, Raigarh : 1958 MPLJ 585 : AIR 1958 MP 355 were only required to consider the question whether when a municipality is superseded that supersession keeps alive the personality of the municipal committee or whether during the period of supersession the committee ceases to exist for any purpose whatsoever. In that connection, it was wholly unnecessary to consider the effect of vesting under Clause (c) of Sub-section (3) of Section 57. Again, in observing that vesting under Clause (c) meant vesting in equity, the learned Judges omitted to give due weight to the words "for the purposes of the Province" occurring in Clause (c). These words are significant and they unmistakably show that the vesting in His Majesty is not only equitable but also legal vesting of the property. It cannot, therefore, be argued that the legal effect of vesting under Clause (c) was that the Provincial Government became a trustee of the property, the beneficiary being the committee. No doubt, the Government would ordinarily utilise the property vested in it under Clause (c) for the benefit of the committee. But that is far from saying that legally the Government became a trustee of the property for the benefit of the Municipal Committee. It cannot, therefore, be urged that it was open to the Municipal Committee to sell its equitable interest in the property to the Appellant and to require the Government to convey the property to the Appellant. The Defendant No. 2 had, therefore, no power to sell the property in suit to the Appellant when it was vested in His Majesty for the purposes of the Province. That being so, the learned single Judge was right in holding that the Appellant obtained no title to the property under the sale deeds executed by the Defendant No. 2 in his capacity as administrator.

On this view, the Appellants possession of the property, which the administrator was not competent to transfer, was no better than that of a trespasser. As a trespasser, the Appellant cannot claim compensation for the improvements said to have been made by him on the land. A trespasser makes improvements at his own risk. The learned single Judge has allowed the Appellant to remove the materials of the constructions put by him on the land, agreeing with the finding of the Courts below that the Appellant acted bona fide in putting up the constructions. This direction is in the circumstances of the case proper. The question whether the Appellant is entitled to the refund of the consideration paid by him for the land does not arise in the present case as no such claim was put forward by him in the original Court.

For these reasons, the decision of the learned single Judge is upheld and this appeal is dismissed with costs.