Dabur India Limited v. K.r. Industries

A.K. Sikri, J.

1. The defendant contends that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the instant suit filed by the plaintiff. Therefore, this application is filed under the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) seeking dismissal of the suit on this ground. Suit is titled as suit for permanent injunction restraining infringement of copyright, passing off, rendition of accounts, delivery up, damages, etc. Thus, it is a composite suit which includes several cause of action. What needs to be mentioned at the outset is that insofar as alleged infringement of passing off is concerned, the suit is filed under the provisions of the old Act i.e. Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. Therefore, provisions relating to the territorial jurisdiction as contained in the said Act (hereinafter referred to as Act of 1958) shall be applicable.

2. The plaintiff is a manufacturer of large range of pharmaceutical, toiletries and medicinal preparations. In the present case, the two products of the plaintiff with which we are concerned with is DABUR RED TOOTH POWDER or DABUR LAL DANT MANJAN. The case set up by the plaintiff is that in the year 1993, it adopted a unique colour combination and arrangement of features which was subsequently changed in December, 1999. The carton adopted in December, 1999 is extremely popular. This new carton while retaining the conical shape and white cap adopted the following features.

* On one column has the words RED TOOTH POWDER within a yellow blurb.

* Immediately below the blurb is a oval shaped picture of a family with a yellow background.

* Above these two features there is legend within a blurb mentioning the fact that this is a new pack.

* The column immediately next to it contains the same features in the Devnagri script.

* A third column sets out the details including composition, weight, MRP and manufacturers name, etc.

* The top half of the third column contains an oval shaped device containing a diagrammatic representation of the herbs that constitute the ingredients of plaintiffs product.

3. It is claimed by the plaintiff that the aforesaid is also an artistic work within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Copyright Act. It has been designed for and on behalf of the plaintiff by Mr. Ajmer Singh of Mudra Communications Ltd. and the same has been assigned by Mr. Ajmer Singh to the plaintiff. Therefore, the plaintiff is the proprietor of the copyright and unauthorized reproduction of a carton by anybody would amount to infringement of the plaintiffs copyright vested in it. The grievance made in the plaint is that the defendant was also manufacturing and marketing Red Tooth Powder in an identical colour scheme, layout, arrangement of features and getup as that of the plaintiffs. The carton of the defendant is in red colour, conical in shape and a white cap. It is alleged that the defendant had the plaintiffs carton in mind while creating their own and the adoption and use of impugned packaging/container by the defendant is dishonest and amounts to passing off the goods of the defendant as that of the plaintiff as it would cause confusion in the minds of unwary classes of customers with imperfect recollection and also amounts to infringement of the plaintiffs copyright. With regard to jurisdiction of this Court, following averments are made in para 18 of the plaint:

Para 18 : This Honble Court has jurisdiction to entertain and try the present suit by virtue of the provisions of the Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957 as the defendant carries on its business activities in Delhi. The defendant is also selling its goods in Delhi i.e. within the territorial jurisdiction of this Honble Court.

4. The defendant in its written statement has raised the plea of want of territorial jurisdiction and in this behalf following preliminary objection is taken in the written statement:

The plaintiff has deliberately filed this suit in this Honble Court in order to harass the defendant. The defendant is based in Andhra Pradesh and carries on business in Andhra Pradesh and neighbouring States. The defendant has never sold any of its goods within the jurisdiction of this Honble Court. The defendant does not have any place of business or dealer in Delhi. This Honble Court, thus, has no jurisdiction to entertain and try the present suit. The suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.

5. Referring to the provisions of Section 105 of theof 1958 and placing strong reliance on the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Dhodha House and Patel Field Marshal Industries v. S.K. Maingi and M.P. Diesel Ltd., I (2006) SLT 141=2006 (32) PTC 1 (SC)=AIR 2006 SC 730 [LQ/SC/2005/1260] , the defendant has prayed that the plaint be returned on the ground that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

6. I may state at the outset that there is no dispute that for the relief of infringement of copyright, this Court will have the jurisdiction inasmuch as the plaintiff has its office in Delhi and carries on business and works for gain in Delhi. Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act specifically confers jurisdiction on a Court where the plaintiff resides or works for gain in contra-distinction to the legal position contained in Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) as per which suit can be filed where the defendant resides or works for gain. There is no quarrel on this aspect. However, case of the defendant is that in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Dhodha House (supra), this Court has no territorial jurisdiction in respect of cause of action pertaining to passing off as the defendant is from Andhra Pradesh and there is no documentary evidence to show that the defendant is selling goods in Delhi. Once the matter is viewed in this manner, it is urged, the Court should see that there is otherwise no violation of any copyright and in any case any alleged cause of action accruing in favour of the plaintiff in respect of copyright would not give a cause of action for the entire suit containing other reliefs. The aforesaid plea was articulated by the learned Counsel for the defendant in the following manner:

(a) In the first instance, learned Counsel referred to provisions of Order 2 Rule 3, CPC which deal with joinder of causes of action. Rule 3 of Order 2 is in the following words

3. Joinder of causes of action(1) Save as otherwise provided, a plaintiff may unite in the same suit several causes of action against the same defendant, or the same defendants jointly; and any plaintiffs having causes of action in which they are jointly interested against the same defendant or the same defendants jointly may unite such causes of action in the same suit.

(2) Where causes of action are united, the jurisdiction of the Court as regards the suit shall depend on the amount of value of the aggregate subject-matters at the date of instituting the suit.

The jurisdiction referred to in this rule is pecuniary jurisdiction and it presupposes that the Court is otherwise competent to try the suit. If the Court is not competent to try the suit by reason of either the subject-matter or the defendants not being within its jurisdiction, the case is not covered by Sub-rule (2). In support he referred to the judgment of Madhya Bharat in the case of Laxmikumar Srinivas Das v. Krishnaram Baldev Bank, Lashkar and Anr., AIR 1954 Madhya Bharat 156, as well as judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of Kurivalli Lingayya Setty v. Sitharam and Anr., AIR 1955 Madras 595, as well as judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Karam Singh and Ors. v. Kunwar Sen and Ors., AIR 1942 Allahabad 387.

(b) He submitted that though more than one cause of action can be joined in one suit, the Court in which said suit is filed should have jurisdiction in respect of causes of action. In support of this plea, he referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of The State of Bihar v. Oriental Coal Co. Ltd., AIR 1972 SC 378 [LQ/SC/1971/531] . In that case the respondent (assessee) was having registered office at Calcutta and was paying sales tax under Bihar Sales Tax Act by cheques. It filed application for refund on setting aside of assessment by the Appellate Authority. The sales tax authorities refused to refund on the ground that the assessment was validated by Sales Tax Law Validation Act. On this refusal, the assessee filed a suit for refund on original side of Calcutta High Court alleging that cause of action arose at Calcutta on the ground, inter alia, that cheques were encashed at Calcutta and, therefore, the Calcutta High Court had the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Holding that the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction, the Supreme Court dealt with the provisions of Bihar Sales Tax Rules and pointed out that all applications from a dealer for refund of the excess tax paid have to be made to the Commissioner in prescribed form and the Commissioner is to make order sanctioning the refund if he is satisfied that refund is due. In view of the said Rules, the Supreme Court opined that since application for refund could have been made only before the Commissioner whose office is situated in Bihar and the refund could have been made only in accordance with the said Rules, entire cause of action in respect of the claim for refund on the basis of a Appellate Authoritys order arose within the State of Bihar and no part of cause of action arose outside Bihar. In the process, the Supreme Court also made following observations on which learned Counsel for the defendant placed strong reliance:

The fact that the plaintiff based his claim on three alternative grounds, for one of which alone a part of the cause of action can at best be said to have arisen in Calcutta but not for others, cannot confer jurisdiction on the Calcutta High Court to try the suit on the basis of grounds in respect of which no part of the cause of action arose in Calcutta. The cause of action, within the contemplation of law is that which relates to a tenable plea.

(c) He also referred to the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Surendra Kumar Maingi v. M/s. Dodha House, AIR 1998 Allahabad 43 : 1998 PTC (18) 249 (All), which judgment has been upheld by the Supreme Court in Dhodha House (supra).

(d) He submitted that fine distinction which is to be made in cases relating to infringement of copyright is that there can be no copyright in the word or words but the right can only be in the artistic manner in which the same is written. If the two words are written in a totally dissimilar manner, question of infringement of copyright would not arise and if the two words are similar or confusingly similar, it would be a case of infringement of copyright or passing off. For this, he referred to the judgment of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Associated Electronics and Electrical Industries (Bangalore) Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s. Sharp Tools, Kalapatti, AIR 1991 Karnataka 406=1993 (13) PTC 85 (Kar.) (DB), and submitted that once this pointed distinction is borne in mind, the present case would essentially be a case of infringement of trademark/passing off and not that of copyright and, therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to try upon the provisions of Section 62 of the Copyright Act. It is obvious that insofar as relief of passing of sought by the plaintiff invoking the provisions of Act of 1958 is concerned this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain this suit and grant such a relief. This issue is now emphatically and conclusively settled by the Supreme Court in Dhodha House (supra).

7. The plaintiff could not dispute that the defendant is carrying on business in Andhra Pradesh. It could not also point out any sale of its products made in Delhi by the defendant. In a suit for passing off under the of 1958 place of suing has to be where the cause of action or part of cause of action or where the defendant resides, or carries on business or works for gain. This is because of the reason that having regard to the provisions of Sections 105 and 106 of theof 1958, territorial jurisdiction of the Court would be determined on the touchstone of Section 20 of the CPC. This has been consistent view taken by various Courts as well as this Court. Without elaborating, purpose can be served by mentioning some of these judgments:

(i) Haryana Milk Foods Ltd. v. Chambel Dairy Products, 98 (2002) DLT 359 [LQ/DelHC/2002/2245] =2002 (25) PTC 156 (Del.) [LQ/DelHC/2002/1033] .

(ii) Lok Nath Prasad Gupta v. Bijay Kumar Gupta, 57 (1995) DLT 502 [LQ/DelHC/1995/167] =1995 (32) DRJ 350. [LQ/DelHC/1995/86]

(iii) Gupta Brothers Conduit Pipe Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Anil Gupta and Anr., 2001 (24) PTC 159 (Del.) [LQ/DelHC/2001/1491] =2001 (4) RAJ 474=2001 (7) AD (Del.) 838.

(iv) Himachal Pradesh Horticulture Produce Marketing and Processing Corporation Ltd., Shimla v. M/s. Mohan Meaking Breweries Limited, Solan (Himachal Pradesh), AIR 1981 Punjab and Haryana 117.

8. The next question, however, which is more important is whether the plaintiff can combine the two causes of action one under the Copyright Act and the second under the of 1958 in a situation where this Court has the jurisdiction insofar as cause of action under the Copyright Act is concerned but has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the cause of action relating to Act of 1958.

9. Order 2 Rule 3 of CPC enables a plaintiff to combine more than one causes of action. Though this provision relates to pecuniary jurisdiction, the Court have taken the view that Rule 3 of Order 2 of CPC is subject to the condition that Court has jurisdiction in respect of causes of action involved. In Karam Singh (supra), this question was answered in the following words:

It has been suggested that this rule enables a plaintiff, as of right, to join various causes of action against different defendants in the same suit. I doubt whether that was the intention. In the first place, Order 1 contains no provision corresponding with that in Order 2, Rule 6 and, consequently, if the contention was right, no Court would have any power to prevent any inconvenience which might arise out of a joint trial. In the second place, in order that the provisions of the rule should be applicable it is necessary that the right to relief should arise out of the same set or transaction or series of acts or transactions and this implies, in my judgment, that the acts or transactions, where they are different, should be so connected as to constitute a single series which could fairly be described as one entity or fact which would constitute a cause of action against all the defendants jointly. Whether this necessary condition exists in any particular case would, of course, depend upon the nature of the case but I am satisfied that this at least is necessary that the case should be such that it could be said that the Court in which the suit was instituted had local jurisdiction in the first instance to deal with the controversies arising between the plaintiffs and each of the defendants. This proposition is supported by the decision of the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court in B and N W.F.Y. Co. Ltd. v. Sadaram Bhairodan, 49 Cal. 895 [LQ/CalHC/1922/83] .

10. Similarly in Laxmikumar (supra), where the defendant executed three mortgages over three different sets of properties situated within three different districts in favour of the same mortgagee, and he filed a suit to enforce all the mortgages in Court X, but that Court had no jurisdiction with reference to two of the mortgages, it was held that the Court was not competent to entertain the suit with respect to those mortgages and this rule did not cure the defect. To the same effect is the judgment of the Madras High Court in Kurivalli Lingayya Setty (supra).

11. At this juncture, I may refer to two judgments of this Court relied upon by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff. First judgment is Glaxo Operations UK Ltd., Middlesex (England) and Others v. Samrat Pharmaceuticals, Kanpur, AIR 1984 Del. 265 [LQ/DelHC/1983/311] =1984 RLR 291 [LQ/PunjHC/1984/139] =1984 (4) PTC (Del.) 66, wherein this Court allowed the joinder of two causes of action, one based on registered trademark and other of registered copyright even when in respect of trademark the Court had no jurisdiction. A Single Judge of this Court in the said judgment holding that Court had the territorial jurisdiction observed as under:

Para 10 : During arguments the complaint of the Counsel for the defendant was that the plaintiff had acted with cleverness by way of combining his cause of action on the basis of trade mark with the one on the basis of copyright so that they could bring suit in respect of both the causes of action at Delhi, that the cleverness should not be encouraged and that, therefore, it should be held that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit. But in my view there is hardly any cleverness. The plaintiffs desire protection against infringement of their rights with respect of their product Glucose-D and Glucon-D. The products are the same while different types of rights are claimed. The plaintiffs claim rights as proprietor of registered trade mark as well as copyright with respect of the carton of the very same product. Not only that the plaintiffs could combine these causes of action on the basis of registered trade mark and registered copyright but also it was absolutely necessary to have done so because the same were being claimed in respect of the same product.

Para 11 : I, therefore, hold that this Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit. When the objection of the defendant is no hollow and without any force, there is hardly any necessity of framing any issue and then formally hearing arguments again as arguments were heard already on this matter. Hence, I overrule the aforesaid objection of the defendant.

12. Second judgment is, again, of a Single Judge of this Court in the case of Roop Chand Arya Industries v. Kiran Soap Works and Another, in Suit No. 565/1980 decided on 7th October, 1980. Here, the defendants contention that this Court had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit was repelled by making following remarks:

Mr. Anoop Singh contended that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the said suit as neither the defendants reside nor carry on business within the jurisdiction of this Court nor are their goods sold in Delhi. Mr. Anoop Singh further contended that the plaintiffs had got the wrapper registered under the Copyright Act on 19th July, 1980 and the suit was instituted on 26th July, 1980 and the above was done only to create jurisdiction in this Court under Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act.

I do not agree with the contention of Mr. Anoop Singh. The plaintiffs admittedly reside and carry on their business in Delhi. Section 62 of the Copyright Act clearly gives jurisdiction to this Court to entertain the suit. I am also not inclined to agree with the contention that the suit is bad for mis-joinder of causes of action. The contention is that the two causes of action, i.e., the infringement of the trade mark and the infringement of the copyright cannot be joined in one suit. The two reliefs, in my opinion, are inter-linked and they can be tried together in one suit.

13. Normally, I would have felt myself bound by the aforesaid two judgments which are not only of this Court but relate to same subject-matter, namely, joining of two causes of action under trade mark and copyright law. Even if I hold different opinion, the normal course of action would have been to refer the matter to the Division Bench. However, that is not necessary in the instant case in view of the fact that the controversy now stands settled by the Supreme Court in Dhodha House (supra). In that case two judgments one of Allahabad High Court and other of this Court were under challenge before the Supreme Court. Both the cases were considered together and one common judgment was given. Judgment of the Allahabad High Court was in the case of Surendra Kumar Maingi v. M/s. Dodha House (supra). The Allahabad Court had, after relying upon Laxmi Kumar (supra), Kurivalli Lingayya Setty (supra), and Karam Singh (supra), held that two causes of action could not be combined and the Court at Ghaziabad has no territorial jurisdiction to try the suit as is clear from para 11 of the judgment which is reproduced below:

It is urged that the Trial Court has completely ignored to consider the provisions of Section 105 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act and in view of the aforesaid provisions the Court at Ghaziabad had not territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit with respect of matters enumerated therein. In support of this proposition, learned Counsel has placed reliance on H.P. Marketing and Processing Corpn. v. M.M. Breweries (supra), wherein it was held that in a suit for passing off or injunction on account of infringement of trade mark, the cause of action partly or wholly can arise in a given jurisdiction only if the defendant is proved to have directly made sale of goods under the impugned trade mark, within that jurisdiction, not to an individual consumer but to a distributor, whole-saler or retailer and that such a sale is on a commercial scale. Reliance is also placed on C.B. Dembla Trading v. Bharat Sewing Machine Co., AIR 1982 Delhi 230 : 1983 (3) PTC 292 (Del.) [LQ/DelHC/1981/428] (para 5). It is also urged that unless the Court has jurisdiction to try all the causes of action, such different causes of action cannot be joined together in one suit. In support of this proposition, reliance is placed on AIR 1942 Allahabad 387, AIR 1954 Mad. Bharat 156, AIR 1955 Mad. 595 [LQ/MadHC/1954/168] and 1983 AWC 986. It is, thus, urged that the Court at Ghaziabad has no jurisdiction to try the suit. In the suit as framed cause of action arising under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act has also been joined for which the Court has no territorial jurisdiction. Mr. Sahini learned Counsel for the plaintiff-respondents has submitted that the Court at Ghaziabad has jurisdiction to try the suit and in support of this proposition, he has placed reliance on Glaxo Operations UK Ltd. v. Samrat Pharmaceuticals (supra). Reliance is also placed on Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Reward Soap Works, AIR 1983 Delhi 286 : PTC (Suppl.) (1) 438 (Delhi). I have considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties. The authorities cited by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff-respondents do not relate to such cases where the Courts had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of Section 105 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act. In the present case a bare perusal of the plaint would show that the suit is based upon alleged infringement of registered trade mark or relating to any right in a registered trade mark or for passing off by the defendant of any trade mark which is identical with or deceptively similar to the plaintiffs trade mark. Such a suit cannot be entertained by the Court at Ghaziabad in view of Section 105 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act. The mere fact that the Court may have jurisdiction to entertain the suit with respect to a cause of action under the Copyright Act under Section 62 of thecan be of no avail. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the Court at Ghaziabad has no territorial jurisdiction to try the suit.

14. The Supreme Court specifically approved the view of the Allahabad High Court and disapproved the view of this Court.

15. Taking note of the facts of the Division Bench judgment of this Court which was under challenge, it was observed that the Division Bench of this Court was of the opinion that a composite suit based on infringement of trade mark, copyright, passing off and for rendition of accounts of profits as also injunction having been filed, the Delhi High Court had the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The portions dealing with the judgment of this Court are extracted below:

Para 43 : The Delhi High Court in its judgment placed strong reliance upon a judgment of the same Court in Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Reward Soap Works (supra), wherein it was held that a composite suit based on infringement of trade mark, copyright, passing off and for rendition of accounts of profits, seeking to restrain the defendants from infringing its trade mark and wrapper claiming the same to be identical with or deceptively similar to the wrapper of the plaintiffs mark, is maintainable, holding:

The comparative scope of a copyright and trade mark registration are different, even though where a design on a wrapper is registered under the Copyright Act, there is, to an extent, an overlapping between the two remedies. Some controversy is no doubt possible if the mere jurisdiction of the Court to entertain an action for infringement of copyright would also give the Court the necessary jurisdiction to deal with the corresponding infringement of trade mark, where both constitute part of a composite suit. In view of the undoubted jurisdiction of this Court in relation to the infringement of copyright, Court would be justified in granting injunction of both the trade mark and copyright at this stage of the proceedings, particularly, where there is a specific averment in the plaint, whatever it may be worth, that the plaintiff has been selling the goods, inter alia, within territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

Para 44 : It was held that although in Dodha House (supra), and Tata Oil Mills (supra), was noticed but had not been distinguished on cogent grounds, the former was not followed.

Thereafter, answer given in the following paras while accepting the view of all High Courts in preference to this High Court:

Para 46 : The short question which arises for consideration is as to whether causes of action in terms of both the 1957 Act and the 1958 Act although may be different, would a suit be maintainable in a Court only because it has the jurisdiction to entertain the same in terms of Section 62(2) of the 1957 Act

Para 47 : A cause of action in a given case under the 1957 Act as also under the 1958 Act may be overlapping to some extent. The territorial jurisdiction conferred upon the Court in terms of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure indisputably shall apply to a suit or proceeding under the 1957 Act as also the 1958 Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 62 of the 1957 Act provides for an additional Forum. Such additional Forum was provided so as to enable the author to file a suit who may not otherwise be in a position to file a suit at different places where his copyright was violated. The Parliament while enacting the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act in the year 1958 was aware of the provisions of the 1957 Act. It still did not choose to make a similar provision therein. Such an omission may be held to be a conscious action on the part of the Parliament. The intention of the Parliament in not providing for an additional Forum in relation to the violation of the 1958 Act is, therefore, clear and explicit. The Parliament while enacting the Trade Marks Act, 1999 provided for such an additional Forum by enacting Sub-section (2) of Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act. The Court shall not, it is well settled, readily presume the existence of jurisdiction of a Court which was not conferred by the statute. For the purpose of attracting the jurisdiction of a Court in terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 62 of the 1957 Act, the conditions precedent specified therein must be fulfilled, the requisites wherefor are that the plaintiff must actually and voluntarily reside to carry on business or personally work for gain.

Para 53 : In this case, the Delhi High Court could not have invoked its jurisdiction in terms of the 1957 Act. The primary ground upon which the jurisdiction of the original side of the High Court was invoked was the violation of the 1958 Act, but in relation thereto, the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 62 of the 1957 Act could not be invoked.

Para 54: The plaintiff was not a resident of Delhi. It has not been able to establish that it carries on any business at Delhi. For our purposes, the question as to whether the defendant had been selling its produce in Delhi or not is wholly irrelevant. It is possible that the goods manufactured by the plaintiff are available in the market of Delhi or they are sold in Delhi but that by itself would not mean that the plaintiff carries on any business in Delhi.

Para 57 : For the purpose of invoking the jurisdiction of a Court only because two causes of action joined in terms of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the same would not mean that thereby the jurisdiction can be conferred upon a Court which had jurisdiction to try only the suit in respect of one cause of action and not the other. Recourse to the additional Forum, however, in a given case, may be taken if both the causes of action arise within the jurisdiction of the Court which otherwise had the necessary jurisdiction to decide all the issues.

16. It is thus, clear from the aforesaid discussion that the Supreme Court has now conclusively determined that the two causes of action could not be combined. When the Supreme Court overruled the Division Bench judgment of this Court laying contrary principles, by implication, single Bench judgments of this Court in Glaxo Operations UK Ltd., Middlesex (supra) and Roop Chand Arya Industries (supra), also stand overruled.

17. Following this judgment of the Supreme Court, which applies to the facts of this case as well, I have no option but to allow the present application of the defendant. The plaint is returned to the plaintiff for filing in the Court of competent jurisdiction.

18. Pending IAs also stand disposed of along with the suit. No costs.