D. Sivakumar And Another v. The Government Of Tamil Nadu, Represented By Its Secretary To Government And Others

(Prayer: Petitions filed Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying to issue a Writ of Declaration, to declare Rule 38-B of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959 and introduced by G.O.Ms. No.158, Industries (MMC I) Department dated 25.08.2008 as illegal, ultra tires, Section 15 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 and Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 301 to 304 of the Constitution of India.)

M.M. Sundresh, J.

1. Heard the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and the learned Additional Advocate General for respondents.

2. In view of the common issues involved in the two Writ Petitions and also in view of the fact identical prayers have been sought for on same grounds a common order is passed in the Writ Petitions. These two Writ Petitions have been filed seeking a Writ of declaration, declaring Rule 38-B of the Tamil Nadu Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 1959, which is introduced by way of a Government Order in G.O.Ms. No.158, Industries (MMC I) Department, dated 25.08.2008 as illegal, ultra vires, Section 15 of the Minor and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 and Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 301 to 304 of the Constitution of India.

3. Rule 38-13 of the Tamil Nadu Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 1959 is as follows:

"38-B. Transport of Sand outside the State not to he made:---- No transport of sand covered under Rule 38-A of these rules shall be made across the border of other States."

4. The brief facts of the case are as follows:

An order was passed by a Division Bench of the Honble High Court dated 26.07.2002 directing the State Government to constitute a Committee of experts consisting of Geologists, Environmentalists and Scientists to study the river and riverbeds in the State with reference to the impact of the sand quarrying. The Honble High Court directed the said Committee to submit a report and further directed the Government to take necessary steps to arrest the exploitation and improve the situation. While passing the order this Court has observed as follows:

"Rivers are being plundered by a powerful mafia controlling the sand mining business. The illegal trade is driven by the unholy nexus between contractors, politicians, trade union leaders, panchayat and Revenue Officials and corrupt policemen, making a mockery of the regulations imposed by the Government. Contractors who quote marginal amounts for auction rights go on to make a killing, extracting many time the permitted amount of sand as enforcement agencies turn a blind eye"

In compliance with the directions of the Ilonble High Court, a six member high Level Committee was constituted by the Government in G.O.Ms. No.(2D) No.46, Industries Department, dated 25.09.2002. The Committee of the experts in turn gave their report pointing out that illicit, indiscriminate and haphazard sand mining has led to deepening of the river beds, widening of the rivers, damage to Civil structures, depletion of ground water table, degradation of ground quality, damages to the rivers system and reduction of bio-diversity.

Based upon the recommendation of the High Level Committee, the Government of Tamil Nadu introduced Rule 38-A of the Tamil Nadu Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 1959 by way of G.O.Ms. No.95, Industries Department, dated 01.10.2003. The objective of the said Government order was to eliminate indiscriminate and unscientific sand quarrying and also to prevent further damage as noted by the High Level Committee. Accordingly, in the said Rule the right to exploit sand in the State of Tamil Nadu became vested with the Government through the Public Works Department.

5. The above said rule was challenged by lease holders in a batch of Writ Petitions and the Honble High Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. P. Krishnamoorthy, 2004 (4) MLJ 418 [LQ/MadHC/2004/757] , upheld the validity of the said rule. Not being satisfied with the same, the matter was taken to the Honble Supreme Court and the Honble Supreme Court has also upheld the validity of the Rule in State of Tanzil Nadu v. P. Krishnamurthy, 2006 (4) SCC 517 [LQ/SC/2006/257] .

6. Thereafter, the Government of Tamil Nadu introduced Rule 38-B of the Tamil Nadu Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 1959 purporting to exercise the power under Section 15(1) of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957. The validity of the said Rule is put in issue in the Writ Petitions. The Writ Petitions have been filed by the petitioners who are registered dealer and civil contractor respectively challenging the said Rule 38-B. The writ petitioners sought for a prayer to declare the said Rule 38-B as unconstitutional by raising several grounds.

7. Submissions on behalf of the petitioners:

Shri. V.T. Gopalan, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners raised several contentions in support of the prayer to declare Rule 38-B as unconstitutional and ultra vires the parent Act. They are as follows:

(i) The impugned Rule 38-B is unconstitutional, since the same is in contravention of Article 301 and 304 of the Constitution of India. In other words Rule 38-B does not have the legislative competence and sanction of the Constitution.

(ii) Rule 38 is liable to be declared as ultra vices the parent Act namely, the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957. Section 15 of the said Act does not empower or authorise the State Government to pass such a rule thereby prohibiting the transport of sand outside the State of Tamil Nadu.

(iii) Rule 38-B is liable to be set aside since even Section 23-C of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, does not authorise such a rule making power resulting in the prevention and prohibition of transport of sand outside the State.

(iv) As per the principle of ejusdem genesis, the prior word "illegal mining" should be taken into consideration for interpreting and construing the subsequent words "transportation and storage of minerals". The learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has submitted that Section 23-C is only applicable in case of preventing illegal mining, illegal transportation and storage of illegally mined minerals and therefore, Rule 38-B is liable to be declared as ultra vires.

(v) The word regulation as mentioned in Section 23-C cannot be construed as prohibition and there cannot be any prohibition in view of the protection available under Article 301 and without following the procedure contemplated under Article 304 of the Constitution of India.

8. The submissions of Shri P.S. Raman, learned Additional Advocate General are as follows:

(a) The contention of the petitioners that Rule 38-B is unconstitutional in view of the Articles 301 and 304 of the Constitution of India has no legal basis since Article 301 is subject to Articles 302 to 304 and in any case they would not be applicable in the present case since the impugned rule has been passed by deriving power under the Central Act namely, the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957.

(b) Even though Rule 38-B has been introduced purportedly deriving power under Section 15 of the Parent Act, the power can be traced in the plenary or enabling provisions. Further, in view of the power conferred on the States to make rules for preventing transportation under Section 23-C of thethere is no basis that Rule 38-B is in violation of Articles 301 and 304 of the Constitution of India.

(c) The word regulation would necessarily mean prohibition and therefore the impugned rule is valid in law.

(d) The principle of ejusdena generis would not apply when the words are very clear and there is no ambiguity in Section 23-C. Therefore, the principle of ejusdena generis is not applicable in the present case and the said principle will have to be made applicable always with caution.

(e) The overwhelming public interest as well as the environmental issue also will have to be taken into consideration since the Rule has been introduced in order to prevent indiscriminate sand mining.

9. We have considered the submissions made on behalf of the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners and the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the respondents.

10. Whether Rule 38-B is violative of Article 301 and 304 of the Constitution:

Articles 301 and 304 of the Constitution of India are extracted hereunder:

"301. Freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse. Subject to the other provisions of this Part, trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free.

304. Restrictions on trade, commerce and intercourse among States Notwithstanding anything in Article 301 or Article 303, the Legislature of a State may by law

(a) impose on goods imported from other States (or the Union territories) any tax to which similar goods manufactured or produced in that State are subject, so, however, as not to discriminate between goods so imported and goods so manufactured or produced; and

(b) impose such reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse with or within that State as may be required in the public interest:

Provided that no Bill or amendment for the purpose of Clause (b) shall be introduced or moved in the Legislature of a State without the previous sanction of the President."

On a reading of Article 301 of the Constitution of India it is clear that trade, commerce and intercourse throughout India shall be free. Similarly, Article 304 of the Constitution grants power to the State Legislature to make law with regard to restrictions on trade, commerce and intercourse among States. The State legislature cannot introduce any bill regarding the above said subjects without the previous sanction of the president. Hence it is clear that the protection given under Article 301 of the constitution is subject to Article 304, provided the law has been made by the State Legislature by complying with the procedure contemplated under the proviso to Article 304. We may also note that Article 302 provides for making of the law by the parliament to impose restrictions on trade, commerce and intercourse.

Shri V.T. Gopalan has contended that the prohibition made under Rule 38-B of the Tamil Nadu Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 1959 is in violation Article 301 since it infringes ones freedom of Trade and the said Rule is also in violation of Article 304 since no prior sanction from the President of India has been obtained.

We are not in agreement with the submission made by the learned counsel for the simple reason that the Rule 38-B has been introduced by the State as the delegate of the Parliament to carryout the purpose of Section 23-C of the Parent Act. In other words the contention raised by Shri V.T. Gopalan does not arise for consideration, since Rule 38-B has been introduced not deriving the power under Article 304 of the Constitution of India but under Section 23-C of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957.

The said issue has been considered by the Honble Supreme Court in State of Tripura v. Sudhir Ranjan Nath, 1997 (3) SCC 665 [LQ/SC/1997/268] . It is held therein in paragraph 21 of the said judgment that the impugned rule having been made by the State as the delegate of parliament to carry out the purpose of the cannot be held to be in contravention of Article 301 of the Constitution. The Honble Supreme Court has further held that in such a situation the compliance of the procedure contemplated under Article 304-B of the Constitution does not arise for consideration. Further the judgment relied on by Shri V.T. Gopalan in Jindal Stainless Ltd. v. State of Haryana, 2006 (7) SCC 241 [LQ/SC/2006/335] , does not have any application to the present case since the issue involved therein was as to whether the Compensatory Tax imposed by the State is valid or not.

Hence we hold that the impugned Rule 38 is not unconstitutional being violative of Article 301 and 304 of the Constitution of India.

11. Whether Rule 38-B is in violation of Section 15 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957:

The learned Senior Counsel has contended that inasmuch as in the absence of any power under the Parent Act, the impugned rule is not good in law. In support of his contention, the learned Senior Counsel has relied upon K.P. Enterprises v. District Collector, Salem, AIR 2004 Mad. 151 [LQ/MadHC/2003/170] ; State of Tamil Nadu v. M.P.P. Kavery Chetty, AIR 1995 SCC 858; K.T. Varghese v. State of Kerala, 2008 (3) SCC 735 [LQ/SC/2008/158] , to contend that under Section 15(1) of the MMDR Act, 1957, there is no power to control the movement of any minerals after the sale.

In the judgment reported in K.P. Enterprises v. District Collector, Salem, AIR 2004 Mad. 151 [LQ/MadHC/2003/170] , unfortunately Section 23-C has not been brought to the notice of this Court. It is well settled principle of law that when a particular point of law is not consciously determined by the Court, that does not form part of ratio decidendi. It is further to be noted that a judgment rendered without reference to the statutory provisions cannot be considered as a ratio decidendi and in any case such a judgment will not be binding when an issue is before the Division Bench. In this regard, we may refer the judgment reported in Arnit Das v. State of Bihar, 2000 (5) SCC 488 [LQ/SC/2000/939] , wherein the Honble Supreme Court has held that a decision which is not expressed, not accompanied by reason and not proceeding on a conscious consideration of an issue cannot deem to be a law declared and the same is not the ratio decidendi. Similarly, in Tvl. N. V. S. Agro Derivatives v. Commericial Tax Officer, Theni, 2006 (1) CTC 449 : 2006 (1) MLJ 192 [LQ/MadHC/2005/1503] , the Honble High Court has also taken the same view. In so far as the judgment reported in K.T. Varghese v. State of Kerala, 2008 (3) SCC 735 [LQ/SC/2008/158] , is concerned, the facts of the said judgment are totally different from the present case. The said judgment pertains to the transaction of the year 1997-98 during that time Section 23-C was not in the statute book. So is the other judgment in ; State of Tamil Nadu v. M.P.P. Kavery Chetty, AIR 1995 SCC 858, which was also rendered prior to coming into existence of Section 23-C of the. Hence these decisions are not favouring the case of the petitioners in any case.

12. Application of Section 23-C:

According to Shri V.T. Gopalan, Section 23-C is only meant for illegal mining, illegal transportation and illegal storage of minerals. A perusal of Section 23-C would clearly show that the State Government could make Rule preventing illegal mining, transportation and storage of minerals. The words transportation and storage are distinct and different forming a separate class or category than the word illegal mining. We are of the opinion that such an interpretation as canvassed by Shri V.T. Gopalan cannot be given since the plain meaning should be given to the words transportation and storage. In this connection, Shri P.S. Raman has relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in C. Narayana Reddy v. Commissioner of Panchayat Raj, AIR 2004 AP 234 [LQ/APHC/2003/622] , wherein the similar provision like Rule 38-B was challenged before the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. In the said case Rule 9-W of Andhra Pradesh Mineral Concessions Rules which prohibits movement of sand across the border to the neighbouring State was challenged. The Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has upheld the rule by tracing the power under Section 23-C interpreting the words illicit mining, transportation and storage as distinct and different. We are in complete agreement with the said judgment.

Further Section 4(1)(A) of MMDR Act, 1957 says as follows:

"No person shall transport or store or cause to be transported or stored any mineral otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder."

Section 4 of the said Act provides for prospecting or mining operation to be licensed or lease. Therefore, it is very clear that power has been conferred on the authorisers to regulate the transport and storage of minerals. We are of the opinion that when in a case of a prospecting or mining operation given under a license or lease such a restriction could be made, Section 23-C should necessarily be construed giving power to the State Government to control and regulate the movement of the minerals.

We are also in an agreement with the contention raised by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the respondents that even if the statute does not give the power for the Government to make rule the power can be traced to the enabling provision. Since Section 23-C provides for the rule making power resulting in the introduction of Rule 38-B, we are of the opinion that Rule 38-B cannot be challenged on the ground that Section 15 of the parent Act does not provide for such a power. In this connection, we also refer Pine Chemicals Ltd. v. Assessing Authority, 1992 (2) SCC 683, wherein the Honble Supreme Court was pleased to hold that when the power is available with the parent Act, the wrong quoting of the statute would not make the rule ultra vires. We are also of the opinion that Rule 38-B is constitutionally valid. In this connection, it is useful to refer Quarry Owners Association v. State of Bihar, 2000 (8) SCC 655 [LQ/SC/2000/1173] . The Honble Supreme Court in paragraph 36 as stated as follows:

"36. We have to keep in mind, in the present case, delegation of power is on the State Government which is the highest executive in the State, which is responsible to the State Legislature. In a parliamentary democracy every act of the State Government is accountable to its people through the State Legislature which itself is an additional factor which keeps the State Government under check not to act arbitrarily or unreasonably. When a policy is clearly laid down in a statute with reference to the minor minerals with the main object under the being for its conservation and development, coupled with various other provisions to the guiding it, checking it and controlling it, then how could such delegation be said to be unbridled ...".

Therefore, we are of the opinion that Rule 38-B is valid in law, having been introduced by invoking the power conferred under Section 23-C of the MMDR Act, 1957.

13. Definition of the word "Regulation":

Shri V.T. Gopalan has contended that the word regulation mentioned in Section 23-C of theshould not be construed to mean prohibition. He further contended that a total prohibition is impermissible in law, violative of Article 19(1)(g) and therefore, the impugned rule is liable to be declared as bad and law.

We are of the opinion that the word "regulation" has no fixed connotation. The said word will have to be given wider meaning when the public interest is involved. In the judgment reported in State of Tamil Nadu v. Hind Stone, 1981 (2) SCC 205 [LQ/SC/1981/61] , the Honble Supreme Court has held as follows:

"10. One of the arguments pressed before us was that Section 15 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act authorised the making of rules for regulating the grant of mining leases and not for prohibiting then as Rule 8-C sought to do, and, therefore, Rule 8-C was ultra vires Section 15. Well known cases on the subject right from Municipal Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Virgo and Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for the Dominions up to State of U.P. v. Hindustan Aluminium Corporation Ltd., were brought to our attention. We do not think that `regulation has that rigidity of meaning as never to take in `prohibition. Much depends on the context in which the expression is used in the statute and the object sought to be achieved by the contemplated regulation. It was observed by Mathew, J. in G.K. Krishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu: "The word `regulation has no fixed connotation. Its meaning differs according to the nature of the thing to which it is applied". In modern statutes concerned as they are with economic and social activities, `regulation must, of necessity, receive so wide an interpretation that in certain situations, it must exclude competition to the public sector from the private sector. More so in a welfare State. It was pointed out by the Privy Council in Coommonwealth of Australia v. Bank of New South Wales and we agree with what was stated therein that the problem whether an enactment was regulatory or something more or whether a restriction was direct or only remote or only incidental involved, not so much legal as political, social or economic consideration and that it could not be laid down that in no circumstances could the exclusion of competition so as to create a monopoly, either in a State or Commonwealth agency, be justified. Each case, it was said, must be judged on its own facts and in its own setting of time and circumstances and it might be that in regard to some economic activities and at some stage of social development, prohibition with a view to State monopoly was the only practical and reasonable manner of regulation. The statute with which we are concerned, the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, is aimed, as we have already said more than once, at the conservation and the prudent and discriminating exploitation of minerals. Surely, in the case of a scarce mineral, to permit exploitation by the State or its agency and to prohibit exploitation by private agencies is the most effective method of conservation and prudent exploitation. If you want to conserve for the future, you must prohibit in the present. We have no doubt that the prohibiting of leases in certain cases is part of the regulation contemplated by Section 15 of the."

Similarly, in Quarry Owners Association v. State of Bihar, 2000 (8) SCC 655 [LQ/SC/2000/1173] , it has been held that the word regulation will have to be given a wide interpretation taking into consideration of social, economic and political justice. We are of the opinion that while deciding as to whether the prohibition is reasonable, the Court has to take into consideration the greater public and social interest as against the fundamental right of the citizen. In Indian Handicrafts Emporium v. Union of India, 2003 (7) SCC 589 [LQ/SC/2003/841] , the Honble Supreme Court has held that prohibition of trade and ivory does not offend Article 19(1)(g) and the same is a reasonable restriction under Article 19(6) of the Constitution. It is also to be noted only sand is prohibited from taking outside the State in view of the overwhelming public interest.

Therefore, we are of the opinion that the definition of the word "regulation" is wide enough to cover the prohibition and movement of minerals outside the State.

14. Statement and Reasoning of Section 23-C:

The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has further contended that in view of the statement and reasoning for Section 23-C of the Act, it cannot be construed that the word transport and storage are independent words and therefore, they should be read as illicit transport and illicit storage. On a plain reading of Section 23-C of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, there is nothing to indicate that the words transport or storage would only mean illicit transport and illicit storage. In this connection, it is useful to refer Bhaiji v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Thandla, 2003 (1) SCC 692 [LQ/SC/2002/1326] , wherein the Honble Supreme Court has held as follows:

"Reference to the Statement of Object and Reasons is permissible for understanding the background, the antecedent state of affairs, the surrounding circumstances in relation to the statute and evil which the statute sought remedy. The wait of judicial authority leans in favour of the view that the Statement of Object and Reasons cannot be utilised for the purpose of restricting and controlling the plain meaning of the language employed by the legislature in drafting a statute and excluding from its operation, such transactions which it plainly covers."

Therefore, by applying the said principle the contention raised by Shri V.T. Gopalan does not merit acceptance and hence the same is rejected.

15. Principle of Ejusdem Generis:

Ejusdent Generis is a Latin Expression which means "of the same kind". In other words, it means words of similar class.

In so far as the principle of ejusdem generis is concerned, we are of the opinion that the said rule applies only when the subjects of enumeration constitute a class or category, statute enumerates the specific words, the general terms follow the enumeration and there is no indication of a different legislative intent. The principle of ejusdem generic would therefore apply only when there is an ambiguity while interpreting any statute. The said Rule is applicable when particular words pertaining to class, category or genus are followed by general words. In this Connection, the Honble Supreme Court in Grusin: Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay, 2002 (1) 147 ELJ 593, has held that the said principle will have to be applied with care and caution. The FIonble Supreme Court has also held that the plain meaning will have to be given by the Court.

We are also of the opinion that the Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision. A construction which requires for its support, an addition or substitution of words will have to be avoided. In the present case, the learned Senior Counsel for petitioner wants the Court to read the words "transport and storage" as illegal transport and illegal storage. We are afraid such an interpretation cannot be given and the same is impermissible in law. In this connection, it is useful to refer the recent judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Dharmendra Textiles Processors, 2008 (1) CTC 53: 2008 (306) ITR 277 [LQ/SC/2008/1994] , the Honble Supreme Court in paragraph 52 has stated as follows:

"52...It is a well-settled principle in law that the Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision or a stipulated condition which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the Legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. Similar is the position for conditions stipulated in advertisements.

Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental references to referents. The object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature enacting it. (See Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse, 1997 (6) SCC 312 [LQ/SC/1997/957] ). The intention of the Legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. As observed in Cranford v. Spooner, 1846 (6) Moo PC 1, the Courts cannot aid the Legislatures defective phrasing of an Act, they cannot add or mend, and by construction make up deficiencies which are left there. [See State of Gujarat v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel, 1998 (3) SCC 234 [LQ/SC/1998/291] ]. It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. (See Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd., 1978 (1) All ER 948 (HL). Rules of interpretation do not permit the Courts to do so, unless the provision as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful meaning. The Courts are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the itself. (Per Lord Loreburn L.C. in Vickers Sons)".

The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said. "Statutes should be construed not as theorems of Euclid", Judge Learned Hand said, "but words must be construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them". (See Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 FR 547). The view was reiterated in Union of India v. Filip Tiago de Gama of Vedem Vasco de Gama, 1990 (1) SCC 277 [LQ/SC/1989/606] (SCC page 284, paragraph 16).

In D.R. Venkatachalam v. Deputy Transport Commissioner, 1977 (2) SCC 273 [LQ/SC/1976/490] , it was observed that the Courts must avoid the danger of a priori determination of the meaning of a provision based on their own preconceived notions of the ideological structure or scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the disguise of interpretation.

While interpreting a provision the Court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the Legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. (See Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Popular Trading Co., 2000 (5) SCC 511 [LQ/SC/2000/659] ). The legislative cases omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process...."

In this connection, it is useful to refer a recent judgment of the Honble High Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. K. Selvaraj and another, W.A. Nos.4150 and 4151 of 2004 dated 19.08.2008, wherein one of us was a party (Justice K. Raviraja Pandian) in which the Division Bench of this Court has considered the application of the Principles of "ejusdem generis" in detail. In paragraph 5, 6 and 20 of the said judgment the Honble Bench has stated as follows:

"5. We are not able to concur with the reasoning given by the Writ Court for setting aside the notification. The principle of interpretation of the statute or a provision of a statute has been the subject matter for decision before the Apex Court in a plethora of cases. In all those cases, the Apex Court ruled that the elementary principle of interpreting any word while considering a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. Where the words are clear and there is no obscurity, and there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the Court to take upon itself the task of amending or alternating the statutory provisions. Wherever the language is clear the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used. While doing so, what has been said in the statute as also what has not been said has to be noted. The construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words has to be avoided. In case of an ordinary word there should be no attempt to substitute or paraphrase of general application. Attention should be confined to what is necessary for deciding the particular case.

6. The Apex Court further ruled that no words or expressions used in any statute can be said to be redundant or superfluous. In matters of interpretation one should not concentrate too much on one word and pay too little attention to other words. No provision in the statute and no word in any Section can be construed in isolation. Every provision and every word must be looked at generally and in the context in which it is used. It is said that every statute is an edict of the legislature. (See: Gwalior Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. Custodian of Vested Forests, Palghat and Another, 1990 Supp SCC 785; Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 323 [LQ/SC/1991/439] ; Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse, 1997 (6) SCC 312 [LQ/SC/1997/957] ; Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India and others, 2002 (3) SCC 722 [LQ/SC/2002/345] ; and Grasim Industries Limited v. Collector of Customs, Bombay, 2002 (4) SCC 297 [LQ/SC/2002/440] ).

20. The exposition of law as to the applicability of the rule of ejusdem generis is classically expressed by the Apex Court in the case of Siddeshwari Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, 1989 (2) SCC 458 [LQ/SC/1989/30] , as follows:

12. The expression ejusdem generis "of the same kind or nature" signifies a principle of construction whereby words in a statute which are otherwise wide but are associated in the text with more limited words are, by implication, given a restricted operation and are limited to matters of the same class or genus as preceding them. If a list or string or family of genus-describing terms are followed by wider or residuary or sweeping-up words, then the verbal context and the linguistic implications of the preceding words limit the scope of such words.

13. In Statutory Interpretation : Rupert Cross (p.116) says:

"The draftsman must be taken to have inserted the general words in case something which ought to have been included among the specifically enumerated items had been omitted..."

14. The principle underlying this approach to statutory construction is that the subsequent general words were only intended to guard against some accidental omission in the objects of the kind mentioned earlier and were not intended to extend to objects of a wholly different kind. This is a presumption and operates unless there is some contrary indication. But the preceding words or expressions of restricted meaning must be susceptible of the import that they represent a class. If no class can be found, ejusdem generis rule is not attracted and such broad construction as the subsequent words may admit will be favoured. As a learned author puts it :

"...if a class can be found, but the specific words exhaust the class, then rejection of the rule may be favoured because its adoption would make the general words unnecessary; if, however, the specific words do not exhaust the class, then adoption of the rule may be favoured because its rejection would make the specific words unnecessary. (See Construction of Statutes by E.A. Driedger p.95 quoted by Francis Bennion in his Statutory Construction page 829 and 830)."

15. Francis Bennion in his Statutory Construction (pp.830-31) observed:

"For the ejusdem generis principle to apply there must be a sufficient indication of a category that can properly be described as a class or genus, even though not specified as such in the enactment. Furthermore the genus must be narrower than the words it is said to regulate. The nature of the genus is gathered by implication from the express words which suggest it...

It is necessary to be able to formulate the genus; for if it cannot be formulated it does not exist. `Unless you can find a category, said Farwell L.J., `there is no room for the application of the ejusdem generis doctrine."

In S.S. Magnhild v. McIntyre Bros. & Co., 1920 (3) KB 321, McCardie, J. said: (KB p.330)

"So far as I can see the only test seems to be whether the specified things which precede the general words can be placed under some common category. By this I understand that the specified things must possess some common and dominant feature."

17. In Tribhuban Parkash Nayyar v. Union of India, 1970 (2) SCR 732 [LQ/SC/1969/398] , the Court said : (SCC p.106, para 13: SCR p.740)

The rule reflects an attempt to reconcile incompatibility between the specific and general words, in view of the other rules of interpretation, that all words in a statute are given effect if possible, that a statute is to be construed as a whole and that no words in a statute are presumed to be superfluous..."

18. In UPSEB V. Hari Shankar, AIR 1979 SC 65 [LQ/SC/1978/217] , it was observed : (SCC p.30, para 15 : AIR p.73)

"... The true scope of the rule of `ejusdem generis is that words of a general nature following specific and particular words should be construed as limited to things which are of the same nature as those specified. But the rule is one which has to be `applied with caution and not pushed too far..."

19. The preceding words in the statutory provision which, under this particular rule of construction, control and limit the meaning of the subsequent words must represent a genus or a family which admits of a number of species or members. If there is only one species it cannot supply the idea of a genus."

Therefore, on a consideration of the various judgments of the Honble Supreme Court and the Honble High Court and after going through Section 23-C of the Act, we are of the opinion that the principle of Ejusdem Gcneris would not apply to the present case.

16. Environmental Perspective:

The said rule has been introduced in view of the attempt made by the dealers of sand and contractors of building to transport the sand purchased from the Government outside the State. According to the Government, the said rule has been made in public interest and also taking into consideration of the hardship that caused to the consumers in the State of Tamil Nadu as well as the high rate of urbanisation in the State. In the counter affidavit, it is also stated by the Government that illegal, unaccounted sand is also transported outside the State.

It is well known that sand in the present form has already undergone various changes over thousands of years. As found by the Expert Committee, due to over exploitation and indiscriminate mining of river sand, the environment and the eco-system got very much affected. The Expert Committee has also found out that the indiscriminate mining has resulted in deepening of the river beds, widening of the rivers, damage of civil structures, depletion of ground water table, degradation of ground quality, damage to the rivers system and reduction of bio diversity. Therefore, what is important is to use the barest minimum of sand for developmental activities. If the sand is allowed to be transported due to the demands in various places outside the State it would only increase the demand for more sand. This in turn would affect the environment seriously. Hence one has to see the impact on the natural resources. Whether it is authorized or not, legal or illegal what is important is the conservation and protection of the environment. The right to clean environment is a guaranteed fundamental right under Article 21. Article 48-A of the Constitution speaks about protection and improvement of environment and Article 51-A of the Constitution deals with the fundamental duties to protect and improve the natural environment including forest, lakes, rivers and wild life. The Honble Supreme Court has held in Indian Handicrafts Emporium v. Union of India, 2003 (7) SCC 589 [LQ/SC/2003/841] , that the implementation of Directive principle is within the expression of restriction in the interest of general public.

Hence, we hold that from the environmental perspective also the impugned rule has to be sustained.

17. Doctrine of Public Trust:

In State of Tamil Nadu v. Hind Stone, 1981 (2) SCC 205 [LQ/SC/1981/61] , it has been held as follows:

"6. Rivers, Forests, Minerals and such other resources constitute a nations natural wealth. These resources are not to be frittered away and exhausted by any one generation. Every generation owes a duty to all succeeding generations to develop and conserve the natural resources of the nation in the best possible way. It is in the interest of mankind. It is in the interest of the nation...."

Thus, the Honble Supreme Court has evolved the principle of doctrine of public trust. As of the said theory, the natural resources are not only meant for the present generation but should be preserved for the posterity. The Government and the present generation acts as a trustees for the future generation. The said principle was also followed by the Honble Supreme Court in T.N. Godarvarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, 2006 (1) SCC 1 [LQ/SC/2005/966] , wherein the Supreme Court was pleased to hold that the natural resources are the assets of the entire nation, that is the obligation of all concerned including the Union Government and the State Government. Therefore, under the principle of public trust doctrine also, the impugned rule will have to be sustained.

18. Impact of Rule 38-A.

Rule 38-A of the Tamil Nadu Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 1959 was introduced based upon the recommendations of the Expert Committee and also in pursuant to the orders passed by the Honble High Court. The said Rule has been introduced with a view to regulate and control indiscriminate, over exploitation and illicit sand mining. As stated earlier both the Division Bench of the Honble High Court as well as the Honble Supreme Court have upheld the validity of the Rule 38-A. We are of the opinion that Rule 38-B is nothing but a natural sequence to Rule 38-A. The object and purpose of Rule 38-B is similar to that of Rule 38-A. Therefore, Rule 38-B will have to be read in the context of Rule 38-A which is upheld by the Honble Supreme Court of India.

19. It is a matter of fact that there is a huge demand for sand due to the spurt in developmental activities. It is also a matter of fact that in some of the neighbouring States, there is a total ban of sand quarrying in the rivers. As held already the rivers are natural resources of the nation as well as the entire world and they cannot be allowed to be damaged in a particular State as against the other States. Rivers and other water resources are dwindling coupled with the increase in demand for water due to ever growing population. It is to be noted that even in the counter affidavit it has been stated by the respondents that the dealers and businessmen are trying to make huge profits by selling not only the sand from the Government but also indulging in indiscriminate quarrying and transporting the same in the guise of a valid permit. Hence, we are of the opinion that taking into consideration of the overall public interest the impugned Rule will have to be sustained.

20. For the reasons stated above, we are of the opinion that the Writ Petitions are liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the same are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are dismissed.