Hardayal Hardy, J.
(1) THIS case raises an interesting but difficult point under the Estate Duty Act,
1953 (hereinafter called the Act ). The facts are not many and are also not in
dispute.
(2) THE deceased A. T. Sahani who was an employee of the Indian Airlines
Corporation died on 11th September, 1963 in an air crash while on duty. Under Rule
159 of the Indian Airlines Corporation (Flying Crew) Services Rules, a member of the
flying crew was entitled to certain compensation at specified rates in the event of his
death or an injury caused by an accident during or as a result of air journey
performed as such in the Corporations service. The rule as it stood at the material
time reads as under :-"the Corporation shall pay compensation in the
undermentioned circumstances and at the rates indicated below. Such compensation
is payable only when the death or an injury is caused by an accident during or as a
result of air journey performed as a member of the flying crew in the Corporations
service.
(1) Death resulting from air journey on duty
Rs. Senior Captain (Basic Pay exceeding
Rs. 1,250) . . . . . . 45,000. 00 Captain and Sr. Flight
Navigator
(Basic Pay exceeding Rs. 1,050. 00) . . 40,000. 00
Jr. Captain, Flight Navigator & Sr.
Radio Officer in selection grade
(Basic pay not exceeding Rs. 1,050. 00) 35,000. 00
First Officer, Sr. Radio Officer &
Flight Engineer (Basic pay not exceeding
Rs. 6,50 . . . . . . 30,000
First Officer, Sr. Radio Officer, &
Flight Engineer (Basic pay not
exceeding Rs. 650. 00 ). . . . 25,000
The compensation payable under the said rule was in addition to the compensation
which the Corporation had agreed to pay under an agreement described as Pilot
agreement entered into with the Corporation on 1st April 1960 according to Rule (iv)
where by it was provided that the Corporation shall pay compensation for the death
of a pilot, a maximum of 36 times his monthly basic pay if such death occurred in
the circumstances mentioned in the above-mentioned Service Rules or while
travelling on duty in surface transport provided by the Corporation or its nominated
agents.
(3) IN accordance with the terms of the aforesaid agreement between the
deceased and his employer, a sum of Rs. 68,300. 00 was received by his widow as
compensation.
(4) THE Assistant Controller of Estate Duty included, infer alia, the said amount of
compensation in the principal value of the estate of the deceased under the head
"movables".
(5) ON appeal by the "accountable person", the Zonal Appellate Controller of
Estate Duty, Delhi held that this was a case where compensation was payable to the
legal heirs only in the event of death of the deceased. There could therefore be no
question of the deceased having any interest in the compensation. He further
observed that the mere right of nomination which the deceased had exercised in this
case, was of no consequence. He accordingly excluded the sum of Rs. 68,300. 00
from the principal value of the estate of the deceased.
(6) THE Revenue appealed against the decision to the Appellate Tribunal which
confirmed the exclusion. The Tribunal held that only the property in which the
deceased had an interest in his life-time would be deemed to be the property over
which he could be said to have a power of disposition. In the case of a
compensation receivable on his death such compensation came into being only by
reason of the death of the deceased. As such it could not be said that the deceased
had any interest in it during his life-time. The Tribunal therefore held that the
property in question was not one over which the deceased had any power of
disposition.
(7) AS the Tribunals order gave rise to a question of law; at the instance of the
controller, the following question was referred under section 64 of the Act, to this
Court for the opinion. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case,
the compensation amounting to Rs 68300. 00 was a property within the meaning of
Section 6 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953the Act does not define the term property
Probationary Flight Navigator, . . 25,000
Second Officer, Probationary Flight
Engineer & Radio Officer . . . . 20,000
Air Hostess and Steward . . . . 15,000
Probationary Radio Officer, Protionary Air
Hostess and Probationary
Steward . . . . . . . . 10,000
except by way of an inclusive definition of the term in section 2 (15) which reads as
under s. 2 (15) "property" includes any interest in property, movable or immovable,
the proceeds of sale thereof and any money or investment for the time being
representing the proceeds of sale and also includes any property converted from
one species into another by any method; Explanation 1. The creation by a person or
with his consent of a debt or other right enforceable against him personally or
against property which he was or might become Competent to dispose of, or to
charge burden for his own benefit, shall be deemed to have been a disposition made
by that person, and in relation to such a disposition the expression "properly" shall
include the debt or right created. "explanation 2.-The extinguishments at the expense
of the deceased of a debt or other right shall be deemed to have been a disposition
made by the deceased in favour of the person for whose benefit the debt or right
was extinguished, and in relation to such a disposition the expression "property"
shall include the benefit conferred by the extinguishments of the debt or right.
"section 5 is the charging section. It imposes estate duty in the case of every person
dying after the commencement of the Act upon the principal value of the property
passing on his death. It also determines what properties passing on a death are
liable to charge and at what rates. Section 2 (16) which defines the expression
"property passing on the death" is also an inclusive definition and gives neither the
definition of the word "property" nor does it attempt to lay down what property will
be held under the Act to have passed on the death". S. 2 (16) "property passing on
the death" includes property passing either immediately on the death or after any
interval, either certainly or contingently, and either originally or by way of
substitutive limitation and "on the death" includes at a period ascertainable only by
reference to the death; "section 6 to 17 deal with properties which actually do not
pass according to the provisions of Section 5 but are deemed to pass under a fiction
created by these sections. In this case we are mainly concerned with Section 6
which reads as under :-Property within Disposing Capacity.-- Property which the
deceased was at the time of his death competent to dispose of shall be deemed to
pass on his death. "the question as phrased postulates as if the present case is not
covered by Section 5 and the matter has to be discussed in the light of the artificial
meaning given to the expression "property which passes on the death" in Section 6.
But as I shall presently show that is not the correct way of approaching the
problem. In order to appreciate the precise content of this expression, it is
necessary to understand its true meaning under both these sections. The question
therefore primarily resolves itself into one of interpretation of these two sections.
(8) NOW, as observed by P. N. Bhagwati,. in a bench decision of Gujarat High
Court in Mahindra Ramhhai Palel v. Controller of Estate Duty. , Gujarat (1) the
expression "passes on the death" might have created some difficulty of
interpretation but two generations of judicial decisions have imparted to that
expression as occurring in section 1 of the U. K, Finance Act, 1894, which imposed
for the first time in England the duty called "estate duty". exact shades of meaning
that could not have been originally discerned and our Act being modeled on the
English statute it would be a fair presumption to make that when the legislature
enacted our Act, the legislature used the expression "passes on the death" in the
sense in which it had been judicially interpreted in England. We might, therefore
usefully refer to English decisions on the interpretation of section I of the U. K.
Finance Act, 1894, in order to comprehend the true import of passing of property
referred to in section 5 of our Act," As in this case we are mainly concerned with
Section 6 we may as well turn to Section 2 of the U. K. Finance, Act. 1894 which is
in terms also identical with those of section 6 to 17 of the Act. Sections I and 2 (l)
(a) in so for as they correspond to sections 5 and 6 read as under :-Section 1.-"in
the case of every person dying after the commencement of this Part of this Act,
there shall. save as hereinafter expressly provided, be levied and paid, upon the
principal value ascertained as hereinafter provided of all property, real or personal,
settled or not settled which passes on the death of such persons a duty, called
estate duty, at the graduated rates hereinafter mentioned and the existing duties
mentioned in the First Schedule to this Act shall not be levied in respect of property
chargeable with such estate duty. "section 2 (1)-"property passing on the death of
the deceased shall be deemed to include the property following, that is to say:- (a)
Property of which the deceased was at "the time of his death competent to dispose;.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,. . . . . . .
(9) IT may be mentioned that even the English Act did not give any definition of
this expression but by 1953 when our Act, which as said above, was modeled on
the English statute, came to be enacted, the expression had acquired a precise
content and meaning. The classic meaning of the expression was given by Lord
Parker of Waddington in Attorney Genera! v. Milne (2) when he said "the expression
passing on the death is not further defined, but is evidently used to denote some
actual change in the title or possession of the property as a whole which takes
places at death. For the purpose of this section it is absolutely immaterial to whom
or by virtue of what disposition the property passes. in Nevill v. Commissioners of
Inland Revenue, Viscount Haldane L. C. while dealing with Sections I and 2 of the
Finance Act, used a much simpler phraseology when he observed:-"the scheme of
the Act is" that a new duty called estate duty, is to be levied on the principal value
of the property settled or not settled, which "passes" on death. "passes" may be
taken as meaning "changes hands. " The principle is contained in S.. Sect. 2
combines definitions of such property with the extension of the application of the
principle laid down in S. I to certain cases which are not in reality cases of changing
hands on death at all, but are to such an extent in an analogous position that it has
been deemed proper in these instances to impose a similar tax. These cases are
technically altogether outside S. 1. That section is concerned with all property
changing hands, whether under the previsions of an instrument settling by
conferring successive rights to the same property, or by virtue of the general law
prescribing the succession to property. It is a change of the hands into which the
property comes that is the occasion of the tax, whether the property is settled or
not. "sections 6 to 17 of the Indian Act no doubt mention different kinds of property
which are deemed to pass, but as was observed by Lord Radcliffe in Sanderson and
others, v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (4) with reference to section 1 and 2 of
the U. K. Finance Act, estate duty is net charged by the Act upon two different kinds
or classes of property, property which passes in the natural sense and property
which is deemed to pass by virtue of special statutory provision.
(10) WHAT sections 6 to 17 provide is that property passing on death is deemed to
include certain kinds of property or, perhaps more accurately certain property in
certain situations and is not to be deemed to include certain property in other
situations. Section 5 and sections 6 to 17 like sections 1 and 2 of the U. K. Finance
Act are however mutually exclusive. That they were mutually exclusive, was indeed
the view that was held at one time and it had the high authority of Lord Macnaghten
who said in Earl Cowley v. Inland Revenue Commissioner (5) that "if the case falls
within Section 1 it cannot also come within section 2. The two sections are mutually
exclusive. " Lord Halsbury who too was in that case, also appeared to take the same
view as Lord Macnaghten. But in Public Trustee v. Inland Revenue Commissioners
(6) all the law Lords including Viscount Simonds and Lord Radcliffe who took part in
that decision, were uniformly critical of the above-mentioned dictum of Lord
Macnaghten in Cowleys case.
(11) FOR the decision of the present case neither the facts in Cowleys case nor
the controversy about the correctness of Lordmacnaghtens dictum are of much
relevance except that the view regarding mutual exclusiveness of sections I and 2
which had held the field for nearly sixty years, inspite of occasional hesitant doubts
cast on it in some decisions, was finally discarded by the House of Lords in 1960
Appeal Cases 398 and the true impact of Section 2 (1) on Section I was described
by Lord Radcliffe in these words:-"its purpose is to explain and refine upon the
meaning of the words "property. . . . which passes on. . . . death" which section I
had declared to be subject to the charge of duty. Sub-section (1) therefore selects
certain categories of property and, aided by the interpretation section, S. 22, brings
them expressly under the description of property passing on death, indifferent to the
question whether, if it itself had not been part of the original scheme of the Finance
Act, 1894, any one of those categories or any particular form of property falling
within one of the categories would or would not have been treated by the general
words of section 1. I can see no significance one way or the other in. the fact that it
declares its purpose by saying that the categories selected shall be "deemed" to be
included in the "property passing" which is charged by section 1. Such a phrase
gives statutory certainty to what might otherwise be in some aspects uncertain and,
in a few, impossible. Thus sub-section (1) (a) names a category, "property of which
the "deceased was. . . . competent to dispose, which seems plainly to embrace all
property which was within his absolute disposition at his death. "
(12) THE conclusion that emerges from the above discussion is that it is section I
of the English Act which as I have said before, corresponds to section 5 of the
Indian Act and no other section that imposes the charge of estate duty, that the
charge so imposed is imposed upon property that passes on death and on no other
property, and that the effect of section 2 (1) (a) of the English Act which
corresponds to section 6 of the Indian Act is to give to the word "passes" in section
1 (,a) meaning wider and less natural than it would have had if section 2 (1) (a) had
not been enacted.
(13) IN order, therefore, to enable the Revenue to bring to charge any property for
the purpose of estate duty by taking recourse to section 6, the attempt must also
satisfy the test that it was the property of the deceased in the sense in which it is
defined in Section 2 (15 ).
(14) I have already said that the Act does not define the word property except by
way of an inclusive definition. The restraint appears to be deliberate because the
term cannot be precisely defined and any attempt to do so will take us to the realms
of metaphysics. However, according to Lord Halsbury in New York Breweries Co. v.
Attorney General (7) page 62, a case referred to by Grover. (as his Lordship then
was) in Mwut Singh v. The Collector of Eshite Duty (8) "property is not something
necessarily connected with physical possession and capable therefore of being
treated by manual delivery; but if one comes to analyse its meaning, it is manifest
that a great many things, chosen in action, are in the ordinary sense of the word
"property" and capable of being treated not indeed by physical handling, but by the
documents of title and investments recongnised by the taw as transferring the title,
the incorporeal right to sue (that is what is strictly comprehended in such phrases),
documents which are capable of being enforced and treated as subjects of property.
"
(15) IT is therefore in this general and comprehensive sense that we have to
consider whether the deceased had any interest in the compensation payable by the
Corporation to his legal heirs on the happening of the event and in the -
circumstances mentioned above.
(16) I now pass on to the other aspect of the case, namely the "passing of the
property on death". We have already seen that both Lord Parker of Waddingion in
Attorney General vs. Milne and Viscount Haldane (2) in Nevill v. Inland Revenue
Commissioners (3) were clearly of (he opinion that the expression "passing on the
death" was evidently used to denote some actual change in the title or possession of
the property as a whole which took place at death or that. there was changing of
hands. In other words there must be some property and that includes interest in
that property over which the deceased had some kind of title which was in his
possession during his life time immediately before his death and which changed
hands on his death. In Adamson and another v. Attorney General (9) Lord Russell of
Killowen adverted to the meaning of the expression "passing on the death" as given
by Lord Parker in these words "further, a phrase of Lord Parker in Attorney General
v. Milne (2) is quoted as showing that the eminent authority took the view that whenever any change of title to property takes place at death property passes
within the meaning of section 1. I cannot so interpret what Lord Parker said. As I
read his statement he means no more than that when property passes there must
be some change in the title to or possession of the property as a whole which takes
place on the death. "
(17) IN whatever way one may look at the meaning of the expression "passing on
the death", so far as section 5 is concerned, it cannot be disputed that before the
property passes the deceased must have had some title to or possession of the
property. The question is whether by enlarging the ambit of that expression in
section 6 the legislature has brought about any such radical change in its meaning.
Is it possible that a person should neither have any title in the property nor should
he be in possession thereof and yet he should be competent to dispose of it .
Counsel for the Revenue argued that compensation was payable to the heirs of the
deceased pursuant to a contract of employment between, the deceased and his
employer, the Indian Airlines Corporation. It was a remuneration to which the
deceased was entitled under the terms of his employment; only its payment was
conditional upon his death being caused by an accident during or as a result of air
journey performed as a member of the flying crew in the service of the Corporation
or while travelling on duty in surface transport provided by the Corporation or its
nominated agents and was by its very nature, receivable by his legal heirs. Although
no specific rule was pointed out to us it was also stated that the deceased had
power of disposition over it in the sense that he could nominate the person or
persons by whom the amount was recoverable after his death, and that the
deceased had actually nominated his wife for that purpose. Learned counsel
therefore contended that the right to get compensation as a condition of ones
service is as much an interest in property as any other interest which a person may
have in incorporeal property, such as chooses in action etc. The circumstance that the
occasion for the exercise of that right arises after the death of that person and is
also conditional upon death, does not in any way detract from the existence of that
right and the deceaseds interest therein during his life-time. The payment of
compensation is not gratuitous nor does it depend upon the discretion of the
Corporation It is a compulsory payment which the Corporation is bound to make on
the happening of a certain event to the heirs of the deceased. There is thus a direct
nexus between the right of the deceased as an essential condition of his service to
have that compensation paid to his legal representatives and the right of his legal
representatives to receive that payment. This right of the deceased must be
regarded as interest in the property in much the same way as he would have had in
any actionable claim of which the payment was postponed until after his death. In
as much as the deceased had also the right to nominate the person to whom the
payment should be made. be had also the power of disposition over it. In support of
his argument the learned counsel for the Revenue referred us to a decision of the
Court of Appeal in England in Attorney General vs. Quixley (10) The question raised
in that case was whether the estate of Margaret Louise Quixley. a teacher, was
subject to estate duty in respect of a death gratuity payable to her legal
representatives by the Board of Education under the provisions of the Teachers
(Superannuation) Act, 1925. The lady was a school teacher who was ultimately at
the time of her death interested in a sum which was called a death gratuity. She had
been a teacher for some years. By the School Teachers (Superannuation) Act of
1918, a system was established for the profession: with respect to the grant of
Superannuation allowances and gratuities to their legal personal representatives.
Section 6 of the Act however declared that "nothing in this Act shall give any person
an absolute right to any superannuation allowance or gratuity, and, except as in this
Act provided, the decision of the Board on any question which may arise as to, or
which may affect the application of this Act to any person. . . . shall be final. There
was another Act of 1922 which made contributions compulsory. In 1925 there came
another Act, the Teachers (Superannuation) Act. By section 5 (1) it was declared:
"subject to the provisions of this Act, the Board of Education shall grant to the legal
personal representatives of a teacher who has been employed. . . . and who dies
while in contributory service. . . . . . a sum not exceeding an amount equal to the
amount of the additional allowance which the Board might have granted to him if he
had at the date of his death become permanently incapable of serving efficiently as a
teacher in contributory service, whichever is greater.
(18) THE lady made the required contributions and also fulfilled the other
conditions on which the payments of the gratuity to her personal representatives
depended.
(19) ROWLATT. held that although the quantum of the gratuity was not
ascertainable until death, the gratuity was property passing at the death of the
deceased, of which she was competent to dispose, within the meaning of the
Finance Act, 1894, and so subject to duty.
(20) MISS Quixleys administrate appealed. One of the questions posed before the
Court or Appeal was: Is there a right which the lady had in the gratuity within the
term "property" lord Hansworth M. R. answered the question thus :but first of all,
if the interest that she had falls within the term "property", we can leave outside, for
the monment, the other matters brought into consideration in the argument. Now it
appears to me that from and after the 1925 Act came into operation, whereby it was
laid down that the Board shall make a grant to the legal personal representatives of
a teacher, that interest was not only an interest in an uncertain amount, but was a
right which was within the term "property".
(21) THE next question posed by the learned Master of the Rolls was: Is that right
a piece of property under the section To this right a piece of property under the
section To this his Lordship gave the following answer :"in my view it is, and, being
such it prima-facie comes within the enlarging words in section 2, sub-section 1 (a)
of the Finance Act, 1894. Be it observed that what we have to do is not to take the
ordinary meaning of words, but we have to interpret "shall be deemed. " Therefore,
what might not at once appear to be rightly called "property passing on the death"
is still to be property passing on the death, and as such includes property of which
the deceased was at the time of his death competent to dispose. It was, in my
judgment, property. " And then went on to add:-"counsel was, I think rightly,
compelled to admit that she could dispose of a sum ultimately to be received, or
could dispose of this interest by her will, although he said she could not raise any
money upon it in the sense that there could not be an assignment of it while she
was alive. But it would appear to me that to suggest that the deceased lady had no
power to dispose of the sum by will would be to take away half the merit of the
gratuity upon her deceased. If and when it is received it must be subject to her will
and absolute right to receive some sum is of benefit and of comfort to her, because
she is, by means of that knowledge and that competence to dispose of it, able to
make some provision for those who are the objects, and rightly the objects, of her
disposing power, ]t appears to me, therefore, that in view of the right which this
lady had, she bad this power to dispose of the sum by will and, thus, when one
looks at the Act of 1894, section I, the charging section, and section 2, which I have
referred to as a section which sweeps into the charge under section I property
which is to be deemed for the purpose of section I to be property passing in the
death, and when one looks, at the still wider interpretation under section 22, sub
section 2 (a), it is clear that this sum that is ultimately received, 429 17s. 6d. does
fall within the charge imposed by section 1 of the Finance Act, 1894. "lawrence L..
put the proposition in these words :-"section I of the Finance Act, 1894, imposes
estate duty upon all property which passes on the death. In order that the estate
duty may be payable under that section the property must have a continuous
existence before and after the death, and the possession or enjoyment of the
property must pass from one person to another on the death. Section 2 deals with
property which does not in fact pass on the death, and enacts that, for the purposes
of liability to estate duty, that property shall be deemed to pass. In order that estate
duty may be payable in respect of property under that section, it is not necessary
that there should have been a continuous existence of that property, nor is it
necessary that it should pass from one person to another on the death. It would
include property which comes into existence for the first time on the death of a
person. Amongst the property which is so deemed to pass under section 2 is
"property of which the deceased was at the time of his death competent to
dispose"-see sub-section l (a) of section 2. The words "competent to dispose" are
further defined by section 22, sub-section 2 (a) which enacts, so far as material for
this case, that a person shall be deemed competent to dispose of property if he has
such an interest therein or such general power as would enable him to dispose of
the properly. and the expression "general power" to dispose of the "property is
further defined in the second part of the same sub-section, and it "includes every
power or authority enabling the donee or other holder thereof to appoint or dispose
of property as he thinks fit, whether exercisable by instrument inter-vivos or by will.
""now the sole question arising in this case is whether the death gratuity payable to
the deceased was property of which the deceased was, at the time of her death,
competent to dispose within the meaning of section 2, sub-section l (a) and section
22, sub-section 2 (a) of the Finance Act, 1894. Counsel for the appellant has
admitted, and I think, rightly admitted, that the deceased was competent to dispose
of this property by will as she might think fit. It seems to me that that admission
carries the contention of the Crown the whole length. "
(22) I have already said that the provisions of sections I and 2 (1) of the U. K.
Finance Act correspond to section 5 and 6 of the Indian Act. In Quixleys case, the
learned judges also referred to section 22 (2) (a) of the Finance Act which reads as
follows:-"a person shall be deemed competent to dispose of property it he has such
an estate or interest therein or such general power as would. if he were sui juris,
enable him to dispose of the property,. . . and the expressiongeneral power"
includes every power or authority enabling the donee or other holder thereof to
appoint or dispose of property as he thinks fit, whether exercisable by instrument
inter-vivos or by will. "
(23) THE provision corresponding to that section in the Indian Act is contained in
section 3 (1) (a) which almost reproduces the language of the English Statute.
(24) IT is true that in the instant case the deceased was not required to make any
contribution for the purpose of earning the compensation as Miss Quixley was
required to make under the Teachers (Superannuation) Act, but the compensation
was payable as a reward for the services which the deceased was required to render
and was a part of the remuneration payable under the Service Rules and the Pilot
agreement and its object was to make some sort of provision for the legal
representatives of the deceased employee. He therefore had interest in it and had
also the right to appoint the person to whom it should be paid on his death.
Although no specific rule providing for such appointment has been pointed out, the
fact that he did nominate his wife as the person to whom the compensation should
be paid and the Corporation accepted the nomination, goes to show that his
authority to do was recognized. Learned counsel for the "accountable person"
countered the argument advanced on behalf of the Revenue by submitting that the
compensation in question is, in no way different, from death compensation under
the workmens compensation schemes etc. which are generally not dutiable, the
deceased having never paid for them nor having held them as his property at any
time. So also are damages paid for deaths on account of accidents. He said there
was a difference between compensation payable on account of damages suffered by
the estate of the deceased as a result of injuries caused to him and the benefit that
accrued to his legal representatives after his death and was occasioned by it. It was
argued that in one case the deceased had an interest in compensation amount
which be could dispose of during his life time while in the other case he had no such
interest nor had he any right of disposition over it as the benefit itself occurred after
he ceased to be there to see to its disposition.
(25) IN this connection the learned counsel cited a Bench decision of Lahore High
Court in Secretary of State v. Gokal Chand and others (11) where in the context of
sections I and 2 of the Fatel Accidents Act XIII of 1885 which is primarily intended
to give the legal representatives of a person whose death has been caused by the
wrongful act, neglect or default of another person a right to recover compensation
from the latter for the pecuniary loss resulting from the death to the deceaseds
children or other relatives enumerated in the Act or to the estate of the deceased.
Sir Shadi Lal C.. who spoke for the Bench said: "the law contemplates two sorts of
damages: the one is the pecuniary loss to the estate of the deceased resulting from
the accident; the other is the pecuniary loss sustained by the members of his family
through his death. The action for the latter is brought by the legal representatives,
not for the estate, but as trustees for the relatives beneficially entitled; while the
damages for the loss caused to the estate and, when recovered, form part of the
assets of the estate. The loss to estate had accrued during the lifetime of the
deceased and could have been recovered by him"
(26) THE above case was approvingly referred to by a Division Bench of Madras
High Court (Rajamannar C.. and Venka- tarama Ayyer.) in Gobald Motor Service Ltd.
, a company registered under the India Companies Act, by its Managing Directors N.
Veeraswami Chettiar and another V. R. M. K. Velusami and others (12) where the
learned judges also referred to the following "the rights of action in the two case are
quite distinct and independent. Under the Law Reforms (Miscellaneous Provisions)
Act, 1934, the right of action is for the benefit of the deceaseds estate; under the
Fatal Accidents Act the right of action is for the benefit of the deceaseds
dependents. "
(27) LEARNED counsel next argued that so far as the dependents of the deceased
were concerned their right to receive compensation was a mere expectancy which
was not transferable under section 6 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and
cited in this connection a judgment of the Privy Council in Ananda Mohun Roy V.
Gour Mohan Mullick (13) and of Madras High Court in Palanatti Raghudu and
another V. Nallagudda Erraiva and another (14) I do not think section 6 (a) T. P.
Act, has any bearing on the question arising for decision in this case as we are not
concerned in any way with the rights of the dependents to transfer or dispose of
their right of expectancy in this case. For the purpose of decision of this case what is
material is the right of the deceased to dispose of by will or otherwise the
compensation which his dependents or legal representatives. are entitled to receive.
(28) I also do not think much of the distinction which the learned counsel
endeavoured to draw between the pecuniary damages for the loss caused to the
estate and the pecuniary loss sustained by the numbers of his family through his
death. The distinction may have some relevance and I dare-say it does have some
relevance when one has to consider the question of damages as was the case in
Feay v. Bai-nwell (15) decided by Singleton. but it does not seem to have any
relevance for the purpose of deciding whether the compensation payable in the
present case is property which should "be deemed to pass on the death of the
deceased. "
(29) LEARNED counsel lastly contended that a mere power of nomination for which
there does not seem to be any specific provision in the relevant Rules or agreement,
cannot be regarded as a power of disposition. He also doubted whether the power
to nominate comes within the expression "competent to dispose of. In this
connection our attention was invited to a decision of Madras High Court in D.
Molianayelu Mudaliar and another V. Indian Insurance and Banking Corporation Ltd.
Salem and (mother (16) where the effect of nomination under section 39 of the
Insurance Act 1938 with reference to a policy of life insurance was considered. It
was there said :"so far as nomination is concerned there is no appreciable difference
between the English and American law on the one hand, and what obtains in India.
According to the English law the payee or the nominee is nothing more than an
agent to receive the money, which money remains as the property of the assured
and at his disposal during his life time and on his death forms part of the estate.
The result is that the payee or the nominee takes no beneficial interest in it. "
(30) THE above passage however does not contain the full statement of law on the
subject because after referring to a large number of cases, Govinda Menon.
added :"there is an exception to the above rule. I n case of nomination of a wife as
the payee under a policy of life insurance. if the construction placed upon the
declaration is that a trust has been created under the provisions of the Married
Womens Property Act, the beneficiary takes the assured amount free of all the
liabilities of the insured and if it is construed as a mere nomination, the nominee has
no more right than to receive the amount subject to all the liabilities as if the
disposition was by means of a testamentary instrument. "
(31) IT is, however, not necessary to discuss at length the legal effect of
nomination in this case because the nomination of his wife by the deceased was
recognized by the Corporation and the payment of compensation has actually been
made to her without any one else having raised any claim thereto.
(32) ON a close and careful consideration of the whole matter. I am inclined to
take the view that the present case comes within the ratio of the decision of the
Court of Appeal in England in Quixleys case. I would therefore answer the question
in the affirmative. The Controller will also have his costs which are assessed at Rs.
300. 00.