1. This is a reference under Section 256(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). The questions, referred to us, for our opinion, are as follows :

"1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was correct in holding that the first return filed on May 31, 1972, was a valid return though it was not accompanied by the statement of accounts supporting the income shown in the return

2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that an application for extension of time made on September 30, 1971, but received in the Income Tax Office on October 1, 1971, could be considered in deciding the question of reasonableness for the delay in filing of the return "

2. In this reference, we are concerned with the assessment year 1971-72. The due date for filing the return was October 30, 1971. Application for extension of time to file the return was filed on October 1, 1971. Although the application bears the date September 30, 1971, the finding is that it had been filed on October 1, 1971. A return for the relevant assessment year was filed on May 31, 1972, showing an income of Rs. 80,000 by estimate. It appears that it was realised by the assessee himself that the return filed by him was defective for various reasons. A revised return was, therefore, filed on March 17, 1973, showing the total income of Rs. 1,03,470. The returns having been filed beyond the due date, a penalty proceeding in terms of Section 271(1)(a) was initiated. The Income Tax Officer held that the return filed on May 31, 1972, was no return as it lacked the necessary particulars. He, therefore, levied penalty for 17 months' delay in filing the return. A sum of Rs. 28,626, being 2% of the tax of Rs. 84,194, was imposed. The firm was treated as an unregistered firm. On appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner considered the plea of the assessee for not filing the return within time. In that behalf, he examined the reasonableness for the delay in filing the return. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner applied himself to the pleas advanced by the assessee. Upon full consideration, he held that no reasonable cause had been shown for late filing of the return. The finding is in the following words :

"Therefore, I have to come to the irresistible conclusion that the application for extension of time was sought for in routine manner and the cause shown for the delay or for seeking extension of time is not at all reasonable."
3. This finding, that there was no reasonable cause for late filing, has not been upset by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. Suffice it to say, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner dismissed the appeal of the assessee without any modification.

4. The assessee, being aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, filed an appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal also proceeded on the footing that the application for extension of time had been filed on October 1, 1971. Nothing has been brought to our notice indicating that the application had been filed earlier. We shall, therefore, also proceed on the basis of the fact that the application for extension of time had been filed on October 1, 1971. The Tribunal, however, considered the question of reasonable cause for late filing of the return from an entirely different angle. It observed that the assessee having filed an application for extension of time on October 1, 1971, although beyond time, may have left the assessee under the impression that time had been extended till March 31, 1972, as prayed for by him. The Tribunal was, therefore, of the view that there was reasonable cause until March 31, 1972, for not filing the return. In regard to the delay beyond March 31, 1972, the plea of the assessee was rejected by the Tribunal as well. The Tribunal, therefore, modified the order of penalty. Since the first return had been filed on May 31, 1972, the penalty would be leviable for April and May, 1972. The Tribunal also held that the first return filed on May 31, 1972, could not be ignored and, therefore, penalty for two months only could be levied.

5. The Revenue, being aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal, moved it for reference to this court. The Tribunal has, accordingly, referred to us the two questions mentioned above.

6. No one has appeared on behalf of the assessee, although notice of the reference was issued and served upon them.

7. The first question which arises for consideration is whether the return filed on May 31, 1972, was a valid return although it was not accompanied by the statements of accounts supporting the income shown in the return The return filed on May 31, 1972, has not been produced before us. We have, therefore, to decide this question on the basis of the facts recorded by the Income Tax Officer and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner has noted that no statement of accounts had been filed along with the return. He has observed as follows :

"The original return filed by the appellant on May 31, 1972, is bald and there is no basis to show how the income was estimated."
8. It thus appears that all that was mentioned in the return was that the assessee had a taxable income of Rs. 80,000 during the assessment year. The question as to whether the return is valid or invalid and not capable of being taken any notice of has been the subject-matter of several decisions. The conspectus of the decisions shows that it will depend upon the circumstances of each case. Every error or omission will not render a return an invalid return. Rule 12 of the Income Tax Rules, 1962, provides the form and the manner in which the return has to be filed. The assessee's case is covered by the provisions of Rule 12(1)(b)(i) which reads as follows :

"in the case of a person not being a company to which Clause (a) applies, and not being a person to whom Clause (c) applies--

(i) where the total income includes any income chargeable to Income Tax under the head 'Profits and gains of business or profession', be in Form No. 2 and be verified in the manner indicated therein."

9. It appears that Sub-clause (2) of Rule 12 of the Income Tax Rules is not relevant for our purpose. It, therefore, need not be referred to. There is some sanctity attaching to the requirement of Rule 12(1)(b)(i) of the Income Tax Rules. It must be verified in the manner indicated in Form No. 2. The verification assumes importance for the reason that the form postulates the filing of statements of accounts. Part No. VI of Form No. 2 prescribes the particulars of income from business or profession. Paragraph 2 enjoins that if the accounts are kept on the mercantile system of accountancy, a copy of the manufacturing accounts or trading accounts, the profit and loss accounts and balance-sheet or trial balance must be attached to this return. In terms of Part VI, the assessee was required to disclose the manner in which his return was made up. But without the statements of accounts and the particulars required in Part VI, it would be no return. No half-way compliance of the direction can be made for the purposes of assessment. Such an action, therefore, will not be fulfilment of requirement of Form No. 2 and Rule 12(1)(b)(i) of the Income Tax Rules, 1962. Without the statements of accounts, it is not possible to proceed with the assessment with any sense of propriety. In that view of the matter, the filing of statement of accounts assumes importance. From the fact that the statement of accounts have not been indexed, it is difficult to hold that it is a return which can be taken serious note of. A similar question arose before a Full Bench of the Rangoon High Court in the case of CIT v. A.R.A.N. Chettiyar Firm AIR 1928 Ran 108. In that case, none of the details required under Note V at pages 2 and 3 of the Form was mentioned and the Income Tax Authority treated the return as no return at all. In that case, it was contended by the assessee that though defective, the return could not be treated as a nullity and that the details required in the Form were only instructions to the assessee as to how the Form should be filled up. In those circumstances, the Full Bench observed as follows (p. 108) :

"I am clearly of opinion that the particulars prescribed by the form are laid down in the Act itself : Section 22(2). Statutory Rule 19 embodies the form of return (exhibit A) furnished to the respondent. This rule has the same force as a section in the Act and a return which completely ignores its provisions cannot, in my opinion, be considered as any return."
10. We are in respectful agreement with the Full Bench decision of the Rangoon High Court.

11. A similar view was taken by a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court in the case of Lal Mohammad Sardar Mohammad v. CIT 

12. Form No. 2 has been prescribed by Rule 12 of the Income Tax Rules. It must, therefore, be treated as a statutory form. The requirement in the form, therefore, must be held to be a statutory requirement. A situation may arise where there may be clerical omissions. Those omissions may be rectified later on. The law has taken note of situations where there may be genuine omissions. In that situation, the assessee should not be penalised. In Section 139(5), it has been prescribed that if an assessee discovers any omission, or any wrong statement in the return, he may furnish a revised return at any time before assessment is made. Similarly, in Section 185(2), it has been prescribed that where the Income Tax Officer considers that the application for registration is not in order, he will intimate the defect to the firm and give it an opportunity to rectify the defect. In Section 185(3), the Income Tax Officer is enjoined to intimate the defect to the firm, if he considers the declaration in terms of Section 184(7) not in order and to give an opportunity to rectify the defect in the declaration. It will thus be seen that wherever the defects or omissions are bona fide or are such which do not go to the root of the matter, specific provisions have been made to permit rectification of mistakes. The omissions of other kind which go to the root of the matter, stand on a different footing. In the situation postulated by Section 139(5) or Section 185, the return of the filing of the farms does not become a nullity. But where the omission of the filing of the return is of the substance of the matter and not of form, the return cannot be taken as any return at all. In the instant case, Part VI of the return had not been filled up at all. In fact, nothing had been filled up in the return, except the income from profession with a note "on estimate". Such a return must be held to be no return at all. In my view, therefore, the return filed on May 31, 1972, was no return. The delay in filing the return till that date could not have been condoned in the view that I have taken. We are constrained to hold that the Tribunal was not correct in holding that the first return filed on May 31, 1972, was a valid return since it was not accompanied by the statements of accounts in respect of the income shown in the return. Before concluding this chapter, it must be observed that we heard the Department ex parte. No one appeared on behalf of the assessee. That may have handicapped us and the matter may require fuller consideration when properly agitated. On the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the view that the Tribunal was not correct in the view that it took.

13. The next question which falls for consideration before us is whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that the application for extension of time filed on October 1, 1971, could be considered in deciding the question of reasonableness for the delay in filing the return. The Tribunal has not found that the application for extension of time had been filed on September 30, 1971. In fact, all the authorities proceeded on the footing that the application had been filed on October 1, 1971. That must be treated as a closed chapter being a finding of fact. The question is whether there was any obligation upon the Income Tax Officer to pass any order upon an application for extension of time filed after the due date for filing of the return. The application bore the date September 30, 1971, but there is no controversy that it was received in the Department on October 1, 1971. The application does not show that it was filed before the Income Tax Officer. In fact, the Income Tax Officer has noted in his order that from the records it did not appear whether any such application was filed by the assessee.

14. Be that as it may, assuming that the application was filed on October 1, 1971, it was only the case of the assessee that it had been filed on September 30, 1971, and we have to consider whether the assessee could have been labouring under the impression that the time had been extended. The submission of the assessee found favour with the Tribunal. We have considerable difficulty in accepting the view of the Tribunal. It is true that a return may be filed at any time before the notice is issued or before the four years' period has expired. It is also true that an application for extension of time may be filed at any time, but any application filed after the due date for filing the return loses all its sanctity. If any analogy is needed, it is like filing of an application for extension of time to carry out a pre-emptory order after the expiry of time. Any application for extension of time after the pre-emptory time cannot postpone the rigour of the pre-emptory order. Similarly, once the time fixed by the statute has expired, no one has the right to assert that his prayer has been granted. The reasonableness of the delay in filing the return was not considered by the Income Tax Officer because he never saw the application. The matter was, however, considered by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who, on the basis of the submission urged on the behalf of the assessee, found that there was no reasonable cause for the delay in filing the return. The Tribunal has not upset the findings of fact arrived at by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. In that situation, it was wrong on the part of the Tribunal to have observed that merely by filing of an application for extension of time, the assessee could have been under the impression that the time had been extended. We are fortified in the view that we have taken by a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of T. Venkata Krishnaiah and Co. v. CIT [1974]93ITR297(AP) , In that case, the Income Tax Officer had issued notice to the assessee to file his return by September 16, 1963.

15. No application for extension of time was filed till that date. An application for extension of time was received in the office of the Income Tax Officer on September 18, 1963. In that situation, the submission urged on behalf of the assessee was that having prayed for extension of time, the time for filing the return must be deemed to have been extended. Their Lordships clearly rejected this submission and held that the Income Tax Officer was not bound under the provisions of the Income Tax Act or Rules made thereunder to pass any order thereon. We are in respectful agreement with the view of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. It was open to the Tribunal to have looked into the cause shown by the assessee and found that, as a matter of fact, the ground advanced for delay in filing the return was reasonable or not, but it did not do so. Merely, on the application for extension of time, the Tribunal could not have assumed that the assessee would be labouring under the impression that the time had been extended and that circumstance would be reasonable cause for not filing the return within the stipulated period.

16. In that view of the matter, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the application for extension of time, received in the office of the Income Tax Officer on October 1, 1971, could be considered as relevant material in deciding the question of reasonableness for delay in filing of the return. As a sequel to our decision on the two points referred to us, the order of the Income Tax Officer is restored.

17. For the reasons stated above, both the questions are answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. However, there shall be no order as to costs.

18. Let a copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar be sent to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Patna, as required under Sub-section (1) of Section 260 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.