D.K. Jain, C.J.These three appeals, by the Revenue, u/s 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short " the"), are directed against the orders passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench (for short, "the Tribunal"), in I.T.A. No. 340/Chand/2001 ; 646/ Chand/2001 and 321/Chand/2003, pertaining to the assessment years 1996-97 to 1998-99.

2. Since, in substance, the issues raised in all the three appeals are similar, they are being disposed of by this common order. According to the Revenue, the orders of the Tribunal involve the following substantial questions of law:

(Questions proposed in appeal for the assessment year 1996-97)

1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the honble Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was right in law to admit additional evidence and granting relief to the assessee on the basis of this evidence in violation of Rule 29 of the Income Tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963

2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the honble Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was right in law in holding that sufficient opportunity to cross-examine the evidence relied on by the Revenue had not been granted to the assessee

3. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the honble Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was right in law in not accepting the plea of the Revenue to determine the written down value of the 100 per cent, depreciable assets in question according to Explanation 3 to Section 43(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961

3 The respondent-assessee is a banking company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. In the return of income for the relevant assessment years, the assessee claimed depreciation on the assets, leased out by it to the Punjab State Electricity Board (for short "PSEB"), Nagpur Alloys Castings Ltd. (for short, "NACAST"), and various other concerns. In the case of PSEB and NACAST, the assets in question were purchased by the assessee from them and leased out on lease rental, as per the terms of the lease deeds. However, in relation to other concerns, the assets were purchased from third parties and leased out to the lessees.

4. During the course of assessment proceedings for the said assessment years, the Assessing Officer held doubts about the genuineness of these transactions. After carrying out some enquiries, he found that the assets were either not in existence or the lease arrangements were nothing but pure financing transactions. Confronting the assessee with the material collected by him, the Assessing Officer came to the conclusion that the transactions of leasing out of assets by the assessee to various concerns were sham and a colourable device to evade tax. Accordingly, he disallowed the assessees claim for depreciation on all the leased out assets.

5. Being aggrieved, the assessee preferred appeals to the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). Before the Commissioner, the assessee furnished voluminous evidence in support of its claim for depreciation. It was pleaded before the Commissioner that the assessee had not been allowed an opportunity to cross-examine the persons, who had denied having supplied the equipment to the assessee and whose statements had been relied upon by the Assessing Officer. The Commissioner furnished the copies of evidence, so adduced, by the assessee to the Assessing Officer for his comments. However, ultimately the assessees submissions did not find favour with the Commissioner and accordingly, he dismissed the assessees appeals.

6. The assessee carried the matter in further appeals to the Tribunal. By the impugned orders, in so far as the claim of depreciation on the equipment leased out to PSEB and NACAST, is concerned, the Tribunal has directed the Assessing Officer to allow it but in respect of other assets, it has remanded the matter back to the Assessing Officer with a direction to reframe the assessment in accordance with law after allowing the assessee an opportunity to cross-examine the persons, on whose statements reliance had been placed.

7. We have heard Mr. D.S. Patwalia, learned Counsel for the Revenue, and Mr. Ajay Vohra, learned Counsel for the assessee. The main thrust of Mr. Patwalias arguments is that the Tribunal has erred in entertaining additional evidence, furnished by the assessee before it, without following the procedure laid down in Rule 29 of the Income Tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963(for short "the Rules"). It is asserted that the Tribunal has not recorded any reason for admitting the evidence, which had been rejected by the Commissioner. It is also submitted that before the Assessing Officer, the assessee had never requested for an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. Learned Counsel had also urged that the Tribunal has ignored the provisions contained in Explanation 3 to Section 43(6) of theand has not indicated the value of the assets for calculating the depreciation.

8. We are of the view that the appeals, preferred by the Revenue, are devoid of any merit. It is manifestly clear from the order of the Commissioner that the additional evidence, adduced by the assessee before him, was entertained and its copies were given to the Assessing Officer for his comments though ultimately, the Commissioner did not find any substance in the appeals. It cannot, therefore, be said that the Commissioner did not entertain the additional evidence, as is being pleaded now. Instead, he found that the additional evidence also did not advance the case of the assessee. In that view of the matter, furnishing of the same evidence before the Tribunal is not tantamount to additional evidence within the meaning of Rule 29 of the Rules. Thus, in our opinion, on the facts in hand, there has been no violation of the said rule. It is pertinent to note that during the course of hearing of appeals before the Tribunal, no such objection was raised by the Departments representative.

9. As regards the question, whether in a given case, sufficient opportunity had been granted to an assessee or not is a pure question of fact. In this regard, the Tribunal has noticed that since the assessments were getting barred by limitation by March 31, asking the assessee to meet the case against them on two dates in the last week of March itself was not sufficient opportunity. The finding of the Tribunal is based on appreciation of the material placed before it and therefore the question proposed cannot be said to be even a question of law.

10. Turning to the third question, namely, the determination of written down value of the assets in question, in accordance with Explanation 3 to Section 43(6) of the Act, we find that no such plea was raised before the Tribunal. Hence, the question sought to be raised does not arise from the order of the Tribunal.

11. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that no question of law, much less a substantial question of law, arises from the order of the Tribunal.

12. Accordingly, we decline to entertain the appeals. Dismissed.