1. The Calicut Corporation issued notices to six persons under S.137 of the Kerala Municipal Corporations Act, 1961 claiming that the persons were liable to pay profession tax under S.113 (1) (a) of the Act for constructing or purchasing buildings with a view to derive rent therefrom and collecting rent therefrom: in so doing, the Corporation claimed, the persons were exercising.a profession, art or calling or transacting a business or holding an appointment, public or private. The six persons sought to be taxed filed six writ petitions which came before a learned judge of this Court; and the learned judge disposed of five of them by a common judgment reported as K. V. Subhadra Kovilamma v. State of Kerala (1970 KLT. 586) and the sixth writ petition by a separate judgment following the earlier decision. The Corporation has filed six appeals against these judgments in the six writ petitions; and in one of the writ petitions the State has also filed an appeal. Thus, the seven writ appeals.

2. The seven writ petitions are similar to the six writ petitions which have given rise to the appeals, having been filed by seven others, to whom also the Corporation issued notices under S.137 of the Act.

3. The relevant provision with which we are concerned in these cases is S.113(1) (a), which provides that every person who "exercises a profession, art or calling or transacts business or holds any appointment, public or private" shall pay a half yearly tax assessed in accordance with the rules in schedule H, etc. Exactly similar provisions occur in the Kerala Panchayats Act (S. 69 (1) (ii) (a)), the City Municipality Act of Madras and the Punjab Municipal Act. These provisions have come up for consideration in quite a few cases; and the relevant decisions have been cited before us. Recently, a Division Bench of this Court, to which one of us was a party, has had occasion to consider the same expression appearing in S.69 (1) (ii) (a) of the Kerala Panchayats Act, the question involved in the case being whether a person who collects rent from tenants of agricultural lands situated in a Panchayat is liable to pay profession tax. That decision is reported as D. H. Namboodiripad v. The Executive Authority, Thekkumkara Panchayat (1970 KLT. 578). Between this decision of the Division Bench and the decision of the learned single judge under appeal (Subhadra Kovilammas case) almost all the relevant decisions bearing on the question have been considered. The most favourable of the decisions considered in the aforesaid two decisions, from the point of view of the Corporation, is probably Waliati Ram Nathu Rao v. Municipal Committee, Rupar (AIR. 1960 Punjab 669), a case which has been considered by the Division Bench is Namboodiripads case. In addtion to these decisions, the only other decision we need consider is the decision of the Bombay High Court in Kisan Supdu Ingale v. Bhusawal Borough Municipality, Bhusawal (AIR. 1966 Bom 15 [LQ/BomHC/1965/1] .

4. The power of the State legislature to legislate regarding profession tax is contained in item 60 of List II of the Seventh Schedule: the item reads

"Taxes on professions, trades, callings and employments."

It is by virtue of this power conferred on the State legislature that S.113 (1) (a) of the Kerala Municipal Corporations Act has been enacted. And the question for us to consider is whether the persons sought to be taxed in these cases are exercising a profession, trade or calling or employment (in the language of the Constitution) exercising a profession, art or calling or transacting a business or holding any employment, public of private (in the language of S.113 (1) (a) of the Act).

5. From all the decisions considered by the two decisions of this Court and the decision of the Bombay High Court which has already been referred to, what we can gather by way of principles (looking at the question from the point of view of the Corporation looking at the question in the most advantageous manner for the Corporation) is that the terms "profession", "art", "calling", "business" and "appointment", have to be given the widest amplitude; that in interpreting the expression, "exercising a profession, art or calling or transacting business or holding an appointment, public or private", the principle followed in interpreting a constitutional enactment should be followed that the interpreation should not be strictly grammatical or that too much importance should not be attached to the natural or grammatical meaning; that the terms have to be interpreted according to "common sense principles"; and that the terms "profession", "trade", "calling", "employment" (for that matter, the terms "profession", "art", "calling", "business", "appointment", etc. as they appear in the Kerala Municipal Corporations Act) are not mutually exclusive (they are overlapping) and are used in this manner to give the widest amplitude to the taxing power-Bearing these principles in mind and giving the widest amplitude to the expression used in S.113 (1) (a) and giving the terms "profession", "art", "calling, business", "appointment", etc the common sense meaning, we find it difficult to hold that investing money in purchasing or constructing buildings with a view to derive rent there form and collecting rent therefrom can be said to be exercising a profession or calling or transacting a business or holding an appointment. It may be that the income derived as rent from the buildings is taxable income; but the investment of money on buildings with a view to derive rent therefrom and collecting rent therefrom cannot be said to be a profession, a calling, a business or an employment. And we therefore agree with the learned Single Judge.

6. The result is that all the seven writ appeals have to be dismissed "and they are dismissed. And the seven writ petitions have to be allowed and they are allowed. The respective notices in the seven writ petitions proposing to assess the petitioners to profession tax are all quashed. And we pass no order regarding costs.